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- [00:00]
A
Today on the sand the Great Books Podcast, we are discussing the Meno with Dr. Daniel Wagner of Aquinas College. The MENO is a rich dialogue, particularly on the subjects of virtue and knowledge, but it is also well known for being a dialogue on education because of the subtle lessons that the drama of the dialogue actually gives us, how each soul in the dialogue actually responds to truth. In fact, the Meno has been called the secular Bible of St. John's College simply because of its ramifications on the nature of education itself. For those following along on our schedule, you might have known that this week we were supposed to discuss the MENO with Montana Classical, our friend on X. But that recording has apparently fallen into the abyss and I cannot locate it. So we're going to jump ahead a week and discuss The Meno of Dr. Daniel Wagner, who does a fantastic job, particularly on the mathematics and geometry of behind the famous scene of Socrates leading the slave boy through what he already knows. And also, as an aside, we are going to read Sir Gawain and the Green Knight for Christmas. So if you're looking for a good Christmas read, we're gonna have some wonderful guests. Go check out Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, translated by either Tolkien or by Armitage. Both of them, by the way, have wonderful audiobooks. I typically do not recommend audiobooks, however, listening to these so spoken and their alliterative verse is incredibly beautiful and brings a lot of volume and richness to the text. But this week, join us for the dialogue the Mino on the subjects of virtue and knowledge and education, led by Dr. Daniel Wagner. Welcome to Ascend, the Great Books Podcast. My name is Deacon Harrison Garlick. I'm a husband, father of five and serve as the Chancellor and General Counsel for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa. We are recording on a beautiful afternoon here at the Chancery. If you are new to Ascend, we are a weekly podcast that helps guide you through the great books. For example, if you want to read Homer's Iliad, Aeschylus's Oresteia or Sophocles Theban plays, we have podcasts, videos and written guides to help you or your small group read these great books. Check us out on X, YouTube, Facebook and Patreon. We appreciate all of our supporters who have access to our guides and visit thegreatbookspodcast.com for our reading schedule and other information. We are continuing in our study of Plato. Together we have read and discussed first Alcibiades, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and the Phaedo and Last week we had a good introductory conversation on Plato's meno. Today we are returning to the MENO to discuss its lessons on education. To help guide us, we have Dr. Daniel Wagner, who serves as a Director of Catholic Studies and the Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Aquinas College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. And he is also serving as a fellow with the Lyceum Institute, an online educational institute dedicated to classical intellectual tradition of the Western world. Welcome, Professor.
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B
Thanks so much for having me. Deacon Garlic. It's a pleasure and an honor and I'm excited to participate in your treatment of classical education today.
- [03:37]
A
Yeah, no, I appreciate it. I appreciate you being here. Tell us a little bit like just to get started on the Lyceum Institute. You guys are very active on X. I think that's where I've seen you guys. But like, what's your mission? What's your purpose?
- [03:48]
B
Yeah, excellent. So the Lyceum Institute is online digital education. It was founded by my good friend Dr. Brian Kempel. And it's for anyone that takes the intellectual life seriously. We are fully aligned with Catholic teachings on subsidiarity and our approach generally, you know, we focus on the mastery of language both through the, the trivium, grammar, logic, rhetoric, and then also the classical languages. So we offer courses regularly on Latin and Greek. And then I would tell you, I've taught several seminar style courses there on Aristotle's logic, primarily categories and the posterior analytics, and then Aristotle's physics and then a course on the problematic nature of modern philosophy and also a course on phenomenology. And the courses are very nicely structured. I wasn't, I did not used to be a fan of online teaching, but they're asynchronous with the lectures we pre record and students listen to the audio lecture and then, and then we have a meeting later in the week. And so students come prepared, they've done the readings, they've listened to the lecture, and that's really conducive to good dialogue, I found. So I actually like it in some ways more than the standard kind of in class meeting. Students are highly motivated, they're from all over the world. That's one of the really exciting things for me as a teacher to get to participate in the Lyceum is that we have highly motivated teachers at kind of all levels of education. There are folks that have PhDs, there are folks in the profession, workforce, and then there's graduate students. So that's really cool. For me, it really pushes me as a, as a teacher and a scholar so that's the Lyceum Institute. I encourage you to check it out. It's reasonably priced and we have, I think, upwards of 200 folks participating right now. So with quite a few classes and if you become a member, you have access to a lot of resources, lectures and other materials in the classical tradition. So. Yeah, I don't. And I would also mention a connection with it are. We have a journal called Reality, which. Which focuses on the importance of a return to classical realism. And yeah, I think. I think that's what I would say about the Lyceum, if. Do you have any questions?
