The End of the Pacific War - American History Hit

Loading summary

Transcript64 lines

[00:00]
Ryan Seacrest
Hey, it's Ryan Seacrest for Albertsons and Safeway. Now through August 26th, it's back to Deals Time, where you can enjoy storewide deals and earn four times points. Look for in store tags to earn on eligible items from Hershey's, Cheez It, Kellogg's, Gatorade, Smart Water, Skinny Pop, Oberto, Zoa and Activia. Then clip the offer in the app for automatic event long savings. Shop in store or online for easy drive up and go pickup or delivery. Subject to availability restrictions. Apply. Visit Albertsons or Safeway.com for more details.
[00:31]
Verizon Representative
Gas, groceries, eating out. It all adds up fast. With the Verizon Visa card, you get rewarded every time you spend. Get 4% in rewards on gas, dining and at grocery stores, and you can put those rewards toward your Verizon bill or on new tech like a smartwatch and earbuds. Apply today at Verizon. Application required. Subject to credit approval. Must be a Verizon mobile account owner or manager or FIOS account owner. See verizon.com Verizon Visa card for terms and restrictions. The Verizon Visa signature card is issued by Synchrony bank pursuant to a license.
[00:57]
Visa USA Representative
From Visa USA Income.
[01:02]
Ryan Seacrest
And Doug Limu and I always tell you to customize your car insurance and save hundreds with Liberty Mutual, but now we want you to feel it. Cue the emu music, Limu.
[01:11]
Doug Limu
Save yourself money today.
[01:14]
Ryan Seacrest
Increase your wealth.
[01:16]
Doug Limu
Customize and save.
[01:18]
Don Wildman
We save.
[01:21]
Ryan Seacrest
That may have been too much feeling. Only pay for what you need@libertymutual.com Liberty.
[01:25]
Don Wildman
Liberty Liberty Liberty Savings Very underwritten by.
[01:28]
Ryan Seacrest
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and affiliates.
[01:29]
Don Wildman
Excludes Massachusetts Tuesday, August 14, 1945 New York City. It's a scene so many of us have witnessed before. Crowds packed into Times Square, shoulder to shoulder, not an inch to move. But today, here on the streets of Manhattan, the atmosphere is electric, almost unhinged. People are cheering, kissing, hugging, dancing in the streets. They rip apart phone books and toss off the pages like confetti. Even those in uniform join in, tearing those off, too. Hands stretch skyward beneath a flurry of waving flags, star spangled banners fluttering in a frenzy above them. The glowing ticker of one Times Square spells it out. Official Truman announces Japanese Surrender. The war in the Pacific is over. As Life magazine reported weeks later, it was as if joy had been rationed and saved up. For three years, eight months and seven days since Sunday, December 7, 1941, the tensions of war exploded into an orgy of frenzy and fun.
[03:01]
Doug Limu
Hello everyone.
[03:01]
Don Wildman
Welcome to American history. Hit here in the summer of 2025, we find ourselves on the threshold of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War with Japan, a conflict of such fateful magnitude that its echoes can still be heard clearly in the geopolitics of our world today. From the azure waters of Hawaii to the jungles of New guinea to the shattered cities of China and Japan, the Pacific War was a brutal, sprawling confrontation that redrew the map of Asia and transformed the United States into a global superpower across two oceans. And today, we are privileged to discuss the Pacific War with an author whose nearly 2,000 page trilogy on the subject ranks as one of the most definitive histories ever offered. Welcome to American history. Ian W. Tolle. Thank you for coming.
[03:48]
Doug Limu
It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you.
[03:50]
Don Wildman
As a son of a man who served in the US army in the Pacific in 1945, he was in Manila. I'm very gratified to meet you. Let me just explain to the audience you've written other great histories, but the books we're referring to today, I just want them to know these titles. Pacific Crucible, War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-42, which was published in 2012. The Conquering Tide War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-43, 2015. Twilight of the Gods, War in the Pacific, Western Pacific, 1944-45, published in 2020. More than a decade taking readers through the entirety of the Pacific War. You'll be doing podcasts for life. What does it mean to you that we're at the 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender? Is the world. Is America beginning to forget how important this was?
[04:38]
Doug Limu
I think in many ways it is, yes. I think as this war recedes in history, inevitably the memories begin to fade. There are a few veterans of the war still alive, but the youngest are about a hundred. So it just doesn't have the same sort of salience in our culture as it did even 25 or 30 years ago. I suppose there's. That's somewhat inevitable. You know, time marches on, events recede the history, and yet, given the rising tensions in the Pacific, in some ways that history is more relevant than ever before. Yeah.
[05:12]
Don Wildman
Well, let's do our part here today to change that story. We've only got a single episode with you, so we're going to try and keep this focused on the last phase of the war in the Pacific. But before we get there, what is it that made the Pacific War so distinctly different from the one in Europe? Was it simply that it was an ocean war? Driven by the Navy.
[05:29]
Doug Limu
I think that's one very important reason. Yes. I think you can begin just by looking at a map of Europe and looking at a map of the Pacific. Pacific, Obviously, it's an ocean feeder. And what I've argued is that to really understand what happened in the Pacific, you should sort of invert your understanding of warfare. We are, as Americans, we're a continental country. And really, since our American Revolution, we've thought of our army as the principal arm of our national defense, our armed forces, really, going back to Washington. And when you come to the Pacific War, really, I think it's helpful to think of it as first as a sea war and an air war. And the air war was carried on by both the army and the Navy, in which the ground forces played a particular role, often in supporting sea and air operations. By taking an island, for example, when we needed an air base, a naval base. And it really. If we had invaded Japan, then the army really would have played the most important role in that very terrible campaign. But because we didn't really, I think to fully understand what happened there is begin with the naval war and then understand ground fighting as a sort of adjunct or an auxiliary to that.
[06:39]
Don Wildman
Maybe this is a bit of a spoiler, but why did it matter to our leadership that we emerged so wholly victorious, no matter what, in the Pacific?
[06:47]
Doug Limu
Well, I think there was a mood in the country, and I think FDR felt this in a very personal way, having seen what had happened in the First World War. I think there was a feeling that we had to win this war entirely in both Europe and in the Pacific in order to essentially kind of impose a new order. You know, I hesitate to use the word new world order because it's so charged, but that was the mood, I think, in 1944, 45, was we need to defeat these enemies completely and then rebuild. We need to be sure that Germany and Japan, you know, can never again challenge the peace of the world.
[07:23]
Don Wildman
Yeah, I asked that question because we're going to be talking about that later. And there are many moments along the way that a negotiated surrender is a important term, you know, having to do with those last months. This is, of course, is Japanese, the United States fighting mainly. But how much are other allies involved in this war in the Pacific?
[07:40]
Doug Limu
Well, you. You also have the war in China, which had begun in 1937, so many years before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor. You had hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops moving through China and trying to force the Chinese to peace settlement. And so it's Important to note that this was one of the largest and most catastrophic ground wars in history. That's happening at the same time in the Pacific. Our allies were the British, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Canadians, the Commonwealth countries, basically. And then of course, the Philippines, very important ally. And some of the other island nations of the Pacific contributed in various ways.
[08:22]
Don Wildman
It's such an important factor that is often overlooked, I think of the Philippines especially, and how much the Filipino guerrillas were a part of that struggle. What led up to the war was very complicated. But more than anything, it was the radical shift in Japan to the hard right. Those hawks who perceived the decades after World War I as their moment to create empire, why so urgently were they cued by Germany's success?
[08:46]
Doug Limu
Yes, most definitely. You had an imperialist ambition that existed within the army in particular. Really. If you look at post Meiji era Japan under the document called the Meiji Constitution, the military had a particularly important role. And the role of the emperor was somewhat ambiguous. And what happened was in the 1920s and then particularly the 1930s is that you had very ambitious factions within the army and the Navy which decided that they would essentially like to seize control of Japan and to control every aspect of Japanese foreign policy. And they were able to do that and to essentially sort of force the country into this imperialist adventure in mania. Then in China, and then finally the strike on Pearl harbor, the attack on Britain in the Pacific War, very much sort of over the clear preferences of Hirohita, the emperor, who generally opposed these sorts of imperialist adventures, but intended to acquiesce in the mask military, had gone ahead with them. And so really a part of the story of the Pacific War is really a failure of Japanese regime to make coherent decisions and instead allowing hot heads and very ambitious men in the military to sort of drive events.
[10:11]
Don Wildman
Some of the same things are going on, of course, in the Pacific as they are in Europe. I mean, we have economic hardship. Interesting. An over dependence on imports, which is specific to Japanese situation. It being an island country, there's a persistent belief that Japan ought to lead Asia, land of the Rising sun and all this. And there is an important factor which is the expansionist policies of the United States, specifically in Hawaii and in the Philippines, which are now threatening Japanese hegemony in this area. Was there kind of a Monroe Doctrine for Japan? Were we even part of creating that?
[10:46]
Doug Limu
Yeah, I think they really had accepted what you might call the kind of Nazi view of history, which is that the strong nations would dominate the nations around them. And as you had said in your last question, that Japanese really saw their decision to strike us at Pearl harbor was intimately connected to this view that they had that the Nazis were unstoppable in Europe, that they were going to conquer Russia. They were literally converging on Moscow the same week that they hit us at Pearl Harbor. And so the Japanese, certainly there was a master race ideology that had emerged and become very important in the 1930s. And I think their view was we are the leading nation of Asia and we should dominate Asia. And that was certainly part of their vision and why they went on this extraordinary rampage that seems so short sighted and risky and foolish in retrospect.
[11:45]
Don Wildman
I'll be right back after this short break. Meantime, if you'd like us to cover anything specifically, if you have any ideas of subject matter we should be looking at, send us an email@ahhistoryhit.com we'd love to hear from you.
[12:04]
Visa USA Representative
Tired of spills and stains on your sofa? WashablesOfAs.com has your back. Featuring the Annabe Collection, the only designer sofa that's machine washable inside and out. Where designer quality meets budget friendly prices. That's right, sofas start at just $699. Enjoy a no risk experience with pet friendly stain resistant and changeable slipcovers made with performance fabrics. Experience cloud like comfort with high resilience foam that's hypoallergenic and never needs fluffing. The sturdy steel frame ensures longevity and the modular pieces can be rearranged anytime. Check out washablesofas.com and get up to 60% off your ana bay so sofa backed by a 30 day satisfaction guarantee. If you're not absolutely in love, send it back for a full refund. No return shipping or restocking fees. Every penny back. Upgrade now@washablesofas.com Offers are subject to change and certain restrictions may apply.
[13:12]
Don Wildman
The US strategy was really is usually talked about as a matter of island hopp across the Pacific, which of course was certainly for the Marines and the army, but that ignores the massive coordination required between the ground forces and the Navy, which had never been of course never happened on this scale. It played a huge role in how this war was executed, successfully or not. Can you comment on where that was in 1945 as we approached the end of the war?
[13:39]
Doug Limu
Yeah, all issue of joint operations really had been fairly ad hoc throughout the second World War and before the Second World War we really had no tradition of placing one service under the command of another, which at least for discrete operations. Eventually it became clear that was necessary to deal with this command problem. But before the Second World War and going all the way back to the birth of the Republic, we had a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy. These are two civilian cabinet officers that would sit in the cabinet, reporting directly to the President. And there was no way to resolve differences between them except by asking the President to make a decision. And then under those two civilian cabinet officers, you had a separate military chain of command, which, again, there was no tradition and no mechanism to sort of blend those two chains of command. All of that was done after the Second World War with the creation of the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the formal charter. So all of that is a bit of a long winded way of saying that whenever the army and the Navy and the other services, the Marines, the Air Force, had to work together, they had to do it in sort of an ad hoc way, you know, sitting down and agreeing on a plan and then maybe agreeing on kind of a contingent command table just for that one operation.
