Mellon vs. Churchill: The Untold Story of Treasury Titans at War

Summary

A Book with Legs Podcast: "Mellon vs. Churchill: The Untold Story of Treasury Titans at War"

Host: Cole Smead, CEO and Portfolio Manager at Smead Capital Management
Guest: Jill Eicher, Author of Mellon vs. Churchill: The Untold Story of Treasury Titans at War
Release Date: June 16, 2025

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Introduction

In this compelling episode of A Book with Legs, host Cole Smead engages in an enlightening discussion with Jill Eicher about her debut book, Mellon vs. Churchill: The Untold Story of Treasury Titans at War. The conversation delves deep into the intricate battle between Andrew Mellon, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, focusing on their conflicting approaches to managing post-World War I war debts.

Origins of the Story

[00:02 - 02:23]
Cole introduces Jill Eicher, highlighting her extensive background, including her tenure at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Bipartisan Policy Center, and her academic stints at Stanford University and the International Churchill Society. Jill shares how the story of Mellon and Churchill "found her" while researching successful public-private partnerships at Stanford. She discovered unexpected connections between these two influential figures and became fascinated by their subsequent clash over international debt restructuring.

Jill Eicher: "Actually, the story found me. I wasn't looking for it at all."

Andrew Mellon: From Business Tycoon to Treasury Secretary

[05:48 - 09:54]
Jill provides a detailed account of Andrew Mellon's appointment as the Treasury Secretary under President Warren G. Harding. Despite not being the first choice, Mellon's vast experience as a venture capitalist and his pragmatic approach to credit management made him a suitable candidate during the tumultuous post-war economy marked by rampant unemployment and inflation.

Jill Eicher: "He was perhaps one of the most talented credit managers of his era."

The Economic Turmoil of Post-War Europe

[09:54 - 11:03]
Delving into the economic devastation in Germany post-WWI, Jill explains how the country's inability to repay reparations led to a broader financial crisis affecting not just Europe but also the United States.

Jill Eicher: "Germany was as devastated as the rest of Europe. And economically, they really had destroyed their currency."

The Clash of Titans: Mellon vs. Churchill

[11:03 - 14:59]
Mellon's approach favored restructuring debts to rehabilitate debtor nations' credit, whereas Churchill and Lloyd George of the UK advocated for the cancellation of debts, believing it was untenable for allies to meet repayment obligations. This fundamental disagreement set the stage for their prolonged conflict.

Leffingwell (quoted at [23:31]): "The international war debts do not represent wealth created but wealth destroyed."

Public Perception and Political Maneuvering

[17:10 - 22:01]
The discussion touches on Churchill's charismatic yet tumultuous political life, balancing his responsibilities amidst personal tragedies and public unrest in Britain. Meanwhile, Mellon grapples with restricted powers imposed by a debt commission, limiting his ability to negotiate independently.

Jill Eicher: "They really did tie the hands of Mellon and the commission."

The Mellon-Baldwin Agreement and the Dawes Plan

[35:05 - 50:38]
Jill elucidates the formation of the Mellon-Baldwin agreement, a pivotal debt restructuring deal intended to stabilize Britain's finances and, by extension, European economies. This agreement served as a precursor to the Dawes Plan, which aimed to facilitate Germany's economic recovery and enable the repayment of debts to the U.S.

Jill Eicher: "The Dawes Plan was meant to find some way to structure a way for Germany to start to recover as well as the Allies."

Personal Lives and Influences: Ailsa Mellon

[18:03 - 20:43]
Mellon's daughter, Ailsa, emerges as a significant yet understated character in the narrative. Her role as a hostess and philanthropist provided Mellon with crucial social leverage, aiding his diplomatic endeavors and illustrating the intertwined personal and professional lives of these titanic figures.

Jill Eicher: "She is one of the most accomplished philanthropists of the United States who is, I believe, she's not been properly recognized for all that she did."

Churchill's Vision and Influence on American Policy

[38:46 - 42:43]
Churchill's extensive tours in the United States showcased his deep admiration for American culture and his strategic efforts to influence American public opinion. His oratory skills and genuine fascination with the U.S. positioned him as a pivotal figure striving to align British and American interests.

Jill Eicher: "He really was able to do that. And on top of that, he had just lost his daughter and his mother and his brother-in-law."

Fiscal Responsibility and Modern Parallels

[58:47 - 62:50]
Cole draws parallels between Mellon's and Churchill's philosophies and today's fiscal challenges, emphasizing the importance of disciplined investing and responsible debt management. The discussion underscores the enduring relevance of Mellon’s and Churchill’s approaches in navigating contemporary economic issues.

Cole Smead: "Mellon has defined what I believe is the new American century in the centrality of work and its value."

Conclusion and Future Endeavors

[65:46 - 69:11]
As the conversation wraps up, Jill expresses interest in further exploring related historical narratives, particularly concerning the National Gallery of Art. Cole encourages listeners to engage with Jill's work and reflects on the lasting impact of Mellon and Churchill's legacy on modern financial and political landscapes.

Jill Eicher: "This is part of American history. And it has to do with the National Gallery of Art."

Notable Quotes

• Andrew Mellon on Work and Service:

  "The purpose of life is to be occupied and serve in the most useful capacity provided it is an honest endeavor. The question is to find where one can give the most service. My main pleasure in work is being able to accomplish results."
  [66:38] Cole Smead

• Leffingwell on War Debts:

  "The international war debts do not represent wealth created but wealth destroyed."
  [23:31]

Key Takeaways

1. Public vs. Private Sector Roles: The episode highlights the delicate balance between government responsibilities and private sector expertise in managing national and international financial crises.

2. Historical Debt Management: Understanding the Mellon-Churchill conflict provides valuable insights into contemporary debt restructuring and international financial negotiations.

3. Leadership and Pragmatism: Both Mellon and Churchill exemplify how leadership grounded in pragmatism and strategic vision can influence global economic policies.

4. Interdependence of Economies: The discussions underscore the interconnectedness of global economies and the importance of collaborative approaches to economic recovery and stability.

Final Thoughts

Mellon vs. Churchill: The Untold Story of Treasury Titans at War offers a nuanced exploration of two of the 20th century’s most influential figures. Through Jill Eicher's meticulous research, listeners gain a deeper appreciation for the complexities of post-war economic policies and the enduring impact of leadership decisions on global finance. This episode serves as a testament to the power of historical analysis in informing present-day investment and economic strategies.

