Tristan Redman (3:08)

Last week, we were really struck by something that the former head of MI6 told the BBC. He was being asked what advice he'd give the British Prime Minister about how to navigate the world if he was still running the UK's foreign intelligence spy agency.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (3:22)

If you don't have a sphere of.

Tristan Redman (3:23)

Influence, then you're in a sphere of influence.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (3:27)

The truth there is that fundamentally we.

Tristan Redman (3:31)

Are in this new might is right paradigm and that if you don't possess hard power, you don't get a vote. So all this week, we're teaming up with our sister podcasts at the BBC World Service, who are experts in their regions to look at those spheres of influence and tell the story of how we got here. We'll be looking at China and Russia, why global powers are fighting over Africa. And we'll look at how the former empires of Europe and the players in the Middle east, like Iran, fit into this new world order.

Asma Khalid (4:04)

But since our show is about where America and the world meets today, we're going to start with the United States. From the BBC, I'm Asma Khalid in Washington, dc.

Tristan Redman (4:15)

And I'm Tristan Redman in London. And today on the Global Is Donald Trump building an empire? And if so, is that a break from the way the US historically sees itself?

Asma Khalid (4:34)

Tristan, with all the headlines that we have seen about US ambitions in Venezuela and Greenland over the last several days, I have been wondering what this all means in regard to the United States place in the world in this moment.

Tristan Redman (4:48)

Well, Asma, seeing as in our duo, I have been assigned to represent, quote, unquote, the rest of the world. I guess there are a lot of people, certainly in Europe, scratching their heads about what the US place in the world is right now. Because, you know, the United States is just saying this country is in our sphere of influence, in our immediate geographic neighborhood, and therefore we are taking this action and it's not dressing it up in any other terms.

Asma Khalid (5:17)

Tristan, you mentioned this phrase, sphere of influence, and it is a bit of a wonky term that's thrown around a lot. And so I would love for you to define what, what you mean by it.

Tristan Redman (5:29)

I don't know. I have a lot of questions. Is it a geographical area? Is it your immediate neighbourhood or your hemisphere, or is it a grouping of linguistically or culturally similar countries? So can it change from week to week, depending on what your foreign policy interests are at any particular moment. So I'm hoping that this week we can answer some of these questions. What would you say it is, Asmaa?

Asma Khalid (5:57)

Tristan, I am fascinated by the focus people seem to have in this moment around the idea of a sphere of influence, because it doesn't feel entirely new to me. I've been wondering, I mean, isn't this the way the world has always been governed? You can look back to the days of empires and colonialism. It feels like for centuries the world has been governed by spheres of influence. What would you say, Tristan, is the United States current sphere of influence?

Tristan Redman (6:25)

Well, we keep being told recently, don't we, that it's the Western Hemisphere. But that doesn't entirely wash for me because US Interests span all the way across the globe in all directions. So I've been wondering actually, would it be easier to define the US Sphere of influence by what's not in it, rather than what's actually in it? So we've learned recently that the US doesn't care much about Ukraine, for example, cares much less about Europe than it used to, is maybe much less interested in Taiwan than it used to be. It's certainly less interested in Afghanistan than it has been for the last 20 years. It's kind of forgetting about Africa. And there are places around the world that the United States would be happy to leave to the spheres of influence of other powers. So maybe the US Sphere of influence, Asma, is kind of everything in the world except some clearly defined places that it's not interested.

Asma Khalid (7:25)

It seems to me that what we are seeing now from the Trump administration is a major shift from the conventional worldview that American presidents took these ideas of democracy, human rights being at the core of American foreign policy. And now we see President Trump very explicitly changing the conversation, instead focused on on economics, not on human rights and democracy. And in the past several days, we have seen multiple US Officials make this clear when it comes to the sale of Venezuelan oil. In fact, the vice president, J.D. vance, said as much on Fox News just the other day.

Advertisement Voice (8:02)

The way that we control Venezuela is we control the purse strings, we control the energy resources, and we tell the regime, you're allowed to sell the oil so long as you serve America's national interest. You're not allowed to sell it if you can't serve America's national interest.

Tristan Redman (8:16)

Nonetheless, we want to take a step back, though, from these daily ins and outs and take a wide angle view of how the Trump administration is repositioning The United States place in the world. And we naturally thought to turn to our good friends over at AmericasT, which is the BBC's US news and politics podcast.

Anthony Zuercher (8:37)

I'm Anthony Zuercher. I'm a North America correspondent here at BBC News. I'm also a co presenter of the podcast AmericasT. And it's great to be here on a sister podcast.

