Graham Allison on the Global Realignment: Iran, China, Israel, Greenland

Summary

All-In Podcast: Graham Allison on the Global Realignment

Episode Date: March 9, 2026
Guests: Graham Allison, Harvard Professor
Hosts: Chamath Palihapitiya (A), Jason Calacanis (C), David Sacks, David Friedberg

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Episode Overview

This episode features an in-depth, wide-ranging conversation with Professor Graham Allison, renowned for his expertise on international security and the US-China relationship. The panel explores the fast-moving geopolitical landscape, including the Iran conflict, American and Israeli motivations, impacts on global alliances, the likelihood of war involving China and Taiwan, the strategic significance of Greenland, nuclear proliferation, and domestic social unrest in the United States. Allison’s signature clarity and historical perspective underpin a discussion that’s both sobering and rich with insight.

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Iran Crisis: American, Israeli, and Global Dimensions

[01:30 – 24:28]

Key Insights

• Fog of War & Uncertainty

  • All current analysis about the US and Israel’s escalation with Iran is fundamentally uncertain.
  • Graham Allison:

    "There's a huge level of uncertainty currently about what's happening and about what's likely to happen. … There's a fog of war that's actually increased because we got two big fog machines adding to the confusion, namely Trump and the administration on the one hand and Bibi on the other."
    [01:32]

• Demonstration of Power

  • The recent operations in Iran and Venezuela reflect “supreme military and intelligence power” by the US and Israel, but create risk for hubris.

• Regime Change Dangers

  • Regime change rarely works long-term (see Afghanistan, Iraq). Destroying a regime leaves a vacuum often filled by chaos.
  • Allison:

    "Breaking something's a lot easier than building something."
    [03:07]

• Is This "Bibi's War"?

  • Allison calls the escalation the result of Netanyahu’s 20-year obsession with Iran:

    "I’m pro-Israel but anti-Bibi in this respect... I don't see evidence that Iran was about to attack the U.S. or get a nuclear weapon."
    [04:36]

• Trump’s Motivation

  • No clear evidence of a grand strategy; Trump appears impulsive and susceptible to persuasion. The timing fits tactical opportunity (Iranian leadership exposed).
  • As for China, Allison doubts the Iran escalation is purely leverage, but the demonstration of force may play into upcoming talks.
  • Allison:

    “Maybe he got excited by the upside, not quite careful enough about the risks or the downside.”
    [08:29]

• Civil War or Quagmire?

  • Warns Iran could descend into "Syria plus," with possible civil war, fragmentation, or a hostile power vacuum.

Notable Quotes

• Allison, on the unpredictability of war:

  "In wars, very frequently it's easy to get in and it's quite difficult to get out."
  [05:46]

• On potential US withdrawal:

  "Trump is erratic, impulsive, but he has some coordinates... November 3rd is a big day for him... I can easily imagine in the next week... he’s left himself room to declare victory."
  [18:51]

• On Israel and rising antisemitism:

  "Bibi is not Israel. ... What Bibi’s doing to Israel’s democracy is really destroying it and the impact of that on Jewish kids in America ... that’s not the country I want to be proud of."
  [22:05]

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China, Taiwan, and the Global Power Balance

[24:28 – 39:50]

Key Insights

• No Imminent Taiwan War

  • Allison assigns only a ~5% chance China will attempt to invade Taiwan by 2028 unless provoked.
  • Reasons: Preference for “peaceful reunification,” internal military purges weakening Chinese readiness, upcoming more China-friendly Taiwanese politics, Trump’s own accommodating stance.
  • Allison:

    "The likelihood of an attack on Taiwan this year or next year or even into 28... is very low. I put it at about where the prediction markets are, 5% or something low.”
    [25:09]

• Status Quo & Strategic Ambiguity

  • Decades of delicate balancing—one China policy, strategic ambiguity—have preserved peace and Taiwan’s prosperity.

• Taiwan’s Importance

  • 96% of advanced semiconductor manufacturing centered on the small island; this concentration is a major global risk.
  • The US faces enormous logistical and military challenges in defending Taiwan given its geography and China’s proximity.

• China’s Rise and Dual Narratives

  • China’s meteoric economic, technological, and geopolitical ascent fuels a narrative of inevitable US decline.
  • Economic power is central to China’s strategy—domination in manufacturing, technology, and global supply chains.

Notable Quotes

• "Never has a country risen so far so fast on so many different dimensions."
  [33:43]

• On US–China rivalry:

  "That dynamic, the shifting of the seesaw, is what gives you this Thucidity and dynamic ... [that] drags them into a war, after which they think, my God, how did this ever happen?"
  [35:20]

• On advice to Taiwan:

  "So I say to the Taiwanese friends, you know, basically, don’t screw it up."
  [28:59]

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China’s Domestic Challenges

[36:37 – 39:50]

• Population decline and youth unemployment are described as Xi Jinping’s largest internal threats.
• Rapid advances in robotics and AI are transforming manufacturing and could offset some demographic problems.
• Chinese society is, in many ways, more adaptive and technologically progressive than the US.

"More than half of the factory worker robots in the world are in China … If demographics is only a problem because of workers, we're going to have worker [robots]."
[37:27]

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The Arctic and Greenland: The New Geopolitical Frontier

[39:50 – 48:57]

Key Insights

• Greenland is valued for its strategic location for missile defense and sea lanes as the Arctic melts.
• The US doesn’t need to invade or own Greenland to achieve its aims; long-term leases suffice.
• Rising socialism in Europe isn't seen as a direct risk of Chinese/foreign dominance, but allied relations are more important than ever as the power balance shifts.

"We, the US, can get everything we want from Greenland without invading it or owning it."
[40:27]

• Trump’s “Greenland drama” is characterized as a reality TV performance to create leverage—not a substantive territorial ambition.

