Christiane Amanpour (3:35)

What will be the line that tells you that you have, that it's done? What is the end game? Because let me tell you what a former head of the Iran branch of your own military intelligence told the New York Times. Decapitation has its limitations. I don't think we've scratched the surface of the, in the ability of Iran to find replacements who can take over for the people that have been decapitated. That's happening. I mean, they keep finding replacements. And you've been doing this assassination policy for years on, you know, nuclear scientists and the like. And so what is, where will you say that, okay, we've degraded enough. That's the end. What is the end?

Naftali Bennett (4:18)

When we see that on the three dimensions, the nuclear, ballistic, and terror dimensions, threat has been all but, you know, pretty much removed. And we feel that Iran cannot threaten us in the future.

Christiane Amanpour (4:33)

Are you concerned, though, that just like, you know, in. You certainly degraded Hamas, you degraded Hezbollah, you took out their leaders, you took out leaders from, you know, from Iran over the summer and other, you know, regional leaders, and yet they keep refilling the ranks. And some American intelligence say that, you know, actually a former American commander says that for every one killed, there's another 10 who are ready to take, to take, you know, to take up arms again. Are you looking for the regime to collapse? Are you looking for it to people to rise up? What are you looking for?

Naftali Bennett (5:13)

Look, the issue of the rise up, that's a decision the Iranian people will have to make. That's not ours to decide. We are very considerably degrading the regime itself. The Basij, the terror police, the policemen that have been running after women who don't cover their heads, et cetera, et cetera. But that's not ours to decide. We're focused on removing the threat to the region and the threat to Israel.

Christiane Amanpour (5:46)

The Washington Post, as you probably know, has revealed a cable. It's a State Department cable from the US Embassy in Jerusalem. And I just want to play this. You say it's not ours to say, but actually, Prime Minister Netanyahu did say, after the killing of Ali Larijani, this is what he did say. Let me just play this.

Edward Fishman (6:05)

We are undermining this regime in the hope of giving the Iranian people an opportunity to remove it.

Christiane Amanpour (6:12)

Okay? So he, he, he said it over and Again, that we're trying to do this, to pave the way for the Iranian people to remove it. But I wonder what you make of this cable. As I said, from the State Department to the. Sorry. To the State Department from the US Embassy in Jerusalem. It says senior Israeli officials privately told U.S. diplomats that if Iranians take to the streets, quote, the people will get slaughtered because the IRGC has. Still has the upper hand. Um, this. At the same time as your prime minister is calling on the people to stand up. How do you justify it? And do you agree with that cable that's. That come from the US Embassy to the State Department?

Naftali Bennett (6:56)

Well, look, ultimately, Christian, I believe that this regime will fall. I don't know when, though. It's a corrupt, old, disconnected and incompetent regime, pretty similar to the Soviet regime in the 80s. So ultimately, it will collapse. And that would be good for the people of Iran, for the region. We cannot time this, and we cannot. It's not a deterministic situation where if we take three or four specific actions, this will happen. It's an issue of the Iranian public. But we are significantly damaging the whole terror apparatus, the whole Basij IRGC regime apparatus, to make it as weak as it'll ever be, or at least in the near future. I understand it's not easy, and, no, I can't be here and guarantee that within days the regime will fall.

Christiane Amanpour (7:50)

Are you surprised? Because there has been surprise expressed in Washington at the level, and even in the Gulf States at the level of Iranian retaliation that does continue. Sure, you've degraded it, but it still continues. And the level of the checkpoint, sorry, the chokehold and the retaliation on the Strait of Hormuz and the very important, you know, oil transport waterway there, because certainly in the United States, again, there is very much concern about the spiking oil prices, the, you know, cost of living going up and all, you know, all the attendant, you know, whatever, you know, the fallout from doing this kind of retaliation.

Naftali Bennett (8:32)

No, I'm not surprised. We expected and we knew that Iran is building a formidable war machine, terror machine, nuclear machine, ballistic missile machine. And that only magnifies the need or emphasizes the need to have acted when we did.

Christiane Amanpour (8:53)

There are quite a few diplomats, certainly in the Arab world who are concerned, who, you know, who have a stake in the negotiations that were going on before this war even. There's reports now of European diplomats and national security officials who are beginning more and more to come out and say that they believe that there was a endgame, a successful, potentially, certainly on the Nuclear issue resolution. Regarding negotiations that President Trump was into, you know, the indirect negotiations with Iran via the Omanis. Many people are saying they believe that this was going in the right direction. I see you. I see you shaking your head because I know that Israel has never believed in these negotiations. But the truth is that there was no imminent threat from Iran. All the intelligence says that, um. Do you think that it was the. Given what's been going on now for the last more than three weeks, Israelis dying Israelis, you know, being on the receiving end of missiles, allies in the Gulf, all these people who you've signed the Abraham accords with, etc. Do you think that it's. That this was the right way to go? I know it was a dream of Netanyahu's. He said it himself. But my dream for 40 years has now come true.