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Transcript

[Cole Smead]

You're listening to A Book with Legs, a podcast presented by Smead Capital Management. At Smead Capital Management, we advise investors who play the long game. You can learn [e-mail] or by calling your financial advisor. Welcome to A Book with Legs podcast. I'm Cole Smead, CEO and Portfolio Manager here at Smead Capital Management. At our firm, we are readers and we believe in the power of books to help shape informed investors. In this podcast, we speak to great authors about their writings the late, great Charlie Munger prescribed. Using multiple mental models and analysis. We analyze their work through the lens of business markets and people. We're going to have quite a bit of fun today. In this episode, we are going to learn how to settle matters that you don't create, you can't control, and you need to abide by the powers that be around you in an international conflict. Jill Eicher is joining us to discuss her newly released book, Mellon vs. The Untold Story of the Treasury Titans at War to introduce our listeners and our viewers to Jill. Jill previously served in the U.S. department of the Treasury. She also worked at the Bipartisan Policy Center. If I remember correctly, Jill, out of my notes, it was the research lab that you worked with there. She has been a visiting scholar at Stanford University and also at the International Churchill Society. She also worked in the investment management business like I do or our firm does, Hellman Jordan Management, a Boston based investment management firm. She is a graduate of Wellesley College and did postgraduate work at Strasbourg University. She also. I don't know if I've had this before, but she holds a patent to her name as well. I found that little tidbit out there, Jill. So thank you for joining me. Really glad to have you today.

[Jill Eicher]

Thank you, Cole. Deeply complimented to be on your podcast.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, go on.

[Jill Eicher]

How many people have ever done that kind of research and found the patent?

[Cole Smead]

Well, you just stick around. It's not AI it's just what the human brain can do with a little search. So this is your first book. We were kind of talking offline about people that had pushed you or given you encouragement on this. Why this story for your first writing, it's always like for an author's first book. It's like this is a lot of energy. It's like taking off on a spaceship. This takes a lot of work, I assume. But why was this story so important to you for that?

[Jill Eicher]

Actually, the story found me. I wasn't looking for it at all. As a matter of fact, I was. I was looking for successful public private Partnership models out at the School of Engineering at Stanford. And I discovered that Winston Churchill had created a wonderful public private partnership, which was the Anglo Persia Oil Company. On behalf of Great Britain. Churchill formed this partnership to give Britain a secure source of oil. This was, of course, as the Royal Navy was transferring from coal fuel to oil. And of course, that public private partnership eventually became British Petroleum. I also found that Andrew Mellon had created a very successful public private partnership here in Washington, D.C. of course, the National Gallery of Art. I found it very interesting that two men not known in the world of infrastructure finance had created these wonderful, lasting public private partnerships. And then I came upon an article, a very short article in the New York Times saying that Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had hosted Andrew Mellon, the US Secretary of the treasury, for dinner at the Ritz. I, of course, thought, oh, my gosh, maybe they're friends. And I thought they have this wonderful kind of shared interest. Mellon, of course, had big oil interests in Gulf Oil. Then I found out, of course, that Gulf Oil had done a deal with the Anglo Persia Company. Both men liked art. I thought, oh, my gosh, I bet you they're friends. I could not have been more wrong. And that's when I came upon, having done some more research, this epic battle of wills between the two of them. And my husband, who's an investigative journalist, grilled me for several nights about this. He said, you know, everything's known about Churchill. This can't possibly be. And after about three nights, he decided, well, you know, you better dig deeper. And I reached out to the International Churchill Society, and they said, no, Jill, they never met. And I said, actually, I think they did. And the International Churchill Society was wonderful. Lee Pollack was the director at the time. And they offered me a grant. And that's how I started. And then as I met people along the way, they just offered encouragement, and the story just became. Took on a life of its own, just as you said, it was a spaceship rocket over several years.

[Cole Smead]

Lynn, the other thing about that story. Cause obviously that comes later in your book. There's a restaurant that's no longer at the Ritz there in London, and it's now, I think it went out. I'm sure someone's placed that. But I remember it was like the restaurant to kind of go to for the West End. And I had kind of like a Churchill melon moment where I'm sitting there with a partner of ours. It's our outsourced trading group who's based there in London. And we look and Damian Lewis of billions fame walks in the room with Anna Wintour like the Vogue magazine editor. And I'm like, well that's crazy. And another person goes, oh, and that's like Nancy Pelosi. That lady looks like Nancy Pelosi. I was like, there's not a chance in God's name that's Nancy Pelosi up there. We laughed it all off. Well, no, she was in London for the, you know, talking with, you know, the PM at the time about the Friday Accords and how they need to keep with, you know, what was going on with Brexit and whatnot. And it just cracked me up because as I'm reading your story, I'm like, I can just imagine this kind of grand dinner at the Ritz. And I've seen a small piece of that before. So let's jump in, teach our listeners how Mellon became the Treasury Secretary under Harding. He wasn't necessarily the first choice is what I took away from your book, but he was considered to be kind of like a good choice for the role.

[Jill Eicher]

Well, Harding had said that he wanted to bring the best minds into his cabinet. He had said that publicly for quite a number of weeks. And Philander Knox, who was a senator from Pennsylvania, I think he was really the, the idea of Mellon becoming Treasury Secretary, I think it started with Philander Knox and he went to talk to Mellon. Mellon of course at this time is 65 retirement age. He's made millions in dollars in multiple industries. You know, he really was one of our original venture capitalists. And he and Knox had this heart to heart talk at Mellon's house and Knox walked away realizing if Harding asked Mellon, Mellon would say yes. Then the economy, the post war economy had really destroyed many industries. Unemployment was rampant. The men coming back from the war, there were no jobs, there was rampant inflation. The national debt had quadrupled. Mellon knew that these were going to be very challenging economic times. And I think the idea of that he might be able to do something to the good as he said was what made him think, maybe I can lend a hand.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, because it reminds me of just a very conservative banker, obviously has all these business interests. I think you mentioned in the book he resigned from over 60 corporations, many of those bank corporations that he was involved in. So I also kind of thought about his life as like he had a connection to really that was a Gilded age thing, like the kind of the trust busting of the Teddy Roosevelt era where a director and the cross holdings. He was on a lot of businesses. I was going to ask you, did you get the. If you become the Treasury Secretary today, what I do know is if you have business interests, you could sell those tax free. You don't pay capital gains because you're doing something good for the country. Is that what he would have if he divested those interests at that point, or do you have any information on that? Because I was kind of wondering that.

