80,000 Hours Podcast, Episode #218

Hugh White on Why Trump Is Abandoning US Hegemony – and That’s Probably Good
Recorded: June 12, 2025
Host: Rob Wiblin
Guest: Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at Australian National University

Overview

In this episode, Rob Wiblin talks with renowned strategic thinker Hugh White about the end of US global hegemony, the roots and realities of multipolarity, and why America’s new trajectory—exemplified and accelerated by Donald Trump’s foreign policy—is not as catastrophic as many fear. White draws on his decades of scholarship and policy experience, including his recent essay "Hard New World: Our Post-American Future," to examine what drives the US’s retreat from leadership, why America's global order was always an aberration, and how allies, rivals, and middle powers need to adapt to a new age of great powers with competing spheres of influence.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Decline of the Unipolar Moment

(02:06, 03:38, 20:33, 22:25)

The post-Cold War US-led unipolar order was historically rare—a “new Rome” period that benefited the world, but was always going to be short-lived.
America's costs and risks to sustain global leadership have risen as China and Russia gain power—the arithmetic no longer adds up.
Leaders and publics in the US are increasingly unwilling to bear these burdens, especially as the ostensible benefits fade.

"A US-led unipolar order is probably the best of all possible worlds. ... I wish it had lasted forever. It's just not the way it's worked out."
— Hugh White (03:38)

Wiblin: The “fish in water” metaphor for his generation not noticing the peculiarity of the post-Cold War status quo.
White: Unipolarity ended not because of bad American choices alone, but due to deep shifts in power and weaker driving imperatives for US engagement.

2. Why the US Got Involved Overseas—And Why It’s Pulling Back

(06:23, 07:12, 13:51, 16:54)

US isolationism made sense due to defensible geography and the European balance of powers; US engagement began only when Eurasian hegemony by one power seemed possible.
Deep drivers of US intervention: self-preservation and homeland security, not primarily altruism or abstract values.

"Going to war with another major power is a perfect example ... because the costs and risks are so high ... the more likely it is that what's driving you is a sense of your own security."
— Hugh White (13:51)

Post-Cold War interventions appeared cheap as no rivals sought to seriously contest US primacy; global leadership seemed a “walk in the park.”
Now, challenges from China and Russia, plus the renewed salience of nuclear risks, have fundamentally altered the calculus.

3. Multipolarity: What It Is, Why It’s Happening, and Why It’s Not “the End”

(23:12, 31:57, 35:26, 52:14, 73:31, 74:23)

Russia in Europe and China in Asia are asserting spheres of influence—challenging US global leadership.
The US no longer credibly offers to “go to the wall” for allies when nuclear blackmail is plausible and its core interests aren’t at stake (see Biden’s explicit statements on Ukraine).
Multipolarity is not inherently disastrous compared to the alternative: “perpetuating a world in which strategic rivalry between nuclear-armed great powers keeps escalating.”

"The alternative ... is perpetuating a world in which strategic rivalry between nuclear-armed great powers keeps escalating. And that is worse than multipolarity."
— Hugh White (00:00, 73:46)

White argues for managing the transition to multipolarity, drawing parallels to the stable balance after the Napoleonic Wars (Concert of Europe), and cautions against aiming for a return to lost unipolarity.

4. Trump’s Foreign Policy Reflects and Accelerates a Deeper Shift

(35:42, 41:46, 44:46)

Trump’s “America First” orientation is less the sole cause of US retreat and more a vehicle for inevitable trends—the end of US-led order is driven by deeper forces.
Trump’s personal distaste for “dependence” and alliances, plus his affinity for strongmen, aligns with a public increasingly skeptical of the burdens of global leadership.

"Trump is much more willing than any previous American leader, on the one hand, accept other great powers as co equals with the United States. I think he has very little trouble with that. Indeed. And on the other hand, to reject the idea that America should take responsibility for defending a whole lot of what he would see as mendicant allies who can't be bothered defending themselves."
— Hugh White (36:23)

Marco Rubio, now Secretary of State, has been explicit about accepting America as “one pole in a multipolar global order.”
For allies: there is no going back, no matter who follows Trump, as these deep-seated trends now cut across parties and cohorts.