Naftali Bennett (10:13)

Well, you've asked a bunch of questions.

Christiane Amanpour (10:14)

I know, but they're all wrapped up in one. Okay, go ahead.

Naftali Bennett (10:19)

So, look, I understand the impatience. It's natural. But a threat that's been building for 40 years cannot be dismantled in 10 days. It takes a bit of time. And if we had not acted now, we would have reached the point where the threat is just not manageable. So you're asking about an imminent threat. We were. A responsible leadership doesn't wait for the moment that the threat is imminent, because by then it's too late. Let's take two historic cases, the Cuban Missile Crisis and North Korea. In 1962, when a threat was building on America's southern border, America acted in time to prevent the threat from becoming unmanageable. Whereas in the 90s, when North Korea was moving towards becoming nuclear, the world didn't act. So do we want to adopt the Kennedy strategy or the 90s strategy? We want to adopt the Kennedy strategy and ensure that Iran does not become an unmanageable threat.

Christiane Amanpour (11:31)

I mean, look, you know, the Cuban Missile Crisis, there were actually missiles, you know, ready and aiming at the United States. It was a real imminent threat. That was an imminent threat, and it was resolved diplomatically. That was 1962, when there were leaders, you know, who believed, and the UN Was involved and believed in the power of negotiation. But here's the thing again, I tried to figure out how you see an end to.

Naftali Bennett (11:58)

Yeah, if I may, on that very point, Donald Trump sent his negotiators to negotiate with Iran, and I believe he meant to achieve a deal where the deal is where they dismantle their nuclear weapons program. Kushner and Wyckoff got there, talked to The Iranians understood that there's totally no beginning of a start because they saw the Iranians are adamant. Sometimes you start a negotiation and you see that there's zero chance, and called up Trump, told him there's zero chance for these guys to dismantle the nuclear program. And he made the logical decision, which is to act. That's all that happened here.

Christiane Amanpour (12:45)

Right. But as I told you, first of all, you say nuclear weapons program, as you know, that there wasn't at the time or now an imminent threat of nuclear weapons, despite what the US Say about building.

Edward Fishman (12:57)

No, no, no, no. Hold on.

Christiane Amanpour (12:58)

I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question.

Naftali Bennett (13:01)

Let me interrupt you, okay? No, no, this is important because responsible leaders, if you wait for the threat to be imminent, it's too late. When is the threat imminent? When they have a bomb? When they have 10 bombs? When the missile is on its way to Europe or America or Israel? Imminent. Precisely. To prevent us from getting to that moment, we had to act.

Walter Isaacson (13:24)

Now.

Naftali Bennett (13:25)

It's such a logical thing that I think anyone who's decent should understand that if you wait for the last moment, it's too late, just like what happened with North Korea.

Christiane Amanpour (13:37)

So I'm interested because you are confirming that it was an imminent threat at the time. But now, building on what you've just said, I want to ask you then, what is the next logical step? Because that highly enriched uranium, not quite yet at bomb grade, but the 60% that you all said, you remember in June, Israel, the United States said they had obliterated Iran's nuclear capabilities, but that that highly enriched was buried somewhere if. And that could be an issue. Right. So what do you think Israel, the United States should do to get that 400 kg of highly enriched uranium back? Otherwise, the problem remains. The problem that you're citing.

Naftali Bennett (14:21)

Well, the nuclear program is much, much broader than just that particular batch of highly enriched uranium. We're talking about thousands of centrifuges. We're talking about the weaponization program, we're talking about the ballistic missile program. And if you dismantle everything, then ultimately even that uranium is useless because you can't just shoot it. Right. A centrifuge is sort of like one of those lettuce dryer machines where it turns around, revolves and you'd have to pour that 60% into advanced centrifuges. But if we dismantle the whole thing, there's no program. It is very important to extract that uranium out of Iran, but it's part of a much broader element. And we, yes, we have to remove this threat. In fact, what we're seeing Iran doing now just proves that it could be much, much worse if we hadn't acted. Because it wouldn't just be an oil blackmail, it would be a nuclear blackmail.

Christiane Amanpour (15:29)

Let me just move on, because there's other things to ask you, including about Lebanon, the other front that's been opened in this war. And I know that, you know, there's potential actual ground troops going in. So the leader of the opposition party, Yair Golan, says a deep military maneuver inside Lebanon without a clear political objective will drag Israel back into the Lebanese quagmire and won't bring real security to the communities of the north. Are you concerned, giving Israel's previous experience and eventual decision to withdraw from Israel, sorry, from Lebanon, that you could get caught in another major, you know, quagmire, which leads to more deaths, more instability, more, you know, more instability in that region? Because I know you think, I know the strategy is to change the Middle east by essentially bombing all the threats that you perceive. But are you concerned about getting back into a ground, you know, invasion, occupation and quagmire?