[Jill Eicher]

I don't know. I'm sorry, I can't help you there.

[Cole Smead]

Because I've seen that nowadays I know that they get a special provision for that. So It's March of 1921. The Germans, they stopped making reparation payments to the Allies. Explain to our audience why they were doing this. Where was Germany at? Because they're really kind of the bottom of this scheme in much of the story.

[Jill Eicher]

Well, Germany was as devastated as the rest of Europe. And economically, they really had destroyed their currency. They had no credit anywhere in the world, and they were desperate. They could not pay reparations. There was no possibility of that. There was no possibility of the Allies repaying the United States either. Which is why the Wilson administration had to extend a moratorium on repayment of the loans to the Allies to. Because it was just the economic conditions in Europe were so dire. People were starving. There was no possibility for any of the governments to make payments.

[Cole Smead]

Sure. But that's not where obviously Mellon started out. I mean, he came in and Harding's view was these are debts. And very much Congress's view, too was these are debts. You know, how do you look at their view at the beginning of this discussion?

[Jill Eicher]

I think Mellon played a very large role in shaping that view. He was perhaps one of the most talented credit managers of his era. He was pragmatic in the sense that he believed that both creditor and debtor could only do what they could do and they had to meet in the middle. That was his area of expertise. Did believe in forgiving loans in certain circumstances. He believed primarily, though, in restructuring loans because he thought that the debtor would want its credit to be rehabilitated as much as the creditor wanted to be repaid. And so that was always his point of departure, is how to restructure a debt so that the debtor can repay and the creditor can be as patient and as forgiving as possible. But that is generally the course. I think he played a very large role in the early Harding cabinet to say that restructuring the debt, keeping the debt as a live asset, would be not only good for the United States, but good for the credit of the allies.

[Cole Smead]

Sure. Because I think you point out in the book early on, even in 1920, David Lloyd George, the British PM at the time, he asked the Wilson administration to cancel the debt. So that becomes also a kind of overarching theme. Is Britain more than other allies are saying there's no point to this, let's just cancel it. And I think maybe the best echoing of this comes from Keynes later in the book. I think I have a quote for Keynes if we bring it up later. But again they're really the ones crying out the whole time being, I'll call it more honest because you have Germany who's like we just can't pay anything. And then you have the other allies like oh yeah, we're going to come, yeah, we're going to somehow make this work. And UK for a long time during really the arc of your book is saying there's no point to this, don't we just need to cancel these debts?

[Jill Eicher]

Right. And that voice was, the real voice I think carrying that sentiment was Churchill and Lloyd George. Both of them, they knew that the, all of Britain and all of France always assumed that the United States would cancel the debt.

[Cole Smead]

Sure.

[Jill Eicher]

And it was, they were shocked when not only the Wilson administration but then the Harding administration both said no, wait a second, these were loans. You signed the loan documents you promised to repay with interest. And the, the idea that the United States was intent on collecting was unimaginable to the Allies for a very long period of time.

[Cole Smead]

You begin the Churchill discussion, your book not with him riding in on a horse and kind of gallivanting to the rescue. He's out on a camel in the Middle east with all people T.E. lawrence, who most people would know as Lawrence of Arabia. So how does Churchill, I mean you give a little bit of the history of the UK or I should say Britain effectively took over African and Middle east assets from Germany post World War I. That's part of what they started getting. How do you look at his entrance with kind of almost like a Hollywood esque touch to it on a camel falling off and letting everyone go away. And he's still riding the camel because he's so tough in a Hemingway fashion.

[Jill Eicher]

I just at that moment when I found that part of the story, I just thought this is too good to be true. And to think of him being. First of all, he is away from Great Britain when the job he most wants becomes available. He's been dreaming of being Chancellor of the Exchequer all of his life and he is over trying to find a way to make it economically feasible for Britain to oversee these new territories that it's been awarded. And he promised when he left that he promised the then Chancellor the Exchequer that he was going to find these great savings and to prove his mettle as a good money manager. And what happens while he's over there riding across the desert on camels with Lawrence of Arabia, of course, his dream job becomes available. And I thought, oh, my goodness, you just can't imagine this.

[Cole Smead]

Well, correct. And so it's not given to him, but he ends up in the Cabinet, even though he doesn't become the Exchequer, the Chancellor, the Exchequer. You know, they. Then they have a Cabinet meeting up at the Dunrobin Castle that you talk about in the book. And they're up in Scotland, which is interestingly obviously Churchill's backyard of his constituency. He is a Member of Parliament from Dundee. And so he's juggling this cabinet meeting, you know, with nobles up in the northern part of the country, in Scotland. At the same time, he's out really campaigning and pressing the flesh, as they say, with his people. You know, it's chaotic. But at the same time, Churchill's a very charismatic person and is able to juggle a multiplicity of things in a way that others won't. Is what I took away from your writing. Is that kind of a fair way of looking at this period of his life.

[Jill Eicher]

That's exactly true. You're completely correct, Cole. He really was able to do that. And on top of that, he had just lost his daughter and his mother and his brother in law. So there was a great deal of grief, family loss on his shoulders. At that moment, the policies of the Lloyd George government were very unpopular. There were demonstrations in the street, shop windows being broken, and Churchill had to go and try to save his seat as a Member of Parliament and defend the policies of the government, even though his constituency was suffering greatly because of those policies.

[Cole Smead]

Sure. The other character you introduce, and she kind of floats through the arc of this story is Andrew Mellon's daughter. And I don't want to butcher this, but is it Ailsa?

[Jill Eicher]

Ailsa, Ailsa.

[Cole Smead]

So she comes off as capable social good at getting things done. I mean, she. You know, I have three daughters myself, but this is kind of an incredible. He had his own marital problems, it sounded like in his past, you know, through his wife and infidelity. But this daughter, through that storm of his marriage seems to be. She loves her dad, she blesses her dad, she does things that are beneficial to her dad. It's a really kind of like, it's like a little breadcrumb that I took away. It's like, wow, what an incredible daughter. And really makes things easy for his future roles as those come about.