5. The Case for and Challenges of Self-Reliance Among Former US Allies

(44:46, 47:27, 88:31, 95:58, 104:58, 107:46)

US allies will retain valuable relationships with the US even without security guarantees—time to build “post-alliance” ties.
Countries like Japan, Australia, and especially Europe (with its scale and historical capacity for significant cooperation) need to pivot to greater defence self-reliance.
Europe’s nuclear dilemma: Will it cohere as a single, credible nuclear entity, or will multiple countries (e.g., Poland, Germany) seek their own deterrent?
Allies must also accelerate domestic military manufacturing and wean themselves off US-dependent platforms (see F-35 maintenance dependence; 104:58).

6. Counterarguments, Pushback, and Realpolitik

(54:07, 61:24, 64:09, 69:27)

Skeptics note China’s slowing economic growth and demographic decline—White counters that China’s current position is strong and “even if it flatlines,” it is still far more powerful than past US rivals.
On the “big alliance” theory (collective action by US, Japan, NATO, Australia, India): White is dismissive, especially of India’s willingness, and doubts joint resolve to risk nuclear war for secondary interests.

"If you're Japan ... is it harder than lining yourself up to go to fight with the United States, a war against China which, even with Japan's help, the United States can't win? ... The United States will never occupy Beijing."
— Hugh White (69:27)

7. Regional Adaptation Strategies (Europe, Asia, Middle Powers)

(89:25, 91:44, 94:22, 109:44, 132:25)

In Asia: Japan can defend itself, but only with more military spending and likely nuclear weapons. Some middle powers (like Thailand) have long experience “playing both sides.”
Taiwan’s future is grim—no plausible level of military spending will fundamentally alter the island’s defensibility. The US should be honest about this.
Europe can and likely will become a true great power, but only if it solves its nuclear credibility problem and integrates further.
Australia needs (uncomfortably) to pivot to genuine independent defence and balanced diplomacy vis-à-vis China, India, and neighbors.

"We need to rethink our diplomatic positioning ... position ourselves as equidistantly as possible between India and China ... and work much more closely with our Southeast Asian neighbors, who are going to be a real strategic asset to us."
— Hugh White (128:05)

8. The Impact of AI/AGI on Geopolitics

(133:03, 135:06, 139:22)

Many in the US see a revolutionary advantage if it can reach AGI before China and use that to “dictate terms.”
White is skeptical—unless AGI-enabled capabilities could neutralize China’s nuclear arsenal, no strategic advantage is decisive (and such a scenario is terribly risky and destabilizing).
AI will change the nature of competition, but not the core realities and asymmetries of resolve, interest, and nuclear deterrence.

"Boring old nuclear weapons can kill 50 million Americans in an afternoon ... unless [AGI] can neutralize Chinese nuclear weapons, it's not going to put America in the capacity to dictate to China."
— Hugh White (135:45)

9. Realism as a Framework—Its Value and Limits

(149:56, 150:17)

White describes himself as a pragmatic, lowercase-r realist: focusing on the real costs and risks over wishful idealism.
Ideals and cooperation matter (“I'm not a capital R realist”), but the hardest security choices are driven by existential national interests and grim cost-benefit logic.
The lesson: "Politics is the art of the possible ... of the next best." Multipolarity, with all its flaws, is "the next best" world order.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments (with Timestamps)

On the End of Unipolarity:

"America emerges a country with no equals, as the sole pole, hence unipolar ... That's why, for example, Francis Fukuyama called it 'the end of history.' ... I wish it had lasted forever. It’s just not the way it's worked out."
— Hugh White (03:38)
On Nuclear Blackmail:

"Russia can always threaten ... to use tactical or even strategic nuclear weapons, something that terrifies correctly, people in the United States and in Europe. And the US cannot respond ... because it's not credible."
— Robert Wiblin (31:57)
On Deep Trends, Not Just Trump:

"Trump is still very important because Trump's own America first isolationism ... fits the strategic imperatives that America faces at the moment."
— Hugh White (35:42)
On Multipolarity vs. Nuclear Rivalry:

"The alternative is not returning to the old uncontested, unipolar order ... It's perpetuating a world in which strategic rivalry between nuclear, armed great powers keeps escalating. And that is worse than multipolarity."
— Hugh White (00:00, 73:46)
On the AI/AGI “Edge”:

