Melissa Murray (6:21)
Sure. So Roe is a kind of classic substantive due process opinion. The right to privacy is announced by the court in 1965 in a case called Griswold v. Connecticut, which is not about abortion at all, but rather about almost hundred year old ban on contraception that Connecticut kept Well into the 1960s when most states had eradicated their bans on contraception. In that opinion written in 1965, William O. Douglas identified this right to privacy that he said did not necessarily arise out of constitutional text, but emanated from the penumbras of various constitutional guarantees, namely the protections of the Bill of Rights, the first Amendment, freedom of association, the third Amendment, which prohibits the quartering of soldiers in the home, the fifth Amendment which prohibits or provides a right against self incrimination. On and on and on. None of these rights mean anything, he said, if there isn't some right of the individual to be sequestered from undue state intrusion, like that's at their core what they mean. And then he linked it to a pair of decisions that came from the 1920s, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce vs. Society of Sisters. None of which are about abortion or contraception, but rather about the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children in a manner of their choosing. They responded directly to two state law that one prohibited the teaching of German in schools. So this was a very nativist law passed in the wake of World War I. And the other was a law that prohibited parents from sending their children to any school other than a public school. And again, very anti immigrant, very nativist and anti Catholic. The court in those cases basically said that parents have to have this right of seclusion from the state, like in intimate life, to raise your children, you've got to have some privacy to be able to make decisions. And so Griswold came from all of that this idea that the state can't come into your house and put a soldier in there, the state can't make you testify against yourself, the state can't tell you how to raise your children or what language that they ought to speak. And that none of this makes sense unless you have some right as an individual against state intrusion. And so in that opinion, Douglas says all of this tethers the ban on contraception to an intrusion on this right of privacy and strikes it down. Fast forward to 1973. So not even 10 years later, an abortion case comes before the court. And there had been a movement within the criminal justice system for about 15 years to liberalize a lot of laws that prohibited sexual offenses, including abortion. And in some jurisdictions, they had repealed them entirely. There were four jurisdictions in the US that had repealed their bans on abortion, and then others had liberalized the law. So basically, a woman can get an abortion if she went before a panel of doctors and pled her case and they decided that, you know, abortion would be an acceptable avenue for her because of her health issues or physical issues, whatever. In Roe vs Wade, Harry Blackmun, who is a conservative member of the court, this is a Nixon appointee, he had been counsel to the Mayo Clinic, and he basically traces the history of abortion and the prohibitions on abortion in the United States. And he determines that, in fact, there hasn't always been a criminal ban on abortion. They begin arising in the mid to late 1800s at the same time where there are these alarming concerns about white women not having children and immigrant women having too many children. So this idea, again, this sort of anti immigrant fervor, very nativist fervor, in favor of increasing the white birth rate. And so the medical profession, which is becoming more professionalized at this time, trying to keep out the midwives, decides to band together. They professionalize. The AMA is born during this period, and one of the first things they do is lobby together for criminal bans on abortion across the country. And so Harry Blackmun's very clear. We haven't always prohibited abortion. And this is sort of a standard response under substantive due process that there's no fundamental right to something. And how do we know this? Because it's always been prohibited. Justice Scalia used to do this all the time. And Harry Blackmun is essentially anticipating that argument. It wasn't the case that we've always prohibited. In fact, at various points in our history, women have had the right to terminate a pregnancy. It's just after this period in the 1800s when it gets foreclosed. And so after tracing that history, he then links this idea of a right to terminate pregnancy to this right to privacy that had been previously identified in in Griswold and says, if the right of privacy means anything, it has to mean the woman has the right to make a decision about something as fundamental to the person as whether to bear or beget a child. And then he says, women have this right. It's part of the right to privacy. It's grounded in the 14th Amendment, and they can make these decisions in consultation with their physicians. And, you know, and there it's born. And so the critique of the substantive due process logic is that one, the right to privacy isn't written down in the Constitution. Douglass anticipated that in Griswold. He's like, yeah, lots of these rights aren't written down in the Constitution. The right of parental autonomy is not in the Constitution. The right to marry is not in the constitutional. But we recognize them as rights. Nor is the right to association specifically delineated in the First Amendment, but we recognize it as a right. So there are lots of things that aren't enumerated. And he talks about the ninth Amendment, and Justice Goldberg also latches onto this. So what's enumerated is not necessarily exhaustive. And Blackmun kind of echoes those things. So this writes in there, too. The critique, of course, is that because it is unenumerated, it doesn't exist. And they're making this up out of whole cloth. I think what a lot of people on the left don't appreciate when they deride the right to privacy as conjured out of whole cloth is one, there actually is jurisprudential underpinnings for the right to privacy, like cases from the 1920s. The right to marry is part of the right to privacy. And when you think about it that way, you can't deride the right to abortion without also imperiling these other rights of intimate life that we basically view as sacrosanct. If the right to an abortion is imperiled because it's unenumerated, then there is no right to marry either. That's unenumerated.