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A
Otherwise, I mean, where do I sign up? It sounds excellent. That's what I'd like to do. I mean, I spend my day, you know, I'm an attorney, so I spend my day reading contracts and, you know, handling conflic conflict and untying knots and things like this. Yeah, And I think I would much rather be sitting in one of your all's classes. That sounds fantastic. No, I really appreciate, you know, URLs project. There's a lot of other projects that are kind of like it that I feel like are kind of starting. There's a groundswell of these things, particularly online. And I think this is beautiful. And I think it's a way that, you know, a lot of people can reach out and learn, particularly if they don't have anywhere in their local community. Right. So this is like really analogous to how this podcast started was, you know, trying to offer people kind of a small group setting to read the great books. People are reaching out to me on Twitter and saying, hey, I'd love to read the great books, or even me and my friends would love to read the Iliad, but no one we know has even read it. And if we try and read it together, we just feel lost. Right. And so I think offering these online things, even though I think we all agree, like obviously being together in person and having a great drink and having a charcuterie board and these things would. Would probably be a little bit better. It's more real. Right. But in the absence of that, I think bringing wisdom over this new technology is really helpful and can really. Where my heart really landed on trying to start this podcast is reaching those people that are in kind of those. Those islands, that isolation. Right. Someone who wants to learn the great books, they want to engage in the classical tradition, but they're in some type of isolation where there's no one in their community that can help them like this. That's a way that, you know, The Lyceum Institute or Ascend can step in and say, hey, like, here's a way to engage. And I think that it has been. It's been really humbling. I'm sure you guys have stories on your end as well. It's been really humbling for people to reach out or even send pictures of, like, reading the Iliad on their lunch break and things like this. Because, I mean, their experience, what's true, good and beautiful. And to have any small part in that, it's really a delight.
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B
Excellent. Yeah, I totally agree. I. Yeah, like I said, I really look forward to that format as opposed to the, the. The traditional. I don't know if you would call it traditional, but, you know, I teach at a, at a college. I think it's very exciting and I always learn from the students. And I mean, and that's, you know, connected to our topic, the Maino Today. That's because the students are 100% committed to active learning, Right. I'm not just, like, trying to dump information into their. Upload it for them or whatever. So, yeah, I think it's a fantastic opportunity. And I mean, and Dr. Kempel, one of his areas of specialty is technology, and he's very good at setting out limitations and the problems with modern technology, but also the benefits. And I think we're really reaping the benefits. It can be a great tool for education when used properly.
- [09:28]
A
So it's beautiful. No, I appreciate it. I appreciate you mapping that out for us. So, as you mentioned, right, today we're kind of returning to the mino. So let me kind of like, set this up where this is in my head and like, for our listeners that are following along and our studies into play.
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B
Doh.
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A
So last week we did kind of our. Our deep dive, but it's still kind of introductory because I feel like even after you talk about Plato's dialogue for, you know, three, four hours, you still somehow are just scratching the surface, right? There's all kinds of depths still there. And so one of the things, like particularly in my own formation, the MINO was not a dialogue that I was familiar with when I went through the great books the first time. And as I read through it, you know, it's like it's a conversation on virtue, but in certain ways it feels like it's that via negativa to a certain degree. Like, we end up kind of talking about what virtue is not, which is a true type of knowledge, right? So to learn what something is not is a type of knowledge. And then I Think, but it doesn't seem to come to any kind of, like, clear conclusion. And then typically when people talk about the Mino, what they always talk about is the episode of the slave boy. And it's like, okay, we're going to draw geometric formations down here in the sand or whatever, and the theory of recollection, right? And so how much do we push into that? How much does he really hold to this, etc. And so as I kind of read it and reread it and even talked about it last week, you know, I. I mentioned that the translation I ended up picking up was this one by Eva Brann and her kind of compatriots, and they have a wonderful introduction and wonderful notes, and I really actually appreciate this translation. But one of the things it says in here, in a quote, a lecture she gave elsewhere, she talks about the Meno as the secular Bible of St. John's College. And what that really caught my attention, outside of its just, like, being a phenomenal claim, is that I saw nothing in this dialogue that would merit that. And so I was like, no, you know, I've missed something, right? I got to go back to the text. And so last week, you know, I feel like I was just kind of in the shallow end of trying to understand, like, oh, wait, there is a strata of education here, right? There is a way to compare, say, Mino, his slave boy, Annatus, to compare how they're interacting with, trying to be instructed. And so I appreciate you coming on today because I kind of reached out, you know, to my betters and said, you know, who. Who maybe could have a conversation. I'm just like, me know, an education. And so they're like, oh, you got to have Dr. You know, Daniel Wagner on. He's gonna come on and unlock all the mysteries of Plato for you. So that's what I was promised.