"Boring old nuclear weapons can kill 50 million Americans in an afternoon ... unless AGI can neutralize Chinese nuclear weapons, it's not going to put America in the capacity to dictate to China."
— Hugh White (135:45)

Important Segment Timestamps

[00:00 - 03:38] — The decline of unipolar US power
[06:23 - 07:12] — Why US isolationism became impossible
[13:51 - 16:54] — Motivations for engagement: values vs. core security
[23:12 - 35:42] — The success of China and Russia’s challenges, and the role of nuclear blackmail
[41:46 - 44:46] — Rubio's multipolarity, post-alliance relationships
[52:14 - 54:56] — Limits of "peak China" arguments
[69:27 - 73:31] — Collective allied resistance unlikely; make multipolarity work
[95:58 - 104:58] — Europe's nuclear and defense dilemmas in the post-NATO world
[109:44 - 115:09] — Taiwan’s predicament and US honestly about defense
[133:03 - 139:15] — AI/AGI's impact and strategic realities
[149:56 - 155:45] — Realism as a guiding framework

Conclusion: What Should the US and Its Allies Do?

For US voters: America does not need to hang on to global leadership to remain prosperous or safe.
For US policymakers: Accept and help shape an effective multipolar order rather than futilely resist it.
For allies and middle powers: Prepare for independent security, accelerate self-reliance, and cultivate post-alliance relations with the US.
For foreign policy professionals: Let go of nostalgia for the unipolar moment and refocus on realistic priorities.

Final Thought:

"It would be lovely to have a unipolar order led by a benevolent United States ... but the next best is a multipolar order and we need to focus on building that and making it work."
— Hugh White (155:14)

This episode covers the arc of the US-led international system, the inevitabilities and choices in global order, the hard arithmetic of risk, and the new logic of power in the 21st century. Instead of clinging to unipolar dreams, White urges leaders and publics alike to engage in the serious, unglamorous work of making a complex multipolar world as stable as possible.

80,000 Hours Podcast, Episode #218

Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Decline of the Unipolar Moment

(02:06, 03:38, 20:33, 22:25)

The post-Cold War US-led unipolar order was historically rare—a “new Rome” period that benefited the world, but was always going to be short-lived.
America's costs and risks to sustain global leadership have risen as China and Russia gain power—the arithmetic no longer adds up.
Leaders and publics in the US are increasingly unwilling to bear these burdens, especially as the ostensible benefits fade.

"A US-led unipolar order is probably the best of all possible worlds. ... I wish it had lasted forever. It's just not the way it's worked out."
— Hugh White (03:38)

Wiblin: The “fish in water” metaphor for his generation not noticing the peculiarity of the post-Cold War status quo.
White: Unipolarity ended not because of bad American choices alone, but due to deep shifts in power and weaker driving imperatives for US engagement.

2. Why the US Got Involved Overseas—And Why It’s Pulling Back

(06:23, 07:12, 13:51, 16:54)

US isolationism made sense due to defensible geography and the European balance of powers; US engagement began only when Eurasian hegemony by one power seemed possible.
Deep drivers of US intervention: self-preservation and homeland security, not primarily altruism or abstract values.

"Going to war with another major power is a perfect example ... because the costs and risks are so high ... the more likely it is that what's driving you is a sense of your own security."
— Hugh White (13:51)

Post-Cold War interventions appeared cheap as no rivals sought to seriously contest US primacy; global leadership seemed a “walk in the park.”
Now, challenges from China and Russia, plus the renewed salience of nuclear risks, have fundamentally altered the calculus.

3. Multipolarity: What It Is, Why It’s Happening, and Why It’s Not “the End”

(23:12, 31:57, 35:26, 52:14, 73:31, 74:23)

Russia in Europe and China in Asia are asserting spheres of influence—challenging US global leadership.
The US no longer credibly offers to “go to the wall” for allies when nuclear blackmail is plausible and its core interests aren’t at stake (see Biden’s explicit statements on Ukraine).
Multipolarity is not inherently disastrous compared to the alternative: “perpetuating a world in which strategic rivalry between nuclear-armed great powers keeps escalating.”

"The alternative ... is perpetuating a world in which strategic rivalry between nuclear-armed great powers keeps escalating. And that is worse than multipolarity."
— Hugh White (00:00, 73:46)

White argues for managing the transition to multipolarity, drawing parallels to the stable balance after the Napoleonic Wars (Concert of Europe), and cautions against aiming for a return to lost unipolarity.

