Podcast
Ajmal Sohail Counterterrorism & Counterintelligence
Hosted by Ajmal Sohail · EN
Jihadi-Terrorism and Insurgency, Militancy and Violent Extremism in Central-South Asia, Middle East and Africa.
ajmals.substack.com
ajmals.substack.com
10episodes
Episodes
Newest firstAll episodes
The Shadow Economy Fueling Terrorism and Global Instability
Apr 2000:27:14Tap to summarizeFor this episode, I’m bringing you inside my latest presentation on counter–narco‑terrorism, where I break down the full architecture of the Golden Triangle’s production networks, the cross‑border trafficking routes, and the transnational actors who keep this illicit economy alive. CIA released another notorious Drug-trafficker and sole Sponsor of Taliban’s Haqqani Network from the US JailFrom state and non‑state facilitation to the financial pipelines that launder billions across continents, this talk exposes how narcotics, insurgency, and organized crime intersect to reshape regional security. Opium, Insurgency, and IntelligenceIt’s a deep dive into the mechanics of a shadow system that fuels instability far beyond its borders — and why understanding these networks is essential for any serious conversation about global security today. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Fault Lines: ISIS‑K, Minorities, and the Taliban’s Security Crisis
Apr 1500:21:28Tap to summarizeWelcome back to the program. Today, we’re diving into one of the most complex security challenges in Afghanistan: the rise of ISIS‑K, its systematic targeting of minorities, and the Taliban’s struggle to contain the group.When we look at ISIS‑K’s pattern of violence, it becomes clear that their attacks on minorities are not random. They are rooted in a rigid ideological framework. ISIS‑K follows an extreme Takfiri interpretation of Salafi‑Jihadism, one that labels Shia Muslims, Sufis, Sikhs, and other minority communities as religiously illegitimate. In their propaganda, these attacks are framed as acts of “purification,” which gives the group both a theological justification and a recruitment narrative. Targeting minorities also provides ISIS‑K with high‑visibility operations that attract global media attention and help them differentiate themselves from the Taliban, who—despite their own history of violence—do not pursue systematic sectarian cleansing in the same way.But ideology is only one layer. Strategically, ISIS‑K uses these attacks to undermine the Taliban’s claim that they can govern and provide security. Every successful attack exposes gaps in Taliban intelligence, weakens their credibility, and fuels the perception that Afghanistan is far from stable. Sectarian violence also creates the kind of chaos in which ISIS‑K thrives, allowing the group to present itself as the most uncompromising jihadist alternative.Now, the question many observers ask is whether the Taliban are actually capable of curbing ISIS‑K. The answer is complicated. On one hand, the Taliban control the territory, the borders, and the state apparatus. They have long‑standing relationships with local communities, which gives them access to human intelligence networks. And ISIS‑K is a direct threat to their rule, so they are highly motivated to fight it.On the other hand, the Taliban face serious limitations. There is ideological overlap between the two groups, which makes it difficult for the Taliban to offer a convincing counter‑narrative—especially to radicalized youth. Their security structure is fragmented, lacking the professionalism and coordination needed for modern counterterrorism operations. Governance failures, economic collapse, and the exclusion of minorities create fertile ground for ISIS‑K recruitment. And in urban areas like Kabul, ISIS‑K operates through small, covert cells that are much harder for the Taliban to penetrate.External factors also play a role. Porous borders, regional rivalries, and the absence of international counterterrorism cooperation all give ISIS‑K room to maneuver. These dynamics allow the group to survive, adapt, and continue launching high‑impact attacks.In the short term, the Taliban may be able to suppress ISIS‑K in certain rural areas. But in the medium term, ISIS‑K will remain capable of symbolic, high‑visibility attacks. And in the long term, without political inclusion, economic stability, and credible ideological alternatives, the Taliban are unlikely to eliminate ISIS‑K entirely.This is not just a security issue — it’s a structural and regional one. And it will shape Afghanistan’s future for years to come. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Inside the Operation: Decoding the Istanbul Consulate Attack
Apr 700:12:00Tap to summarizePodcast Description:In this episode, intelligence analyst Ajmal Sohail unpacks the Istanbul attack with a practitioner’s eye: how the cell was formed, how coordination likely occurred, and what vulnerabilities were exploited. From encrypted communications to symbolic target selection, this conversation reveals the operational logic behind modern extremist attacks. It also explores how Türkiye’s complex geopolitical position shapes both the threat landscape and the counter‑terrorism response. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Europe’s Antisemitism Crisis: From Hate Crimes to National Security Threats