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B
Setting the bar high.
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A
We're looking forward to it. But yeah, I mean, like, you know, do you have a particular love for the Meno? Like, how do you approach it in your class? Like, what's a good way to get started?
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B
Yeah, I love. I do. I love this dialogue. I think probably it's my. It's my favorite dialog, although that's difficult. I love the Repub. But I love. Because of its connection to education, I actually start my. My intro class is called Know Thyself. And I. I start the class. I mean, I start with a reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics 1:1 through 2, just to get an idea of. Of the meaning of philosophy. With the students. But the, the first real deep dive into a text is Plato's Meno. And I, I do see a really strong connection there. So maybe with, with respect to what we mean by classical education, let me just tell you what I think real quick and maybe you can add to that or, or correct me or, and then I can kind of connect it to may know the maino as a dialogue in general, if that makes sense. So I think on a classical education model the first thing is we understand that, that learning is about inculcating virtuous habits of knowing in the person. And that's really important because not everybody thinks of education like that. And, and then of course the, the manner in which we do that, we're going to use, you know, Socratic approaches in terms of dialogue and then engage with primary source texts, classics that, that express, you know, those profound truths, beauties and goodnesses about reality and the human person and God. So does that seem like presentation of the meaning of classical education?
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A
Yeah, I think so. You know, I typically tell people, you know, truth is, is the conformity of the mind to reality. And I think classical education is the best model of actually doing that. Yeah, the classical education is simply kind of pulling from, I mean what you're doing is you're pulling from kind of a time tested treasury of things, right? We're as modern, we seem to be a little bit obsessed with what's new. We have all this new thing, this new techne, this new technology, everything will make things easier. And so we're always kind of pursuing what's the newest thing out there. And I think it's somewhat counter intuitive to us to test the things that are perennial, the things that have been around for over a millennia. And so I think that classical education, my children are in a classical school. I've really come to appreciate it because I see them engaging in subjects proportionate to their age, but engaging in subjects in elementary school that I don't think that I really even thought of or had any kind of tangential relationship to until maybe college in undergraduate. Even then I was still very lost. It wasn't until grad school that I kind of stumbled into, I think what I would see as actual education, not simply maybe by a clarification by contrast. So much of modern education is simply a training. It trains you for a societal function, usually not even a societal function, just an economic function. You're just kind of a cog and you can go do these skills and you better hope that the economy doesn't move past what your skill set is or advance in some way and then you get left behind and you go back to school and get trained again. But there's no real formation of the actual intellect. And I think this is even at a really high level. So I was at Ave Maria University and did master's work in theology and that was my kind of core formation. I came into the church down there and I went from there to law school. And that contrast could not have been any more clear between actually being formed and being trained. Because I remember being in law school and it really dawning on me like, oh, we're never actually going to discuss what justice is. We're never even going to discuss what a law is. We're just going to memorize complicated, you know, systems and apply them to complicated fact patterns and train us to kind of see these patterns of logic and whoever's the best at this kind of rises to the top. But we're not actually going to learn about like what is our role within, inside, like the common good. So even like when I critique, you know, education as a training, I don't mean that the belittle, you know, certain areas or whatever. I mean, I would say that even of my law school training. So I think classical really is the formation of what's true, good and beautiful in a very time tested way that I also think one thing that's unique about it is all the subjects interrelate, right? There's an actual pedagogical order of why you study certain things in the order that you do. Whereas opposed to so many modern places, it's like, okay, you need this many classes in science and this many classes in literature and you just kind of like check the boxes. But there's no actual like sinews between those classes. It's very atomized as opposed to when you walk into a classical setting, every single thing seems to be interconnected and moving towards one whole. Um, so those are just some like general observations that I would have.