Notable Quotes

• "I think Trump’s Greenland venture was more like for fun."
  [42:45]

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The 80-80-9 Framework: Modern Security Milestones

[48:57 – 56:20]

Key Insights

• Allison’s memorable framework:
  • 80 years since a great power war
  • 80 years since a nuclear bomb was used in conflict
  • 9 nuclear-armed states worldwide
• These milestones are not “natural”; they’re the result of hard-won, fragile international architecture.
• Nuclear nonproliferation is eroding, with North Korean and Pakistani acquisition seen as major failures.
• Israel’s policy of “affirmative non-proliferation” (military action against potential nuclear states) is contrasted with US missteps in Korea.

"80 years. This is the longest peace in recorded history since Rome. This is not natural, this is very abnormal … The 80, the 80 and 9 we should not take for granted."
[49:47, 52:43]

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Domestic Politics: Populism, Inequality, Socialism

[56:20 – 62:10]

• Rising economic inequality is sowing political instability and making the US fertile ground for populism or socialism.
• Allison cites alarming wealth imbalances and references minimal stock market participation for most Americans.
• Radical policy ideas—UBI, taxes on the wealthy, or greater wealth redistribution—may become serious, out of necessity, not ideology.
• There is an urgent need for those at the top to consider new forms of generosity or social action.

"If the top 10 or 20% are taking 80% or 70% of the pie, that's not stable and sustainable, I think, in a democracy ... it's an invitation for some more radical ideas."
[57:53]

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Memorable Moments & Quotes

• On war’s unpredictability:

  "If we woke up tomorrow or today and a couple of ships have been sunk or a couple of hundred of Americans have been killed, this is going to have a very different. A different image."
  [08:18]

• On American military hubris:

  "You can do four or five different scenarios for how this might conceivably end. It could end up being an extended civil war in Iran among the various national groups, even some of them possibly seceding. So again, fairly chaotic. Look like Syria plus."
  [17:44]

• On humility and wisdom:

  "You can measure a man's knowledge and thoughtfulness by his humility ... you have extraordinary depth, and you've thought so deeply about so many of these issues." — Chamath [62:10]

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Timestamps Index to Key Sections

• Iran and Global Realignment: [01:30 – 24:28]
• China and Taiwan: [24:28 – 39:50]
• The Arctic & Greenland: [39:50 – 48:57]
• Nuclear Proliferation (80-80-9): [48:57 – 56:20]
• US Populism & Inequality: [56:20 – 62:10]

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Conclusion

Professor Graham Allison provides a clear-eyed, historically grounded analysis of a world in flux—from Iran’s upheaval to China’s steady rise and America’s own internal reckoning. He warns against overconfidence, highlights the limits of power, and stresses the fragility of the global order. The conversation ends on a note of humility—and urgent curiosity for the challenging years ahead.

Transcript

[A]

Welcome to another episode of the All In Interview. I'm really excited to be joined by Back to All In Harvard Professor Graham Allison. Professor Allison, welcome back to All In.

[B]

Thanks for having me.

[A]

We last had you at the summit in Los Angeles, so it's great to have a conversation. A lot's happened since we last got together for the audience. Graham Allison's the founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. He's advised every secretary of Defense since Kissinger. He's helped dismantle 12,000 Soviet nuclear weapons. And his book Destined for War remains the definitive framework for understanding the US China relationship. I think it's worth kind of bringing forward some of the things that have happened in the world since we last met.

[C]

I'm going all in.

[A]

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[B]

Well, thank you again for having me back. You'll have a great podcast. I enjoyed the summit and I'm sorry we're not there in person to catch up, but I think about Iran. How much to say? So this could be a long lecture. Let me just do four or five quick points. First point, most important point is that there's more questions than answers, though. There's a huge level of uncertainty currently about what's happening and about what's likely to happen. Part of this is Clausewitz's famous fog of war, but there's a fog of war that's actually increased because we got two big fog machines adding to the confusion, namely Trump and the administration on the one hand and Bibi on the other. And then we got all the chattering class around us. So I would say, why did Trump decide to go to war now? There's six different reasons he and the administration have given and each one they back around. What's the objective? There's five different objectives backing around. And when is this war going to end? You know, a day, a week, a month, who knows. So it's very uncomfortable to recognize how uncertain Things are, and most of the conversation about it tries to make it more confident. But I think the place to start is there's a huge amount of uncertainty. Having said that, I'll still give you my prejudices about a few of the points. Point two, this has been an extraordinary demonstration of supreme military power and supreme intelligence power. US military and the intelligence community and the Israeli counterparts have been way, way, way off the charts. And I think this should make all Americans proud of what's been built over this decade of two decades of investment, but especially the past decade. Third point, there's no tears to be shed for Khamini and Islamic Republic regime. It's an evil leader, an evil regime. There's no bad thing that could happen to them that we shouldn't be cheering out of. That next point, though, breaking something's a lot easier than building something. And destroying targets is something that our military knows very well how to do. Building a new regime, regime change is something that we know historically doesn't work very well. At least in Iraq and Afghanistan, we had every word said that's been said in this case. And we then went in all in and spent more than a billion dollars of many, many thousands of American lives. And when we went to Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. When we left Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. So I would say, unfortunately, it's against a backdrop that's hard. The next point, slightly more controversial, but I think this is Bibi's war. If your reader or your listeners don't remember Moby Dick, they should go look at it again. Ahab had this fixation obsession with the white whale and tried to find a way to kill the white whale whenever he could. For the last two decades, that's been Bibi's number one, number two, number three agenda. He's tried to sell that war to Obama, to Trump, won to Biden. And how he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, whom I thought had his number, I'm surprised. So I'm pro Israel, but anti Bibi in this respect. And I think that I understand he's brilliant politically, but I don't think this. The arguments that were made that Trump has actually repeated that Imran was about to attack us, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was building an ICBM that was going to attack the U.S. i see no evidence for that. There's many, many bad things about the Iranian regime, but not most of the claim set that were made. So I look at this And I hope it turns out well. But I remember that in wars very frequently it's easy to get in and it's quite difficult to get out.