4. Trump’s Foreign Policy Reflects and Accelerates a Deeper Shift

(35:42, 41:46, 44:46)

Trump’s “America First” orientation is less the sole cause of US retreat and more a vehicle for inevitable trends—the end of US-led order is driven by deeper forces.
Trump’s personal distaste for “dependence” and alliances, plus his affinity for strongmen, aligns with a public increasingly skeptical of the burdens of global leadership.

"Trump is much more willing than any previous American leader, on the one hand, accept other great powers as co equals with the United States. I think he has very little trouble with that. Indeed. And on the other hand, to reject the idea that America should take responsibility for defending a whole lot of what he would see as mendicant allies who can't be bothered defending themselves."
— Hugh White (36:23)

Marco Rubio, now Secretary of State, has been explicit about accepting America as “one pole in a multipolar global order.”
For allies: there is no going back, no matter who follows Trump, as these deep-seated trends now cut across parties and cohorts.

5. The Case for and Challenges of Self-Reliance Among Former US Allies

(44:46, 47:27, 88:31, 95:58, 104:58, 107:46)

US allies will retain valuable relationships with the US even without security guarantees—time to build “post-alliance” ties.
Countries like Japan, Australia, and especially Europe (with its scale and historical capacity for significant cooperation) need to pivot to greater defence self-reliance.
Europe’s nuclear dilemma: Will it cohere as a single, credible nuclear entity, or will multiple countries (e.g., Poland, Germany) seek their own deterrent?
Allies must also accelerate domestic military manufacturing and wean themselves off US-dependent platforms (see F-35 maintenance dependence; 104:58).

6. Counterarguments, Pushback, and Realpolitik

(54:07, 61:24, 64:09, 69:27)

Skeptics note China’s slowing economic growth and demographic decline—White counters that China’s current position is strong and “even if it flatlines,” it is still far more powerful than past US rivals.
On the “big alliance” theory (collective action by US, Japan, NATO, Australia, India): White is dismissive, especially of India’s willingness, and doubts joint resolve to risk nuclear war for secondary interests.

"If you're Japan ... is it harder than lining yourself up to go to fight with the United States, a war against China which, even with Japan's help, the United States can't win? ... The United States will never occupy Beijing."
— Hugh White (69:27)

7. Regional Adaptation Strategies (Europe, Asia, Middle Powers)

(89:25, 91:44, 94:22, 109:44, 132:25)

In Asia: Japan can defend itself, but only with more military spending and likely nuclear weapons. Some middle powers (like Thailand) have long experience “playing both sides.”
Taiwan’s future is grim—no plausible level of military spending will fundamentally alter the island’s defensibility. The US should be honest about this.
Europe can and likely will become a true great power, but only if it solves its nuclear credibility problem and integrates further.
Australia needs (uncomfortably) to pivot to genuine independent defence and balanced diplomacy vis-à-vis China, India, and neighbors.

"We need to rethink our diplomatic positioning ... position ourselves as equidistantly as possible between India and China ... and work much more closely with our Southeast Asian neighbors, who are going to be a real strategic asset to us."
— Hugh White (128:05)

8. The Impact of AI/AGI on Geopolitics

(133:03, 135:06, 139:22)

Many in the US see a revolutionary advantage if it can reach AGI before China and use that to “dictate terms.”
White is skeptical—unless AGI-enabled capabilities could neutralize China’s nuclear arsenal, no strategic advantage is decisive (and such a scenario is terribly risky and destabilizing).
AI will change the nature of competition, but not the core realities and asymmetries of resolve, interest, and nuclear deterrence.

"Boring old nuclear weapons can kill 50 million Americans in an afternoon ... unless [AGI] can neutralize Chinese nuclear weapons, it's not going to put America in the capacity to dictate to China."
— Hugh White (135:45)

9. Realism as a Framework—Its Value and Limits

(149:56, 150:17)

White describes himself as a pragmatic, lowercase-r realist: focusing on the real costs and risks over wishful idealism.
Ideals and cooperation matter (“I'm not a capital R realist”), but the hardest security choices are driven by existential national interests and grim cost-benefit logic.
The lesson: "Politics is the art of the possible ... of the next best." Multipolarity, with all its flaws, is "the next best" world order.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments (with Timestamps)