[15:02]
Don Wildman
And personal competition between the military leadership was a huge challenge. I mean, you had big egos involved. Here you have MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur, representing the army in the Southwest Pacific. You have Nimitz for the Navy, Halsey, later in the war in 1945, who was really calling the shots, especially with the President just months from dying.
[15:21]
Doug Limu
Well, you know, you have to sort of look at Douglas MacArthur as a kind of a singular figure, because he really was different from everybody else, not just in the Pacific, but I would say across the entire global armed forces because of his. His fame, really, his extraordinary public relations, the fact that he had strong supporters in the press, William Randolph Hearst. It was on a sort of a personal mission to put MacArthur in charge of the Pacific War. And he was enormously popular with the American people, which I think gave him a sense that he had a sort of an independent base of power. And, of course, that came to a head in Korea when finally Truman fired him through insubordination. So MacArthur was certainly the most visible figure in 1945 of all of the commanders in the Pacific. Beneath the hood, though, you still had a Navy that had a very particular idea of how they wanted to win the Pacific War. The key figure was Ernest King, who was the Chief of Naval Operations. He's based in Washington. He's the senior ranking admiral in the Navy, and probably, if you look at the entire Pacific War, maybe the single most influential figure. Putting aside MacArthur and the tremendous public profile he had. But the way in which the blueprint that we used to win the war was really Kane's blueprint more than anyone else's. And he's an almost completely forgotten figure. And that's partly because he didn't really want attention either during or after the war and didn't make a point of sort of recording what he had done. And then I should say, you also had the Air Force, which Army Air Forces would become the Air Force. Hap Arnold was the commanding general of the Air Force, and they had a very particular idea of how they would like to win the Pacific War. And they really were using the B29, the new Boeing plane, to wipe out Japanese cities, which they had begun doing in March 1945. By. By the time we dropped the atomic bombs, they had just essentially leveled most of Japan with these firebombing incendiary raids. And so that the Air Force also believed that they were winning the war, that they could do it more or less on their own. So you really had these three services that all had their kind of visions of how to win the war. In a way, they were working together, even though there was a lot of rivalry there, because each of them were putting tremendous pressure on Japan.
[17:39]
Don Wildman
It's an amazing story of reorganization after World War II, including the building of the biggest office in the world, which is the Pentagon. And for all of this to get under one roof quite, quite literally is an amazing tale. In general, the Pacific War is a chronicle of epic battles on land, sea that often could have gone one way or the other. I'm going to save your breath and tell this list myself. 1942, the Japanese would seem to have such an advantage. I mean, they storm across the Pacific in the days right after Pearl harbor, take enormous amounts of territory, including the Philippines. But then some things start to change. The Battle of Coral Sea, first battle of the naval ships where they don't see each other. Very interesting. Of course, Midway in June, which is an incredibly good fortune for the US Japanese lose advantage of aircraft carriers that will they will never be able to replace. For the Marines, the US Siege of Guadalcanal, which is eventually one, but takes five months of fighting. All of this kicks off the island campaign, all of this taken one step or another. When would you say the tide began to turn for the United States, most specifically?
[18:44]
Doug Limu
Well, you know, if I were to be pedantic about it, Don, I might ask, is it necessary for there be a point at which the tide turns? You know, I mean, there have been books published arguing, should we call Midway or Guadalcanal the turn of the tide. And my, my view has always been, is that necessarily a really illuminating question or not? I mean, and, you know, honestly, I just think of it as, you know, if a boa constrictor, you know, gets a man in its grip and starts crushing the life little by little out of that man, at what point would you say, well, that was the turn of the tide, that moment. So I really think of it as the Japanese kind of pulled off this extraordinary coup by knocking our entire battle line out of action. Eight battleships knocked out of action in the first 15 or 20 minutes of the Pacific war with this attack of Pearl harbor, and then an extraordinarily effective kind of sea air amphibious blitzkrieg across the Western and South Pacific in which, as you say, they took an enormous amount of territory very quickly. But what that, particularly that, that strike on Pearl harbor, what it did was it changed the political conditions in the United States and it kind of focused the energy of the American people in a way that was, you know, clearly going to mobilize this giant economy of ours. War and would result in an enormous amount of ships and troops and airplanes blowing out into the Pacific. And we, I think I'm a bit of a determinist on this point. I think eventually we were going to overwhelm the Japanese just by superior mass. And it was really just a question of how long that would take. So, you know, Midway, immensely important, as you say, four Japanese aircraft carriers, four of their best aircraft carriers, with all of their planes sent to the bottom of the Pacific, blunting their ability to use their naval air power in order to sort of soften up territories in advance of it. And they never again were able to take territory after that. And then Guadalcanal, tremendous losses, naval losses, air losses and troop losses, all three over that five month campaign occurring later in 1942. You know, both of these events, these battles, these campaigns were very important in turning the tide, but I wouldn't necessarily emphasize one or the other. Really. It was more of a continuous process.
[21:08]
Don Wildman
Right. And by 1943, for sure, the strategy really is for Japan to. It's a war of attrition, basically. Right. Let's make this so unattractive for the Americans to come all the way across the Pacific. I have to say, every time I look at those maps in your book or elsewhere, it's such an amazing thing that a war was fought in those days with the technology available so far away from the shores of American shores, it just kind of blows your mind.
[21:36]
Doug Limu
And Strongly agree. Strongly agree.
[21:39]
Don Wildman
And most of all, once you kind of wrap yourselves around that, you realize why wouldn't we have negotiated? That's what's, that's why I asked that question right at the beginning was like why? What was so important that all the way across the ocean, which was even farther then than it is today, would it be so important to control that? That seems such an interesting question to me.
[22:08]
Visa USA Representative
Time for a sofa upgrade. Visit washablesofas.com and discover Annabe. Where designer style meets budget friendly prices. With sofas starting at $699, Annabe brings you the ultimate in furniture innovation with a modular design that allows you to rearrange your space effortlessly. Perfect for both small and large spaces, Anabe is the only machine washable sofa inside and out. Say goodbye to stains and messes with liquid and stain resistant fabrics that make cleaning easy. Liquid simply slides right off. Designed for custom comfort, our high resilience foam lets lets you choose between a sink in feel or a supportive memory foam blend. Plus our pet friendly stain resistant fabrics ensure your sofa stays beautiful for years. Don't compromise quality for price. Visit washablesofas.com to upgrade your living space today with no risk returns and a 30 day money back guarantee. Get up to 60% off plus free shipping and free returns. Shop now@washablesofas.com Offers are subject to change and certainly restrictions may apply.
[23:16]
Don Wildman
We are also dealing with a different culture, obviously, and the Emperor's intervention is going to be important to the ending of this war. Let's talk a little bit more about the internal resistance he faced.
[23:27]
Doug Limu
Sure. Well, we had talked a little bit about the role of the army, the navy and factions within those institutions and the way that they had essentially been able to sort of force Japan into this career of overseas aggression beginning in the early 1930s. And the way in which Hirohito, who was a weak figure in many ways, you know, would acquiesce after the fact in many of these and then would, you know, in the early part of the Pacific War, you know, seem sort of surprised and even thrilled at the victories that his forces were winning, but gradually came to understand that this had been a historic error to attack the Allies, particularly the United States. The fact that Germany was on its way to defeat in Europe, I think opened the eyes of many clear thinking Japanese. They realized this entire project essentially had been a way to take advantage of what was happening in Europe by grabbing the spoils of these failing European empires in Asia. And if Nazi Germany was Going down to total defeat, Japan would stand alone. And so, you know, by mid-1944, within the inner councils of Japanese power, you know, military leaders were beginning to say, we don't really have a way to win this. But that's not the same as saying we need to accept the terms of surrender that are on offer, which is unconditional surrender. And so the war at that point really became a way of trying to extract a high enough cost in blood and treasure to make these operations costly enough to the Americans in particular, that political conditions would change and we would sit down and negotiate. The Japanese really had very much in mind the history of the Russo Japanese War, 1904-1905, when they had defeated Russia in Korea, and particularly at sea. And it was Theodore Roosevelt who mediated peace talks between Russia and Japan, resulting in a treaty that gave each side part of what they wanted. But the Japanese very much had in mind an end of the Pacific War that would be analogous to that, a negotiated peace in which they would get some part, they would keep some part of the empire they had conquered and would come to a new understanding. And so when FDR insisted, beginning in 1943, upon this doctrine of unconditional surrender, that became an obstruction to that. And the Japanese essentially said, we need to break that. We need to break this concept of an unconditional surrender. It needs to be a conditional peace, a negotiated peace, in which really the bottom line became for them, you must leave the emperor on his throne. We must not have any foreign troops occupying our soil, and we need to keep the territories that we had before 1941. And those became the points on which really the army in particular insisted on continuing the fight long after it was hopeless.
[26:21]
Don Wildman
One of the chapters that really gets forgotten these days is Okinawa. It must have been nearly impossible for Americans to process this in late spring. 45, by this time the Philippines are taken back. We have fought the Japanese, as far as American public's concerned, to almost to their doorstep. And then Okanawa happens, which is this horror show. We're only 350 miles from Kyushu, which is the lowest island of the Japanese archipelago. And then you have 82 days of grinding warfare that leaves 12,000 US dead, 100,000 Japanese killed. So many civilians caught in the crossfire that is also the scene of this other part of this time, the war, which is the kamikaze attacks, which a huge thing that we now look back on as just this desperate maneuver, but was actually really effective, wasn't it?
[27:07]
Doug Limu
Well, it was, it was effective in the sense that the Japanese essentially figured out a way to develop a guided missile 25 years before anybody had a guided missile that didn't involve a man at the controls. And so turning an airplane with a bomb into a guided missile is something that no one had ever seen before in our anti aircraft tactics. As effective as they were, they really had become, you know, we'd reached a sort of stage of excellence with the use of anti aircraft weapons and planes protecting naval task forces that really this was the only way the Japanese could hit our ships. And they did hit many of them at Okinawa. They sank, actually sank, I think, something like 34 Ships. Most of the ships they hit were destroyers or other smaller vessels that were on the periphery of the task force. But you also had a number of battleships and aircraft carriers that took devastating kamikaze hits. And so it was an absolute horror show. And it was also, as you say, it was kind of symbolized for the American people, both our servicemen and people at home, the sort of unique, singular fanaticism of the Japanese that they would send their young men in these deliberate suicide attacks on such a large scale. And so I think that contributed also to, to the mood that led to the decision to drop the atomic bombs.