Tristan Redman (8:48)

So good to have you. Thank you so much for joining us, Anthony.

Asma Khalid (8:51)

Yeah, thank you. I love when people are actually in the studio with me in the flesh. A fellow American, Anthony.

Anthony Zuercher (8:57)

It makes a big difference, doesn't it?

Tristan Redman (8:58)

Well, in the last few days, Anthony, Stephen Miller, one of the President's closest advisors, laid out his philosophy for how the world works in 2026. We'd love to play you the tape of him.

Advertisement Voice (9:14)

We live in a world in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.

Tristan Redman (9:27)

But so what do you make of that?

Anthony Zuercher (9:30)

Well, I mean, it is a pretty kind of Machiavellian look at the world, right? And it stands in sharp contrast to even just 20 years ago where the United States was talking about making the world safe for democracy and soft power influencing. The United States had kind of a idealistic view of what the role the United States would have to play. This is a much more pragmatic, cold, clear eyed view of international relations. It's trying to abandon or move away from idealism and sentimentality in foreign policy. If the United States has the power, it's going to exercise it and has a right to exercise it without making apologies for it. And even if it at times ruffles feathers from people who would consider themselves our friends or allies, we really want.

Tristan Redman (10:16)

To understand this viewpoint. So we wanted to go back to the US's early foreign policy and kind of look at a template of what the United States was supposed to be when it was first founded. Because we're hoping that that might help us to understand kind of how we got to where we are now. So if we went back all the way to George Washington, the first President of the United States, what was his view on America's role in the world?

Anthony Zuercher (10:45)

I think if you listened to George Washington, if you read his speeches, he was afraid or reluctant to commit the United States to permanent international alliances. He saw Europe that was rife with conflict, great powers playing out their rivalries in battles across Europe and in seas. He was wary of the United States getting pulled into that. And it was acknowledgement that if he got pulled into these games, it would not benefit the United States. So he, in his farewell address, explicitly said that the United States should not get pulled into permanent alliances. And so I think that kind of outlook dominated the United States foreign policy for decades. So that became kind of the dominating view. And it was one that was practical. Right. I mean, the United States wasn't a major power, and there were very real risks.

Asma Khalid (11:39)

And a small country, too.

Anthony Zuercher (11:41)

Yeah, Poorer country at the time. You play great power games, there's chances are you're gonna end up on the wrong side of it.

Asma Khalid (11:48)

So let's fast forward a bit to the 1800s. And in 1823, President James Monroe was in the White House, and he issued something known as the Monroe Doctrine. In recent months, I think we've all begun to hear. Hear a lot more about something that we thought was like a relic of US History class. And we hear President Trump and his team often referring to this idea. So I want to spend a little bit of time here and parse out exactly what the Monroe Doctrine was.

Anthony Zuercher (12:18)

It's essentially a declaration as written by John Quincy Adams, who was an advisor to James Monroe and would later go on to become president, but a lengthy kind of a declaration that the entirety of the Western Hemisphere was off limits to European power influence, that not only should the United States stay out of these foreign entanglements, but foreign powers shouldn't entangle themselves in Western hemispheric affairs. And it came at a time when the Spanish Empire was crumbling that a lot of the South American countries were gaining their independence from Spain. And there was a power vacuum, a European power vacuum in Latin America. And this was an attempt by the American government to keep that vacuum from being filled by other European nations. And, I mean, it was a declaration. It was a declaration really without teeth. The Americans were not a global power. They couldn't enforce this.

Tristan Redman (13:12)

Anthony, I've been trying to understand what James Monroe was doing. Was he being extraordinarily bold in making this claim to the whole of the Western Hemisphere, or was he showing remarkable foresight about what the United States would later become?

Anthony Zuercher (13:29)

I mean, I suppose a little of both. I mean, it was pretty audacious for an American president that wasn't even controlling all of its territory at the time. It was still trying to expand westward to speak about policy for territories thousands of miles away. But I also think it was prescient. Right. I mean, the fact that we're still talking about the Mondreau Doctrine 200 years after it was rolled out does show that there was A certain amount of foresight to it. It was something that, you know, a series of principles and ideas that set the stage for America declaring a sphere of influence, you know, later on when it could actually enforce it.

Tristan Redman (14:11)

I mean, at this point, when the United States is quite small, why was there a feeling that it needed to be expansive at all? I mean, it's not as though it didn't have a lot of land, as you mentioned, to move into, you know, at its doorstep.