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B
Brilliant, well said. Thank you. Um, so yeah, I really like what this distinction between training and, and actual learning. And the main note to get back to the initial question is highly relevant here. When I first read this dialogue, I was really optimistic for Maino like that he did he. I wanted him to become a better person throughout the dialogue. And superficially you might read it that way. I did for sometimes some time and then I read it 50 times and changed my opinion at the outset of the dialogue. Socrates kind of actually plays around with his name because it sounds like neme which is the Greek word for memory. But if you look at. We can talk more about this Maino's behavior throughout the dialogue. It. It's as if all he does is memorize because what you get him doing is regurgitating people's positions that aren't his. It's Gorgias or it's. It's what he's learned from the Pythagorean school in terms of mathematics. And then ultimately, after he gets kind of perplexed by. By Socrates, he ends up just regurgitating Socrates is words to him in an unreflective way, if that makes sense. So I think one of the points there that Plato wants to make to us that he doesn't say explicitly, but it's there kind of between the lines is memory is obviously an essential faculty. In fact, there's a text, I think maybe it's in the Republic, where he lists that as like the first necessary condition for being one of his students. If you don't have a good memory, you don't get to study philosophy with a stat in mathematics. Right. So. But it's. It's instrumental. Right. It's not the end in and of itself, and it's certainly not order to making us look cool and, and have power in oration, which is, I think, what Meno wants. So, so I, I think that's a really key. I think that's. That's something that the Maino speaks to already, is that that learning isn't just about rote memorization, that's obviously key, but rather it's ordered towards, you know, noose intellectual insight into reality, if that makes sense.
- [19:09]
A
Yeah, it does. No, I appreciate what you said there. I didn't take Mino to really have any type of maturation throughout this dialogue. He stays very flat. And even when Socrates kind of leads all the way through this thing of recollection and does all these things, Mino's questions back to him seem to almost convey that they've made little to no impact that entire like. So I didn't take Meno to. To have this. I contrasted him to what we saw in First Alcibiades, where at least Alcibiades seems to have part of that perplexity.
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B
Right.
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A
Which plays a role here too, where Alcibiades at least comes to understand what he doesn't know. And that leads him, at least on a somewhat, you know, a somewhat real level, that he. He wants by the end of the dialogue to follow Socrates and learn what justice is right now, whether or not it doesn't seem he did that, but at least in that dialogue you've seen some type of, like, transformation the Mino. No, I. I found him to be flat. I think I would couple. I like your observations on his responses. He does seem to have these like, cut and canned responses because that's very sophistic.
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B
Right?
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A
That's. That's the sophists, where he's just. He has these, like, clever sayings and Socrates even critiques him for this at one point. That the only reason he likes, you know, one of the definitions is because it's kind of purple prose, right? It sounds, it sounds fancy. It sounds good. It's not really about whether the definition really conveys to reality or not, but rather like, can the definition be used in some kind of like, you know, as a gain of power or a gain of something? I think that's one thing I would want to tether his responses to is what is Mina? How does Mino see his own purpose in education? Like, why does he want to know things? Because we have almost no context. This dialogue, it just opens up with me being like, hey, what is. What is virtue? And I think one of the questions I would have is like, why, why does Mino want to learn about virtue? Is it. Is it to con? Is it to conform himself to reality? Is it to. To do that, to become virtuous? Or is he looking for, you know, some kind of definition that he can use in rhetoric and arguments or something? Right? Like, what's the purpose? Because if he's the student, like, what's the purpose of him coming to the teacher? To learn.
- [21:23]
B
Yes. Yeah, I can respond to that.
- [21:27]
A
Go for it.