Naftali Bennett (16:36)

Well, you said something that it's a bit unfair. Two things. You said there was a front that has been opened. It hasn't been opened. Hezbollah started shooting rockets at us unilaterally. Secondly, it's unfair to say that we think that we want to bomb the Middle east to change it. No, we don't want to bomb the Middle east to change it. We want security. That's all we want. We don't want a broader Israel. We don't want anything. We want my children here in Ranana and up in the north to live. That's all we have, our only goal in this tiny little country. The problem is, and the mistake that's been made for the past four decades is that we allowed threats to grow and grow to such a size that it became essentially a ring of fire around us. And, yes, it is painful to remove that ring of fire. Hezbollah has taken Lebanon as a hostage. We have no war with Lebanon. But we certainly want to remove Hezbollah as a threat to our people. And this will end when Hezbollah ends, stops being a threat to our people.

Christiane Amanpour (17:47)

Can I ask you about. You say you don't want Greater Israel, you don't want, et cetera, but as you know, the occupied west bank is still under very, very large threat from within, from the settlers and from the security forces and from the idea of, you know, annexation by a different name. That's what your critics say is happening. I want to focus on this. You know, this family, the O' Day family. Four members were killed. The mother, the father, two sons aged age 7 and 5. They were going out to buy clothes and sweets for aid. And the 12 year old survivor, one of the boys said the soldier, IDF dragged him out of the car by his hair, beat him and told him we kill dogs. And there was no accountability or anything. And also a lot of the settlers, as you know, have upped their attacks on Palestinian farms, land, homes, villages, obviously, since October 7th and even more since the beginning of this war. So is this a policy that the government approves? Is this a way to move Palestinians out or terrify them into leaving?

Naftali Bennett (19:02)

No. In Judea and Samaria, there's roughly half a million Israelis. The overwhelming majority of them are law abiding, good people, decent people. And there's about 2 million Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority. There is friction and in many, many cases we see Palestinian terror and killing Israelis. And we also see a small amount of violence against Palestinians. I have zero tolerance for any sort of illegal actions against Palestinians. And it's been investigated and I stand behind all investigations because Israel is a democracy with rule of law and I insist the law abides. But to put it in context, there is a huge amount of terror against Israelis as well. And it's tough.

Christiane Amanpour (19:57)

We're going to have to continue that part of the conversation because it's a much, much bigger story. And I will come back to you on that because there is a lot of law breaking going on there by the settlers and the security forces are not stepping in and protecting the victims of this. So I know your point. You've just made it. And we'll continue that part of the conversation. Just quickly, before I say goodbye, how long do you think your war on Iran will take? What do you think?

Naftali Bennett (20:26)

You know, I wouldn't put a point on the calendar. It ends when the threat ends.

Christiane Amanpour (20:32)

All right. Well, that is a difficult red line to see. And we will, we will come back to you. Thank you very much, Naftali Bennett, and stay with us. We'll be right back after the break. Now, as we've mentioned, Israel says it's killed Iran's intelligence minister Ismail Khatib in a strike on Tuesday. It is just the latest in a string of assassinated Iranian officials. And yet despite the bombs and the new supreme leader, Mojtab Al Khamenei remaining in the shadow, the regime still appears intact. And in fact, it is increasing warnings and intimidation towards anyone inside Iran who might come out to protest the government. My next guest knows the inner workings of this regime all too well. Syed Hossein Mousavian served as a diplomat and nuclear negotiator for the Islamic Republic. And he's joining me now from Princeton, New Jersey, to discuss where he sees all this going. Welcome back to our program.

Sayed Hossein Mousavian (21:39)

Thank you, Christian. Thank you for having me.

Christiane Amanpour (21:41)

So I don't know whether you were able to listen to our previous interview with the former Israeli prime minister, but where do you think this policy of, as they call it, you know, decapitation, elimination, essentially cutting the head off the snake, as they would put it, where does it leave the Iranian leadership right now?