[Jill Eicher]

Oh, I'm so grateful to you, Cole, for thinking of Ailsa. She's, I know she played a minor role in this story and you're so wonderful to put the spotlight on her. She is one of the most accomplished philanthropists of the United States who is, I believe she's not been properly recognized for all that she did. And it began during this period as she became a young woman. She was 20, 30, 40 years younger than all the other women who she was not required. But it was tradition at that point that the cabinet and wives would open their homes and host teas and host dinners. And this is at a time when politicians socialized with one another on grand scale, got to know one another. And so Elsa played a very large role as a hostess, but of course that required hosting foreign dignitaries, all different people from all different walks of life. And so she had a front row seat to her father becoming involved in politics just as he was. And I, I believe they really, they helped one another. They are both very reserved, shy people. But this, this move to Washington for both Mellons, I believe they, they helped one another greatly and they had a great, I believe in the early years, they both had the times of their life.

[Cole Smead]

I agree. As I was imagining Elsa in this, it's like, wow, what a great opportunity to go out and live life, bless other people, et cetera. And I think it was a wonderful story inside of this book. Hi, I'm Cole Smead, CEO and Portfolio Manager here at Smead Capital Management and host of this podcast. If you enjoy this podcast podcast, I'd like to invite you to check out smeedcap.com at our firm. We are stock market investors. We advise investors who play the long game with a discipline that has proven success over long periods of time. Learn more about our [e-mail] Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including loss of principal. Please refer to the prospectus for important information about the investment company, including objectives, risks, charges and expenses. Read and consider it carefully before investing. Smead Funds distributed by smead funds distributors llc. Not affiliated. So in January 22nd, they handcuff mellon. Really is what they do. They box them in by saying, okay, the debt commission. So not Congress, but this debt commission has to agree to everything that you put together. It really is just kind of a voting group behind Mellon to control his powers, isn't it?

[Jill Eicher]

Congress was very adamant that they wanted the power that they had. Back during the war years, a lot of typically congressional power had been ceded to the executive branch and Congress wanted to reclaim that power, even though of course it was a Republican Congress. As even one of Mellon's Pennsylvania supporters, Senator Penrose, said, it doesn't matter who's in the White House, we are going to control foreign policy in the Senate. They believed Mellon's request to be able to negotiate the settlement of the debts with complete autonomy was too much power for the Treasury Secretary to have. And they not only formed this commission, but they also required the terms that they gave for Mellon and the commission to negotiate. Everyone knew that they couldn't possibly achieve those terms, but they also required congressional approval for all of the settlements. So they really did tie the hands of the Mellon and the commission.

[Cole Smead]

Leffingwill had a very present quote in the book. He said, quote, the international war debts do not represent wealth created but wealth destroyed. End quote. Which is just an incredible statement. Can you kind of just briefly explain what he meant by this? Because of what happened in the war.

[Jill Eicher]

Grant, I'm so grateful for you to bring up Leffingwell. He really was a very forward thinking man. Brilliant, absolutely brilliant. And of course he had structured the lending for the Wilson administration. He was really, he held the institutional knowledge of war debts and he continued to try to help. He was very discouraged and really was trying to persuade Congress to listen that the path that they were taking was unworkable, that what they had asked the commission to do was impossible. And he was trying to explain why there needed to be forbearance on the debts. And, and this whole notion that the debts normally loans. He was trying to explain the difference between commercial loans which are made to generate wealth to help a business grow to the next level, which was not the case at all with the money loaned to the Allies. It was loaned to them to fight German aggression, to prevent them literally to save their lives. And that all of that money is just blown up in armament. Literally blown up. And that's what he was. He was trying to make that case, trying to get Congress to listen that trying to force the Allies into repayment when they were so devastated was just an unproductive path to take.

[Cole Smead]

Well, yeah, and I was also thinking about, and you didn't talk about this in the book, but I was also trying to think about kind of the social structure because you have left me. Well, I'll call it like high end intellectuals, right? That people that understand big problems are arguing that they need to let the guard down, in fact, of the United States of America. Let your guard down. Let these just go away. When, if you go to Joe and Jane Six Pack on Main street, they're like, no, these are debts. They don't, like, discharge my home loan or my loan for goods that I purchased for my business. And on Main street, these were looked at as just straight debts, commercial or not. They were just debts that need to be repaid.

[Jill Eicher]

You're totally right. And that was the mistake that the US Government made by not helping the regular people understand the level of destruction in Europe and what the United States should consider doing. Churchill, of course, was trying. Churchill understood that public opinion really matters in politics. He believed, of course, with Churchill's gifts, he could change hearts and minds either on paper or through oratory. He had both those gifts. And that was a piece of education that Leffingwell realized had not been given to the American people for them to understand that difference between commercial loans and the loans to the Allies. And of course, he was writing in the Yale Law School journal and unfortunately, the. You're so right. That was a mistake on the part of policymakers in the United States.

[Cole Smead]

Well, it reminds me a lot of if you're, you know, let's say you're a politically minded person and your sole goal is to get reelected, that's all that matters to you, okay? Just to call a spade a spade, whether economic policy is good or bad, if you can get elected every two years or you can get elected every six years, it doesn't matter. You can live forever to a certain extent in politics like that. And so I was thinking a lot about, like, oh, you know, if we just tax everyone else right now, we'll just pay off all of our entrenched debt here in America. It's like, that sounds good in a sound bite to your constituents in the real world. It just doesn't work like that. Let me pivot a little bit, because Britain's trying to address this in a formal way through the Balfour Note. They're trying to come and say, hey, we want to give. You want to give our allies some honest criticism about their debt. But this is just a big scheme. You got Germany at the bottom, you got the Allies in the middle, and you got the United States at the top. And UK is in some way at the higher part of the scheme because France owes them money, but they also own the United States money. And so it's like Britain's turning to everyone else in the scheme and saying, hey, you need to be thoughtful about what you pay back, and we'll be fair about that. But what they're really saying to the United States is, you need to do the same. And everyone knows it's a backhanded statement. Is that. Is that how the Balfour Note should be looked at?

[Jill Eicher]

The Balfour Note was for the benefit of the United States policymakers.

[Cole Smead]

Correct?