[28:28]
Don Wildman
Aside from seeing this sort of crazy act of this plane going into the ship, were Americans, did they have the intelligence to understand that this was an organized effort?
[28:39]
Doug Limu
Well, yes, clearly they understood that it was an organized effort. Certainly by Okinawa, you know, the first organized kamikaze attacks happened in the Philippines in October 1944. And so the Navy by, you know, by 1945, they'd seen lots of these. They understood exactly what was happening. They knew that there were entire air bases in Kyushu in particular devoted to kamikaze attacks. And that essentially air war, Japanese air war, had reached a point by the spring of 1945 where they were almost entirely concentrating all of their air resources into these kamikaze attacks. So yes, there was a tremendous amount of thought and development of doctrines to defend against these attacks. And they became quite effective actually by the end of the war. It's just that with these attacks, if you get, you know, if one plane out of 30 gets through and hits a ship, it potentially can destroy that ship. And so these were really very, very severe losses that we were suffering.
[29:42]
Don Wildman
I did not understand this myself. And I did a TV show in, I think, 2008 where I dived down to one of these boats that were on the pick, you know, the picket boats that were out there on the periphery. As you say, it's called the USS Emmons. And it was in 186ft of water at this time. And we dived down to this thing for the TV shoot. And I couldn't believe the gash in the side of this boat. I mean, just like the. I'm talking 4 inches of metal is just crushed by this thing. And it's enormous. You can see literally the shape of an airplane going into this thing. That's how effective this was.
[30:14]
Doug Limu
Yeah, that's a deep dive.
[30:16]
Don Wildman
Thank you. And so we come to the fateful days. Surrender coming up, which is going to happen in sort of two stages. The official surrender will be signed In September, but August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announces Japan's surrender. Intention to surrender in a national radio broadcast, which marks VJ Day. That's when everyone's dancing in the streets in New York and in many Allied nations. September 2, 1945, will be the formal surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. We talked about the terms of surrender. They came out of the Potsdam Declaration, right?
[30:52]
Doug Limu
That's right. Yes. The Potsdam Declaration laid out essentially the conditions. And, you know, one of One of the debates internally that we had was whether or not we should signal to the Japanese that the emperor would be permitted to remain on his throne as a constitutional monarch, analogous to the British kings, for example. And the decision was made in Potsdam not to do that. That clause had been included in the draft and then was removed. And I think partly because it was seen as a potentially weakening of the unconditional surrender doctrine that FDR had. So Harry Truman, as the new American president, felt as if that wouldn't play well at home to do that. And so that. That was the decision that was made.
[31:37]
Don Wildman
It is at Potom that Truman gets the word that the atomic test had succeeded. This is July 26, 1945. And so his decision will come out of this information that in itself is a movie that's waiting to be made. That moment between the three of them where one of them thinks he knows something, the other ones don't, and the other ones know they know it. Which is to say Stalin had that information. Incredible. So let's talk, of course, about the atomic bomb and the use of that to end the war. Hiroshima is attacked on August 6th. 120,000 are killed. The city is flattened. Why were these two locations chosen? I know that Nagasaki was a secondary choice, right?
[32:19]
Doug Limu
Yes, it was. There had been a subcommittee set up essentially to choose targets as part of the Manhattan Project. And the committee had Chosen four cities, including Niigata and what is today Fukuoka, I think it was called Fukura in 1945. You had these four cities, and they had been chosen essentially because it was judged that they had the topographical characteristics or that had they had not been destroyed by the conventional bombing raids that had been happening since March. And so that these four cities seem to offer the best opportunity to sort of demonstrate singular power of the atomic bomb. That was the main reason they were chosen. Leslie Groves, the general in charge of the Manhattan Project, had wanted Kyoto included on the list. Henry Stinson, the Secretary of War, had removed that city because of its historical and cultural importance to the Japanese. Rose had then tried to put it back on the listings and took it off a second time. So we very easily could have destroyed Kyoto within the T bomb if Stinson hadn't been there to make that decision. But that was the reason the four cities were chosen. Really, it was. No, it wasn't because of any particular military importance in cities.
[33:32]
Don Wildman
There are a lot of theories about how these chess pieces play. One of the big pieces is the ussr, which is sometime now from the surrender of Nazi Germany. They are freed up now. They invade Manchuria and are pressing down. If you look at your geography very close, relatively speaking, to Japan, that becomes a big factor no matter how you look at this use of the atomic bomb. But the fact that the Russians are coming, so to speak, is a big deal. Where do you land on that issue?
[33:59]
Doug Limu
Well, this is where the history gets very complex and an enormous amount happened just in the space of a few weeks. As you say, the Soviets entered the war on August 9th, same day we hit Nagasaki. FDR and Churchill had been asking for Stalin's commitment to join the war in the Pacific. In the success of allied conferences in 1944 and 45, Stalin had promised at Yalta that his forces would enter the Pacific War three months after the defeat of Germany, which had happened in early May. And so you had this commitment that the LS had asked for. But as the summer progressed, it became clear that we were entering this new era, which eventually would be called the Cold War, in which you have a competition between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies. Eastern Europe in particular is bad blood. There was a lot of positioning for the post war future. And so we really had second thoughts about the USSR coming into the war. The Red army, the largest and most sort of efficient, you know, army on the Asian mainland, was now going to be let loose and they could very easily roll into China, into Korea, you know, as you say, they were coming down the island chain south of the Kamchatka Peninsula. And we now know that Stalin had actually told his army that he wanted Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan. And if the war had gone even a few weeks longer, the Red army might have been in Hokkaido. And then you could imagine a future in which Hokkaido is like, analogous to the East Germany of Japan. You have the northern island of Japan essentially on the other side of the Iron Curtain for the entire 45 years of the Cold War. That easily could have happened. And so part of the dynamic at the end of the war, and I think part of the reason that the decision was made to use the atomic bombs was to try to force the issue, force the Japanese to, To make a decision to, you know, we knew that there were divisions within the regime. There was a party that was much more open to a peace treaty and on American or Allied terms. And so the bombs, what they did is they. And the entry of the USSR in the war, those two things were a shock within Tokyo that kind of forced the process that led to the decision to surrender.
[36:21]
Don Wildman
Boy, there are books written at length on this subject, conspiracies about, you know, whether, you know, all kinds of ways of cutting this. I would recommend to people landing on an article that you wrote for the Museum of World War II in New Orleans, which I happened to land on yesterday, reviewing these facts. And this is a very, I think, a really effective view of it as far as, you know, pushing forward that which I was raised by, meaning a father who was sitting on a boat waiting to go in for a. For the D Day of Japan. He used to say to me, you're only here because of the atom bomb, which was a heck of a legacy to grow up with. But there was that factor of saving American lives and of course, the Japanese lives on the other side of it, which everyone says the invasion would have been just a horrendous horror show like Okinawa proved.
[37:08]
Doug Limu
Yes.
[37:08]
Don Wildman
On the other hand, you can find books that are arguing quite the opposite, or not quite the opposite, but a major factor which is this more of a geopolitical aspect of this stuff. But again, I refer people to your article if they want to look it up, because there's a nice balanced way of looking at this, which is, I think, really important at this point in time.
[37:25]
Doug Limu
Yeah. And I think the thing that we can't throw down the memory hole is the fact that the five star command layer, the top echelon of our military, largely speaking, they afterward regretted the decision to use the atomic bomb. Very few of them, I mean, really, with the exception of Marshall, I think, and Leahy, to some extent, the military did not have any important role in the decision to use the atomic bomb. Nimitz and MacArthur didn't even know about it until about a week before Hiroshima. They were informed. And so, you know, if you have all of these five star admirals and generals saying after the war, some in private, some in public, you know, really wish we hadn't dropped those bombs on Japanese cities, if that's the view that's coming through pretty clearly from, I think seven out of the eight five star officers, Marshall being the sole exception, express these kinds of feelings of regret or even outrage after the war. If those guys are saying that, I think that, you know, you need to probably reassess a little bit. What was the traditional view that so many of us had growing up? I know exactly what your father meant. That was a view that many veterans came back with, that these things saved my life. And it, you know, that's a, I think that's something you have to respect. That's a feeling that ran very deep in that generation. Sure.
[38:51]
Don Wildman
You describe in that article people, you know, the weeping. These were GIs who are, you know, 22 years old, weeping that they suddenly have their adulthoods back. You know, that's how we are recording this. As a matter of fact, on August 6th, and my sister's 80th birthday party is happening tonight, that woman was born on the day the atomic bomb was dropped. Imagine that news to my father.
[39:14]
Doug Limu
Right?
[39:14]
Don Wildman
Crazy. So there was all that factor. But in the end, let's just be coldly specific about this. Was it the atomic bombs that got Japan to surrender?
[39:24]
Doug Limu
Yeah, you had the atomic bombs and then you also had the Soviets coming into the war. And because these things, all of these events were compressed into such a short timeline, it is always going to be a challenge for historians to say what were the, what was the relative importance of the atomic bombs versus the Soviets coming into the war? The USSR suddenly declaring war on August 9th, same day we hit Nagasaki. That was really, really important. Not just because it created the immediate military emergency. It, you had the, you know, the army, Japanese army and Manchuria being overrun and the threat of Soviet invasion of Japan, those were bad enough. The threat of Soviet invasion of Japan also raised the question of whether or not the communists in Japan were seen as a great threat by the Japanese. Right. Whether they would be able to take over the country or part of the country if the Soviets came in. But maybe even more importantly at this point now, this is the first week of August, the last sort of straw that the Japanese regime was grasping at this point was to bring Stalin in as a mediator between the US And Japan. They essentially wanted Stalin to step in and say, I will now facilitate a negotiated peace between these two countries. And they allowed, the Japanese, allowed themselves to believe that this was a possibility. And Stalin, in a very devious way, you know, gave them just enough reason to think maybe this was a possibility. So when the Soviets declare war, it's not just the military emergency. You got the Red army coming, but it's the last sort of hope of this kind of mediated surrender which is collapsed. And so both the atomic bombs and the entry of the USSR into the war, both of these are very important factors. And it's hard to sort of weigh the importance of these two factors because they're happening at the same time.
[41:18]
Don Wildman
And this all leads to the occupation, which is led by General Douglas MacArthur, and a major political social reform of Japan, including a new adoption of a Constitution in 1947. Reminder. On August 15, 2025, we honor the historic 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender in World War II. And maybe we'll all do that as we drive our Hondas and Toyotas and eat delicious sushi, which is the strange and beautiful irony of life. Our amazing guest today has been the author of the famous Pacific War trilogy, and in particular, Volume 3, Twilight of the Gods. And this has been Ian W. Tolle. Thank you so much, Ian. It's been great to meet you.
[42:00]
Doug Limu
Thanks for having me on the pod. I appreciate it.
[42:03]
Don Wildman
Hello, folks. Thanks for listening to American History hit. Each week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of great content like mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode by hitting like and follow. You help us out, which is great. But you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share with a friend. American History hit with me, Don Juan Wildman. So grateful for your support. Bye for now.