[A]

Let me double click on that point you mentioned there's multiple reasons that the administration has messaged for doing this, multiple views on what success looks like, multiple timelines on ending it, and that this is Bibi's war. How do you think Trump was motivated to do this? What is the real motivation? And I will ask this in the context of the big delegation and visit to China coming up next month. Is Trump motivated fundamentally to create leverage with China and use this as a tool to try and maximize his negotiating leverage going into the Chinese negotiations?

[B]

That's a great question. And I wish that the answer was this was all part of a grand strategy that would make me feel hugely better. But I tried to do Trumpology and I was actually having dinner last night with Bill O'Reilly, a former student who I think is one of the better tropologists for trying to interpret. And we were going back and forth through this. It's easy enough to see why the window, tactically, the window in which this attack occurred was chosen because here you got 40, you got the supreme leader and 40 of the other leaders of Iran out in public. So that's an opportunity as a target and the best opportunity that's come along. The question is, why would you be attacking them? And especially Trump, given his campaign and his previous views about not repeating the mistakes of the people that took us into endless windless wars. And I think it's, I mean, I think Bibi is a magician. I think his single mindedness is impressive. I think his agility in making arguments and developing arguments is impressive. How he managed to persuade Trump this was a good idea for the U.S. now I don't have a good idea. And I think that, I think if I listen to the reasons why even the people closest around them have given or that Trump have given, they don't seem persuasive. Now, partly Trump is erratic, partly he sort of acts on the basis of instincts. Somehow it came to him that this was something that could be done. I think actually Beebe painted a pretty, I mean, the upside of this picture, if it's successful, and I hope now that we've gone into it, it would be, would be redefining security in the Middle east for a generation. So getting rid of the Iranian regime as the Bibi and company have gotten rid of the proxies of the regime earlier, which again, since October 7th, been extremely impressive. Could possibly, you could say, well, there's going to be a whole new Middle East. If the Middle east were all like the uae, that would be fantastic. Fantastic for all the human beings that live there. So I think maybe he got excited by the upside, not quite careful enough about the risks or the downside, because the number of ways in which this could go wrong. If we woke up tomorrow or today and a couple of ships have been sunk or a couple of hundred of Americans have been killed, this is going to have a very different. A different image.

[A]

And you think that this is independent then, of the action with Maduro and independent of the big delegation headed to China for big negotiation next month?

[B]

Well, I wouldn't say entirely independent. I would think with Maduro. So Trump, I think this, again, this is my, whatever, armchair trumpology. But I would say initially he thought tariffs were a magic wand. And every leader thinks if you have a magic wand, that's fantastic. He's tried to tariff magic wand and discovered it didn't quite have all the effects that he imagined on Liberation Day. He then discovered the American military, which genuinely is a huge one. And the Maduro operation was just spectacular. I mean, again, it's a military and intelligence operation. Brilliant. No other country in the world could even imagine doing something like that. And that actually makes all of us stand taller. It can also provide a little, or historically encourages hubris and an imagination that this magic wand can work in many other arenas. I don't mind at all the proposition that every other country should take account of the fact that the US has the most remarkable military and intelligence community in the world. And that's not a bad backdrop for China and for a China trip. So I agree that things may not be completely disconnected, but I think in terms of the timing, I mean, right now, when is the war going to be over? If you talk about three or four weeks, he'll be in China March 29th. So my inclination, again, if we were just doing prediction markets, is that he's going to find a way to declare this over before then because he needs a little time to get his mind set on that. But if you ask the folks at the Defense Department, if you ask the people in Israel, they thinking this is another month or beyond, there's a war. So, again, things I don't think are quite, you know, in sync.

[A]

Jason's joined us.

[C]

Professor Allison, it's always a treat to have you here.

[B]

Nice to see you.

[C]

Nice to see you. It's just amazing to have you on here and to give us this Time, if things were to go extremely well and Iran went from a monarchy to a dictatorship, and now in this third act here in the modern day to a democracy, and you actually had a democracy with 93 million citizens in the Middle east, what impact would that have on the region? We've seen the Gulf monarchies evolve, human rights, but they're still monarchies. You have one other, I guess, democracy in the region and Israel. But this could be extraordinary if it was a democracy. But what would that mean to the global chessboard?

[B]

Well, it's a good question. I mean, if this could occur, it would be spectacular even, I think. But I would say this is way, way, way too ambitious. There's a hundred things that would be wonderful outcomes better than what's likely, that would be short of that. I remember in Iraq, after Bush failed to find nuclear weapons, which was the initial, I would say, somewhat cucked up rationale for our going into Iraq, Ghandi Rice, who was the secretary, gave a speech about, well, how wonderful it'll be when Iraq is a democracy and market economy radiating stability through the Middle East. So we're pretty good at doing I have a Dream in that version. I think that's a way, way, way stretch. I would be very happy with a regime there that simply was not about building nuclear weapons, was not about building missiles that threaten the US and our friends and allies in the region, and not about supporting proxies. And if it's a pretty cruel regime, unfortunately, that's unfortunate for the Iranian people, the Persian people. I'm a student of history. I love Persia. I remember of Cyrus and I remember the Peloponnesian War. I remember this is a fantastic culture in history. They've been hijacked by a terrible, terrible group of people. And if those people can be somehow ousted, wonderful for Iranian people and wonderful for the world. If I were betting it again, I'd say go back to the first point questions, uncertainty, finding signals in the noise, extremely difficult. But if I were betting it, it'll end up that the guys with the guns will in some version be the next iteration. And if they're tamer and less determined to threaten our interests, will this have been worth it? Well, again, we'll have to look at over the longer run. I think the other thing that we know about wars is that they're unpredictable and that they have many unanticipated consequences. I think as we watch what's happening now and see what impact does that have on oil and gas prices. Predictable. So you can see and going and Going well, what impact does that have on other countries? So the number of countries now whose economies are being disrupted by this impact and therefore blaming us for it. I had a call from someone in Taiwan yesterday saying, wait a minute, did anybody think what it's doing for us since they had about half of their electricity comes from their natural gas that is now coming in, now not coming. If you ask about what is this meaning for Ukraine, all the patriots that were to hope to prevent missile strikes from Russia on Ukraine are now in the Middle East. So that many more target. So there's just. Unfortunately it unfolds in so many, so many different directions now. I don't want to seem too pessimistic about it because again, I think we've been shocked, fortunately on the upside, by how professional our military and intelligence folks have been and also how pathetic or hollow the Iranians have been. First day of the attack, I was at the Defense Department and I gave them a list of 11 things that I would do and be capable of doing if I were playing the Iranian hand. And they seem to be. I mean, I hardly even want to say out loud, but they act like a paper tiger.