Sayed Hossein Mousavian (22:06)

It really depends to the end state of strategy of President Trump, the United States and Israel. On the US Side. What we have heard during last days, very publicly, officially, you have heard a lot. The strategy, the aim of attacking Iran was regime change. You heard an official from White House director of energy publicly said the goal was to control Iranian energy. You heard Senator Graham saying that after regime change we will have tons of money. Therefore, it seems at least part of the establishment is looking for regime change and Iranian oil and wealth. If this is the case, I think we are going to have endless war. But Israeli objective, I think is different than the US you heard Prime Minister Netanyahu very clearly, very officially, very openly said he is following the strategy of Greater Israel. And you heard the ambassador, United States ambassador to Israel, which very openly said Israel has right to occupy other Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, based on what the Israeli prime minister and officials said, the main objective of Israel is a Greater Israel. Therefore, they are not convinced even about regime change in Iran, as Alan Iyer, the former Persian spokesperson of State Department said. He said Israel is not convinced about even disintegration of Iran. He is after the total destroying Iran.

Christiane Amanpour (24:14)

Okay, so let me. I know, Mr. Mousavian, hold on one second. I just need to ask you a question here. I want to ask you about where because I consider you somebody who's essentially, you know, close enough to be part of the current government there. So the resilience of it. How do you, how do you account for it? Because I want to play a soundbite from Iran's foreign Minister Abbas Al Aqchi, who spoke to Al Jazeera about the decapitations and about how the regime is still operating.

Abbas Al Aqchi (24:45)

I do not know why the Americans and the Israelis still have not understood this point. The Islamic Republic of Iran has a strong political structure with established political, equal economic and social institutions. The presence or absence of a single individual does not affect this structure. Of course, individuals are influential and each person plays their role, some better, some worse, some less. But what matters is that the political system in Iran is a very solid structure.

Christiane Amanpour (25:18)

So, Mr. Mousavian, how solid? First of all, do you agree with the foreign Minister? And these are very top leaders now who've been assassinated. From your supreme Leader to the head of the intelligence to the head, you know, the national security official, Ali Larijani. How much more can the government there tolerate in terms of targeted assassinations?

Sayed Hossein Mousavian (25:43)

First of all, about the resilience, Christian. I think the world already is somehow surprised. During past 20 days, Iran has demonstrated significant resilience. The American Israeli assumption was that the regime would collapse 48 hours, maximum 72 hours after they assassinate number one, the supreme leader and about 50 very high level security military officials. But Iran retaliated just three hours after the assassination of the leader. And the officials attacking the U.S. military bases in the region, attacking Israel. And during last past 20 days you have seen how powerfully they are retaliating. I think perhaps Israelis and Americans, they should have already studied the history. When Iran resisted eight years Saddam invaded Iran, the us, Europe, Soviet Union, China, India, all regional countries, they were supporting, supporting the aggression of Saddam. And Iran was alone. And for eight years Iran alone resisted. And Saddam is over 20 years, Saddam is gone. Therefore, I think they will be able to continue their resilience, their resistance, at least for months to come. And about the assassination strategy with Israelis now they are leading, if you go back again, Christian, to history after revolution, 1979, up to the US Israeli attack on Iran in 2025, thousands of Iranian officials have been assassinated. Thousands. And during eight years, war after war, under different circumstances. But we have never seen regime collapse or dysfunctionality, I mean, or disintegration of the system. And after the first U.S. attack, 2025, up to now, I think more than 200 officials have been assassinated. But you see, still the system is intact. Therefore, I really don't believe the assassination strategy would bring regime collapse. Perhaps it could be more counterproductive for Israel and for the US because during past 20 days you have seen the Iranians have been united. They are worried about the security and stability of their country. Especially when they have seen hundreds of homes, hospitals, schools, even historical monuments have been destroyed by the attack. Now they are very much concerned about the security and stability. That's why they have been united. They are in the streets, thousands of people every day they are in the streets in order to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the country. But having said that, Christian, we should not make a mistake. Majority of Iranians, they are not satisfied with the social and economic situation of the country.

Christiane Amanpour (29:15)

Right? I was going to ask you about that. I was going to ask about that. Let me ask you a question, because this is crucial, right? It's crucial and nobody's answered it. You say unity. You know perfectly well that there is a cadre of Iranians inside Iran and outside Iran, the majority who are celebrating. They are celebrating because they think this is an opportunity to be liberated from 47 years of cruel and ruthless repression by the regime. Most notably, as you say, they have legitimate, you know, complaints about social restrictions, about the economy, about everything. And yet they were brutally crushed in January. This is a very different dynamic now to all the things that you've told, you've been telling me about what I mean, Iran could never, never meet their, this government can never meet their, their needs, can they? I mean, why should these people want to see the continuation of a government that for 47 years has crushed them to the point that they are celebrating being bombed by foreign countries?

Sayed Hossein Mousavian (30:29)

We need to have a distinction on two issues. One, the fact that majority of Iranians, they are not satisfied with economic and social situation of the country, about the inflation, about poverty, about corruption, about dysfunctionality of the system. And they are asking for major, major reforms and a better life. No doubt about it, no question. But when the issue, when the nation is faced with foreign attacks threatening the integrity and sovereignty of the country, they have already united and now they are united in order to defend the integrity of their country.