Summary4 min read

American History Hit: The End of the Pacific War

Episode Release Date: August 11, 2025
Host: Don Wildman
Guest: Ian W. Tolle, Author of the Pacific War Trilogy

Introduction to the Episode

In this poignant episode marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, host Don Wildman welcomes renowned historian Ian W. Tolle. Tolle, the author of the comprehensive three-volume Pacific War Trilogy, provides an in-depth analysis of the war's concluding phase, exploring its enduring impact on geopolitics and the contemporary United States.

The Pacific War: A Distinct Global Conflict

Tolle emphasizes the unique nature of the Pacific War compared to the European theater. He explains, “...the Pacific was primarily a sea and air war, unlike the continental focus of Europe. Ground forces were often auxiliary, supporting naval and aerial operations” (06:39). This distinction underscored the strategic differences and the significant role of naval power in the Pacific.

Japanese Militarism and Internal Politics

A critical factor in Japan’s aggressive expansion was the rise of hardline factions within the military. Tolle states, “The military’s imperialist ambitions, driven by factions within the army and navy, led Japan into a path of overseas aggression that the emperor, Hirohito, had little control over” (08:45). These factions sought to emulate Germany’s success, believing in the dominance of strong nations over weaker ones.

Allied Involvement and Contributions

While the United States was the primary combatant against Japan, numerous allies played pivotal roles. Tolle notes, “Allied forces, including the British, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and Filipino guerrillas, significantly contributed to the Pacific campaign” (07:40). The resistance from places like the Philippines showcased the extensive coalition fighting against Japanese expansion.

Island Hopping and Strategic Victories

The U.S. strategy of island hopping was central to reclaiming territory and establishing crucial bases. Wildman lists key battles, to which Tolle responds by highlighting the continuous nature of momentum: “It was a continuous process of overcoming Japanese defenses through superior mass and logistics” (18:43). Battles such as Midway and Guadalcanal were pivotal in diminishing Japan’s naval and air capabilities.

The Impact of Kamikaze Tactics

Kamikaze attacks represented Japan’s desperate measures to inflict maximum damage on Allied forces. Tolle explains, “By Okinawa, kamikaze attacks had evolved into a coordinated and deadly strategy, sinking numerous ships and instilling fear among American sailors” (27:07). These suicide missions underscored the fanaticism and tenacity of Japanese forces, influencing American perceptions and strategic decisions.

The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

The culmination of the Pacific War involved the controversial use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tolle provides insight into the selection process: “Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen for their topographical suitability to demonstrate the bomb’s devastating power, rather than their military significance” (32:18). This decision was also influenced by the impending Soviet entry into the war, adding geopolitical pressure to expedite Japan’s surrender.