[A]

Do you think there's more damage that can be done by being more successful? If we think back to Iraq, Iran is twice as many people, a hundred million versus fifty million, four times the land area, a much better equipped military, and arguably the military system. The regime is embedded in every aspect of industry. So the more successful the United States is in dismantling the Iranian regime and as was advised by Condoleezza Rice who apparently was just in the White House today and advising the president and publicly stated, it's time to finish them off, it's time to go all the way, et cetera. Does that not then leave a country with no infrastructure, no leadership, a hundred million people in tatters? And that's the classic breeding ground for some of these extremist groups to seize control and seize power. And we don't have the resources to go in and have another multi decade Afghanistan, Iraq problem, I'm afraid.

[B]

I agree, yes. I think the uncertainties about that, I mean, you can do four or five different scenarios for how this might conceivably end. It could end up being an extended civil war in Iran among the various national groups, even some of them possibly seceding. So again, fairly chaotic. Look like Syria plus, okay, it could look like Iran or Afghanistan. Well, excuse me, we were there for more than a decade with unlimited resources, hardly any constraints on the number of people. And how did that work out. So I say that I'm a small C conservative and kind of think history is not always, certainly not the only guide, but is a good place to start. I, I would say nervous shit.

[A]

Is it too late to have a Venezuelan outcome where we've taken out the head of the snake and we've simply replaced it? The snake can continue operating and living without too much destructive damage and effect. But it seems like we may be a little too far gone now in Iran and that to take this all the way might be very difficult to manage.

[B]

Is it too late? If I were again, we're all in the dark and all the uncertainty. So back to point one. But after that, I would say Trump is erratic, impulsive, but he has some coordinates and one of them is his power. November 3rd is a big day for him. He's focused on that. The economy is a crucial element of that. That's part of the framing of the China relationship. The impact of this on the economy is already evident and could become more evident the public opinion. Again, I think I saw today in the Journal that he sent HIG Smith out to sell the war. Good luck. I'm not sure he can sell so public opinion of this. It's about 6 to 4, unfavorable because they didn't make the case for the war in advance. The impact of this on other parties, including parties that we care about, is negative. So I can easily imagine in the next week, even if you look at Taekse, the way in which he's left himself room to declare victory at having, as you say, cut off the head of the stake, destroyed their nuclear capabilities, destroy their ability to project power, or in the Defense Department, we always say destroy or degrade. Degrade has a lot of dimensions, as you would point out. And now it's up to the Iranian people to seize their own government and take advantage of themselves. The difficulty with that will be Bibi wants to fight on till the regime is destroyed. And that'll be an interesting struggle to see how that goes. Earlier, Trump demonstrated that when he thought it was in American interests, he was prepared to pull Bibi's chain. So we'll see.

[C]

This is, I think, before we move out of the MENA region, a topic that's coming up. There's obviously no support for this war in America. Most Americans put foreign affairs today at 1 or 2% of their concern. Economy and many other issues are high on their list. And he's been pretty clear, hey, we're not going to put boots on the ground. And then there's this anti Semitic underpinning that's happening in America that's become pretty acute. And you had Rubia, who we mentioned earlier, say, hey, we did this because the Israelis were going in anyway and we had no choice. And then they walked that back. Explain to the audience how we should look at that turn of events where there's a group of people in America, specifically people in the Maga Party, who believe Trump has betrayed them and that he's captured by the Israeli government in some way and he's doing their bidding. I'm not saying that that's my perspective, but that is an undertone that we're seeing and that's something new in our lifetime, I think.

[B]

It certainly is. So this is a big topic, but I'd say when I talk about it, I say I'm pro Israeli and anti Bibi. So Bibi is not Israel. The people whom I know mostly and respect mostly in Israel are the national security barons, the people who've been the Chief of staff or the head of Mossad or the head of Shin Bet, or the people that work in those structures and they believe that Bibi is actually destroying the Ben Gurion's Israeli democracy that they cared about. Or take Tom Friedman, it's pretty hard to accuse him of being anti Semitic, but he's been, I think, very clear and very courageous in pointing out that what Bibi's doing to Israel's democracy is really destroying it and the impact of that on Jewish kids in America. I mean, I say this on campus where they want to be proud of Israel. They deserve to be proud of the country that has been built over these years. But they look at the behavior of these crazy right wing settlers and their activities in the occupied west bank, or they look at some of the activities in Gaza, or they look at now the kind of unlimited war without any even attempt to make arguments about proportionality and just say, wait a minute, that's not the country I want to be proud of. I want to be proud of Rabin's Israel. I want to be proud of Ehud Barak's Israel, I want to be proud of Ben Gurion's Israel. And I'm pretty much of that persuasion. I think what, what maybe risks in this and risked earlier with citing. I mean, interfering in American politics invites pushback. So I think this could have a big, long term negative effect both in the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, especially younger, under younger people. If you look at the polling for the under 30s on Israel, it's just like shocking yeah.

[A]

Can we move to China? Because I think that again, this is going to be the big story over the next month. You've said publicly that ousting Maduro from Venezuela could embolden China to accelerate a Taiwan takeover. The CIA, it has been reported in media, warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech companies about a possible invasion as soon as next year. You've separately met publicly with Chinese officials. What's your view on the likelihood and the timeline of a China attempted takeover of Taiwan? And what are these kind of motivating factors that might make that happen sooner?

