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- [00:01]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
Want to get more from American Scandal? Subscribe to Wondery for early access to new episodes, ad free listening and exclusive content you can't find anywhere else. Join Wondery in the Wondery app or on Apple Podcasts. American Scandal uses dramatizations that are based on true events. Some elements, including dialogue, might be invented, but everything is based on historical research. It's April 2009. On the tarmac at Port Fourchons heliport in Louisiana. Mike Williams instinctively ducks his head to avoid the rotor wash as he approaches the helicopter, then slings his duffel bag into the cargo hold. He's brought everything he needs for the next three weeks. That's the length of his shift, or hitch, as it's known among rig hands. The 36 year old Williams is on his way to start a new job as chief electronics technician on the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig. He'll be responsible for every electronic system on board, from navigation to security, and the rig is positioned off the coast of Louisiana right now and the only way to get there is by helicopter. As he climbs into the cabin, Williams feels a thrill of excitement. The Deepwater Horizon is meant to be one of the most technologically advanced rigs in the world, and as a mobile unit it moves from site to site and is responsible for drilling some of BP's deepest exploratory wells. So for Williams, joining its crew feels like a step up to the big leagues. Williams grabs an empty seat in the chopper and straps himself in. Sitting beside him is a large, ruddy cheeked man in his mid-30s. Man sticks out his hand. Hey, how you doing? You must be one of the new guys. Jason Anderson, tool pusher. Williams leans over to shake Anderson's hand. Mike Williams, Chief Electronics Technician. Electronics, huh? You're gonna have your work cut out on Horizon? Yeah, what do you mean by that? I mean it's not too late to stay behind. What, does the TV in the mess room not work or something? Yeah, that along with half the other systems on board. You're kidding. Not even a little bit. You can't even flip a light switch without something else breaking. Oh, come on, it can't be that bad. Horizon has one of the best reputations in the Gulf. Yeah, we got a reputation all right. Run it, break it, fix it, run it again. Like I said, you're gonna have your work cut out. William shakes his head. Here I thought this might be a promotion. I didn't mean to rain on your parade. You're joining a great crew, at least the best. I'd say. In fact, I've been on Horizon practically since she was launched in 01. We make sure we look out for each other. Well, I was in the Marines and it was the same there. No man left behind, right? I thought you had that look about you. Well, you'll fit right in. All right. Looks like we're about to take off, Anderson bellows over the growing engine noise. Welcome to the family, I guess. A few minutes later, the helicopter is flying over the sapphire blue waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Mike Williams has worked on a lot of rigs, yet he feels a sense of awe when the deep water horizon comes into view. Thick concrete columns rise out of the water, supporting a wide deck and two floors of living quarters. Above them, towering some 260ft high into the sky, is the steel oil derrick. But as the helicopter circles the rig and prepares to land, Williams mind returns to the tool pusher Jason Anderson's comments, and Williams begins to wonder exactly what kind of mess he's flying into. American Scandal is sponsored by AT&T. It's quite a relief in knowing things are handled. You know, like when a neighbor brings in your mail before it rains or a friend grabs your coat from the chair you left it on. Staying Connected matters. And that's why AT and T has connectivity you can depend on, or they'll proactively make it right. That's the AT and T guarantee. AT and T connecting changes everything. Terms and conditions apply, so visit@&t.com guarantee for details.
- [04:11]
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- [04:13]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
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- [04:18]
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- [04:50]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
From Wondery I'm Lindsey Graham and this is American scandal. During the 1990s, the oil giant British Petroleum was transformed. Under the leadership of John Brown, the once dead ridden bureaucratic state enterprise became one of the most profitable companies on the planet. By the year 2000, BP had oil fields from Alaska to Vietnam and from the North Sea to the Gulf of Mexico, with revenue topping $100 billion a year. Key to the company's success was a relentless policy of risk taking and cost cutting. But even according to its own internal investigations that focus on profit fostered a culture of bullying and an apparent disregard for environmental and safety regulations. And despite the best efforts of lawyers at the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as multiple criminal convictions, BP showed no sign of changing its ways. And by 2009, the company was drilling deeper than ever before years using rigs like Deepwater Horizon to find oil miles beneath the Gulf of Mexico. The rewards were potentially enormous, but the risks were even greater. So, faced with an unstable well and the constant pressure to drill faster, problems quickly began to mount for the crew of the Deepwater Horizon. And eventually, conditions on board would reach the breaking point. This is episode two, the well from Hell. When Mike Williams arrives on the Deepwater Horizon in April 2009, the first man to greet him is Jimmy Harrell. The Horizon's chain of command changes depending on whether it's moving or drilling. When the rig is on the move, the captain is in charge, just like a ship. But once it's