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B
Yeah. So I think you can get an answer. First, I do want to say I didn't. Because I didn't say this, that, that the term neme means to remain. Right, So I mean, so that. So your interpretation. I'm. I'm 100% on the same page with you. Maino is like this perverted form of just staying in the same place. And by the way, this is not original to me. I. So I'll take the opportunity to. To recommend a commentary by. By Klein. Excellent work. And he makes this point. So, yeah, if you look at, if you just look. So the dialogue starts, right, with. With. With Meno asking this question, is virtue teachable? Do we. Do we have it by nature or in some other way? And, and Socrates response with the methodological point, right? That he doesn't know what, what virtue is, whether it's teachable. He's so far from that, he doesn't even know what it is. Right? And this is a really important point because he's got a methodological approach to answering questions. He's famous for asking this question, tsd, what is it? Right. And that's what he does. You guys have read the Euthyphro, that, that, that's, that's the. It's the same procedure. You probably notice. Like actually the, the procedure that he. The Elenchus, or the challenge that he brings to Euthyphro is parallels almost identically the challenge he brings to Meno, if that makes sense. So those are good texts to kind of look at together. So if you look at Meno's behavior, though, he says, sure, I can tell you what virtue is. And then we'll be able to answer as to whether or not it's. It's teachable. He clearly believes at that point, right. That if he's being genuine, that is teachable. Okay? He thinks he knows what it is. Also, he tells us, because he's learned it from Gorgias. So it sounds that we're getting Gorgias's approach to the meaning of virtue. But then we get this series of definitions from him, right? He has roughly four definitions of virtue. And Socrates does two things. He uses his elangatic method to criticize and break down those definitions or deconstruct, but not in a modern, a postmodern sense, because he believes in truth, obviously, but to break them down and show that they can't be true in accord with what I call his positive account of definition. And this is often missed by students the first time they read it. He gives a very robust account of what it would mean to define something in positive terms. And Maino, of course, fails to do that. And we can talk more about that. He fails to do that. And what does he do when he reaches that moment of aporia, of being puzzled, like, of knowing that he doesn't know? Well, here I think he, he. He kind of really shows us his true character to answer you know, your question, which is he's not seeking in dialogue the truth, right? He's not using language or as a vehicle to understand reality. Rather, it seems to be for him an instrument of power for his own gain, which is, of course, characteristic of the sophist, right? And especially Gorgias is probably the most famous for this. And the telltale sign is that he. He makes an ad hominem attack on Socrates at that point, right? He accuses him of hurting him, tells him that he Stung him like the, this electric eel, this torpedo fish. And Socrates will make a big deal of that later in the dialogue when he, when he brings the Maino's own slave to a state of being, puzzled and he says, you know, hey Mayno, did I, did I hurt him by doing this? By showing him that he doesn't know, but he thought he know, he knows. So and then, and then he does something. The other, the second thing aside from the ad hominem attack is he, he contradicts himself, right? And this is kind of the sophists, the telltale sign of the sophist, right, is since they don't care about the truth, they're only trying to use rhetoric to persuade their interlocutor to get them to do what they want, right? They don't mind contradicting themselves. So famously, you know, Gorgias in the Praise of Helen and Conium. I mean, he contradicts himself all over the place and he tells you he doesn't care if what he's saying is true. He's just going to convince you that Helen is not at fault for the Trojan War. So Meno does this at point one in the dialogue, you know, he's, he's claiming that it's teachable and that, that there's going to be a way to say we can learn it. And then at point two he turns around and he says, you know, learning's impossible, right? You know, he proposes this aristic argument. Socrates calls it aristic, an aristicone logo. It's a, it's, it's an. We use the term heuristic now in English, right? It means that you're, you're not pursuing the truth, you're, you're using language like as a boxing match. It's a fight, right? And you just want to win, you know, So I would say that's, that's mean, you know, to answer your question, I think Maino's behavior kind of betrays that. He's, he's kind of an antithesis to the classical education model, right? He's not, he's doing it for the sake of power, you know, and the philosophers, the sophists and the philosophers in a sense agree that language, logos is dunamis or power. It's just the philosophers believe that it's power, order towards the truth about reality. The sophists think it's ordered towards their own self benefit, if that makes sense. And it's usually political gain. So I'll let you respond. Those are just some thoughts on, on the character of Meno. But I think you're right, he doesn't. He doesn't seem to change.
- [27:11]
A
No. Wonderful thoughts. Yeah. I think, you know, maybe as an appetizer, the next dialogue that we are reading on the podcast is the Gorgias. And I think that that actually has one of the best. The very end of that dialogue in which Socrates is. Is dialoguing with callicles. I think it's the best kind of just ripping off the veneer of the sophist where he just, you know, straight up admits, like, no, I. I want to be able to speak well and have this rhetoric basically to be a tyrant, right? I want to satiate my appetites and do these things. And Meno, you know, as we've kind of talked about on the podcast, but Mino, historically speaking, right, is this kind of mercenary general who Xenophon writes about, would just, you know, cut the throat of his best friend if it meant that he would, you know, benefit from it. And that's the guy in the dialogue that's asking us what virtue is. And so I think that what we see here, and this kind of goes back into kind of our tent peg here, right, is education. And so that kind of goes back into why do people want to know things we see here that I think Meno, again, I don't think he has much of a maturation here, but I think Meno wants to know things to serve his own ends, right? To gain in glory and power and wealth and sex and whatever, all the lower appetites, right? He wants to do that. And I think that Socrates is trying to offer him a different route, somewhat like he offered Alcibiades. But Meno just does not seem. I mean, he just seems to really struggle, even with, like, basic things. I mean, if you look at. When he tries, Socrates tries to make a distinction between the universal and the particular. I mean, Mino just cannot get it. It reminds me of the. It's so funny because I think last week on the podcast, I. I even apologized for Euthyphro coming up so much because as I was watching Socrates try and dialogue with Meno, I kept thinking about his dialogue with Euthyphro where, you know, he'll ask for a definition and what he receives back are examples, right? And then it's really hard for people to understand why, you know, why is this not actually sufficient? But can we go back to one of the things that you said that I think is really intriguing, particularly in the role of education, is this perplexity, right? In the Greek. I Love the. It's a torpedo fish, right? Whatever it is, I love this Eva brand translation. They call it the numb fish.