[B]

So let me clarify. I. I'm not sure, or I may have been misinterpreted. But obviously the Chinese watch very carefully. They study wars and they will learn lessons from what's going on here. But I don't think the Venezuelan operation, other than making them feel envious about the capabilities, will impact their likelihood of attacking Taiwan. So Taiwan number one. I think the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan this year or next year or even into 28, but let me just do 26 and 27. Absent some major provocation by Taiwan or some other third incident is very low. I put it at about where the prediction markets are, 5% or something low. So I'm not counting on that.

[C]

Second, why is that so low? I'm just curious.

[B]

Why 5%? Yeah, because first, they have a theory of the case of what they call peaceful reunification, and they think things are evolving in that direction. The theory of the case is that the current government, which is a DPP government, currently is stymied by its opposition in the parliament. So they can't even buy the arms sales that we previously gave them. There's $11 billion arm sales that the Chinese have complained about. But Taiwan is. The legislature probably won't buy half of that. Okay, so the current president is struggling. There's going to be an election in January 28, and they think it's likely that the former party, the kmt, will be elected somebody that'll be much more sympathetic to China and to an evolving relationship. So that's number one. Number two, the Chinese have been engaged in a deep, deep purge of all of their military leadership. I mean, it's hard to believe, and you read about in the paper from time to time that he fired this guy. He fired this guy. He's fired the equivalent of every four star in our whole political system and every combatant commander and every commander who would be commanding the forces over to deal with Taiwan. So while they've been building up that military capability Takes a long time to get that back into order, in my view. So I would say that part makes me feel less likely. Third, I think he understands that if he were to do this, there's a risk, not a certainty, but a risk that the US Would become involved and that the impact of that either on China's economy, which he's got to worry about first, and also on its evolution, would be significant. So I'm looking for. And finally, in Trump, he has the most accommodating president that China is likely to see with respect to Taiwan. So Trump has made no secrets. I mean, he talks publicly of his views about Taiwan in, I think, a couple of the memoirs. There's this discussion where he's in the Oval and he's talking about Taiwan, and he picked, or somebody asked him about Taiwan. He picks up one of those Sharpies and goes on a spot on the Resolute desk, and he says that Taiwan. Then he draws his hand around the whole desk. He said, that's China. So I would say I'm less worried about Taiwan on the current path. Now, over the longer run, the Chinese are absolutely clear, Xi and all the leadership, that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. And how that could be satisfied in a way that. That allow the Taiwanese the degree or substantial degree of the freedom for both their economy and their society is the challenge that we've been struggling with for a long time. But the good news is we've been doing this for 50 years, and Taiwan has never seen such a better, you know, such such circumstances. So I say to the Taiwanese friends, you know, basically, don't screw it up.

[A]

Are we taking the right course of action, do you think? I guess the big question for you is, what's the strategic imperative to keep Taiwan from falling under direct Chinese control for the United States? And are we taking the right actions to hedge our bets, if you will, against that happening, meaning on shoring of semiconductor manufacturing, but also maybe from a defense perspective and positioning perspective, you can share a little bit about whether we're

[B]

sure that's a big question. So first, Scott Besant, the Secretary of the treasury, when he's asked about this, he says the biggest threat that he's ever seen is the fact that 96% of the advanced semiconductors come from one small island that could become cut off. So tsmc, as you all have discussed before, produces the advanced semiconductors for essentially everybody of whom we're the principal consumer, and we prevent them shipping this to China. That's a pretty complicated situation to begin with secondly, Taiwan is halfway around the world, as President Trump says, and 90 miles off the shore of China, and we're far away and we have a lot of other things and worry about. So it's a little bit like Cuba, so inherently indefensible if China were seriously determined to either destroy it or to take it. Now, on the other hand, since the opening to China and the Shanghai communique, there's been an agreement of maintaining a status quo with the US Commitment being what's called strategic ambiguity, in which the US And China have been committed to Taiwan. Internal development is left to its own device, and China doesn't use military force to prevent that. But we say Taiwan is. There's one China and the only China's capital is Beijing. And then we have a little bit of ambiguous way to talk about the relationship between Taiwan and China, but certainly letting it evolve in any way that the parties would be prepared to live with. Most people expecting that over time this relationship will work its way out. And when I talk to Chinese about it, I say to them, first, you've never seen 50 better years on either side of the straits. So this has been fantastic for both societies in terms of what they care about. And secondly, if they look at this situation, if China's core strategy is correct, which is the inexorable rise of China and that continues in another decade or two, Taiwan will look like a fleet and therefore not going to be an issue. If China's main narrative doesn't work, Taiwan is not going to be their biggest problem, so they should work on the other issues.

[A]

If you think about China projecting influence around the world, how important is it for them to continue to do that? There was recently an objective, I think, of a GDP growth in the 5% range. 4 to 5%. Is that right for China? Which.

[B]

4 and a half to 5.

[A]

Yep, 4 and a half to 5, which is a record low in recent history for them. Is it imperative for China to continue to extend geopolitical and economic influence around the world to grow its economy? Going back to the framing of the rising power, do they still need to do that to keep people happy at home, or is China going to be able to maintain happiness at home in a multipolar world where China and perhaps the US and perhaps some other countries share influence around the world?