[Jill Eicher]

You're absolutely right. The Allies were taking their cues from Britain, and Britain wanted to lead on it, particularly Churchill, who really did provide the conceptual framework for the Balfour Note. And the intention of the Balfour Note really was to put the United States in the position of seeing itself as a greedy creditor. And so the Balfour Note essentially said, we, Britain, will forgive all the debts of our allies if the United States will do the same. There were only two creditor nation, two creditors for loans, war loans, and one was Britain, who funded most of the Allies needs in the early years of the war, and then the United States. So there are only two creditors. And Britain said, you know, they were trying to set the bar that we'll do this magnanimous, generous gesture of forgiving all of those allies who owe us money if the United States will do the same thing. It was disingenuous because virtually none of the credit, the debtors that owed money to Britain, there was no possibility of Britain really being able to collect much of the money owed to them.

[Cole Smead]

Sure. The social game of this. So it's like you tell the story of King George sitting down with William Howard Taft, who is a former president, sitting chief justice at the time, visiting England. And it might as well be like, we're letting one of our dukes of the United States come over, sit down with the King of England. And this comes up as subject. And I think Taft kind of pans it off as like, oh, well, you know, kind of like, here's the policy, and, you know, I think we're just gonna stick to what's the status quo. So you have that going on. You then have, like, people like Basil Blackett, who asked the most recent question. Also, maybe during this, he said, quote, is it worthwhile to begin by pillaring American selfishness? End quote. And so that you have this tension of, do we mock and ridicule the Americans for this? Because they are our allies and they've been very helpful in this season. That tension also comes to. I think you talk about Churchill, where he's like, hey, we shouldn't fear them on this, because ultimately he knows that if no one pays, it's America's problem anyway. And therefore he didn't fear America, I guess, like other British politicians did, because on one hand they were worried. I think the Balfour Note debate was really around Britain's credit, right? Are we gonna hurt our credit standing in the world? And yet if we don't, if we can't pay off this money, maybe, does it matter what our credit standing is? Because this is our primary creditor.

[Jill Eicher]

Right? Churchill was strong form on this point. He had no fear of pushing the United States as hard and as long as possible. To shame the United States into doing what he believed in his heart was the right thing was to cancel all indebtedness related to the war. Churchill passionately believed that. He never wavered on the point. He wrote the Will America article while in government. He wrote that piece, will America Fail Us? That really was how Churchill felt about it. His resolve on the point only strengthened as the years went on, that that was the right thing to do and that the important thing for Britain was to just keep pressing the United States to come to realize that in every way that they can by shaping public opinion, by British policy, by influencing the allies. Churchill decided we'll just play the long game until they figure out this is the right thing to do.

[Cole Smead]

You know, to your point, I mean, and isn't that kind of the question being asked by our own allies now is like, you know, as uncomfortable as it is, and you're talking to like your classic right wing conservative evangelical who voted for Trump, isn't that kind of the awkward question is like, what are our allies going to think about us in the aftermath of this? And that's really what the tension of this book is, is, you know, very tough economic terms with your allies.

[Jill Eicher]

That is the question that this story, what I took away from studying the language and the arguments back and forth was it came down to the question of what nations owe to one another and the recognition that we live in an interdependent world, like it or not. And how can we have discussions to tackle these tough questions? If you think of Mellon and Churchill were two brilliant men. They had extraordinary work ethics, they were both patriotic, they both wanted to do good things for their country. And they could not figure out how to come together, represent their two points of view, and perhaps give the world a blueprint of how to answer this question. We're still struggling with it today.

[Cole Smead]

Sure. So France is causing a lot of pressure. They're going to occupy the Ruhr, which is going to create a Whole nother problem and chain of reactions. In late 22, Churchill loses his seat in Parliament. And Parliament is taken over by the Conservatives, which, funny enough, Churchill helped found the Conservative Party originally at this time, he wasn't a Conservative. How does this really lead to the Mellon Baldwin agreement? Because you have new government coming in and you have Mellon that to your point, he's a banker, he looks at this as a restructuring. And the Mellon Baldwin agreement is really just a debt restructuring.

[Jill Eicher]

It is. You're exactly right. It was a debt restructuring. Stanley Baldwin, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, was sent over by Boner Law to negotiate with Mellon. And the two of them had very productive conversations. A lot of the negotiations took place at Mellon's home. And Baldwin was then, unfortunately, Bonar Law did not like the terms. He thought that they were not fair. But Mellon had faith that Baldwin would be able to persuade Bonar Law that this was the right thing to do. And of course, from Mellon's point of view, Britain was really the only solvent debtor that the United States has. And so this was the most important settlement. And he wanted it to be completed first. He was then going to use it as a model for all others. And Mellon sent Baldwin on his way with confidence that Baldwin would be able to persuade Boner Law that this was the best deal that Mellon would be capable of getting congressional approval for because it was far more generous than the terms that had been dictated to the Mellon and his commission by Congress. And so Mellon was going to have to use his political capital, if you will, and the support of Coolidge to persuade Congress to agree to these terms.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, and let's see, I was just going through my notes here. The other. I'll put this out as a little tidbit for listeners and viewers. Let's see. Boner Law penned an anonymous op ed in the papers. And so I just thought, like, what if a major world leader penned an anonymous op ed? I mean, he'd be called out on the carpet for effectively lying and hiding things and whatnot. And at this time, it was like, this is the way I gotta go out and explain to the public versus now people just go out on social media and tell them how they think. And you have to have a lot more transparency. So I thought a lot about the inner workings of societies in that piece. You know, when you turn to Churchill at this time, I mean, he's out of politics, he's about to publish a book, he is hanging out at his home, he's remodeling, working on in the Mediterranean, he's hopping a trip train back and forth between Britain and the south of France. I mean, he's jet setting, but he's still as important to this issue. Even though he really is almost superfluous from a political perspective to the central dialogue, he is still one of the central figures. And I think there's a magnet around these two gentlemen the whole time. It doesn't matter what their role is.

[Jill Eicher]

Well, I came to think of Churchill as wanting to be recognized as Britain's foremost expert on American foreign policy and, well, actually America in general.

[Cole Smead]

Okay, I would agree, but I want you to explain your view first.