Anthony Zuercher (14:25)

Yeah, I mean, I think there's something kind of built into the American character, I suppose, you know, this idea that we're a special place. And maybe it has something to do with all of the kind of various evangelical, religious, proselytizing groups that moved in the United States, that they felt like they weren't just going to keep to themselves. They wanted to tout what a great place they were from, what a great country they were in. This country founded on the idea of democratization and self rule. And there was this drive, and the term for it at the time was Manifest Destiny. That the United States had this, by dint of divine providence or the power of its ideals, had this obligation to expand across the continent. And then once it was done expanding across the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, then Americans started looking towards the north and the South. I mean, there was a zealotry to it. I think at times it sounded like.

Asma Khalid (15:21)

When you were saying the Monroe Doctrine was first issued, the US didn't necessarily have the military power to enforce this vision that it was going to control the Western hemisphere. That would come some years later. And I think what you were alluding to is kind of the end of the 19th century. Right. When you see President William McKinley followed up by President Teddy Roosevelt. And that to me, Anthony, is. Is the era that I find so resembles some of what we're seeing today. These were two men who presided over an expansionist era of US foreign policy. How would you characterize their approach to US Influence and power?

Anthony Zuercher (16:01)

Yeah, I think it was a moment in time where the United States was first really starting to flex its muscles. It had become a more powerful country. It had become a continental country. And you saw McKinley and Roosevelt, who was his vice president, wanted to use this new economic power, this new strength that the United States had and craft a military that allowed it to project itself. Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was a naval strategist, who was very influential with Roosevelt, talked about the idea that geography is destiny as far as it comes to determining a nation's power. And so Roosevelt, when He ultimately became president, built a dozen 15 new battleships that the great White Fleet that began touring around the world. And Roosevelt actually created a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that not only was the Western Hemisphere off limits to the Europeans, but that the United States had an active role as the hemisphere's policemen to ensure stability throughout the entire hemisphere. And now, because of the United States new military power, it could actually enforce it and do something about it. Whereas it was just kind of a pie in the sky idea in the 1820s, this Monroe Doctrine we're going to stop and tell Europeans to stay out. Now, the United States had some of the muscle to be able to enforce that. And constructing the Panama Canal was one of the big key components of making the United States able to project power throughout the hemisphere. That was a big thing that Roosevelt adopted as a key project. You saw the United States assert its military power and economic power. And Venezuela. Roosevelt sent the Marines to Nicaragua, sent the Marines to Haiti, and then even beyond that, by acquiring the Hawaiian Islands, by defeating Spain in the Spanish American War, and acquiring the Philippines and Guam, the United States was vastly expanding its territory, not just on the continent, which it had over the past hundred years, but around the globe. All of these holdings gave the United States a foothold to become more of a global power. And while it would take another 40 years for the United States to really gain global preeminence, this was, you know, the inklings that the United States had ambitions beyond just his borders.

Asma Khalid (18:21)

You know, one thing I noticed when President Trump returned to the White House during that inaugural address he gave, he specifically Name checked President McKinley.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (18:31)

And we will restore the name.

Anthony Zuercher (18:35)

Of.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (18:35)

A great president, William McKinley, to Mount McKinley where it should be and where it belongs. President McKinley made our country very rich through tariffs and through talent.

Asma Khalid (18:56)

Is it your sense, Anthony, that whether it's McKinley or Roosevelt, we're talking about both of them, that these are people or an era that the President deeply admires and wants to replicate?

Anthony Zuercher (19:07)

Absolutely. There is a very real nostalgia for that period in time. And I've been with the President, listening to him talk about that era as kind of the golden age. And I've asked him about it with Columbia used tariffs as a tool to do something. There's also talk today of it being a way of raising revenue the way it was in the 19th century. Do you see it? Both options could be one that you.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (19:31)

Prefer another, not only with Colombia, with.

Anthony Zuercher (19:33)

Everyone else, but it could raise revenue as well.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (19:36)

It was when we were at our best in terms of financially as you know, from 1870 to 1913. That's when we were really, relatively speaking, at our strongest economically, as he is.

Anthony Zuercher (19:50)

Directly referred to the late 1960s century as a time when the United States was at the apex of its power, which was kind of interesting because the United States was the dominant power after World War II. But Trump goes back farther than that. He's very nostalgic for the idea of an ascendant United States that had big ambitions and was willing to do big things, take new territory, expand the country, project power in ways that weren't building structures and establishing kind of international norms and coalitions and organizations the way the United States did after World War II, but just kind of the United States as a solo actor doing what it wants to do, using the power it had.

Asma Khalid (20:36)

You mentioned World War II there and the institutions that were built after it. And I believe what you're referring to there are institutions like NATO and the United nations, which the US Helped create. What would you define as the United States sphere of influence around that time period?