[B]

This is one you raised and we talked about the last time, which is interesting. I think we agreed. So let me just, again, for people that don't remember Sartre. So first, China is a meteoric rising power. Never has A country risen so far so fast on so many different dimensions. If you take a snapshot of the year 2000 and the year 2025 and compare China on any metric of power, it's just dumbfounding, dumbfounding. So a country that I have compared it to kind of like Formula one racing, a country that we couldn't find in our rearview mirror in 2020, or, sorry, 2000 because it was so far behind, we have trouble finding in our rearview mirror today because it's beside us or in many races, even slightly ahead of us. That's GDP. It was less than 5% of global, or it was less than a quarter the US in 2000. Today, by purchasing power parity, it's 25% larger. In 2000 trading, it was 5% of global. Today, and we were 15. Today it's 35 and we're 25. If you do advanced tech in any arena, take 5G. Oh my goodness. Take EVs. Oh my goodness. Take whatever. Okay, so rapidly rising power, that's essential. That's the infrastructure for their grand narrative, which is the inexorable rise of China to its natural position in the international order, which they think is at the top of the pyramid. So they are absolutely determined to be number one in their own arena to begin with. And then after that, maybe more. And they also, they have a second, the second proposition. There's the inexorable decline of the US and they look at the various parts of the US and the components, including getting involved in unnecessary wars, as part of that story, as part of their narrative. And that dynamic, the shifting of the seesaw, is what gives you this thucidity and dynamic that we discussed before, which most often, hard as it is to believe, but most often discombobulates people so much that then some incident or accident, like something that happens over Taiwan leads to a vicious circle of actions and reactions that drags them into a war, after which they think, my God, how did this ever happen? So that's a long story, but I would say the economic piece is essential for this. And that economic piece means they want to be the manufacturing workshop for the world and the foundry for the world and the supplier for the world.

[C]

There are two major challenges they have. I believe one of them is population decline. The other is unemployment. And the AI that we've seen and what's hitting first could hit them in a major way. Manufacturing is moving to robotics at an alarming place. Then you have things like self driving, which is a major job there for Many people. So on those two axis, when you see the youth unemployment, which I think is 15 or 20% in some locations in China and population decline, is that Xi's two biggest challenges to deal with and how does that affect this relationship?

[B]

Good question. And this is more in your space than mine because I've tried to follow, but Elon says there's going to be more robots than people. Okay.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And if you ask him where are the most advanced robots in the world, the ones that are kicking his ass or he worries about, they're China. So they got a huge number of robot companies. When I was there in, when was I last there in January, I went to see a factory. Xiaomi, the phone company Xiaomi, three years ago decided they would make cars after watching Apple spend $10 million not able to make a car within three years. That factory is producing cars right now. And they have a huge demand for these cars. They have three lines. One of the lines is all robots. So they're putting a lot of robots to work. More than half of the working the factory worker robots in the world are in China. And so some of the people are saying, well, you know, demographics is going to be not so big a problem because if demographics is only a problem because of workers, we're going to have worker. In fact, the American workers are more worried about taking our jobs. Now the issue for the impact on education, they have a number of people that have been educated in arenas that are now, no longer, you know, high demand jobs. Unfortunately, we have a lot of that too. I mean, if you look at people, college graduates now that graduated in, I don't know, DEI subjects, they're having trouble getting jobs. So I would say it's a little. There are more similarities there than differences. The other thing is Chinese have demonstrated a great, much greater capacity or readiness to adopt and adapt to new technologies. So if you look at, I'm sure you have, or y' all have probably had him on Jensen Wong, but when he went to China, he said, gee, I think I came to the future. You know, that the people don't, you know, they don't use. Not only do they not use coins, they don't use bills, they don't lose checks, they don't use credit cards. They just have their face. And then go through the story.

[A]

Let's shift around to what some have described as the longer term playing field, which is near the Arctic. Some have argued that much of the recent push for Greenland by the United States is driven by the military threat coming over the Arctic. From Russia and from China. I'm wondering if you could just help frame for our audience, why is Greenland so strategic to the United States? And is this effectively a proxy for defense against China and Russia? And why now?

[B]

Another big question. So let me start with the bottom line. I think the, at least from the judgments of the people whom I respect the most, we, the US can get everything we want from Greenland without invading it or owning it. So Greenland has been an important base for missile defenses, a dual tool base. We had two other bases that we closed, but we can open as many other bases as we want and they're very amenable to that. I think President Trump's right to say, well, yeah, but I don't want a short term lease on these bases. I would say a 99 year lease sounds like a pretty good lease to me. For in 99 years, God knows what's going to be happening. But to the extent that missile defense is part of it, which it is, I would say that's a part. For the naval component, Yes. I think as the Arctic melts, you already now have an opening of sea lanes and the way that territorial ownership, the abutters have their claim to the local and the regional. And there the main claims are Russian and Canadian. We have a chunk from Alaska and then Greenland would be a piece of that. So I would say that's relevant. But those sea lanes, at least for the Navy people I talk to are, they're not as important as they used to be because now there's so many different ways to get it. You're not going to try to blockade a waterway with ships. You're going to do it with smart mines or you're going to do it simply by attacking the ships on the array. And if it's underwater, underwater is pretty much all the same, but it's good to have narrow places and shallow places for looking for things. I would say. I think Trump's Greenland venture was more like for fun. Plus, I mean, I think one of the people that knows him well says, remember, he's first off a reality TV producer and star. So he just has fun, starting with a drama, getting people very excited, letting the tension rise and then finding a resolution. And I think we're on track to a resolution there.

[A]

Let me push back just on that point, please. What I have heard is that there's rising socialism in Western Europe, growing concern that over time, as socialism becomes more of the mainstay in the governing models in Western European nations, those nations fall more under the influence of China and As a result, if you think about the influence that China could then have on, on Denmark and on Danish foreign policy, if the United States doesn't secure what it needs for the long term, and it may not know what it needs for the long term physically in Greenland today, we only know what we need today, that we're at risk of China having outsized influence over Greenland tomorrow, and that that's the real reason for the big push today for Greenland. How does that sit with you and does that align kind of with, with what some folks are concerned about?

[B]

I have to think about it. I hadn't heard that argument just that way. Again, what is socialism? It's complicated. Certainly the Chinese, well, yes, they're socialists in some respect. I would say capitalism is, I mean, they're autocratic and they're party led, but then their economy is essentially fiercely capitalist. I mean, you have. One of my friends, gladiatorial conflict that makes the competition in Silicon Valley look, look tame as the parties fight each other.