[Jill Eicher]

I really felt that he knew that he had a lot to contribute to British policy because he made it his. He could see that the United States was going to be a great power, a great force, and he realized that Britain needed to partner with that, needed to not try to resist, but join forces. And Churchill had, of course, great political ambitions. And so therefore he took on the mantle of being the best thinker on American foreign policy, on American America in general, and of course during this period, how to influence American public opinion.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, we hope you're enjoying the podcast. You know, we work hard putting together this show, but we work even harder for our investors at Smead Capital Management. At smead, we believe in disciplined investing, which is why the SMEAD funds have a proven track record of long term outperformance. If you're an investor who plays the long game and want to invest in wonderful companies to build wealth, we invite you to visit smeadcap.com past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including loss of principal. Please refer to the prospectus for important information about the investment company, including objectives, risks, charges and expenses. Read and consider it carefully before investing SMEAD funds distributed by Smead Funds Distributors llc. Not affiliated. I think, you know, after reading your book of what I've Known at Churchill Prior and other books I've read and then reading this, I think Churchill was more American than most Americans. I think he understood the vision of America and I would think he really understand what Pax Americana was for far before it entered the lexicon. In other words, he just had such an optimistic vision of America and it was like he knew what was right for America and he was eventually going to push it to that rightness or that right place. And I think your book argues that he wasn't going to force them to do that. He was going to use his humanity and his prose and his logic and his ability to connect with others to draw them towards their position of greatness. Is that a fair way of putting it?

[Jill Eicher]

Absolutely. And his tours, when he would be selling his book, he would pack auditoriums, interviews. Everyone wanted to talk to this British writer who was traveling on private trains across Canada and then coming across the United States, having dinner with the hearse and the Astors. Everyone wanted to hear what he had to say. And he was one of the greatest orators of ever. But he could change hearts and minds, and he knew it. And he wanted to use that gift for the good. But it also was a way for him to learn about the United States. He was captivated by all that he saw on his tours. He admired the United States, whether it be Hollywood or the leaders of business or just the woman who taking care of his hotel room who was talking about what stock she was buying. He found that all fabulous.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, well, yeah, to your point, when he did his visit, it was in the late 20s, right near the top of the stock market. So he. He thought the gambling going on the stock market was quite an interesting thing. And it was gambling to call a spade a spade. He also, he loved Banff. He talked a lot about Lake Louise and the Banff Springs Hotel. And I love Banff. So this is not like, sponsored by visit banff.com or something like that, but I totally understand that. The Canadian Rockies are a totally beautiful place. Coolidge obviously becomes president because Harding unexpectedly dies in 23. Things change. How does the Dawes plan come about?

[Jill Eicher]

The Dawes plan came about because the United States realized that they would not be able to reach any settlement agreements on the war debts until the issue of reparations was resolved. It was like it was just this elephant in the room, and everyone knew it. And the Allies could not come together and resolve it, which was what the United States was hoping. They decided they would leave reparations to the Allies to resolve, but that was just not possible. They needed some type of intervention, and the Coolidge administration realized that the United States was perhaps best suited. But of course, the Coolidge administration didn't want to have the government be involved in this. And so this was part of the way that foreign policy worked in these years, was to bring in the best minds from the private sector who would work on behalf of the government and. And go to the meetings so that it wouldn't be as though the US Government was officially participating in these discussions. But brilliant American bankers, businessmen, were there representing the government. And so Charles Dawes, who chaired the Dawes Commission and helped with the Drafting of the Dawes Plan, which was meant to be a temporary plan, the idea was to find some way to structure a way for Germany to start to recover as well as the Allies, and then also, of course, for everyone to be able to repay the United States. And so that was the goal of the Dawes Plan.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah. And in the Dawes Plan, you mentioned that Parker Gilbert ran the Dawes Plan, and the Germans called him the Emperor of Europe, which I just love. It's like, hey, you want to be the person in that chair? Great. We hate you, too.

[Jill Eicher]

Yes, exactly.

[Cole Smead]

So there's a couple things I want to jump into here. I consider this a tautological argument. Okay. When the US Said they didn't have any stake in reparations, that's tautological, because we all know that they do, just not directly. Okay. You know, they were not a party to the Treaty of Versailles. It's not uncommon for the United States to not sign agreements that the other parts of the world make. That's actually pretty common. We write our own rules in a lot of cases. But to say that we're not a party of the Treaty of Versailles, that's for Germany and the Allies to deal with. When we have the Allies owing us money that they're getting from Germany, it means we are collecting reparations. Isn't that what's really going on is we were trying to build a structure to benefit from payments that were ultimately at their core. It's like, what was the underlying payment for the bond? Well, it was German reparations, actually.

[Jill Eicher]

No. The United States was trying to collect on its debts to the Allies. And so that was the real intent as far as reparations. The United States did not want to claim any reparations. Congress did push Mellon at one point, though, to put a bid in to be repaid for monies related to the direct costs of the US Military contribution to the war. But the United States did not want. It didn't want to claim any territory it was not interested in. The money coming back from Germany had to do with the loans. And most of the money lent to Germany came from private American banks. And they, of course, wanted to be repaid for that money. But as far as reparations, Germany was to make no reparations to the United States.

[Cole Smead]

Well, correct. Directly, but. But everybody else that was wanted to get reparations from Germany were the same people that couldn't pay back the United States.

[Jill Eicher]

Yeah. So essentially, what happened with the Dawes Plan, it did create this circular movement of money where the Money going to rebuild Germany, whether it be its central bank, its railroads, all of that was allowing Germany to make reparation payments to the Allies. The allies then were able to make payments on their war debts to the United States. So, yes, it was a circular system that people finally realized. Realized, sorry.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, Mellon made a very interesting. Again, I just put this as a footnote that I just found really interesting. So under the first Trump administration, Keith Kroc was the undersecretary of state, and he had to deal on the China issue in technology. So, like, think of Huawei and all that kind of stuff. And I'll never forget, I was at a talk he was giving at a tech conference called cosm, and he said, oh, we looked at our allies on the technology issue with China as our customers. Well, then I'm reading your book, and what did Mellon call the allies on these, ultimately these debt payments? And he used the same term. He said, these are our customers. Do you just look at that as his practical, pragmatic business sense, saying, hey, how do I address and meet your needs? And that's part of what really cautioned to be pretty pragmatic in his work?