Soviet Entry and Its Geopolitical Ramifications

The Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan in August 1945 had significant implications. Tolle remarks, “Stalin’s rapid invasion threatened to divide Japan, potentially leading to a divided nation akin to Germany, which influenced the urgency of Japan’s surrender” (33:59). This Soviet intervention, combined with the atomic bombings, left Japan with little option but to capitulate.

Terms of Surrender and Aftermath

The Potsdam Declaration outlined the terms for Japan’s surrender, notably the removal of the emperor from state affairs. Tolle discusses the internal Japanese resistance to these terms: “The insistence on unconditional surrender by FDR obstructed Japan’s hopes for a negotiated peace, compelling them to accept harsh conditions” (30:51). This led to significant reforms during the subsequent American-led occupation, including the adoption of a new constitution in 1947.

Reflections on the End of the War

Tolle and Wildman delve into the complex legacy of the war’s end. Tolle reflects, “Most five-star military officers later regretted the use of atomic bombs, recognizing the profound human cost and ethical dilemmas it posed” (37:25). This critical reassessment challenges the traditional narrative of the bombings as purely necessary to save American lives, highlighting the nuanced and often conflicted perspectives of wartime leaders.

Conclusion: The Legacy of V-J Day

As the episode concludes, Don Wildman and Ian W. Tolle underscore the enduring significance of V-J Day. They honor the sacrifices made and the profound transformations that emerged from the war’s closure. Tolle’s extensive research offers listeners a balanced and comprehensive understanding of the Pacific War's final chapter, ensuring that the lessons and memories of this pivotal period remain vivid and instructive.

Notable Quotes

Ian W. Tolle on the distinction of the Pacific War:

“...the Pacific was primarily a sea and air war, unlike the continental focus of Europe. Ground forces were often auxiliary, supporting naval and aerial operations.” (06:39)
Tolle on Japanese militarism:

“The military’s imperialist ambitions, driven by factions within the army and navy, led Japan into a path of overseas aggression that the emperor, Hirohito, had little control over.” (08:45)
Tolle on the atomic bombings:

“Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen for their topographical suitability to demonstrate the bomb’s devastating power, rather than their military significance.” (32:18)
Tolle reflecting on military leadership’s regret:

“Most five-star military officers later regretted the use of atomic bombs, recognizing the profound human cost and ethical dilemmas it posed.” (37:25)

This detailed exploration by Don Wildman and Ian W. Tolle offers a profound understanding of the Pacific War’s conclusion, its strategic complexities, and its lasting impact on international relations and ethical considerations in warfare.