latched up in a position over a well, the offshore installation manager takes command. And that's Jimmy Harrell. Harold is a Mississippi man in his mid-50s with a long white mustache that droops over his upper lip. He introduces himself to Williams and takes him on a tour of the rig. They pass along the main deck and descend into the accommodation block, a two story steel structure packed with crew cabins, a mess hall, offices, even a movie theater. As they pass from room to room, Harold points out the key personnel that Williams will be working with in the coming weeks. Most of the people on board, including Harold and Williams, don't work for bp. Another company, Transocean, owns the Deepwater Horizon and is responsible for the rig's daily operations. But while it is Transocean personnel doing most of the work on board, it's the company's client, bp, that's in charge of the design, planning and execution of the drilling program. And a group of BP well site leaders ensures everything on Horizon meets with BP's approval. As the tour continues, Williams sees safety notices everywhere. Jimmy Harrell proudly tells him that they've now had six years with no time lost. Incidents on the Deepwater Horizon. The federal regulator, the Minerals Management Service, even gave the crew an award last year to recognize the rig's exemplary record. It's reassuring to Williams that they seem to take safety so seriously, but it doesn't quite square with what he heard on the flight over. At the end of the tour, they stop off at the drill Shack, a steel enclosed cabin the drilling team uses to house their monitoring and computer system. There, they're greeted warmly by the drill team, who call Harold Mr. Jimmy. Among the men in the shack is Jason Anderson, the tool pusher Williams met on the helicopter. Anderson takes Williams to the window that overlooks the moon pool, a square hole in the deck that opens onto the sea. Through this moon pool, the team can lower equipment into the sea even in stormy weather. Right now, a drill bit is suspended over the pool and Anderson tells Williams they are preparing to drill into the seabed, the first step in opening a new exploratory well. Then suddenly, behind them, one of the tool pushers curses at his computer screen. Eager to make himself useful, Williams goes over to take a look. A blue screen of death stares back at him from the monitor. The tool pusher says, that's been happening a lot, and it's making a difficult job even harder. The computer system manages the sensors that acts as the driller's eyes and ears on the well. But when the computers freeze, they have no way of knowing what's going on under the water. Williams is a bit taken aback. As far as drilling for oil goes, this is one of the most challenging regions in the world. But the crew is still relying on technology that looks like it's from the 1990s. For a rig that's supposedly at the cutting edge, it doesn't seem that well equipped. Built in South Korea in 2001, the Deepwater Horizon was once a state of the art rig. But by the time Mike Williams arrives, it's starting to show its age. Salt water has corroded its pipes and many of the rig's sensors have stopped working properly. Drilling has always been the priority. The rig has never been in dock for repairs, and many essential tools haven't been properly inspected in nearly a decade. This all means that maintenance takes up more time every shift. And the crew's workload isn't made any lighter by the fact that their numbers have been reduced year after year. When the rig was first deployed, there were so many employees on board that there wasn't enough work for them all. But to cut costs, Transocean has transferred more and more crew members off the rig. Now there are fewer people doing more work than ever before. But it's still not enough for bp. As one of Transocean's biggest clients, BP is putting intense pressure on the company to drill faster and at an even lower cost. So no matter how hard the crew of Deepwater Horizon think they're working now, they know it'll be even worse next year or even next month. So for Mike Williams, his first days on board leave him feeling unsettled. When Williams brings up the maintenance problems. The other crew members say they've spoken to Transocean's management several times already and nothing ever seems to get done. But after a couple of weeks on Deepwater Horizon, Williams discovers a problem he simply can't ignore. One that could put all their lives at risk. So right away, he goes to see his boss, Jimmy Harrell, in his office. Williams knocks sharply on the door. A voice from the inside calls out. Yeah, come in. Hey, can I talk to you for a minute, Mr. Jimmy? It's urgent. Are you sure, Mike, what's up? Williams steps inside and pulls the door closed behind him. He sits across the desk from Harold. I've been working on that fire and gas detection system. It looks like someone has disabled the alarms. Harold leans back in his chair and smiles reassuringly. Oh yeah, that was us. We shut them off. You shut them off? Yeah. There were constant false alarms in the middle of the night. No one was getting any sleep. But sir, isn't that a serious safety hazard? We were more concerned about people making mistakes on their shift because they only got two hours of shut eye. But what if there's a real emergency? Our watch officers will spotted they're on the bridge 247 monitoring the fire and gas sensors in real time. Look, if anything happens, they'll hit the alarm. But in a crisis, I mean, even a few moments of hesitation can make all the difference. I would sleep better knowing there was a working alarm. Well, Mike, I understand that, but we just can't fix it right now. This is the best we can do. But I do appreciate you coming to me with us though. Thanks. It's clear that as far as Harold is concerned, the conversation has is over. But Williams doesn't move. Harold frowns. So, anything else I can help you with, Mike? Yeah, because it's more than just the