[Jill Eicher]

Well, that was his way of responding to the chart. There started to develop groups. There were people who believed that the loans needed some type of revision, that they needed to be restructured. Some people believe they should just be totally forgiven. Primarily Wall street bankers, of course. And on the other side, there are people that there should be. Every penny should be repaid. And Mellon was trying to forge a middle road between these groups. And this was part of the education. It was Leffingwell who first put this idea forward, resonated completely with Mellon. And so Mellon tried to get people to see that the United States needed Europe to recover just as much as Europe itself needed to recover. And those were the interdependencies. And that's what he meant, that American farmers wanted to sell their goods to Europe. Well, the Europeans had to recover economically in order for that to happen. And so to have them seen not as debtors, but instead of as customers.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, Elsa comes up again later in the book. She obviously gets married to David Bruce. In May of 1925, he is dispatched as the vice consul of the American Consulate in Rome. And so here's her father back in the grind of these discussions, and he's got the ultimate social cover to go visit for, you know, not state reasons, which is go to see his daughter in Rome. And obviously, at the time, Mussolini is in power in Italy, which obviously we now Think of as like a really bad name. But that's who the power was post World War II was in Mussolini's hands. Is it just. Again, she's the right daughter for the right person at the right time, and she's so important to his ability to get things kind of pushed forward while he really is using as a reason to go see his daughter.

[Jill Eicher]

Well, there are two parts to that. First of all, it's 1926.

[Cole Smead]

Oh, it's 26. Pardon me.

[Jill Eicher]

And this is at the height of just the worst possible point in the battle between Churchill and Mellon. And Britain has launched this campaign casting the United States as Shylock. The American press is casting Britain as spongers. And of course, the face of this discussion is Churchill and Mellon. And Mellon is he. He was not a man who could express emotions. You have to think of Mellon through what he does. And he was devoted to his children. Elsa was in particularly important to him because she had played such a large role in seeing him evolve, but she also understood the pressures he was under. And the truth was, he missed her. She got married. And David Bruce wanted to be a great diplomat. He was very well suited for it. But it took Elsa away from aw. And so Mellon missed her greatly. And in those days, people took summer vacations of one or two months. And the other side was that Mellon really wanted to see how Europe was recovering with his own eyes and talk to people, trusted bankers that he knew. And so he was doing. I came to believe that he was doing research, which is what Mellon always did. But he was also visiting, genuinely wanted to see his daughter.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, let's see. So on this trip, that's when they visit, obviously. Famously at the Ritz in 26. Mellon realized at this point the Allies were not good for the debts. He's really coming around to the idea that this is almost pointless. Keynes has a quote in your book. He pointed out that he said this after the meeting. If I remember correctly, he said at that meeting that on the current structure, nothing really passes and nobody is a penny worse, end quote. The bonds were getting bought by American investors at its origin, or again, when they restructured, they still had to go out and sell these. So it was really. As long as their liquidity was present in the American bond market, you could restructure. And these kind of stayed all up. Obviously, if that scheme collapses, if there's no investors, none of the debt matters because the market's effectively voting with their feet saying these debts are worthless.

[Jill Eicher]

The realization that summer that when there'd be no appetite for those bonds in the United States. That would be when this whole debt restructuring and reparations, all of it, would collapse. That's when that awareness was starting to grow from just bankers and certain people in Europe. That is when Mellon realized that, oh, my goodness, this is not going to be workable going forward. Mellon. And Mellon's response to this was, of course, never articulated. But Mellon realized that two things could happen. One, for some reason, Congress could actually forgive the debts for whatever reasons, and also that Europe could default. And Mellon's goal was to build what Jamie Dimon calls the fortress balance sheet. Mellon was a great believer in that. He wanted to protect the economic strength of the United States. Those two risks were huge in Mellon's mind. That's why he was aggressively running surpluses and using every penny to pay down the debt to protect the credit of the United States. His intent was to pay off the entire national debt in, say, 20 years so that the loans from the allies wouldn't matter. It wouldn't harm the U.S. taxpayer because, of course, the government had promised U.S. taxpayers that there would never be any economic consequence to them because of the loans. Mellon was intent on honoring that promise.

[Cole Smead]

Hey, I want to give a big shout out to everyone who's been working so hard on this show. You know, we recently hit the top 10 in investing podcasts on Apple Podcasts and even number one in the business category in several countries. As you may know, this show is brought to you by Smead Capital Management. Smead Capital Management understands how frustrating and illogical the stock market can be. If you're searching for funds with a proven track record, give the Smead funds a look. Or better yet, reach [e-mail] and don't forget to mention you're a fan of the podcast. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including loss of principal. Please refer to the prospectus for important information about the investment company, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses. Read and consider it carefully before investing. Smead funds distributed by Smead Funds Distributors llc. Not affiliated. Let's. Let's take what you just said about Mellon and then let's put our Churchill lens over the top of that. Okay? Because I think it's kind of like those two views put together. So let's just say I look at the world today through those two lenses. Okay? To your point, you know, we have to be fiscally responsible. We obviously have not been. Okay, that's like case in point. But if you look at from the Churchill lens on top of that, Isn't it interesting that our past commitments, we are not holding, we're trying to renegotiate those? Our willingness to stick our neck out there for the rest of the world is going away. In other words, we're retrenching back to our own shores on some level, in some way. So am I surprised that the goodwill we typically get through the treasury markets is somehow eroding when Pax Americana and our willingness to step in and do the right thing is also coming to the time where we're in the worst fiscal position? We've been really in my lifetime, since I was born in 1983. And yet we don't look at those lenses together and say, wait, what if they're actually tied to each other? Is that a fair kind of two lens view of what Mellon was saying and at the same time, what Churchill thought to be right for America in its purpose in the world?

[Jill Eicher]

Absolutely. Churchill believed that because the United States had become the greatest power in the world, with that came responsibility. That was at the core of Churchill's, all of Churchill's arguments to get the United States to see, well, great, you can be the supreme power. We, Britain used to be the supreme power. But with that comes a responsibility. And part of that responsibility is making the world prosperous and bringing peace to the world. That's part of the responsibility that Churchill saw. That's what he was hoping the United States would realize. Okay, you're a great power, but it does come with responsibility.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah. The stock market crashes after Churchill's visit. Not long after, two years later, Hoover passes in 1931, a moratorium on debt for France. And this was like, hey, you don't have to make any payments. But Congress, shockingly, still has this hope that they're going to get the money at some point, funny enough. So I think you said in your book they put a provision that it was not a cancellation. So they're being ideological on this. Right. We are not canceling your debt. We're just not making you pay for the foreseeable future. Is there any difference?