Loading summary

Transcript64 lines

[00:00]
Ryan Seacrest
Hey, it's Ryan Seacrest for Albertsons and Safeway. Now through August 26th, it's back to Deals Time, where you can enjoy storewide deals and earn four times points. Look for in store tags to earn on eligible items from Hershey's, Cheez It, Kellogg's, Gatorade, Smart Water, Skinny Pop, Oberto, Zoa and Activia. Then clip the offer in the app for automatic event long savings. Shop in store or online for easy drive up and go pickup or delivery. Subject to availability restrictions. Apply. Visit Albertsons or Safeway.com for more details.
[00:31]
Verizon Representative
Gas, groceries, eating out. It all adds up fast. With the Verizon Visa card, you get rewarded every time you spend. Get 4% in rewards on gas, dining and at grocery stores, and you can put those rewards toward your Verizon bill or on new tech like a smartwatch and earbuds. Apply today at Verizon. Application required. Subject to credit approval. Must be a Verizon mobile account owner or manager or FIOS account owner. See verizon.com Verizon Visa card for terms and restrictions. The Verizon Visa signature card is issued by Synchrony bank pursuant to a license.
[00:57]
Visa USA Representative
From Visa USA Income.
[01:02]
Ryan Seacrest
And Doug Limu and I always tell you to customize your car insurance and save hundreds with Liberty Mutual, but now we want you to feel it. Cue the emu music, Limu.
[01:11]
Doug Limu
Save yourself money today.
[01:14]
Ryan Seacrest
Increase your wealth.
[01:16]
Doug Limu
Customize and save.
[01:18]
Don Wildman
We save.
[01:21]
Ryan Seacrest
That may have been too much feeling. Only pay for what you need@libertymutual.com Liberty.
[01:25]
Don Wildman
Liberty Liberty Liberty Savings Very underwritten by.
[01:28]
Ryan Seacrest
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and affiliates.
[01:29]
Don Wildman
Excludes Massachusetts Tuesday, August 14, 1945 New York City. It's a scene so many of us have witnessed before. Crowds packed into Times Square, shoulder to shoulder, not an inch to move. But today, here on the streets of Manhattan, the atmosphere is electric, almost unhinged. People are cheering, kissing, hugging, dancing in the streets. They rip apart phone books and toss off the pages like confetti. Even those in uniform join in, tearing those off, too. Hands stretch skyward beneath a flurry of waving flags, star spangled banners fluttering in a frenzy above them. The glowing ticker of one Times Square spells it out. Official Truman announces Japanese Surrender. The war in the Pacific is over. As Life magazine reported weeks later, it was as if joy had been rationed and saved up. For three years, eight months and seven days since Sunday, December 7, 1941, the tensions of war exploded into an orgy of frenzy and fun.
[03:01]
Doug Limu
Hello everyone.
[03:01]
Don Wildman
Welcome to American history. Hit here in the summer of 2025, we find ourselves on the threshold of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War with Japan, a conflict of such fateful magnitude that its echoes can still be heard clearly in the geopolitics of our world today. From the azure waters of Hawaii to the jungles of New guinea to the shattered cities of China and Japan, the Pacific War was a brutal, sprawling confrontation that redrew the map of Asia and transformed the United States into a global superpower across two oceans. And today, we are privileged to discuss the Pacific War with an author whose nearly 2,000 page trilogy on the subject ranks as one of the most definitive histories ever offered. Welcome to American history. Ian W. Tolle. Thank you for coming.
[03:48]
Doug Limu
It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you.
[03:50]
Don Wildman
As a son of a man who served in the US army in the Pacific in 1945, he was in Manila. I'm very gratified to meet you. Let me just explain to the audience you've written other great histories, but the books we're referring to today, I just want them to know these titles. Pacific Crucible, War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-42, which was published in 2012. The Conquering Tide War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-43, 2015. Twilight of the Gods, War in the Pacific, Western Pacific, 1944-45, published in 2020. More than a decade taking readers through the entirety of the Pacific War. You'll be doing podcasts for life. What does it mean to you that we're at the 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender? Is the world. Is America beginning to forget how important this was?
[04:38]
Doug Limu
I think in many ways it is, yes. I think as this war recedes in history, inevitably the memories begin to fade. There are a few veterans of the war still alive, but the youngest are about a hundred. So it just doesn't have the same sort of salience in our culture as it did even 25 or 30 years ago. I suppose there's. That's somewhat inevitable. You know, time marches on, events recede the history, and yet, given the rising tensions in the Pacific, in some ways that history is more relevant than ever before. Yeah.
[05:12]
Don Wildman
Well, let's do our part here today to change that story. We've only got a single episode with you, so we're going to try and keep this focused on the last phase of the war in the Pacific. But before we get there, what is it that made the Pacific War so distinctly different from the one in Europe? Was it simply that it was an ocean war? Driven by the Navy.
[05:29]
Doug Limu
I think that's one very important reason. Yes. I think you can begin just by looking at a map of Europe and looking at a map of the Pacific. Pacific, Obviously, it's an ocean feeder. And what I've argued is that to really understand what happened in the Pacific, you should sort of invert your understanding of warfare. We are, as Americans, we're a continental country. And really, since our American Revolution, we've thought of our army as the principal arm of our national defense, our armed forces, really, going back to Washington. And when you come to the Pacific War, really, I think it's helpful to think of it as first as a sea war and an air war. And the air war was carried on by both the army and the Navy, in which the ground forces played a particular role, often in supporting sea and air operations. By taking an island, for example, when we needed an air base, a naval base. And it really. If we had invaded Japan, then the army really would have played the most important role in that very terrible campaign. But because we didn't really, I think to fully understand what happened there is begin with the naval war and then understand ground fighting as a sort of adjunct or an auxiliary to that.
[06:39]
Don Wildman
Maybe this is a bit of a spoiler, but why did it matter to our leadership that we emerged so wholly victorious, no matter what, in the Pacific?
[06:47]
Doug Limu
Well, I think there was a mood in the country, and I think FDR felt this in a very personal way, having seen what had happened in the First World War. I think there was a feeling that we had to win this war entirely in both Europe and in the Pacific in order to essentially kind of impose a new order. You know, I hesitate to use the word new world order because it's so charged, but that was the mood, I think, in 1944, 45, was we need to defeat these enemies completely and then rebuild. We need to be sure that Germany and Japan, you know, can never again challenge the peace of the world.
[07:23]
Don Wildman
Yeah, I asked that question because we're going to be talking about that later. And there are many moments along the way that a negotiated surrender is a important term, you know, having to do with those last months. This is, of course, is Japanese, the United States fighting mainly. But how much are other allies involved in this war in the Pacific?
[07:40]
Doug Limu
Well, you. You also have the war in China, which had begun in 1937, so many years before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor. You had hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops moving through China and trying to force the Chinese to peace settlement. And so it's Important to note that this was one of the largest and most catastrophic ground wars in history. That's happening at the same time in the Pacific. Our allies were the British, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Canadians, the Commonwealth countries, basically. And then of course, the Philippines, very important ally. And some of the other island nations of the Pacific contributed in various ways.
[08:22]
Don Wildman
It's such an important factor that is often overlooked, I think of the Philippines especially, and how much the Filipino guerrillas were a part of that struggle. What led up to the war was very complicated. But more than anything, it was the radical shift in Japan to the hard right. Those hawks who perceived the decades after World War I as their moment to create empire, why so urgently were they cued by Germany's success?
[08:46]
Doug Limu
Yes, most definitely. You had an imperialist ambition that existed within the army in particular. Really. If you look at post Meiji era Japan under the document called the Meiji Constitution, the military had a particularly important role. And the role of the emperor was somewhat ambiguous. And what happened was in the 1920s and then particularly the 1930s is that you had very ambitious factions within the army and the Navy which decided that they would essentially like to seize control of Japan and to control every aspect of Japanese foreign policy. And they were able to do that and to essentially sort of force the country into this imperialist adventure in mania. Then in China, and then finally the strike on Pearl harbor, the attack on Britain in the Pacific War, very much sort of over the clear preferences of Hirohita, the emperor, who generally opposed these sorts of imperialist adventures, but intended to acquiesce in the mask military, had gone ahead with them. And so really a part of the story of the Pacific War is really a failure of Japanese regime to make coherent decisions and instead allowing hot heads and very ambitious men in the military to sort of drive events.
[10:11]
Don Wildman
Some of the same things are going on, of course, in the Pacific as they are in Europe. I mean, we have economic hardship. Interesting. An over dependence on imports, which is specific to Japanese situation. It being an island country, there's a persistent belief that Japan ought to lead Asia, land of the Rising sun and all this. And there is an important factor which is the expansionist policies of the United States, specifically in Hawaii and in the Philippines, which are now threatening Japanese hegemony in this area. Was there kind of a Monroe Doctrine for Japan? Were we even part of creating that?
[10:46]
Doug Limu
Yeah, I think they really had accepted what you might call the kind of Nazi view of history, which is that the strong nations would dominate the nations around them. And as you had said in your last question, that Japanese really saw their decision to strike us at Pearl harbor was intimately connected to this view that they had that the Nazis were unstoppable in Europe, that they were going to conquer Russia. They were literally converging on Moscow the same week that they hit us at Pearl Harbor. And so the Japanese, certainly there was a master race ideology that had emerged and become very important in the 1930s. And I think their view was we are the leading nation of Asia and we should dominate Asia. And that was certainly part of their vision and why they went on this extraordinary rampage that seems so short sighted and risky and foolish in retrospect.
[11:45]
Don Wildman
I'll be right back after this short break. Meantime, if you'd like us to cover anything specifically, if you have any ideas of subject matter we should be looking at, send us an email@ahhistoryhit.com we'd love to hear from you.
[12:04]
Visa USA Representative
Tired of spills and stains on your sofa? WashablesOfAs.com has your back. Featuring the Annabe Collection, the only designer sofa that's machine washable inside and out. Where designer quality meets budget friendly prices. That's right, sofas start at just $699. Enjoy a no risk experience with pet friendly stain resistant and changeable slipcovers made with performance fabrics. Experience cloud like comfort with high resilience foam that's hypoallergenic and never needs fluffing. The sturdy steel frame ensures longevity and the modular pieces can be rearranged anytime. Check out washablesofas.com and get up to 60% off your ana bay so sofa backed by a 30 day satisfaction guarantee. If you're not absolutely in love, send it back for a full refund. No return shipping or restocking fees. Every penny back. Upgrade now@washablesofas.com Offers are subject to change and certain restrictions may apply.
[13:12]
Don Wildman
The US strategy was really is usually talked about as a matter of island hopp across the Pacific, which of course was certainly for the Marines and the army, but that ignores the massive coordination required between the ground forces and the Navy, which had never been of course never happened on this scale. It played a huge role in how this war was executed, successfully or not. Can you comment on where that was in 1945 as we approached the end of the war?
[13:39]
Doug Limu
Yeah, all issue of joint operations really had been fairly ad hoc throughout the second World War and before the Second World War we really had no tradition of placing one service under the command of another, which at least for discrete operations. Eventually it became clear that was necessary to deal with this command problem. But before the Second World War and going all the way back to the birth of the Republic, we had a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy. These are two civilian cabinet officers that would sit in the cabinet, reporting directly to the President. And there was no way to resolve differences between them except by asking the President to make a decision. And then under those two civilian cabinet officers, you had a separate military chain of command, which, again, there was no tradition and no mechanism to sort of blend those two chains of command. All of that was done after the Second World War with the creation of the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the formal charter. So all of that is a bit of a long winded way of saying that whenever the army and the Navy and the other services, the Marines, the Air Force, had to work together, they had to do it in sort of an ad hoc way, you know, sitting down and agreeing on a plan and then maybe agreeing on kind of a contingent command table just for that one operation.