- [29:29]
B
The numbing.
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A
Yeah, yeah, I like that. The numb fish. He accuses him, right, of like, you just make me numb. And what's he mean there? He means that like, listen, you. Like, I don't even know which way's up anymore. I don't. Like, I thought I understood this, and now you've got me all confused. So you're not a good teacher. You're not a good teacher of this. Because, look, I have no idea. I'm perplexed. I. This is all you do. You go around and make people confused, which really kind of makes him, in a certain way, a type of sophist, I would think. Right. He's not really trying to teach anyone. And Socrates kind of pushes back on this, like, what's, what's the role of this perplexity in teaching?
- [30:05]
B
Yeah, yeah. And it's like, literally, it's like a. It's like being knotted up, right? Like you're. You're all tied up and you can't. You can't. You. You're aware of the. There's a presentation of phenomena or ideas that, you know, seem problematic or present a question to you, and you. You can respond, I suppose, in two different. I mean, you could think about the difference between the philosophers and the sophists in terms of how they respond. Right. The philosopher responds with wonder, you know, Thaumad Zane, and acknowledges. In humility. Right? So you can talk about the virtue of humility, the role it plays here. Ignorance, right. This is the point of departure of knowing. We, you know, famously, like, you know, like Aristotle likes to use the example of the eclipse. Like, we have a description of this event initially, it causes aporio puzzlement. Like, how is it that in the middle of the day, there's no clouds in the sky, I can't see any obstructions, there's no shadows being cast, and the light of the sun is gone. Right? And this is. This is a sort of great. A source, this wonder of great scientific learning. Or if you're angry, I mean, you could become angry and proudful could be your reaction too, because your, Your ignorance is exposed to you. I don't know what's happening here. So I think that the, the idea of the puzzle is massively important for us in learning. It's. It's intellect gives us the ability to observe states of affairs, and that leads us to curiosity. We become puzzled. We're interested in why things are the way that they are. And this is kind of the source of scientific learning and understanding for the human being. Plato's obviously huge on it. Aristotle, of course, as many know, he always starts with aporia. Right. All of his books, you know, he's going to have a, he's going to have a section where he tells you the subject he's studying and basic comments on methodology. And then he's going to go through the puzzles, you know, because they kind of are what guide our inquiry, if that makes sense. And they ground you. A nice thing about puzzles too is they ground you in questions that really matter in terms of who am I, what's the good for me, what's reality and that sort of thing. So, so, you know, so thinking about Mayno's response here, this is, this is why Socrates, I mean, Socrates thinks this is like, I'm not going to say it's the greatest evil. You guys read the Phaedo, right? He thinks the greatest evil is miso logi, the hatred of rational discourse. This, this is like that though, if, if you, if you deny the possibility of learning, you're never going to seek the good and become better, you know, so Maino's heuristic argument, either we know or we don't know and in either case we're not going to learn. This is really kind of pernicious to self actualization and, and, and the good of the human person. It's. Socrates despises it, you know.
- [33:16]
A
Yeah. No, very good. Yeah. I think that maybe it's just as moderns, we're not used to this, right? This, this kind of, that perplexity, you know, being stung by the numb fish, because I'm not sure we always have an appreciation for coming to understand what something is not, is actually a step forward in coming to know what it is. And I think even in my own education I didn't understand this until I studied theology. And so much of understanding God is simply understanding what he is, not like even a lot of our definitions for God, like infinite, right. He's just not finite.
- [33:53]
B
Yeah.
- [33:53]
A
Now trying to, trying to positively state what that means is very difficult. Right. And so this is what St. Thomas Aquinas talks about, the via negativa. Right. There's a way that we can come to describe something through these negative terms. And Socrates seems to do this and he does this really well, particularly with our common definitions. Right. We have common understandings in our head. Yes, I know what virtue is. Yes, I know these things. And when he comes in and ties us all in knots and we become perplexed and et cetera. I do agree that you can get angry. I think Mino's an analog to a certain type of student who doesn't like that, who doesn't want that.