Christiane Amanpour (31:15)

You told me that. I want to talk. I understand, but I want to ask you the day after, let's say this government stays in place. I already read that the president has called in members of the irgc, the Revolutionary Guard, to say how are we going to meet the demands of our dissatisfied people? And even if we survive, they are going to protest again and they are going to want change. So who's going to come out the winner if this regime stands? If it's the military, irgc, it's going to be very tough on the people. And Iran doesn't have the wherewithal to actually meet the legitimate needs of the people, the economic needs of the people, nor do they necessarily want to have a theocracy. So how do you see the day of the after?

Sayed Hossein Mousavian (32:03)

I believe if, if the war is finished today, the problem for the Iranian government, Iranian established, would be at least double or triple compared to the B for war because they have already the economic problem, sanctions, inflation, depreciation of Iranian currency, all a lot of problems before the war. Now they have the damages, the destruction big part of the country after the war. Therefore, this would be a double burden of the Iranian establishment. I really cannot imagine they can sustain the type of governance system which they have been doing during the last two, three decades. And if the war is going to be finished tomorrow, they need substantial reforms in order to satisfy the people domestically and in foreign policy. They have to solve the problem with the regional countries. They need to have a compromise with the US they need to end the hostility with the United States and vice versa. The US Also need to end the hostility with Iran in order to lift the sanctions. Otherwise Iran would have much more problem after.

Christiane Amanpour (33:29)

I mean, that's a huge, huge. If I know that you're part of the system, do you think, well, already the system there is threatening. People don't come out. Orders shoot to kill. You know, Internet is cut. All of these kinds of really ruthless and repressive measures are in place right now. Do you think that system is ready to do what you've just said? You know, major reforms to satisfy the needs of the people?

Sayed Hossein Mousavian (33:58)

You know, Christian, you perhaps you remember I was arrested in 2007 and I was jailed because I was opposing Ahmadinejad foreign policy on nuclear, on a lot of issues. And you may don't know, I have had another prison sentence in 2022 and I have not been able to go back to my country about four or five. Therefore, I have my own problem with the system, more than many Iranian diaspora outside. But I'm talking about the national interest of Iran, national interest of the US the current war is neither in the national interest of the U.S. nor Iran, nor the region. Therefore, we need diplomacy and we need perhaps a very influential mediator to come to bring an end, a compromise between Iran and the US I'm talking about what is really vital. I really don't know whether this war would end or not. I don't know even if the war would end, the governing system of Iran would go for reforms. But what I say, if the war is ended today, the system needs huge reforms in governing system. I mean, they need functionality. They have been really dysfunctional and they need big changes in foreign relations. This is what I'm saying.

Christiane Amanpour (35:33)

All right, I appreciate it. Thank you very much, Mr. Mousaviyan, for being on with us. Thank you. And we'll be right back after this short break.

TaxAct Advertiser (35:48)

Taxact can think of a million things more fun than filing taxes. TaxAct is going to name some now. Sitting in traffic, folding a fitted bedsheet, listening to your co worker talk about his fantasy team digging a hole. Digging an even larger hole next to that original hole. Unfortunately, TaxAct's filing software can't make taxes fun, but TaxAct can help you get them done. Tax act let's get them over with.

Anderson Cooper (36:18)

Hey, I'm Anderson Cooper. On my podcast All There Is, we explore grief and loss in all its complexities. You'll hear deeply moving and honest discussions with people who have faced and are living with life altering losses. Singer, songwriter and actress Sara Bareilles.

Sara Bareilles (36:34)

I'm really honored to be here.

Anderson Cooper (36:36)

You've actually listened to this podcast many, many times.

Sara Bareilles (36:39)

Yes, yes.

Anderson Cooper (36:40)

What brought you to it?

Sara Bareilles (36:41)

I guess my own grief. You realize how un unique you are and you know how much everyone is carrying and how I think really people want permission to share how much pain they're carrying at any given moment. To know that it's okay to be in so much pain. Because I think we all are in different ways.

Anderson Cooper (37:02)

Talking grief, building community. That's what the podcast is all about. This is all there is. Listen and follow wherever you get your podcasts.

Christiane Amanpour (37:17)

Now, for the first time since the war began, Iran says the US And Israel have targeted parts of its oil and natural gas facilities, causing prices to spike. This as the world faces the biggest energy supply disruption in history following Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Our next guest knows this major passage well and highlights its geographic choke point. In his book, former State Department official and author Edward Fishman speaks to Walter Isaacson about the impact of US Military intervention in Iran on the global economy.

Walter Isaacson (37:51)

Thank you, Chris. John and Edward Fishman, welcome back to the show.