alarm system. I'm finding problems like this everywhere. We've got computers that don't work, sensors that malfunction. Look, I. I'm doing my best to patch things up, but to be honest, a lot of these systems just need ripping out and replacing. Barrel size. Yeah, I know. And trust me, I've raised this with the higher ups, there's simply certain trade offs we have to make. Right now it's my job to keep all you guys on this rig safe. That's what I'm trying to do. But it's also my job to get these wells dug. Because if I don't, I can tell you what's going to be ripped out and replaced and it won't be the alarm system. Mike Williams thanks Jimmy Harrell for his time and then trudges back to his office. He thinks Harrell is wrong, but it's not his call to make. He has to respect the chain of command. So he returns to work and the alarm system on the Deepwater Horizon stays silent. At the beginning of 2010, the Deepwater Horizon has moved to a new well in the Gulf of Mexico. BP has named it the Macondo Prospect. Macondo is about 41 miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana. It's the job of the Deepwater Horizon crew to confirm whether this site has commercially viable quantities of oil and gas. If they're successful, they'll cap the well and BP will build a permanent rig on the site to extract the oil at a later date. As a mobile platform that moves from site to site, Deepwater Horizon isn't directly attached to the seafloor. Instead, it floats on the surface, kept in position over the well by thrusters and propellers. From there, a pipe connects the rig to the wellhead 5,000ft beneath the surface. The plan at Macondo is to drill another 13,000ft into the rock to reach what is hoped to be an enormous reservoir of oil and gas. It won't be. The forces of play are enormous. The diamond tipped drill the Horizon team uses is just 7 inches wide at its thinnest point and cuts through the rock by rotating at a high speed. Every extra foot deeper they drill, the heat and pressure will increase, which means the slightest mistake could have disastrous consequences. But the crew of the Deepwater Horizon has plenty of experience and they have no reason to be especially concerned when drilling begins at Macondo and in February 2010. It soon becomes clear, though, that this is no ordinary well. Tool pusher Jason Anderson is on shift at the drill shack, maneuvering the drill into position deep below the sea. One of the well site leaders from BP is with him. They're already behind schedule, and the BP manager urges him to drill faster. Anderson is hesitant, though. Every well has its own temperament, and they found that Macondo is especially volatile. It's already started to belch gas and what drillers call kicks. These can be dangerous. Without careful monitoring, the gas they release can surge past the drill and rise up the pipe to the oil rig above, potentially causing an explosion. But BP is the client and it's in charge of the drilling program. So Anderson does as he's told. He increases the speed of the drill while closely watching the well. Soon, though, he notices a problem. It's not gas this time, but mud. As the drilling team digs deeper into the bedrock, the enormous weight of the earth threatens to crush the newly cut well. So to stabilize the pressure and prevent the well from caving in on itself, they use drilling mud to fill the hole they make. Drilling mud is a mix of synthetic fluids, polymers, oils, and chemicals that can weigh twice as much as water. It's pumped in and out of the well during the drilling. In a constant cycle, Anderson can tell a lot about the state of a well just from the drilling mud. In a healthy well, the volume of mud being pumped in should match the volume coming back out. But right now, the cycle has been broken. There's more mud going in than is coming out. Anderson frowns. This is bad news. It means somewhere far below them, the walls of their well have collapsed and the drilling mud is leaking into the surrounding rock. Anderson explains what's going on to the BP supervisor, who curses under his breath. Drilling mud is expensive stuff, up to $500 a barrel. So even as they speak, BP is losing hundreds of dollars a second. So he tells Anderson to do something to stop it, and quickly. But right now, Jason Anderson isn't worried about the costs of drilling mud. Between the kicks and this latest collapse, he's afraid they're losing control of Macondo altogether and that the Deepwater Horizon is now sitting on top of a bomb, one that could go off any second. American scandal is supported by AT&T. There's a certain comfort in knowing someone's looking out for you before you even need it. A roommate who remembers to lock the door. A friend who shows up unasked with dinner when you're swamped. It's rare, but when it happens, you remember because staying connected matters. And that's why, in the rare event of a network outage, AT&T will proactively credit you for a full day of Service. That's the AT&T guarantee. So before today's over, take a second and reach out to someone. Those small check ins, they're the moments that matter. AT&T connecting changes everything. Credit for fiber downtime lasting 20 minutes or more or for wireless downtime lasting 60 minutes or more caused by a single incident impacting 10 or more towers must be connected to impacted tower at onset of outage. Restrictions and exclusions apply, so see@&t.com guarantee for full details. In the 1880s, the lawless streets of Tombstone, Arizona were home to the most legendary gunfight in history. Hi, I'm Lindsey Graham, the host of the podcast American Historytellers. We take you to the events, times and people that shaped America and Americans, our values, our struggles and our dreams. In our latest series, we follow the notorious Earp brothers as they take on a band of gunslinging hooligans intent on disrupting law and order. But tensions boiled over on October 26, 1881, when the Earps confronted the Clanton and McClurry gangs near