- [34:28]
B
Right.
- [34:28]
A
He just wants the answer so he can utilize it.
- [34:31]
B
Right.
- [34:31]
A
It's very much. It goes back to almost like that training. It's a very utilitarian understanding of why we have knowledge. Right. He wants to trade that knowledge for chaos, for glory, for, you know, these types of things. But I think it's, it's actually a really beautiful thing, right? It's a certain beautiful deconstruction of what you thought you knew. And it opens you up, if you're willing.
- [34:51]
B
Right.
- [34:51]
A
That goes back to maybe what is the role of the student. It opens the soul up then maybe to receiving a positive definition or stepping towards that. I just don't know if that's something that we have a great appreciation for anymore because I don't think we would tolerate it because we're so. Instant gratification. I only have about a 20 second attention span to watch some kind of video, like something actually coming in and trying to do that aporia, that perplexity in me. I, I think we naturally would, would kind of be recalcitrant to it. But I think it, if you talk about what is education, I think that is the moment that's so amazing. I mean, we saw that in first Alcibiades, right? Socrates just ties him in knots. And it's not until he just finally throws his hands up and he's like, listen, I don't know, I have no idea, stop asking me. I actually have no idea things. So he goes from wanting to talk to the assembly about matters of justice because, you know, he's the most amazing person in all of Athens, to acknowledging I actually have no idea what I'm talking about.
- [35:49]
B
Right, right. Yeah, it's brilliant. Yeah, I agree. I think we struggle with this. I mean, I think it's part of the human, in Christian terms. You put this in, in terms of the Fall and our pridefulness. We, we are attracted to being in a position of authority. We don't like being told we're wrong. And we know Mano looks up to Gorgias, who, who, who sold this, this talent, right, of being able to capture people's attention and convince them of whatever he wanted. That's what he promises his students. Like I'll, I'll convince, I can convince you of anything and I can teach you to do that, to other people, you know, so I, I mean so humility obviously is, is a really important virtue to have for, for seeking the truth and also connected to that courage. I think you can see that you guys read looked at the phaedo also. Again, that's clearly a virtue that's extremely important. When, when Simeas talks about he, you know, he gives that life raft analogy and he says look, it might be hard or impossible to get an answer to this question about the immortality of the soul, but he connects it to courage. He says it be weak, you know, faint hearted not to try. And there's a similar statement that Socrates makes to Mena when he's talking to his house servant or slave, you know, so those two virtues, I think to the extent that societally we have difficulty learning now and we just want to open up a Google search and see what Google tells us so that we can answer the question, you know, that might be a result of a lack of these virtues of humility and courage. Courage is the interesting one. It's so important. And the reason is because the pursuit of truth is not only difficult and arduous, it's scary because it's a road that you go down that could determine that life change is necessary. Right. You may well learn. I mean this, this is why, I mean it's one of the reasons I think Socrates gets killed because he kind of systematically shows people in all the classes that they're not actually living the good life. And you can't undo logos. It's a road that once you walk down it, you're stuck with it. And they, they, Socrates wrecked their ignorance as bliss kind of state of being, if that makes sense. And they erroneously thought that killing him would, would end that. Of course it doesn't. Reason is going to cre into your sleep and make your life miserable anyway. So yeah, I think I, I think that the dialogue then the maino speaks to the need for courage and, and also humility. When you, especially when you kind of get critical of, of Meno here and you do find again Socrates in that section where when he responds to Mano's heuristic argument, what part of his response which is more subtle is. I just call it a moral imperative. It's not actually a really an argument. It's Socrates just saying you should not accept this conclusion that learning is impossible because it's going to make you a worse person. Right. He says you should follow me and become virtuous better, you know, so yeah, I don't answers your question but. Or your Thought. But. But yeah, I think. I think that that's there in the dialogue.
- [39:14]
A
I really appreciate your words on courage, because I think that's something that I, as we've kind of read through Plato this time, I've come to understand better, is the role of courage in the intellectual life, to have the courage to actually, you know, because you. You had this moment, I think, when you come to understand a truth or you're close to understanding it, where you really have a moment in which you decide whether or not to engage. Am I. Am I really going to embrace this and realize what I know is wrong and admit that and open myself, or am I. Am I going to push back? Right. I want to think better of him, but I kind of think of the end of the Euthyphro where he just says, you know what? I'm really sorry. Like, you know, I've left the oven on. I have to leave, you know, goodbye.