Edward Fishman (37:56)

Thanks so much for having me on today.

Walter Isaacson (37:57)

Walter, your book Choke Points talks about two types of choke points, geographic ones and economic ones. Let's start with the most famous geographic one, the Strait of Hormuz. Explain to me what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz and whether the Trump administration should have figured that out earlier.

Edward Fishman (38:15)

So Walter, the Strait of Hormuz is by far the world's most important maritime choke points. Of all the choke points, whether it's the Panama Canal or the Straits of Malacca or the Bosphorus, the Strait of Hormuz takes the cake. And that's because 20% of global oil supplies on a daily basis before this war went through that narrow waterway and about the same in terms of liquefied natural gas. And so what we're facing now because Iran has effectively closed the strait is a dramatic shock to the global energy system. In fact, the International Energy Agency, the iea, has said that this is the largest disruption in the history of the world oil market already. And we're only two and a half weeks into this war. I think the thing that surprised the Trump administration and by the way, the markets and really confounded many analysts is that. But the assumption was that if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, they would actually have to physically block it. They would have to lay thousands of sea mines that made sailing through the strait impossible for anyone, including Iranian vessels themselves. And I think the assumption was that Iran wouldn't do that because if the Strait of Hormuz was mined so heavily, even Iran's own oil tankers couldn't get out of the strait. And of course, Iran depends on selling oil to run its economy. What Iran has showed is that just by virtue of using low cost drones, and Iran has become one of the world's leading producers of these drones. Through their shahed program, they can disrupt shipping. They've only attacked a bit over a dozen ships. And you know, before the war, as many as 100 ships, commercial vessels would go through the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis. And just by attacking about a dozen or so, they've been able to change the risk calculus of the entire shipping industry.

Walter Isaacson (40:03)

Well, President Trump was saying our NATO allies should help. But what about our NATO allies like I think Italy is doing in France, who may want to have discussions with Iran and maybe their ships get through?

Edward Fishman (40:16)

Yeah, I mean, there have been reports that both the French government and the Italian government have reached out to the Iranian regime asking whether their ships could get through. And I think this is only going to continue. You know, in some ways it's remarkable that oil barrel hasn't gone even higher. We're already in the hundreds, but I think if this lasts for weeks, we could easily get to 150, even pushing to $200 a barrel. The all time record set during the financial Crisis back in 2008, 2009 was around $147 a barrel. So we are. This could get a lot worse if the crisis continues. And I think so long as this, this strait is closed, I expect many more countries, even beyond the ones that have been publicly reported, are going to reach out to the Iranian government to see if they can cut a separate deal.

Walter Isaacson (41:00)

You know, your book is not just about geographic choke points. You have a really interesting concept you developed historically on economic choke Points. Why don't you tell us what those are?

Edward Fishman (41:13)

Sure. So throughout history, we really have focused on these geographic choke points. And, you know, a big reason why the Ottoman Empire was able to be so powerful for as long as it was was that they controlled the Bosphorus, which, you know, to this day is such a critical maritime choke point. But what happened in the 1990s, when the cold War ended and you had China and Russia enter the global financial system, enter transnational supply chains, you had the creation of these invisible choke points, these parts of the global economy where one country has a dominant position and there are few, if any, substitutes. So if you think about it, the dollar, which does kind of function as the lifeblood of the entire global financial system. You know, 90% of all foreign exchange transactions happen in dollars. That provides the United States with a choke point over the global financial system similar to the one we see playing out right now in the Strait of Hormuz over the global oil economy. Last year as well, we saw that China possesses a similar choke point over rare earth minerals. These minerals that are critical from everything from producing missiles and drones to normal electric vehicles here in the United States. China was able to show that by withholding exports of rare earth minerals, and they refine about 90% of the global supply. Within a few weeks, Ford had to shutter one of its factories for its Explorer suv. And so that's the type of control that these invisible choke points, like the dollar, like China's rare earth, have given great powers today.

Walter Isaacson (42:46)

Well, you talk about the dollar being an invisible choke point. Could the Iranians say, we'll let ships through if they are trading in, say, the Chinese currency instead, and that would undermine our power with the dollar.

Edward Fishman (43:01)

Look, I think the Iranians have quite a bit of leverage right now. I think that they can demand quite a bit to allow ships through the strait. I think one of the big misconceptions that I hear sometimes talked about in the US Is that that, you know, Trump could do a taco. You know, this acronym. Trump always chickens out. We've seen that with tariffs. When Trump has imposed big tariffs that have led to a stock market correction in the United States, he's oftentimes just suspended them for, you know, 90 days or 180 days. The difference here is that with tariffs, Trump unilaterally can suspend the tariffs. But with the straight up Hormuz, even if the US Were to say, today we're no longer going to be attacking sites in Iran, the Iranian government could say, well, wait, we want more you know, we want, you know, for instance, oil to be priced in rmb. I think a more likely ask would be for them to ask the US to pick up and leave their bases in the Gulf. Right. I mean, the Iranian government has said multiple times that the bases, you know, that the US has in the Gulf region have been used as launch pads to attack Iran. And so my guess is if the US Were to, if Trump were to take that move today and say, you know, the war is over, the Iranian government may actually ask for more.