the O.K. corral. In a hail of gunfire, three cowboys were killed, setting off a cycle of violence and retribution, transforming the Earps into both heroes and outlaws. Follow American Historytellers on the Wondery app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can binge all episodes of American HistoryTeller's the Shootout at the OK Corral early and ad free right now on wonder it's late February 2010 by the time the crew of the Deepwater Horizon stops a leak in the Macondo well. They pump in gallons and gallons of drilling mud to balance the pressure and plug the fissures in the rock. But patching the well in this way isn't quick and it's not cheap. It cost BP two weeks of drill time and $14 million. BP originally planned for the Macondo well to be ready in 77 days at a cost of $96 million, but both those targets have already been blown. Deep sea drilling is a risky business, and problems like these are not uncommon. But BP has little patience for setbacks. The company wants the project back on schedule and back on budget, and the crew of the Deepwater Horizon is put under pressure to make up for lost time, according to a later report by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. John Guide is one BP employee who knows precisely how many corners the Deepwater Horizon team is being forced to cut. 52 year old guide is an engineer who oversees operations on the rig from BP's headquarters in Houston, Texas. And just days after the leak in the Macondo well is fixed, he has a conference call with the crew on Deepwater Horizon to discuss another problem. Guide is a BP veteran. He's worked on dozens of deep water wells before Macondo, but this one is turning out to be especially troublesome. He knows that many onboard the oil rig have adopted a new name for it, calling it the well from Hell. Guide hurries into a conference room with his laptop in one hand and a coffee in the other before dialing into the call with the drill team. His BP counterpart on the rig brings him up to speed. A leak has been detected in the blowout preventer of the most important pieces of safety equipment on the well in the event of a kick or an even worse emergency. The huge 300 ton device uses a series of valves to seal the well and stop gas and liquid from surging up the drilling pipe to the rig. On his laptop, Guide watches footage recorded by a remote operated vehicle on the seafloor. The video is grainy, but it still clearly shows hydraulic oil leaking from one of the valves on the giant blowout preventer. Seeing this, Guide sighs. First they lost all that drilling mud and now this. There doesn't seem to be anything on this job that doesn't leak. Guide sips his coffee and listens as the team on the rig discusses the implications of the leak in the blowout preventer. The drill team wants to stop work entirely while they finish repairs to the unit. They're even talking about hauling it back to the surface for maintenance. That could lead to a delay of weeks or even months. Guide clenches his jaw because this is the last thing he needs. He already has corporate breathing down his neck. Most of the executives he works with have only been in their jobs for a couple of months and don't really understand how things work out on the rigs. They keep making last minute changes to the drill program that Guide then has to explain to the disgruntled team on Deepwater Horizon. In one email to his boss, Guide has already explained that the Horizon crew are at their wit's end. So now he taps his fingers on the table as he tries to think of a solution that will satisfy headquarters without putting too much additional pressure on the drill team. It's just then when Guide remembers something. According to federal regulations, a blowout preventer only needs to be repaired if it's not working properly. But in this case, it's only one leaky valve which has a workaround. The rest of the preventer is working just fine. So Guide speaks up to interrupt the debate. He tells the crew that there's no need to haul up the blowout preventer. They can just neutralize the pressure on the leaky valve and keep drilling. To Guide's relief, the team agrees his solution will save them all time and hassle. No one wants to be working on this well longer than they have to. So Guide ends the call with a sigh of satisfaction. One more disaster averted. And from that point on, there are hopes that things on Deepwater Horizon might finally be turning a corner. Because despite all the problems, there are signs the drill team is approaching the hydrocarbon reservoir they've been looking for. They've detected elevated gas levels. And as they drill deeper, sensor readings confirm a large, high pressure formation of oil and gas. Then, in mid April, the drill reaches its target depth of 13,293ft. And it's clear that Maconda holds a rich deposit of fossil fuels. But BP doesn't want to stop there. The plan is to drill a thousand feet more to search for another suspected reservoir even deeper in the rock formation. But as the drill team presses on, it becomes apparent that they've not yet tamed the well. Drilling mud again begins to leak. They try to pump more in, but that doesn't work. And soon they've lost almost 3,000 barrels, roughly $1 million worth of mud. BP is effectively pouring money into a bottomless pit. And executives at the company decide it's time to cut their losses. On April 9, 2010, they call off operations at Macondo. The well from hell has finally beaten them. With further drilling canceled, the team on Deepwater Horizon moves to seal Macondo. BP might return to the site at a later date, but that could be years away. So the crew must ensure the well is stable enough to be left unmonitored for a long time. And to seal the well properly, the team needs to cap it with cement. But first, they need to install centralizers. Centralizers are metal springs that hold the pipe in the center of the wellbore, so that when the cement is pumped in, it forms an even seal on all