[A]

Well, because you can't make money because the taxes are so high.

[C]

That's another.

[B]

And in their case, they decide they're going into an arena, let's say, for example, EVs and so they give advantages to companies getting started, even subsidies. And then they let them fight it out. And lo and behold, at the end there'll be 10 or five. But it's fiercely competitive in the meantime and a lot of guys will get trampled along the way. And then those guys are excess capacity and they'll sell things off without any concern about the Capex, as long as they can stay ahead of the game selling items or even selling out their inventory. So I think the, I think watching the way, watching the evolution of other countries, including Europe and their relations with China as well as with us in this game is a very relevant point. And I would say that one of the things that the Trump administration has had trouble with is recognizing that if we're in a fierce rivalry with China, they got four times as many people. We need to have some allies with heft on our side of the seesaw to keep it from going the wrong direction. And so yes, sometimes you need to give your ally a cold bath in order to get them to shape up. But I think getting Canadians to think of us as an enemy is a pretty wild idea. I mean, any treatment that comes to that conclusion. And if you take Carney, whom I know from when he's a Harvard college kid, he's as American as anybody or he was. But the idea, if you Go and threaten a politician's survival, that's a pretty good way to piss them off. And if you threaten to take territory from people, that's a pretty good way to make them feel hostile. So this is an unusual treatment if we're trying to get guys with heft on our side of the seesaw.

[C]

At the World Economic Forum, I wasn't sure if it was Davos or another one of their forums. Were you at the Davos one this year?

[B]

Sure.

[C]

So, as a total aside, just bringing President Trump's impact, it was two and a half days of people wondering what he would say when he got there. The town shut down as people watched his two hour stand up delivery, and then another two days of people sort of trying to understand and figure out what happened there. So there's something really.

[B]

It was a reality TV show for sure. Yeah.

[C]

They took over.

[B]

This fellow Mooch, who was his communication guy for a week or 10 days till he got fired in the first administration, said on the first night I was at an event, he said, remember, this is going to be a reality TV show. It's going to start with the claim that we're going to invade Greenland, which, my God, invading in a lie, that's a pretty big deal. He said, then you're going to watch the drama build. When Trump had a chance to speak, he's speaking this long range, back and forth, back, but he then had just a paragraph in which he said he basically took the gun off the table. But before that he was doing a mafioso act. Even some mafioso lines about, you can either have it the easy way or the hard way. That's a Godfather line. And so people were saying, yikes, what has been loose on us? So now you have all this drama. But then he says, I've decided we're not going to invade Greenland. He just passes that off. So now the temperature goes down and now the third day he does some other institute or board of peace and he says, we now have a framework of an agreement. So I think half of the time he's having fun with Sonomix. It does get people's attention.

[C]

Sure, it does. You on a substantive basis, shared a framework, 80, 89. And I think I've spent a bunch of time listening to the talk he gave and some people's reaction to it. Maybe you could share it with the audience and why it's important.

[B]

Oh, thank you. I'm glad you. So I think this is a big idea. So these are three numbers, each of which is the answer to a question. And if you can remember the three numbers and you can identify the question to which each one is the answer, you have the big picture about international security in the lifetime of yourself and even your parents. That's virtually everybody who's alive today. So the first 80 is the answer to what?

[C]

How long it's been since a world war?

[B]

How many years since a great power war? Since the world war. Now, whoa, wait a minute. 80 years. This is the longest peace in recorded history since Rome. This is not natural, this is very abnormal. This didn't happen by accident. This was what the people who founded the international order after World War II were trying to build a new world order as they had just lived through a terrible World War II. Simply one generation before they remembered, hey, there was World War I. So if we just keep doing this, we should expect World War three. It should have already happened if it could have happened at the Cuban Missile crisis. So no great power war, fantastic. But a fragile, a work in progress all the time, eroding inevitably for many, many different reasons. Second 80, how many years since we've

[C]

had a nuclear bomb go off?

[B]

Fantastic. So think about that. If you had gone, if there'd been prediction markets and you had gone in 1945 or 50, you would have got 10,000 1 odds against that. It's impossible. The weapon that ended World War II. And you're not ever going to see any use of those weapons in war. Whoa.

[C]

And then nine, the number of countries, nation states that have nuclear bombs today.

[B]

Fantastic. Right now, how in the world could you have only nine countries having nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons being your kind of ultimate security blanket. Again, John Kennedy in 1963 said by the 70s there'll be 25 or 30 nuclear weapons states because he thought that as states acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons, they would do so today, 90, 95 states could have nuclear weapons in a year or two if they decided to build them actually into the 70s. Sweden had a serious nuclear program, South Korea had a nuclear program, Taiwan had a nuclear program. US closed those down, created a so called non proliferation regiment that's accounted for this nine. But I would say again, fragile, eroding, not likely to be sustained. So when I try to do my giving thanks for things that I should be thankful for, thankful for 80 years without a great power war. If there were a great power war, you and I, we wouldn't be here and we wouldn't be having this conversation. All the other issues we have to deal with. So I would say the 80, the 80 and 9 we should not take for granted. We should give thanks for the work that was done to build them. And then we should notice what's going to be required to sustain this.

[C]

And we almost had a tenth nuclear power in Iran.

[B]

We did.

[C]

And we had the latest two, if I'm correct here. You'll correct me because you're the expert. Pakistan and North Korea. And we had that one, Dr. Khan, I believe his name was from Pakistan, who was trying to spread and sell these.

[B]

Absolutely.

[C]

Did we make a critical era, we being the west, even the east, humanity, the leadership of letting Pakistan and North Korea into this club.