[15:02]
Don Wildman
And personal competition between the military leadership was a huge challenge. I mean, you had big egos involved. Here you have MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur, representing the army in the Southwest Pacific. You have Nimitz for the Navy, Halsey, later in the war in 1945, who was really calling the shots, especially with the President just months from dying.
[15:21]
Doug Limu
Well, you know, you have to sort of look at Douglas MacArthur as a kind of a singular figure, because he really was different from everybody else, not just in the Pacific, but I would say across the entire global armed forces because of his. His fame, really, his extraordinary public relations, the fact that he had strong supporters in the press, William Randolph Hearst. It was on a sort of a personal mission to put MacArthur in charge of the Pacific War. And he was enormously popular with the American people, which I think gave him a sense that he had a sort of an independent base of power. And, of course, that came to a head in Korea when finally Truman fired him through insubordination. So MacArthur was certainly the most visible figure in 1945 of all of the commanders in the Pacific. Beneath the hood, though, you still had a Navy that had a very particular idea of how they wanted to win the Pacific War. The key figure was Ernest King, who was the Chief of Naval Operations. He's based in Washington. He's the senior ranking admiral in the Navy, and probably, if you look at the entire Pacific War, maybe the single most influential figure. Putting aside MacArthur and the tremendous public profile he had. But the way in which the blueprint that we used to win the war was really Kane's blueprint more than anyone else's. And he's an almost completely forgotten figure. And that's partly because he didn't really want attention either during or after the war and didn't make a point of sort of recording what he had done. And then I should say, you also had the Air Force, which Army Air Forces would become the Air Force. Hap Arnold was the commanding general of the Air Force, and they had a very particular idea of how they would like to win the Pacific War. And they really were using the B29, the new Boeing plane, to wipe out Japanese cities, which they had begun doing in March 1945. By. By the time we dropped the atomic bombs, they had just essentially leveled most of Japan with these firebombing incendiary raids. And so that the Air Force also believed that they were winning the war, that they could do it more or less on their own. So you really had these three services that all had their kind of visions of how to win the war. In a way, they were working together, even though there was a lot of rivalry there, because each of them were putting tremendous pressure on Japan.
[17:39]
Don Wildman
It's an amazing story of reorganization after World War II, including the building of the biggest office in the world, which is the Pentagon. And for all of this to get under one roof quite, quite literally is an amazing tale. In general, the Pacific War is a chronicle of epic battles on land, sea that often could have gone one way or the other. I'm going to save your breath and tell this list myself. 1942, the Japanese would seem to have such an advantage. I mean, they storm across the Pacific in the days right after Pearl harbor, take enormous amounts of territory, including the Philippines. But then some things start to change. The Battle of Coral Sea, first battle of the naval ships where they don't see each other. Very interesting. Of course, Midway in June, which is an incredibly good fortune for the US Japanese lose advantage of aircraft carriers that will they will never be able to replace. For the Marines, the US Siege of Guadalcanal, which is eventually one, but takes five months of fighting. All of this kicks off the island campaign, all of this taken one step or another. When would you say the tide began to turn for the United States, most specifically?
[18:44]
Doug Limu
Well, you know, if I were to be pedantic about it, Don, I might ask, is it necessary for there be a point at which the tide turns? You know, I mean, there have been books published arguing, should we call Midway or Guadalcanal the turn of the tide. And my, my view has always been, is that necessarily a really illuminating question or not? I mean, and, you know, honestly, I just think of it as, you know, if a boa constrictor, you know, gets a man in its grip and starts crushing the life little by little out of that man, at what point would you say, well, that was the turn of the tide, that moment. So I really think of it as the Japanese kind of pulled off this extraordinary coup by knocking our entire battle line out of action. Eight battleships knocked out of action in the first 15 or 20 minutes of the Pacific war with this attack of Pearl harbor, and then an extraordinarily effective kind of sea air amphibious blitzkrieg across the Western and South Pacific in which, as you say, they took an enormous amount of territory very quickly. But what that, particularly that, that strike on Pearl harbor, what it did was it changed the political conditions in the United States and it kind of focused the energy of the American people in a way that was, you know, clearly going to mobilize this giant economy of ours. War and would result in an enormous amount of ships and troops and airplanes blowing out into the Pacific. And we, I think I'm a bit of a determinist on this point. I think eventually we were going to overwhelm the Japanese just by superior mass. And it was really just a question of how long that would take. So, you know, Midway, immensely important, as you say, four Japanese aircraft carriers, four of their best aircraft carriers, with all of their planes sent to the bottom of the Pacific, blunting their ability to use their naval air power in order to sort of soften up territories in advance of it. And they never again were able to take territory after that. And then Guadalcanal, tremendous losses, naval losses, air losses and troop losses, all three over that five month campaign occurring later in 1942. You know, both of these events, these battles, these campaigns were very important in turning the tide, but I wouldn't necessarily emphasize one or the other. Really. It was more of a continuous process.
[21:08]
Don Wildman
Right. And by 1943, for sure, the strategy really is for Japan to. It's a war of attrition, basically. Right. Let's make this so unattractive for the Americans to come all the way across the Pacific. I have to say, every time I look at those maps in your book or elsewhere, it's such an amazing thing that a war was fought in those days with the technology available so far away from the shores of American shores, it just kind of blows your mind.
[21:36]
Doug Limu
And Strongly agree. Strongly agree.
[21:39]
Don Wildman
And most of all, once you kind of wrap yourselves around that, you realize why wouldn't we have negotiated? That's what's, that's why I asked that question right at the beginning was like why? What was so important that all the way across the ocean, which was even farther then than it is today, would it be so important to control that? That seems such an interesting question to me.
[22:08]
Visa USA Representative
Time for a sofa upgrade. Visit washablesofas.com and discover Annabe. Where designer style meets budget friendly prices. With sofas starting at $699, Annabe brings you the ultimate in furniture innovation with a modular design that allows you to rearrange your space effortlessly. Perfect for both small and large spaces, Anabe is the only machine washable sofa inside and out. Say goodbye to stains and messes with liquid and stain resistant fabrics that make cleaning easy. Liquid simply slides right off. Designed for custom comfort, our high resilience foam lets lets you choose between a sink in feel or a supportive memory foam blend. Plus our pet friendly stain resistant fabrics ensure your sofa stays beautiful for years. Don't compromise quality for price. Visit washablesofas.com to upgrade your living space today with no risk returns and a 30 day money back guarantee. Get up to 60% off plus free shipping and free returns. Shop now@washablesofas.com Offers are subject to change and certainly restrictions may apply.
[23:16]
Don Wildman
We are also dealing with a different culture, obviously, and the Emperor's intervention is going to be important to the ending of this war. Let's talk a little bit more about the internal resistance he faced.
[23:27]
Doug Limu
Sure. Well, we had talked a little bit about the role of the army, the navy and factions within those institutions and the way that they had essentially been able to sort of force Japan into this career of overseas aggression beginning in the early 1930s. And the way in which Hirohito, who was a weak figure in many ways, you know, would acquiesce after the fact in many of these and then would, you know, in the early part of the Pacific War, you know, seem sort of surprised and even thrilled at the victories that his forces were winning, but gradually came to understand that this had been a historic error to attack the Allies, particularly the United States. The fact that Germany was on its way to defeat in Europe, I think opened the eyes of many clear thinking Japanese. They realized this entire project essentially had been a way to take advantage of what was happening in Europe by grabbing the spoils of these failing European empires in Asia. And if Nazi Germany was Going down to total defeat, Japan would stand alone. And so, you know, by mid-1944, within the inner councils of Japanese power, you know, military leaders were beginning to say, we don't really have a way to win this. But that's not the same as saying we need to accept the terms of surrender that are on offer, which is unconditional surrender. And so the war at that point really became a way of trying to extract a high enough cost in blood and treasure to make these operations costly enough to the Americans in particular, that political conditions would change and we would sit down and negotiate. The Japanese really had very much in mind the history of the Russo Japanese War, 1904-1905, when they had defeated Russia in Korea, and particularly at sea. And it was Theodore Roosevelt who mediated peace talks between Russia and Japan, resulting in a treaty that gave each side part of what they wanted. But the Japanese very much had in mind an end of the Pacific War that would be analogous to that, a negotiated peace in which they would get some part, they would keep some part of the empire they had conquered and would come to a new understanding. And so when FDR insisted, beginning in 1943, upon this doctrine of unconditional surrender, that became an obstruction to that. And the Japanese essentially said, we need to break that. We need to break this concept of an unconditional surrender. It needs to be a conditional peace, a negotiated peace, in which really the bottom line became for them, you must leave the emperor on his throne. We must not have any foreign troops occupying our soil, and we need to keep the territories that we had before 1941. And those became the points on which really the army in particular insisted on continuing the fight long after it was hopeless.
[26:21]
Don Wildman
One of the chapters that really gets forgotten these days is Okinawa. It must have been nearly impossible for Americans to process this in late spring. 45, by this time the Philippines are taken back. We have fought the Japanese, as far as American public's concerned, to almost to their doorstep. And then Okanawa happens, which is this horror show. We're only 350 miles from Kyushu, which is the lowest island of the Japanese archipelago. And then you have 82 days of grinding warfare that leaves 12,000 US dead, 100,000 Japanese killed. So many civilians caught in the crossfire that is also the scene of this other part of this time, the war, which is the kamikaze attacks, which a huge thing that we now look back on as just this desperate maneuver, but was actually really effective, wasn't it?
[27:07]
Doug Limu
Well, it was, it was effective in the sense that the Japanese essentially figured out a way to develop a guided missile 25 years before anybody had a guided missile that didn't involve a man at the controls. And so turning an airplane with a bomb into a guided missile is something that no one had ever seen before in our anti aircraft tactics. As effective as they were, they really had become, you know, we'd reached a sort of stage of excellence with the use of anti aircraft weapons and planes protecting naval task forces that really this was the only way the Japanese could hit our ships. And they did hit many of them at Okinawa. They sank, actually sank, I think, something like 34 Ships. Most of the ships they hit were destroyers or other smaller vessels that were on the periphery of the task force. But you also had a number of battleships and aircraft carriers that took devastating kamikaze hits. And so it was an absolute horror show. And it was also, as you say, it was kind of symbolized for the American people, both our servicemen and people at home, the sort of unique, singular fanaticism of the Japanese that they would send their young men in these deliberate suicide attacks on such a large scale. And so I think that contributed also to, to the mood that led to the decision to drop the atomic bombs.
[28:28]
Don Wildman