Anthony Zuercher (20:51)

I mean, the United States became a global power shortly after World War II. The United States became involved in a war in Korea. The United States became involved in a war in Vietnam. I mean, the United States became involved in deciding the fates of nations in South America and Asia. I don't think there was a corner of the globe at that point that the United States didn't involve itself in.

Asma Khalid (21:12)

So the US Sphere of influence at that point, you would say would.

Anthony Zuercher (21:14)

Was the world. Yeah, I think it was the world. And it's interesting now to think of all these structures that the United States built up, and the Post World War I era was the American century. I think it's been described where the United States was the major player in the Western world. We've reached a point now, however, where some of those institutions and structures are being reconsidered.

Asma Khalid (21:40)

We've seen the Trump administration withdraw from a number of international organizations.

Tristan Redman (21:43)

Yeah, yeah.

Anthony Zuercher (21:44)

Withdraw from international organizations, just recently withdraw from all of these UN organizations, abandoned kind of the economic order that was constructed post World War II. An emphasis on free trade, on a global economy, global integration, the idea that you trade with other nations, you're not going to go to war with other nations. You've seen a very dramatic move away from that economic order towards one that's more akin to the late 19th century, where each nation kind of tries to do what it can to gain economic advantage. And I was actually just speaking to someone at the America First Policy Institute earlier today about whether they Think that what happened after World War II was a mistake, that this new order that the United States constructed was somehow misguided. And you heard Stephen Miller say, talk about, you know, America and the west apologizing after World War II, this whole.

Advertisement Voice (22:39)

Period that happened after World War II where the west began apologizing and groveling and begging, engaging these people.

Anthony Zuercher (22:48)

And it sounded like he was going to go off and really kind of condemn the entire order that was set up after that. And this person I was talking to, he said, no, no. But things change, circumstances change. And this is a clear eyed re evaluation of the world as it is now. And institutions that no longer function the way they were intended or no longer suited to meet the current situation need to be abandoned. So it's interesting that what you're seeing now is such a sharp break militarily, economically from this post World War II order. And it might be one that is lasting. It's going to be hard to envision going back to the United States as kind of this global sponsor of an economic order that many Americans don't feel benefits themselves them anymore.

Tristan Redman (23:36)

So the Post World War II order, Anthony advocated a kind of idealist view of the world, spreading democracy, anti communism. But then enter stage right, Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger is known for having a pragmatic view of foreign policy. But what was it that he did for you that actually defines that pragmatic view and what does it mean in terms of this great conversation about spheres of influence?

Anthony Zuercher (24:13)

He definitely showed a willingness to shift American foreign policy not based on idealism, not based on the idea that there are good countries and bad countries, that there are ones that are democracies that the United States needs to support. And anything that wasn't a democracy, the United States wouldn't support. So I mean, you know, the United States was more than willing during the Nixon years to support bad governments and bad people and topple democratically elected governments that in their view were not aligned with American interests.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (24:43)

Good evening. I have requested this television time tonight to announce a major development in our efforts to build a lasting peace in the world.

Anthony Zuercher (24:53)

I think probably the biggest thing that happened during the Nixon years and that Kissinger was obviously a driving force behind was the United States has moved to reopen relations with China.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (25:02)

As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over the past three years, there can be no stable and enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people.

Anthony Zuercher (25:16)

A willingness to reshape the kind of global political map in a dramatic move that realigned or aligned the United States more closely with China and drove a divide in the communist world between the Chinese and the Russians.

Asma Khalid (25:32)

Do you see the United States remit at that time period shift, and if so, what was the United States sphere of influence during the Kissinger foreign policy heydays?

Anthony Zuercher (25:43)

Hmm. I still think it was global minded. I mean, it was a practical look at the application of American power. A willingness of the United States to follow what is in its kind of pragmatic interest, rather than looking after countries that it might have an affinity for.

Asma Khalid (26:02)

How much do you see that vision influencing what we see today?

Anthony Zuercher (26:06)

I think you see in Trump's administration a willingness to make decisions that will be unpopular even among American allies, a willingness to push back against kind of these traditional friendships that the United States has had. In the National Security Directive that the United States released recently, it talked a lot more about Europe and what Europe was doing wrong than it did about Russia or even China. It was a refocus, a realignment of American foreign policy based on different principles than we had seen, based on believing.

Asma Khalid (26:39)

What'S best for the United States.

Anthony Zuercher (26:41)

Yeah, best for the United States, come hell or high water, no matter who it angers, because they have now reevaluated what could be in the United States interests.