sides. Without enough centralizers, the pipe could shift inside the hole, leaving channels in the cement that oil and gas can flow up, potentially risking a blowout. And to ensure everything is done properly, BP has a specialist cement contractor on the job, Halliburton. They recommend using 21 centralizers to stabilize the well, but Deepwater Horizon only has six on hand. An extra 15 centralizers are ordered by a BP engineer. But his bosses are concerned about time. Even after the centralizers arrive on the rig, it'll take at least 10 hours to install them. And the Macondo project is already $50 million over budget. They need to save time and money wherever they can. So it's decided that they will proceed using just the six centralizers they have. Many of the Deepwater Horizon crew aren't happy, but it's not their call. And on April 19, a meeting is held on board to finalize plans for the cement job. Jimmy Harrell, Deepwater Horizons Offshore installation manager, leans back in his chair and runs a thumb along his mustache. Besides, beside him are senior men from the drilling team and none of them looks impressed with what they're hearing. Standing in front of a whiteboard is Bob Kaluza, a newly assigned well site leader from bp. Alright, Halliburton's confirmed that we need a special cement mix from a condo. I guess that's appropriate because as I think we've established by now, it is a very special well. Kaluza looks around the room, but no one laughs at his joke. He turns away to the whiteboard. So we're using this nitrified cement. The nitrogen bubbles make the mix lighter, so the fragile walls of the well we're dealing with down there will be less likely to collapse under the pressure. Jimmy Harrell leans forward to interrupt. Sir, if I may, can I stop you there? Yeah. Is something wrong, Mr. Harrell? Well, you're talking about using that nitrogen cement foam in the deepest parts of the well. Yeah, from top to bottom. That's the plan. Well sir, you realize that well is three and a half miles deep. If we put nitrified cement at that kind of depth, the pressure is going to squeeze the nitrogen right out of it. It'll rise back up the well like bubbles in soda, leave behind a bunch of holes for the oil and gas to slip through. And that, to my mind, defeats the whole point. Well, I appreciate your input, Mr. Harrell, but this plant has already been approved by BP and Halliburton. The walls of the well won't support regular cement. I've been doing this job for 30 years and I can count on two fingers the number of times I've seen nitrogen foam used in at the bottom of a well. If we go ahead with this plan, there's a good chance we're going to get a leak. Why risk it on the well from hell? Kaluza taps his diagram for emphasis. Stopping a leak is exactly why we're using the foam. The engineers have done the calculations. Yeah. Sir, I'm telling you, hydrocarbons are going to blow right through that foam. Mr. Harrell, we change the cement mix now, it will cost us months of extra time and millions of dollars. I for one don't want to have to explain. Explained that to headquarters. They've given us a plan and we're sticking to it. Elusa tosses his marker down on the table between them. Harold shakes his head. He's not going to win this argument. Well, I guess that's why we have the blowout preventer, right? Oh wait, that's leaking too. No one laughs at Jimmy Harrell's joke either. Everyone on board is feeling increasingly nervous about closing the condo. Well, nothing seems to be going right on this job, but it's far worse than even Harrell realizes. Despite what Bob Kaluza says, there is something wrong with the cement, and the crew's attempts to seal the well from hell will only result in disaster. American Scandal is sponsored by AT and T. There's a special kind of calm when you know things are taken care of. Like when the trash bins are already at the curb before you remember it's pickup day. Or when a friend texts to say they've picked up your kid from practice because they know you're stuck in tr. They're all little things, but they take a load off. Staying connected matters. And that's why, in the rare event of a network outage, AT and T will proactively credit you for a full day of service. That's the AT and T guarantee. Because connection isn't just about big life events. It's hearing your best friend's laugh on a random Tuesday. It's sending a thinking of you text and knowing it'll actually send. It's those quick in between moments that end up meaning the most AT and T connecting changes everything. Credit for fiber downtime lasting 20 minutes or more or for wireless downtime lasting 60 minutes. 60 minutes or more caused by a single incident impacting 10 or more towers must be connected to impacted tower at onset of outage. Restrictions and exclusions apply, so see at and t.com guarantee for full details.
- [28:50]
Lawless Planet Narrator
How hard is it to kill a planet? Maybe all it takes is a little drilling, some mining, and a whole lot of carbon pumped into the atmosphere. When you see what's left, it starts to look like a crime scene.
- [29:02]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
Are we really thinking, is our water safe? You destroyed our tap?
- [29:06]
Lawless Planet Narrator
And crimes like that, they don't just happen.
- [29:08]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
We call things accidents. There is no accident. This was 100% preventable.
- [29:15]
Lawless Planet Narrator
They're the result of choices by people. Ruthless oil tycoons, corrupt politicians, even organized crime. These are the stories we need to be telling about our changing planet. Stories of scams, murders and cover ups that are about us and the things we're doing to either protect the earth or destroy it. Follow Lawless Planet on the Wondry app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen to new episodes of Lawless Planet early and ad free right now by joining Wondry plus in the Wondry app, Apple Podcasts or Spot.