[Jill Eicher]

Well, it was a one year moratorium for all war debts that was extended by the Hoover administration. It did have a time. He did set a time limit of one year. But Mellon and all the bankers knew that once you issue a moratorium on a, you know, to a debtor, the, the likelihood of resuming payments is very low.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah.

[Jill Eicher]

And so the, that was the opportunity for the Allies and Germany to get together and come up with a plan of, okay, so how do we, how do we get the United States to cancel their debts. And they thought for sure this was the opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, they were wrong. But they then put forward that plan that they created, saying, we're going to walk away from all our debts, all is forgiven if the United States will. And that was their proposal. The United States declined.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah. And I mean, just them even throwing the idea out that this is not a cancellation of debts. This is like a paper tiger. I mean, that's what this is. It's a paper tiger. You're putting something on paper. It's absolutely worthless in meaning or consequence. The other thing too is with the stock market crash, it exposed exactly what Keynes got at, which was that these were worthless if they. They couldn't be financed. And once liquidity disappeared, it showed you how uneconomic this was, because without liquidity, no one's going to pay anybody. And so it makes me think, as an investor, how often schemes like this go on for quite a long time and then liquidity goes away and everyone says, oh, wait, that doesn't work anymore. We're just going to forget that happened. To quote Charlie Munger, he says, why do we create new ways to lose money? I think the old ways work just fine. Okay. And that's what I was thinking of as I was kind of going through this part of your book, because at the time, you know, Mellon goes from Treasury Secretary to Ambassador to the uk so again, it's not that they disliked Mellon and didn't think he was a nice guy. He goes on to work directly with the British government on many things.

[Jill Eicher]

Mellon was very respectful, respected in Europe because he was very honest, always with them. And he had. He. Churchill got under his skin. They did have this epic battle, but both men. There was merit to what both of them were arguing, and people knew that. And so when Mellon came as ambassador, of course, he was totally disgraced in the United States, but he was welcome in Europe. They wanted his financial expertise. They thought this was a wonderful thing to have him on their shores so he could see what they needed and how they could partner with the United States. So they welcomed him with open arms.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, because the other book that I've read with a UK Ambassador, British ambassador, is obviously Joe Kennedy, who ended up there during the FDR years.

[Jill Eicher]

It was a very different.

[Cole Smead]

Yeah, very different. But again, like, you know, had political ambitions. It was a very different character, but, you know, also played a very social role. I would call it not dissimilar to melon. Let's see, Churchill, you know, compared To Mellon, you know, again, I think he just. He holds a very unique space more in the American, you know, thought and lexicon. You know, Mellon's kind of an afterthought, which. That's what I really thought your book did such a good job of, was taking Mellon and, you know, really elevating him as an American, as a statesman, as a leading, you know, official in the financial world on behalf of the United States. But Churchill, he ended up playing a silent war. I think a lot of the book. Later in the book, you talk about how once public opinion rose up against the United States, he just was mum because he knew he didn't have to say anything. The wheels of time were propounding or expounding to where he wanted them to go. Is that right?

[Jill Eicher]

It is. In Churchill, Churchill's attention had turned. He was very concerned what was happening in Germany, and he was focused on. He understood that the ill will, the bitterness that had played out for the last 10 years, that it was still percolating there. And he was very intent on keeping an eye on what he saw as warning signs. And so his focus had turned to monitoring what was happening policy wise in Europe and in particular in Germany.

[Cole Smead]

Where can our listeners and viewers follow you going forward so that you're going to tell us what your next book is? I'm teasing. I'm just kidding.

[Jill Eicher]

That's so kind of you, Cole. I'm sorry, I don't have a.

[Cole Smead]

Okay.

[Jill Eicher]

This is my first book. I apologize. I don't have anywhere to tell you, so.

[Cole Smead]

Well, I was gonna say, also, do you expect to write more on the subject as you come across more with the Churchill society or anything like that?

[Jill Eicher]

Well, there's a part of the research that I did for this book that doesn't fit into this story because I really wanted to keep the focus on Melanin, Churchill and Wardette. But there's a wonderful story that I'm trying to summon my courage. This is my first book. It took four years. I had to negotiate, see if my husband be okay with this. But I would love for that story to be told. It's a piece of American history. It has to do with the National Gallery of Art. And I very much would like to have the privilege to do it, if the fates allow.

[Cole Smead]

Well, and I think you had that at the very end of the book because they kind of pushed Mellon for tax evasion, and he ended up giving his art collection to the National. Went to the national, now part of the National Mall, and went there. And I could tell it was just like a little breadcrumb you left at the end of the story because it's.

[Jill Eicher]

An important story and it's also beautiful. I mean, there's all kinds of intrigue. And this is Mellon, so of course there's intrigue. And so I appreciate your kind words and encouragement. Thank you.

[Cole Smead]

Well, Jill, thank you for your time. Your book argues that learning and pragmatism, as we saw through melon, are the inescapable, pardon me, inescapable values that we need in business and politics. You further gain life lessons out of the people that Churchill and Mellon were with. Mellon has defined what I believe is the new American century in the centrality of work and its value. He said, quote, the purpose of life is to be occupied and serve in the most useful capacity provided it is an honest endeavor. The question is to find where one can give the most service. My main pleasure in work is being able to accomplish results. End quote. I love that quote. You have to read that. You should go out and buy a copy of Mellon vs Churchill today. If you enjoyed this podcast, go to Apple, Spotify, YouTube. Wherever you listen to A Book With Legs, give us a review. Tell others about the books and great authors like Jill Eicher that we have the opportunity to understand and study the world with and through for our tribe. If you have a great book that you'd like to recommend, email podcastmeecap.com that's podcastmeedcap.com you can also send your suggestions to us on X. Our handle is meedcap. Thank you for joining us for A Book with Legs podcast. We look forward to the next episode. Thank you for listening to A Book.

[Jill Eicher]

With Legs, a podcast brought to you.

[Cole Smead]

By Smead Capital Management.

[Jill Eicher]

The material provided in this podcast is.

[Cole Smead]

For informational use only and should not be construed as investment advice.

[Jill Eicher]

You can learn more about out Smead.

[Cole Smead]

Capital Management and its [e-mail] or by calling your financial advisor.