Mar 2600:04:42Tap to summarizeEurope’s antisemitism crisis is no longer just about hate crimes—it has become a national security challenge.On AnewZ Prime Time, I explained why security services across Europe are alarmed:* Attacks on Jewish institutions are not isolated incidents but part of a wider extremist ecosystem.* Counterterrorism units are now leading investigations because these threats often involve surveillance, financing, and online radicalization—classic hallmarks of terrorism.* The challenge is multidimensional: state actors, organized extremist groups, and self-radicalized individuals are all operating simultaneously, overwhelming traditional policing methods.I emphasized that simply arresting suspects is no longer enough. The real battle is in detecting networks before violence happens—tracking propaganda, monitoring financing, and closing security gaps around synagogues and schools.👉 This conversation is a wake-up call: Europe must treat antisemitism not only as a moral crisis but as a counterterrorism priority.🎧 Listen to the full discussion on my podcast, where I break down how intelligence agencies are adapting to this evolving threat and what must be done to protect vulnerable communities.#Antisemitism #Counterterrorism #Security #Europe #AjmalSohail #Podcast This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Ukraine After the Guns Fall Silent: Why the Post‑War Landscape Will Be a Magnet for Hybrid Threats
Jan 800:16:20Tap to summarizeAs the war in Ukraine eventually transitions toward ceasefire or settlement, the strategic challenge facing Kyiv and its partners will not be a simple shift from war to peace. Instead, the country is likely to enter a complex grey zone—one where violent extremist groups, criminal networks, and state-linked actors see opportunity rather than closure. Understanding this environment now is essential for shaping effective counterterrorism and security policy in the years ahead.1. Post‑War Ukraine: A High‑Value Environment for Extremist ExploitationPost‑conflict environments have historically attracted violent extremist groups, and Ukraine will be no exception. Three structural factors make such settings particularly vulnerable:* Weapons saturation: Years of conflict leave behind large volumes of military‑grade weapons, explosives, and trained personnel. Even with strong Ukrainian controls, the sheer scale of materiel increases the risk of diversion into illicit networks.* Psychological radicalisation: War normalises violence and entrenches grievance narratives. Extremist organisations routinely exploit these conditions, targeting disaffected veterans, traumatised civilians, and displaced populations.* Institutional strain: Prolonged conflict exhausts even capable states. Fatigue, resource depletion, and administrative overload create enforcement blind spots that external actors can exploit.This does not imply that Ukraine will become a failed state. Rather, it becomes a high‑value operating environment for actors seeking to seed instability or channel weapons into Europe’s criminal and extremist ecosystems.2. Ceasefires and Peace Transitions: A Period of Maximum VulnerabilityCeasefires are often perceived as stabilising moments. In reality, they create transitional vulnerabilities that militant actors understand well:* Demobilisation gaps: Fighters disengage faster than monitoring mechanisms can adjust, creating temporary vacuums.* Jurisdictional ambiguity: Control over territory, borders, and internal security is often unclear during transitions.* Reduced vigilance: Political pressure to demonstrate “peace dividends” can lead to premature force drawdowns.Extremist and criminal‑terror hybrid groups rarely strike during these periods. Instead, they embed quietly, build networks, and prepare infrastructure for future operations.3. European Troop Deployment: A Shift Toward Asymmetric and Deniable ThreatsAny future European military presence in Ukraine would reshape the threat landscape. Rather than direct confrontation, adversaries would likely adopt asymmetric tactics designed to raise political costs without triggering escalation:* Sabotage targeting logistics, infrastructure, and energy systems.* Attacks on soft military or civilian‑linked assets to exploit vulnerabilities while avoiding overt provocation.* False‑flag or proxy operations aimed at fracturing political consensus within Europe.The objective is not battlefield victory. It is narrative disruption, political pressure, and strategic exhaustion.4. Intelligence Coordination: The Decisive FactorIn a post‑war environment, intelligence coordination between Ukraine, Europe, and the United States becomes not just helpful, but decisive.* Threats will be transnational by design—weapons flows, online radicalisation, financing, and cross‑border travel.* No single service will have the full picture:* Ukraine understands the terrain and local actors.* European states see spillover effects.* The U.S. often tracks networks, enablers, and global linkages.