- [29:56]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
Foreign it's late February 2010 by the time the crew of the Deepwater Horizon stops a leak in the Macondo well. They pump in gallons and gallons of drilling mud to balance the pressure and plug the fissures in the rock. But patching the well in this way isn't quick and it's not cheap. It costs BP two weeks of drill time and $14 million. BP originally planned for the Macondo well to be ready in 77 days at a cost of $96 million, but both those targets have already been blown. Deep sea drilling is a risky business, and problems like these are not uncommon. But BP has little patience for setbacks. The company wants the project back on schedule and back on budget, and the crew of the Deepwater Horizon is put under pressure to make up for lost time, according to a later report by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. John Guide is one BP employee who knows precisely how many corners the Deepwater Horizon team is being forced to cut. 52 year old guide is an engineer who oversees operations on the rig from BP's headquarters in Houston, Texas. And just days after the leak in the Macondo well is fixed, he has a conference call with the crew on Deepwater Horizon to discuss another problem. Guide is a BP veteran. He's worked on dozens of deep water wells before Macondo, but this one is turning out to be especially troublesome. He knows that many onboard the oil rig have adopted a new name for it it calling it the well from Hell. Guide hurries into a conference room with his laptop in one hand and a coffee in the other before dialing into the call with the drill team. His BP counterpart on the rig brings him up to speed. A leak has been detected in the blowout preventer, one of the most important pieces of safety equipment on the well in the event of a kick or an even worse emergency. The huge 300 ton device uses a series of valves to seal the well and stop gas and liquid from surging up the drilling pipe to the rig. On his laptop, Guide watches footage recorded by a remote operated vehicle on the seafloor. The video is grainy, but it still clearly shows hydraulic oil leaking from one of the valves on the giant blowout preventer. Seeing this, Guide sighs. First they lost all that drilling mud and now this. There doesn't seem to be anything on this job that doesn't leak. Guide sips his coffee and listens as the team on the rig discusses the implications of the leak in the blowout preventer. The drill team wants to stop work entirely while they finish repairs to the unit. They're even talking about hauling it back to the surface for maintenance. That could lead to a delay of Weeks or even months. Guide clenches his jaw because this is the last thing he needs. He already has corporate breathing down his neck. Most of the executives he works with have only been in their jobs for a couple of months and don't really understand how things work out on the rigs. They keep making last minute changes to the drill program. The Guide then has to explain to the disgruntled team on Deepwater Horizon. In one email to his boss, Guide has already explained that the Horizon crew are at their wit's end. So now he taps his fingers on the table as he tries to think of a solution that will satisfy headquarters without putting too much additional pressure on the drill team. It's just then when Guide remembers something. According to federal regulations, a blowout preventer only needs to be repaired if it's not working properly. But in this case, it's only one leaky valve, which has a workaround. The rest of the preventer is working just fine. So Guide speaks up to interrupt the debate. He tells the crew that there's no need to haul out the blowout preventer. They can just neutralize the pressure on the leaky valve and keep drilling to Guide's relief. The team agrees his solution will save them all time and hassle. No one wants to be working on this well longer than they have to. So Guide ends the call with a sigh of satisfaction. One more disaster averted. And from that point on, there are hopes that things on Deepwater Horizon might finally be turning a corner. Because despite all the problems, there are signs. The drill team is approaching the hydrocarbon reservoir they've been looking for. They've detected elevated gas levels, and as they drill deeper, sensor readings confirm a large high pressure formation of oil and gas. Then, in mid April, the drill reaches its target depth of 13,293ft. And it's clear that Maconda holds a rich deposit of fossil fuels. But BP doesn't want to stop there. The plan is to drill a thousand feet more to search for another suspected reservoir even deeper in the rock formation. But as the drill team presses on, it becomes apparent that they've not yet tamed the well. Drilling mud again begins to leak. They try to pump more in, but that doesn't work. And soon they've lost almost 3,000 barrels, roughly $1 million worth of mud. BP is effectively pouring money into a bottomless pit, and executives at the company decide it's time to cut their losses. On April 9, 2010, they call off operations at Macondo. The well from hell has finally beaten them with further drilling canceled, the team on Deepwater Horizon moves to seal Macondo. BP might return to the site at a later date, but that could be years away. So the crew must ensure the well is stable enough to be left unmonitored for a long time. And to seal the well properly, the team needs to cap it with cement. But first they need to install centralizers. Centralizers are metal springs that hold the pipe in the center of the wellbore, so that when the cement is pumped in, it forms an even seal on all sides. Without enough centralizers, the pipe could shift inside the hole, leaving channels in the cement that oil and gas can flow up, potentially risking a blowout. And to ensure everything is done properly, BP has a specialist cement contractor on the job. Halliburton. They recommend using 21 centralizers to stabilize the well, but Deepwater Horizon only has six on hand. An extra 15 centralizers are ordered by a BP engineer, but his bosses are concerned about time. Even after the centralizers arrive on the rig, it'll take at least 10 hours to install them. And the Macondo project is already $50 million over budget. They need to save time and money wherever they can. So it's decided that they will proceed using just the six centralizers they have. Many of the Deepwater Horizon crew