Tristan Redman (26:50)

I wonder, Anthony, if you could break down for us, as you see it, the Trump administration view of what its sphere of influence is. Perhaps you could give us an example of where the Trump White House might say, nope, we're going to step away from that one. It's nothing to do with us. And then another where it might say, okay, well, it may not be in the Western Hemisphere, but that one is one for us.

Anthony Zuercher (27:21)

Yeah, I think you're already seeing that the Trump administration try to disentangle itself from Ukraine. I mean, that is one that comes up time and time again that the United States has no real dog in this fight. This is Europe's problem. I mean, it's complicated a bit by Donald Trump's vowed determination to become a global peacemaker. And so you've seen him get involved personally in conflicts where I think America first foreign strategist would say, we don't have any need to be involved. The India, Pakistan conflict, for instance. Geographically, clearly the United States has a focus in the Western Hemisphere. And the current administration views the Western Hemisphere as the United States sphere of influence, from Canada and Greenland all the way down to Patagonia and Argentina. And we are reorienting our foreign policy and our application of military and economic power to this geographic region. There's a kind of an ideological drive to the Trump administration, though, and you do hear it from people like Stephen Miller and from Trump himself, is that the United States is also leading a fight for Western civilization and Western culture.

Advertisement Voice (28:32)

You have no idea how determined we will be to save this civilization, to save the west, to save this republic.

Anthony Zuercher (28:42)

Stephen Miller's speech at Charlie Kirk's memorial service drew a direct line from Athens democracies to Philadelphia and to Monticello. At Jefferson's home in Monticello.

Advertisement Voice (28:54)

Our lineage and our legacy hails back to Athens, to Rome, to Philadelphia, to.

Anthony Zuercher (29:02)

Monticello, that the United States was the heir to and the guardian of Western civilization. And so I think you could see that motivate the United States to get involved beyond just kind of its hemisphere sphere influence, borders. And that'll be something to watch.

Tristan Redman (29:19)

Anthony, is the flaw in this idea of a US Sphere of influence that, you know, it shouldn't have a need to stray beyond is the floor the fact that mission creep is a bit of a tricky thing to combat against, and you can pretty much define the national interest however you want. The US Military is a very big, very shiny, and very powerful instrument, and the temptation for any president, not just Donald Trump, is to use it.

Anthony Zuercher (29:54)

I mean, I think we saw after this successful military operation, by all accounts, very successful military operation in Venezuela, you know, kind of an ambition from Trump himself to find new ways of using it.

Stephen Miller (quoted) (30:11)

We have the most powerful, most lethal, most sophisticated, and most fearsome. It's a fearsome military on planet Earth, and it's not even close. You know, I've been saying it for a long time. Nobody can take us.

Anthony Zuercher (30:23)

That kind of, you could call it hubris, that kind of optimism. You also saw that after World War II, and it got the United States to overextend itself. You saw that after the successful toppling of Saddam Hussein in the Iraq war, where the United States was able to be successful in one military instance and thought it could do anything, essentially, and could rebuild Iraq as kind of a Western democracy. And obviously, that ran headfirst into reality. So I think there is a very real danger that the United States, with some successes in the Western Hemisphere, starts thinking, well, maybe we can just annex Greenland without worrying about the repercussions of that, or maybe we should start getting more involved in conflicts or concerns beyond the Western Hemisphere just because it's a belief in one's infallibility, and it's certainly possible to envision scenarios where China does something in Taiwan and the United States gets involved there and then. And you know, it could be a very rude awakening for the United States military if it thinks that success against Venezuela or success bombing Iran will translate into success against a major global power. We hope you enjoyed that. Ameracasters it's all back to normal on Monday with another episode of Americancers on five Live with Matt Chorley. So please do send us your voice notes so that we can answer your questions live on the radio. The WhatsApp is 443-301-23-9480 or you can send us an email@americastbc.co.

Helena Merriman (32:16)

If journalism is the first draft of history, what happens if that draft is flawed? In 1999, four Russian apartment buildings were bombed, hundreds killed. But even now we still don't know for sure who did it. It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. I'm Helena Merriman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they miss? The the first time the History Bureau, Putin and the apartment bombs. Listen on BBC.com or wherever you get your podcasts.

Anthony Zuercher (32:52)

UK Bye, y'. All.

Helena Merriman (32:56)

If journalism is the first draft of history, what happens if that draft is flawed? In 1999, four Russian apartment buildings were bombed, hundreds killed, but even now we still don't know for sure who did it. It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. I'm Helena Merryman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they miss? The first time the History Bureau, Putin and the apartment bombs. Listen on BBC.com or wherever you get your podcasts.