* The greatest risk is not lack of data, but delays and silos. Classification barriers, political friction, and bureaucratic inertia can create dangerous blind spots.Effective prevention requires real‑time intelligence fusion, not post‑incident information sharing.5. The Most Likely Future Threat: Hybrid Actors Operating Below the Threshold of WarWhile lone‑actor attacks and isolated extremist incidents will occur, they are not the primary strategic concern. Nor is a large‑scale insurgency likely, given the territorial and social conditions required to sustain one.The most probable threat is hybrid actors—a blend of criminal networks, extremist groups, and state‑linked operatives. These actors:* Operate deniably and adapt quickly.* Exploit legal, political, and informational seams.* Seek destabilisation without openly declaring intent.Their goal is persistent disruption, not territorial control.Conclusion: The Grey Zone AheadUkraine’s post‑war challenge will not be a binary shift from conflict to peace. It will be the management of a grey zone where destabilisation is cheaper, quieter, and harder to attribute. The country’s resilience—and Europe’s security—will depend on recognising this reality early and preparing for a threat landscape defined not by open warfare, but by ambiguity, deniability, and hybrid pressure. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Taliban Dissolves Interpol Liaison Branches – Strategic Implications
Sep 1000:02:51Tap to summarizeTranscriptToday, we examine a critical development in Afghanistan’s international posture.On the direct orders of Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Interpol liaison branches within Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been formally dissolved. This decision, issued via an official decree dated 2 Muharram 1437, marks a decisive shift in the Taliban’s approach to international law enforcement cooperation.This move is widely interpreted as a retaliatory response to the continued non-recognition of the Taliban regime by the international community. It also signals internal efforts to shield senior leadership figures from mounting legal exposure amid growing international scrutiny.Strategic ContextHistorically, these liaison branches served as conduits for:· International criminal data exchange· Arrest warrant coordination· Transnational crime trackingHowever, the landscape has shifted dramatically. The International Criminal Court has recently issued arrest warrants for Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, citing gender persecution and crimes against humanity.Despite four years in power, the Taliban remain diplomatically isolated. They are unrecognized by the United Nations and most sovereign states, with sanctions and travel bans still firmly in place.Motivations Behind the DecisionA. Legal Shielding and Risk ContainmentThe dissolution of Interpol liaison offices serves to:· Minimize exposure to extradition mechanisms· Disrupt international tracking of Taliban officials· Block cooperation with foreign agencies enforcing ICC warrants or monitoring sanctioned individualsB. Ideological Rejection of Western Legal NormsInterpol operates within a secular, rules-based international legal framework—one that fundamentally contradicts the Taliban’s theocratic governance model. This move reflects a broader rejection of multilateral institutions and human rights frameworks.In essence, the Taliban are fortifying their internal sovereignty while severing ties with mechanisms of international accountability. The implications for transnational justice, diplomatic engagement, and regional stability are profound—and ongoing. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Taliban’s Military Infrastructure for Transnational Extremism
Aug 1200:01:00Tap to summarizeThis is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Taliban Signs Tripartite Security Pact with Russian and Chinese Intelligence Agencies
Aug 300:01:10Tap to summarizeThis is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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The Rise of an Anti-China Hegemon Tactical Extremist Group in Afghanistan
May 19, 202500:01:39Tap to summarizeThis is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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Taliban turned Afghanistan into a hub for Global Jihadi-Terrorists
Feb 18, 202500:00:40Tap to summarizeExclusive: Afghanistan has now become a sweet-home for about 22 terrorist groups, under the Taliban control, Foreign Fighters and International Terrorist Networks currently have three important Jihadi-military training Sites in the Country. 1: Sheikh Osama Training Center in Nuristan Province.2: Sheikh Jalaluddin Military Training Camp in Nangarhar Province.3: Tariq Bin Zaid Military Training Camp in Paktia Province.In addition, Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani are paying monthly expenditure to four key leaders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Central Council, including TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.1: $15,000 to Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.2: $6,500 to Mufti Muzahim.3: $4,500 to Maulvi Faqir Muhammad.4: $4,500 to Mufti Muhammad Nadeem Darwish. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe
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