aren't happy, but it's not their call. And on April 19, a meeting is held on board to finalize plans for the cement job. Jimmy Harrell, Deepwater Horizons Offshore installation manager, leans back in his chair and runs a thumb along his mustache. Besides, beside him are senior men from the drilling team, and none of them looks impressed with what they're hearing. Standing in front of a whiteboard is Bob Kaluza, a newly assigned well site leader from bp. Alright. Halliburton's confirmed that we need a special cement mix from a condo. I guess that's appropriate, because as I think we've established by now, it is a very special well. Kaluza looks around the room, but no one laughs at his joke. He turns away to the whiteboard. So we're using this nitrified cement. The nitrogen bubbles make the mix lighter, so the fragile walls of the well we're dealing with down there will be less likely to collapse under the pressure. Jimmy Harrell leans forward to interrupt. Sir, if I may, can I stop you there? Yeah. Is something wrong, Mr. Harrell? Well, you're talking about using that nitrogen cement foam in the deepest parts of the well. Yeah, from top to bottom. That's the plan. Well, sir, you realize that well is three and a half miles deep. If we put nitrified cement at that kind of depth, the pressure is going to squeeze the nitrogen right out of it. It'll rise back up the well like bubbles in soda, leave behind a bunch of holes for the oil and gas to slip through. And that, to my mind, defeats the whole point. Well, I appreciate your input, Mr. Harrel, but this plant has already been approved by BP and Halliburton. The walls of the well won't support regular cement. I've been doing this job for 30 years and I can count on two fingers the number of times I've seen nitrogen foam used at the bottom of a well. If we go ahead with this plan, there's a good chance we're going to get a leak. Why risk it on the well from hell? Kaluza taps his diagram for emphasis. Stopping a leak is exactly why we're using the foam. The engineers have done the calculations. Yeah, sir, I'm telling you, hydrocarbons are going to blow right through that foam. Mr. Harrell, we change the cement mix now, it will cost us months of extra time and millions of dollars. I, for one, don't want to have to explain Explained that to headquarters. They've given us a plan and we're sticking to it. Elusa tosses his marker down on the table between them. Harold shakes his head. He's not going to win this argument. Well, I guess that's why we have the blowout preventer, right? Oh, wait, that's leaking too. No one laughs at Jimmy Harrell's joke either. Everyone on board is feeling increasingly nervous about closing the condo. Well, nothing seems to be going right on this job, but it's far worse than even Harold realizes. Despite what Bob Kaluza says, there is something wrong with the cement. And the crew's attempts to seal the well from hell will only result in disaster. The nitrogen foam Jimmy Harrell is so worried about was designed and supplied by the specialist firm Halliburton. But no one on board the Deepwater Horizon knows that. Halliburton has already found serious issues with the cement it plans to use on the Macondo well two months earlier. Back in February 2010, Halliburton tested the nitrogen foam they had designed for the well, and the results were troubling. The slurry proved unstable under pressure. Halliburton reran the tests, hoping to get a better result, but the concrete failed on nine separate occasions. By the book, Halliburton should have alerted its client to the problem. But informing BP would have raised uncomfortable questions about the quality of all Halliburton's products, potentially jeopardizing lucrative contracts. So instead, Halliburton sent BP the test results without marking them clearly as failures. The BP manager responsible for them never even noticed. Then Halliburton ran the tests again, only this time, they tweaked the conditions and got the positive results they were hoping for. This was not evidence that the concrete mix was suitable for the Macondo well, but it was good enough to get BP's approval. And on April 19, 2010, the Macondo well is sealed with the nitrogen foam cement. Earlier the next morning, Halliburton emails BP to let them know that the cement job is complete and that it all went well. Once cement has been pumped into a well, it's normal industry practice to perform a cement bond log test to check that it's stable. But at Macondo, BP's well site leaders decide that the test is unnecessary. Examining the cement will take 12 hours and add half a million dollars in costs to a job that is already delayed and over budget. The contractors who were meant to run the cement tests are already onboard the Deepwater Horizon to, but BP flies them home. So all that remains are a few more safety tests to check that the well's pressure is stable. And on April 20, Jimmy Harrell and the drill team meet again with BP's well site leader, Bob Kaluza. Despite Harrell's concerns about the cement mix, they have successfully completed the first of the tests on the Macondo well. In the positive pressure test, drilling mud was pumped into the well to see if the cement seal held and it passed. Now Kaluza outlines BP's plans for the final steps in plugging the well. But as Harold reads through the operations for the day, he notices something is missing. Waiting until the end of the meeting, he pulls Kaluza aside and tells him they also have to perform a negative pressure test. This check removes some of the heavy drilling mud and replaces it with lighter seawater. This reduces the pressure on the cement seal from above. If the seal is secure, though, it should still be able to hold. Given the success of the positive pressure test, BP apparently thinks it's unnecessary. But Harrell is insistent it's his policy to also always complete a negative test before declaring a well safe. And after all the problems they've had with Macondo, he thinks they should be taking more precautions, not less. So. Having given way on the cement, Harrell is determined not to compromise. This time, he has to put the Safety of his crew first. The negative test will go ahead whether BP likes it or not. So at 5pm that afternoon, the drill team assembles in the shack, ready to start testing. The goal of the negative test is simple. To release pressure from the well and see if it holds. If it can sustain 0 psi, the cement job has worked. If the