Aside from seeing this sort of crazy act of this plane going into the ship, were Americans, did they have the intelligence to understand that this was an organized effort?
[28:39]
Doug Limu
Well, yes, clearly they understood that it was an organized effort. Certainly by Okinawa, you know, the first organized kamikaze attacks happened in the Philippines in October 1944. And so the Navy by, you know, by 1945, they'd seen lots of these. They understood exactly what was happening. They knew that there were entire air bases in Kyushu in particular devoted to kamikaze attacks. And that essentially air war, Japanese air war, had reached a point by the spring of 1945 where they were almost entirely concentrating all of their air resources into these kamikaze attacks. So yes, there was a tremendous amount of thought and development of doctrines to defend against these attacks. And they became quite effective actually by the end of the war. It's just that with these attacks, if you get, you know, if one plane out of 30 gets through and hits a ship, it potentially can destroy that ship. And so these were really very, very severe losses that we were suffering.
[29:42]
Don Wildman
I did not understand this myself. And I did a TV show in, I think, 2008 where I dived down to one of these boats that were on the pick, you know, the picket boats that were out there on the periphery. As you say, it's called the USS Emmons. And it was in 186ft of water at this time. And we dived down to this thing for the TV shoot. And I couldn't believe the gash in the side of this boat. I mean, just like the. I'm talking 4 inches of metal is just crushed by this thing. And it's enormous. You can see literally the shape of an airplane going into this thing. That's how effective this was.
[30:14]
Doug Limu
Yeah, that's a deep dive.
[30:16]
Don Wildman
Thank you. And so we come to the fateful days. Surrender coming up, which is going to happen in sort of two stages. The official surrender will be signed In September, but August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announces Japan's surrender. Intention to surrender in a national radio broadcast, which marks VJ Day. That's when everyone's dancing in the streets in New York and in many Allied nations. September 2, 1945, will be the formal surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. We talked about the terms of surrender. They came out of the Potsdam Declaration, right?
[30:52]
Doug Limu
That's right. Yes. The Potsdam Declaration laid out essentially the conditions. And, you know, one of One of the debates internally that we had was whether or not we should signal to the Japanese that the emperor would be permitted to remain on his throne as a constitutional monarch, analogous to the British kings, for example. And the decision was made in Potsdam not to do that. That clause had been included in the draft and then was removed. And I think partly because it was seen as a potentially weakening of the unconditional surrender doctrine that FDR had. So Harry Truman, as the new American president, felt as if that wouldn't play well at home to do that. And so that. That was the decision that was made.
[31:37]
Don Wildman
It is at Potom that Truman gets the word that the atomic test had succeeded. This is July 26, 1945. And so his decision will come out of this information that in itself is a movie that's waiting to be made. That moment between the three of them where one of them thinks he knows something, the other ones don't, and the other ones know they know it. Which is to say Stalin had that information. Incredible. So let's talk, of course, about the atomic bomb and the use of that to end the war. Hiroshima is attacked on August 6th. 120,000 are killed. The city is flattened. Why were these two locations chosen? I know that Nagasaki was a secondary choice, right?
[32:19]
Doug Limu
Yes, it was. There had been a subcommittee set up essentially to choose targets as part of the Manhattan Project. And the committee had Chosen four cities, including Niigata and what is today Fukuoka, I think it was called Fukura in 1945. You had these four cities, and they had been chosen essentially because it was judged that they had the topographical characteristics or that had they had not been destroyed by the conventional bombing raids that had been happening since March. And so that these four cities seem to offer the best opportunity to sort of demonstrate singular power of the atomic bomb. That was the main reason they were chosen. Leslie Groves, the general in charge of the Manhattan Project, had wanted Kyoto included on the list. Henry Stinson, the Secretary of War, had removed that city because of its historical and cultural importance to the Japanese. Rose had then tried to put it back on the listings and took it off a second time. So we very easily could have destroyed Kyoto within the T bomb if Stinson hadn't been there to make that decision. But that was the reason the four cities were chosen. Really, it was. No, it wasn't because of any particular military importance in cities.
[33:32]
Don Wildman
There are a lot of theories about how these chess pieces play. One of the big pieces is the ussr, which is sometime now from the surrender of Nazi Germany. They are freed up now. They invade Manchuria and are pressing down. If you look at your geography very close, relatively speaking, to Japan, that becomes a big factor no matter how you look at this use of the atomic bomb. But the fact that the Russians are coming, so to speak, is a big deal. Where do you land on that issue?
[33:59]
Doug Limu
Well, this is where the history gets very complex and an enormous amount happened just in the space of a few weeks. As you say, the Soviets entered the war on August 9th, same day we hit Nagasaki. FDR and Churchill had been asking for Stalin's commitment to join the war in the Pacific. In the success of allied conferences in 1944 and 45, Stalin had promised at Yalta that his forces would enter the Pacific War three months after the defeat of Germany, which had happened in early May. And so you had this commitment that the LS had asked for. But as the summer progressed, it became clear that we were entering this new era, which eventually would be called the Cold War, in which you have a competition between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies. Eastern Europe in particular is bad blood. There was a lot of positioning for the post war future. And so we really had second thoughts about the USSR coming into the war. The Red army, the largest and most sort of efficient, you know, army on the Asian mainland, was now going to be let loose and they could very easily roll into China, into Korea, you know, as you say, they were coming down the island chain south of the Kamchatka Peninsula. And we now know that Stalin had actually told his army that he wanted Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan. And if the war had gone even a few weeks longer, the Red army might have been in Hokkaido. And then you could imagine a future in which Hokkaido is like, analogous to the East Germany of Japan. You have the northern island of Japan essentially on the other side of the Iron Curtain for the entire 45 years of the Cold War. That easily could have happened. And so part of the dynamic at the end of the war, and I think part of the reason that the decision was made to use the atomic bombs was to try to force the issue, force the Japanese to, To make a decision to, you know, we knew that there were divisions within the regime. There was a party that was much more open to a peace treaty and on American or Allied terms. And so the bombs, what they did is they. And the entry of the USSR in the war, those two things were a shock within Tokyo that kind of forced the process that led to the decision to surrender.
[36:21]
Don Wildman
Boy, there are books written at length on this subject, conspiracies about, you know, whether, you know, all kinds of ways of cutting this. I would recommend to people landing on an article that you wrote for the Museum of World War II in New Orleans, which I happened to land on yesterday, reviewing these facts. And this is a very, I think, a really effective view of it as far as, you know, pushing forward that which I was raised by, meaning a father who was sitting on a boat waiting to go in for a. For the D Day of Japan. He used to say to me, you're only here because of the atom bomb, which was a heck of a legacy to grow up with. But there was that factor of saving American lives and of course, the Japanese lives on the other side of it, which everyone says the invasion would have been just a horrendous horror show like Okinawa proved.
[37:08]
Doug Limu
Yes.
[37:08]
Don Wildman
On the other hand, you can find books that are arguing quite the opposite, or not quite the opposite, but a major factor which is this more of a geopolitical aspect of this stuff. But again, I refer people to your article if they want to look it up, because there's a nice balanced way of looking at this, which is, I think, really important at this point in time.
[37:25]
Doug Limu
Yeah. And I think the thing that we can't throw down the memory hole is the fact that the five star command layer, the top echelon of our military, largely speaking, they afterward regretted the decision to use the atomic bomb. Very few of them, I mean, really, with the exception of Marshall, I think, and Leahy, to some extent, the military did not have any important role in the decision to use the atomic bomb. Nimitz and MacArthur didn't even know about it until about a week before Hiroshima. They were informed. And so, you know, if you have all of these five star admirals and generals saying after the war, some in private, some in public, you know, really wish we hadn't dropped those bombs on Japanese cities, if that's the view that's coming through pretty clearly from, I think seven out of the eight five star officers, Marshall being the sole exception, express these kinds of feelings of regret or even outrage after the war. If those guys are saying that, I think that, you know, you need to probably reassess a little bit. What was the traditional view that so many of us had growing up? I know exactly what your father meant. That was a view that many veterans came back with, that these things saved my life. And it, you know, that's a, I think that's something you have to respect. That's a feeling that ran very deep in that generation. Sure.
[38:51]
Don Wildman
You describe in that article people, you know, the weeping. These were GIs who are, you know, 22 years old, weeping that they suddenly have their adulthoods back. You know, that's how we are recording this. As a matter of fact, on August 6th, and my sister's 80th birthday party is happening tonight, that woman was born on the day the atomic bomb was dropped. Imagine that news to my father.
[39:14]
Doug Limu
Right?
[39:14]
Don Wildman
Crazy. So there was all that factor. But in the end, let's just be coldly specific about this. Was it the atomic bombs that got Japan to surrender?
[39:24]
Doug Limu
Yeah, you had the atomic bombs and then you also had the Soviets coming into the war. And because these things, all of these events were compressed into such a short timeline, it is always going to be a challenge for historians to say what were the, what was the relative importance of the atomic bombs versus the Soviets coming into the war? The USSR suddenly declaring war on August 9th, same day we hit Nagasaki. That was really, really important. Not just because it created the immediate military emergency. It, you had the, you know, the army, Japanese army and Manchuria being overrun and the threat of Soviet invasion of Japan, those were bad enough. The threat of Soviet invasion of Japan also raised the question of whether or not the communists in Japan were seen as a great threat by the Japanese. Right. Whether they would be able to take over the country or part of the country if the Soviets came in. But maybe even more importantly at this point now, this is the first week of August, the last sort of straw that the Japanese regime was grasping at this point was to bring Stalin in as a mediator between the US And Japan. They essentially wanted Stalin to step in and say, I will now facilitate a negotiated peace between these two countries. And they allowed, the Japanese, allowed themselves to believe that this was a possibility. And Stalin, in a very devious way, you know, gave them just enough reason to think maybe this was a possibility. So when the Soviets declare war, it's not just the military emergency. You got the Red army coming, but it's the last sort of hope of this kind of mediated surrender which is collapsed. And so both the atomic bombs and the entry of the USSR into the war, both of these are very important factors. And it's hard to sort of weigh the importance of these two factors because they're happening at the same time.
[41:18]
Don Wildman
And this all leads to the occupation, which is led by General Douglas MacArthur, and a major political social reform of Japan, including a new adoption of a Constitution in 1947. Reminder. On August 15, 2025, we honor the historic 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender in World War II. And maybe we'll all do that as we drive our Hondas and Toyotas and eat delicious sushi, which is the strange and beautiful irony of life. Our amazing guest today has been the author of the famous Pacific War trilogy, and in particular, Volume 3, Twilight of the Gods. And this has been Ian W. Tolle. Thank you so much, Ian. It's been great to meet you.
[42:00]
Doug Limu
Thanks for having me on the pod. I appreciate it.
[42:03]
Don Wildman
Hello, folks. Thanks for listening to American History hit. Each week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of great content like mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode by hitting like and follow. You help us out, which is great. But you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share with a friend. American History hit with me, Don Juan Wildman. So grateful for your support. Bye for now.