Walter Isaacson (44:11)

How did sanctions get organized under President George W. Bush and then President Obama?

Edward Fishman (44:19)

I'm glad you asked this, because I think there's an interesting analogy to what's happening right now in the Strait of Hormuz. So in 2005, right after George W. Bush was reelected, the US was fighting two wars, right? Afghanistan and Iraq. Neither was going very well. And to make matters worse, the casus belli, the reason we got involved in Iraq was ostensibly because Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. Well, right when Bush was reelected, a survey group came out and said, well, Saddam didn't actually have wmd. And to make matters even more awkward, just around that time, Iran elected a populist hardliner, a guy named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as their president. And he immediately supercharged their nuclear program. And so the United States was fighting a war against Iraq to get rid of a fake nuclear program. Whereas right next to Iraq, there was a country that was multiple times larger, more powerful, that was actually developing industrial scale nuclear capabilities. And so put George W. Bush into bind because he didn't want to launch another war in the Middle East. And he didn't think sanctions could work because the old paradigm for sanctions was that you needed full support at the UN and you needed to be willing to use a naval blockade. And there was no support for either of those. Well, thankfully, there was a gentleman at the Treasury Department named Stuart Levy, who was the first Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, who took Bush's skepticism about sanctions as sort of a personal challenge. And he tried to think, is there a way that we can actually innovate sanctions and put more pressure on Iran? And there was one day he was in Bahrain, actually at a hotel eating breakfast, flipping through the Financial Times when he came across an article about a Swiss bank that had cut ties with Iran of its own volition. And a light bulb went off in Levy's head where he realized, maybe I don't need to persuade the entire UN to block trade with Iran. I could just manipulate the risk calculus of the private sector. I could go to banks in London and Frankfurt and Singapore and Hong Kong and Dubai, bring with me dossiers of declassified intelligence, showing them how Iran oftentimes was using their banking networks to fund their nuclear programs and persuade nine out of 10 of them to cut ties with Iran of their own volition. And for the one out of 10 who refused to cut ties with Iran, he could threaten to cut them off from the dollar. Basically say you have a choice. Either you keep doing business with Iran or you continue to have access to the dollar, but you don't have both. And that actually was the key. That is how US Sanctions have worked ever since. Manipulating the risk calculus of the private sector, which is very much what Iran has done. By just targeting a few ships, it's been able to manipulate the risk calculus of the entire shipping industry. In the last two weeks, President Trump,

Walter Isaacson (46:57)

who's not a big believer in sanctions, actually imposed sanctions on Russia and Russian oil and even on, I think, tariffs for India for buying Russian oil and on the two biggest oil companies in Russia. And now he's lifted those sanctions. Explain whether those sanctions made sense in the first place and what will happen now that he seems to have just lifted to them.

Edward Fishman (47:23)

Yeah. So I would agree that Trump has never been a big believer in sanctions on Russia. I think his interpretation of the Russia Ukraine war is quite different, I think, from mine and many others, which is that Ukraine actually bears a lot of the blame as opposed to Russia. Setting that aside, last year he did start imposing some pressure on Russian oil. First in August, he imposed really steep tariffs on India, ostensibly because India was buying Russian oil, although I know there were other concerns he had around Prime Minister Modi's refusal to negotiate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. But then the real key, Walter, came two months later. So in October of last year, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, These are the two biggest oil companies in Russia. And they also said that anyone transacting with Rosneft and Luke oil could be sanctioned by the United States. They could be cut off from the dollar. Well, immediately, these big refineries in India, like Reliance said, we can't afford to lose access to the dollar. And so they started immediately cutting back their purchases of Russian oil. The Indian refineries went from buying around 2 million barrels a day down to 1 million barrels a day at the beginning of this year. So a really rapid decline. And we had a situation where Russian oil was selling at about a $30 discount. To the international benchmark. So, for instance, if Saudi Arabia was selling oil for $65 a barrel, barrel, Russia could sell molecularly identical oil for $35 a barrel. So you can just imagine the hit that that was happening. That was. That was giving to the Kremlin. And in February of this year. So just a month ago, the Russian government had the single worst month they'd ever had for oil revenues. And so they were under significant pressure because of these sanctions. I think because of this oil price spike, the Trump administration has completely undone that policy. And just two weeks ago, they eased sanctions on India's purchases of Russian oil. And then last week, they actually expanded that, such that now anyone in the world can buy Russian oil without a threat of US Secondary sanctions. And what that has meant is that Russian oil, which was previously selling, like I said, at A$25,$30 discount, is now actually selling at a premium to global oil benchmarks, because Russia is one of the big producers that actually doesn't rely on the Strait of Hormuz. This has led to a windfall for the Russian government on the order of $150 million to $200 million each day. So, unfortunately, I do think that this has taken a huge amount of leverage off from Vladimir Putin and made it much harder for us to actually push him to agree to a just peace in Ukraine.