[B]

Well, I mean, not into the club, but allowing them to get nuclear weapons, which is. Right. The Israelis have had a different idea. And this goes back to the original attack on Iraq, Osirak, I call it affirmative, non proliferation. So they say we're not allowing nuclear weapons in our neighborhood. And they've destroyed the nuclear weapon project in Iraq. They destroyed the nuclear weapon activity in Syria when the North Koreans were building a plant there half dozen years ago. And now they've been the leaders in the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, which we participated in. However, I'm uncomfortable about the wars, even in Iran. I have to cheer for this because I fear additional nuclear weapons states. And I wish that we had managed somehow. Let's take the North Korean case. I've even said this to Chinese officials. I said, we. And you made a terrible mistake. Maybe we made a bigger mistake to let North Korea get nuclear weapons. But what we should have said to you is, hey, we have an idea. Nuclear weapons are either good for North Korea and South Korea or they're good for neither of them. Your choice. And that would have been hardball. But I think the idea of having Kim Jong Un have Now more than 100 nuclear warheads and missiles that can reach the American homeland is crazy. I mean, here we're talking about Iran and what it might be. Excuse me. It takes 20 minutes longer from Korea to get to Boston than from Iran or maybe 25 minutes. So I think that that's a useful perspective to remind us that we let this thing happen. It's a ticking bomb as far as I'm concerned. If you ask me what to do about it, that makes me cry because Trump in the first administration focused on this problem very seriously and did everything that he thought he could. And I thought it was a good effort, even though it was not successful. But the 20 other ways we've tried to deal with that problem were equally unsuccessful.

[C]

How does China feel about Nuclear proliferation and North Korea having these bombs.

[B]

Well, I think they feel a little ashamed at least about what happened in North Korea and kind of think, well, that wasn't really our problem. But now when you say, well, if this keeps, if things are on the current path, well, maybe South Korea or Japan will have nuclear arsenal in their backyard, they think that's a terrible idea and we would be not very enthusiastic about a Venezuelan or Canadian nuclear bomb. Yeah.

[A]

So, Dr. Allison, just to kind of wrap our tour of the world here, come back to the United States. Since we last spoke, there have been a number of mayors elected in this country that are self declared socialists or democratic socialists of America. And there's a rising populist movement in the United States that seems to be manifesting in many cases candidates that look and act like true deep socialists and want to enact socialist policies. What is the risk to the United States if this continues to go the way it's going? And what is the risk to the United States, do you think, in 2028, if we have a Democrat controlled House and Senate and a very populous Democrat candidate that looks like a DSA member, where does this take us?

[B]

Well, again, good for you all for thinking of uncomfortable, radical questions, but real. So if you look at the numbers, I've been looking at them lately, they're hard to believe in terms of the split between wealthy and poor or rich and poor. If you look at the who's benefited for the last generation in terms of the 0.01%, the 1%, the 10%, the 20%, well, that's us and all the people that we know virtually. And therefore when we say the market is third year in a bull market, and my goodness, here it's up 15 or 16% or this 80 or 70% of people, this is not part of their lives. And when I look at the numbers about both what I think the facts are and then even more people's perception, it's just not stable in a democracy. If everybody gets a vote and if the top 10 or 20% are taking 80% or 70% of the pie, that's not stable and sustainable, I think. And it's a political invitation for a populist and demographic demagogic. I mean, you don't even have to be a demagogue to say that's not fair, that's not reasonable. So I think that it's not. I mean, this is beyond my, I mean I can hardly deal with the problems I focus on. This one is one that I look over my shoulder and think, gee, wait a minute. First this can't be true. But then whenever I've been looking into the numbers lately, they look as bad as they appear. And then this is extremely dangerous. And I would say yes. And so I haven't heard people talking about plausible ways in which this could be addressed, but I think it's an invitation for some more radical ideas. And so while I like very much the Trump accounts for kids to give them some stake, I think that's a fantastic thing. I could probably be persuaded that people, even at my level of income, should pay another 10% of taxes or whatever for some more adjustment. I think the kind of adjustments that are basically putting people on the dole or support for non productive or semi productive activity makes me very uncomfortable. I mean, unless they're lame or ill

[C]

or aging or into UBI proposals, people getting a universal basic income, that, that takes motivation makes me less.

[B]

I like incentive. I mean, I think the stuff of America has been the opportunity for people to be incentivized, to invent, create and create wealth. That's benefits for everybody. But if the jam is not getting spread to 70% of the people, that's not a sustainable political situation. And, and I think, I mean, I thought it was in the New York campaign we got to see some preview of a bit of this. And in the primaries, you're seeing people going into this space. I haven't seen anybody with a coherent program yet. But I think for serious people thinking about what's good for the country, it's a good one to worry about.

[C]

Does seem, Freeberg, that there's a couple of proposals here. Minimum wage, maybe some type of a wealth tax. There are things that people are talking about. We may not all agree with them and they may be hard to execute, but one of them is for the people at the top. I think you would agree, Professor Allison, the people at the top have the most to lose here and they should be thinking about it. And maybe there's generosity and, you know, maybe giving away wealth in a more thoughtful way because there's so much wealth in this top 1%, 10% that they can't possibly spend. And so this might be something that that group of people should be thinking a little bit more about.

[B]

In the State of the Union, Trump called out Dell and a couple of other people for having stepped up and say, okay, I'm all in on this. I would say if something that certainly got my attention and made me think maybe I should be doing something different. Yeah, yeah, right.

[A]

Well, Professor Allison, you know, they say that you can measure a man's knowledge and thoughtfulness by his humility. I will say you have extraordinary depth, and you've thought so deeply about so many of these issues that this world is facing right now, and yet you act with such humility and grace when you speak about them. I want to thank you for that. I want to thank you for taking the time to be with us today. Really appreciate it and look forward to doing it again in person soon.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

Thank you so much on behalf of the audience and just on a personal basis. This is such a delight and privilege to be able to do this with you every year or two. And, man, I hope we can just do it every year, because it's the highlight of my year when we get to talk.

[B]

Excuse me. It's an honor for me. Thank you so much, and thank you for what you all are doing, and thanks for thinking of such hard questions. Take me home tonight to think about socialism. Yes. Yeah.

[C]

Okay. Thank you, sir.

[B]

Thank you.