On the End of Unipolarity:

"America emerges a country with no equals, as the sole pole, hence unipolar ... That's why, for example, Francis Fukuyama called it 'the end of history.' ... I wish it had lasted forever. It’s just not the way it's worked out."
— Hugh White (03:38)
On Nuclear Blackmail:

"Russia can always threaten ... to use tactical or even strategic nuclear weapons, something that terrifies correctly, people in the United States and in Europe. And the US cannot respond ... because it's not credible."
— Robert Wiblin (31:57)
On Deep Trends, Not Just Trump:

"Trump is still very important because Trump's own America first isolationism ... fits the strategic imperatives that America faces at the moment."
— Hugh White (35:42)
On Multipolarity vs. Nuclear Rivalry:

"The alternative is not returning to the old uncontested, unipolar order ... It's perpetuating a world in which strategic rivalry between nuclear, armed great powers keeps escalating. And that is worse than multipolarity."
— Hugh White (00:00, 73:46)
On the AI/AGI “Edge”:

"Boring old nuclear weapons can kill 50 million Americans in an afternoon ... unless AGI can neutralize Chinese nuclear weapons, it's not going to put America in the capacity to dictate to China."
— Hugh White (135:45)

Important Segment Timestamps

[00:00 - 03:38] — The decline of unipolar US power
[06:23 - 07:12] — Why US isolationism became impossible
[13:51 - 16:54] — Motivations for engagement: values vs. core security
[23:12 - 35:42] — The success of China and Russia’s challenges, and the role of nuclear blackmail
[41:46 - 44:46] — Rubio's multipolarity, post-alliance relationships
[52:14 - 54:56] — Limits of "peak China" arguments
[69:27 - 73:31] — Collective allied resistance unlikely; make multipolarity work
[95:58 - 104:58] — Europe's nuclear and defense dilemmas in the post-NATO world
[109:44 - 115:09] — Taiwan’s predicament and US honestly about defense
[133:03 - 139:15] — AI/AGI's impact and strategic realities
[149:56 - 155:45] — Realism as a guiding framework

Conclusion: What Should the US and Its Allies Do?

For US voters: America does not need to hang on to global leadership to remain prosperous or safe.
For US policymakers: Accept and help shape an effective multipolar order rather than futilely resist it.
For allies and middle powers: Prepare for independent security, accelerate self-reliance, and cultivate post-alliance relations with the US.
For foreign policy professionals: Let go of nostalgia for the unipolar moment and refocus on realistic priorities.

Final Thought:

"It would be lovely to have a unipolar order led by a benevolent United States ... but the next best is a multipolar order and we need to focus on building that and making it work."
— Hugh White (155:14)

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#218 – Hugh White on why Trump is abandoning US hegemony – and that’s probably good

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Summary

80,000 Hours Podcast, Episode #218

Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Decline of the Unipolar Moment

2. Why the US Got Involved Overseas—And Why It’s Pulling Back

3. Multipolarity: What It Is, Why It’s Happening, and Why It’s Not “the End”

4. Trump’s Foreign Policy Reflects and Accelerates a Deeper Shift

5. The Case for and Challenges of Self-Reliance Among Former US Allies

6. Counterarguments, Pushback, and Realpolitik

7. Regional Adaptation Strategies (Europe, Asia, Middle Powers)

8. The Impact of AI/AGI on Geopolitics

9. Realism as a Framework—Its Value and Limits

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments (with Timestamps)

Important Segment Timestamps

Conclusion: What Should the US and Its Allies Do?

Summary

80,000 Hours Podcast, Episode #218

Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Decline of the Unipolar Moment

2. Why the US Got Involved Overseas—And Why It’s Pulling Back

3. Multipolarity: What It Is, Why It’s Happening, and Why It’s Not “the End”

4. Trump’s Foreign Policy Reflects and Accelerates a Deeper Shift

5. The Case for and Challenges of Self-Reliance Among Former US Allies

6. Counterarguments, Pushback, and Realpolitik

7. Regional Adaptation Strategies (Europe, Asia, Middle Powers)

8. The Impact of AI/AGI on Geopolitics

9. Realism as a Framework—Its Value and Limits

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments (with Timestamps)

Important Segment Timestamps

Conclusion: What Should the US and Its Allies Do?