Walter Isaacson (49:58)

Have sanctions ever worked, though, against Russia?

Edward Fishman (50:01)

I think we need to be realistic about what sanctions can achieve. And I've always said that. That changing Putin's calculus may be too high of a. Too tall of an order. And if you define the goal of sanctions against Russia as attrition, basically weakening the Russian military industrial complex to make it harder for Putin to execute his imperialist agenda. Sanctions have certainly worked. And I think this is the thing we don't often think about is, well, what would the Russian economy look like today if there were no sanctions? The Russian economy would be far more robust, far more wealthy. They'd have a far more fearsome military industrial complex than they would otherwise have. And so even though sanctions haven't delivered this brass ring of a peace deal in Ukraine, I still think, on balance, they're doing a lot more good than harm.

Walter Isaacson (50:47)

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used to talk about arrows in the quiver that we had in terms of foreign policy, obviously military, but then economic ones that you've discussed, and sanctions and eventually soft power. And all over the past 10, 15, 20 years, thanks to you and Stuart Levy and others, the economic arrows have become more important. Are we now beginning to see the end of that.

Edward Fishman (51:16)

So I think there are two reasons that really led to the rise of sanctions in US Foreign policy. One was the creation of these choke points. The fact that with globalization, the United States could impose really substantial economic pressure on any other country in the world without the use of military force, without a naval blockade. All it takes is signing a document in the Oval Office to cut off a foreign bank or company from the dollar. You don't have to, you know, blockade a port or put a siege on their cities. I think the other factor was that in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the political support in the United States for the use of military force has just totally evaporated. I think what's happened over the last year with Trump's operation to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities last year, Operation Midnight Hammer, and then of course, the really spectacularly successful Maduro raid at the beginning of this year, Trump, in some ways, I think, had this maybe exaggerated sense of the competence and sort of power of the US Military. And in some ways, I think maybe temporarily, Washington forgot the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, that it's much easier to start a war than to end it on terms that are, that are advancing U.S. interests. So I do think in some ways we were creeping in that direction. But I do suspect that we all now are very viscerally aware in the United States and around the world of the very significant collateral damage that military campaigns can have. And so I expect that one consequence of this Iran war is going to be a renewed focus on the use of economic warfare, both by the United States and by countries like China around the world.

Walter Isaacson (52:58)

Edward Fishman, thank you so much for joining us.

Edward Fishman (53:01)

My pleasure. Thanks for the great conversation.

Christiane Amanpour (53:05)

And finally, What you just heard is the whale song of a humpback from over 70 years ago. According to researchers at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, it's likely the oldest known recording of these haunting sounds. Captured near Bermuda on March 7, 1949, it was discovered on a fragile but incredibly well preserved disc slotted into this simple office dictation device that was used for recording. What's striking is how much quieter the ocean was back then compared to now, helping Marine scientists better understand how the soundscape has evolved and the impact of human activity on the survival of these gentle giants. That is it for now. Thank you for watching and goodbye from London. Foreign.

Eva Longoria (54:09)

I'm Eva Longoria and I'm setting out

Edward Fishman (54:11)

to really experience France, to savor its world celebrated cuisine and explore the country's rich history. Eva Longoria Searching For France premieres April 12th on CNN. And next day on the CNN app,

Claire Duffy (54:24)

I'm CNN tech reporter Claire Duffy. This week on the podcast Terms of Service, there's a growing category of products aimed specifically at addressing women's unique health needs. These tools and services are sometimes known as femtech, and they can provide big opportunities and benefits, but they can also come with some risks. To walk us through all of this, I spoke with Bethany Corbin. Bethany is an attorney and CEO of FEM Innovation, where she advises startups, clinicians and healthcare organizations.

Eva Longoria (54:53)

In my opinion, what it really does is gives us a collective language to talk about women's healthcare innovation and the tools that are out there so that we can take control of our healthcare experiences and know how to advocate for ourselves in a system that's probably not been designed to advocate for us.

Claire Duffy (55:10)

Listen to CNN's terms of service. Wherever you get your podcasts.