pressure increases or fluids come out of the well, it likely means there's a leak. And as soon as they begin the test, things don't go to plan. According to later testimony from the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, every time the team tries to release pressure from the well, the readings jump back up. The crew debates what this means and what they can do next. Another test is needed, but it's getting late and they've been on deck for 12 hours already. They're exhausted and hungry, so it's agreed to let the night shift handle it. When this new team clocks in and repeats the test, at first the pressure drops to zero, but then it soon begins to rise again. They run the test once more with the same results. It's a clear indication that hydrocarbons are leaking out of the reservoir into the well. But they're so close to finishing this job and getting off Macondo, no one wants to be the cause of unnecessary delays. So the team searches for alternative explanations. Jason Alexander is the senior tool pusher on the night shift, and he offers a possible. The weight of all the drilling mud still down there might be causing the sensors to give a false pressure reading. This theory is a stretch, but it makes a convenient explanation for the results they've been getting. So the drill team runs a fourth negative test, this time measuring the pressure in a different pipe connected to the well. It holds at 0 psi for 30 minutes. So, relieved, the team declares the test a success and that the well is safe, Deepwater Horizon can finally leave the well from hell. The night shift crew calls BP headquarters in Houston to give them the good news. Then they start the final stage of shutting in the Macondo well, pumping out all the remaining heavy drilling mud and replacing it with seawater. But all the while, 18,000ft beneath them, the pressure is building. And suddenly, on the drill drilling deck, an alarm sounds in the drill shack. Jason Anderson peers over at the console. One of his team throws up his hand. Chase. The pressure's climbing again. Are you kidding? We already told BP the well was stable. I'm sorry, boss. Anderson stomps over to the sensor and scowls. All right, shut off the pumps. I'll call Mr. Jimmy. Management's gonna be mad when they hear about this. Yeah, but when are they ever happy? Suddenly, there's a roar from outside. Anderson rushes to the window. Drilling mud is spewing out of the pipe onto the rig floor. Drilling assistant turns to look at Anderson in alarm. What's going on down there? We gotta get to the drill floor now. Go. Anderson slams open the door to the drill shack and clatters down the stairs outside. The other man follows, hot on his heels. The platform below is already switched slick with mud and it coats them like a heavy rain as they descend. Oh God, it's blowing out. Call Jimmy. Anderson has to yell to be heard over the thunderous sound of the mud being forced out of the drilling pipe. The air is already tinged with the smell of gas. Make the call, then get out of here. If that gas finds a spark, we're dead. The drill assistant races to the phone on one side of the platform. Anderson heads to the control panel. He covers his eyes as he dashes across the drill flag. His face and body are caked in thick, oily mud. He can barely breathe and knows he has only seconds to act. He pounds his hand against the control that activates the blowout preventer. It's supposed to seal off the well, but nothing happens. The torrent of mud keeps coming. Anderson hits the panel again and again. It's not working. It's not working. In that instant, Jason Anderson knows that the blowout preventer has failed and there's now no way to stop the flow of gas and mud that's shooting up the pipe and over the rig. In that moment, Anderson thinks of his wife and kids back in Texas. This was supposed to be his last day on the deep water horizon. And he's glad they don't know what's coming, because he does. Anderson braces himself as the gas ignites with a deafening roar. And the last thing he sees is is a wall of flames from wondering. This is episode two, Deepwater Horizon for American Scandal. In our next episode, the surviving crew members try to escape a burning rig. And as oil spreads across the Gulf of Mexico in the wake of the explosion, communities in the region grapple with the true scale of the dish. If you're enjoying American scandal, you can unlock exclusive seasons on Wondery Binge new season first and listen completely ad free when you join Wondery in the Wondery app, Apple podcasts or Spotify. And before you go, tell us about yourself by filling out a survey@wondery.com survey if you'd like to learn more about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We recommend the books Run to Failure by Abram Lusgarth, A Sea in Flames by Carl Safina and Fire on the Horizon by Tom Schroeder and John Conrad. This episode contains reenactments and dramatized details. And while in most cases we can't know exactly what was said, all our dramatizations are based on historical research. American Scandal is hosted, edited and executive produced by me, Lindsey Graham for Airship. Audio editing by Mohammed Shahzib sound design by Gabriel Gould music by Thrum this episode is written and researched by Lauren Sudworth, fact checking by Alyssa Jung Perry Managing Producer, Emily Burke development by Stephanie Jens senior producer, Andy Beckerman Executive producers are William Simpson for Airship and Jenny Lauer Beckman, Marshall Louie and Erin O' Flaherty for wondering.
- [48:05]
Charlie Brinkhurst Cuff
On Boxing Day 2018, 20 year old Joy Morgan was last seen at her church, Israel United in Christ or iuic. I just went on my Snapchat and I just see her face plastered everywhere. This is the missing sister, the true story of a woman betrayed by those she trusted most. IUIC is my family and like the best family that I've ever had. But IUIC isn't like most churches.
- [48:33]
Narrator (Lindsey Graham)
This is a devilish cult. You know when you get that feeling like you just I don't want to be here and I want to get out out. It's like that feeling of like, I want to go hang out.
- [48:42]
Charlie Brinkhurst Cuff
I'm Charlie Brinkhurst Cuff and after years of investigating Joy's case, I need to know what really happened to Joy. Binge all episodes of the Missing Sister exclusively and ad free right now on Wondery. Start your free trial of Wondery on Spotify, Apple Podcasts or in the Wondery app.