- [39:56]
B
Right.
- [39:57]
A
But there has to be some type of courage there. I don't. You know, we talk a lot about. At least maybe in the Catholic circles, we talk a lot about docility. We talk about humility. You know, even I, I think, use those words maybe too much last week in the role of the student. But courage is, I think, really, really important, particularly in today's age in which, you know, we don't conform our minds to reality anymore. We ask reality to conform to our minds. I think having the courage to actually pursue that truth is something that's really unique. Let's look at, though, you know, his answer to this. You know, so Mino kind of critiques him in a really interesting way, which is, you know, if you don't know these things and you're. You're the numb fish who's also numb, like, how are you going to know if you have actually even find the thing that you're looking for? Which I thought was a. I thought was a legitimate critique. And we kind of get into probably one. Is one of the most famous narratives of probably Plato in general, because people who don't know anything about Plato for some reason know this passage where he's, you know, he takes, you know, slave boy and he's going to start drawing geometric formations in the ground. And he asked them these questions. And, you know, supposedly this is. This is going to show that the soul already knows all these things, this kind of theory of recollection, and that we're not really learning per se, at least not in this life. We've already been reincarnated enough to know everything. But we're kind of just. So this, this teacher just has to tease this out of the soul and it comes forward. You know, one of my, one of my preliminary questions here is, is geometry essential or accidental here? Right. Is there, is there something about math that actually is, you know, tailored to this conversation? Or is it, Is it easier to explain? Why does he not just take the slave boy and explain virtue to him to show that he can do this? Like, why is it, why does geometry all of a sudden pop up in the middle of this dialogue?
- [41:48]
B
Yeah, so before I, I mean, in connection with this, a really interesting point because I think earlier we talked a little bit about, you know, you expect this dialogue to be about virtue and to give you kind of robust account of virtue. And it's really kind of disappointing at the end. Right. I will, I can speak to. There are some positive things that we learn about virtue, but very limited. It's actually limited to only what Socrates needs to answer Meno's question. So it's kind of disappointing in that light. A really fascinating thing is that after Meno gives his first definition, where he lists out the examples, the virtue of the man and the woman and the slave and the, you know, children, etc. A really perplexing thing to me when I, in my later studies of this is Meno actually finishes by telling Socrates there's a virtue for every action, and he uses this term, ergon, for every task or work, or I translate the word functional activity that there's one for. And he, he. And he uses that term. All right, so it's a universal claim that he's making. And not only that, this is exactly how Socrates in the Republic ends up defining virtue appeals to this idea of the functional account. And that really the Republic is just a more and more nuanced account of the human functional act, especially at the level of intellect. And maybe some know, many know that of course, Aristotle is going to pick this up and develop it in Nicomachean Ethics, but book one. So really fascinating that like, Meno actually has like the kernel that I think Socrates and, and Plato would want to go after, which is this idea that what do these examples have in common? Well, they all identify a functional activity and that's like really what we should focus on. And so they never come back to it. Like, it never comes up again in the dialogue. That's really fascinating to me since it's like the point of departure of the republic, which, which really is focused on human virtue, specifically justice, obviously. So why mathematics then? Why does he use a mathematical example in this, what he calls an exhibit. He's like, I can't, I can't prove this to you, Maino, but I'll give you a kind of exhibit. I'll show it to you in a way that can't be denied. That we learned is what he's doing, that terminology is actually itself from the mathematical tradition. So he's using kind of the language of the geometers to talk to Meno about, about how he's going to show him that the conclusion of this argument he's made is false, if that makes sense. So why does he pick mathematics? I would say this has more to do with the character of Meno, okay, And his soul and how Socrates wants to teach him than anything else. In the Phaedrus, Socrates basically expresses that the role, the job of the philosopher is to identify the kind of soul that the interlocutor has, okay, in terms of, you know, the passions and intellectual desires. And then Socrates is. Is a guide to try to help that person from, you know, baser erotic love up to love of the truth proper, which is where we're all supposed to be going, if that makes sense. So Socrates, I think in this case, he's identified May, knows where Mayo's coming from, and he knows Mayno likes mathematical examples. In the dialogue, you can see that in when, when in the second definition, after the second definition, the rule over others definition, Socrates gives him an example of how he. He asked him for an example, and Socrates gives him the example of defining shape, right? As that which is always with color is his example. Now, if you notice, Mano doesn't like that definition. He says, well, what if you don't know what color is, right? That's not going to work, okay? Meno produces basically the stock geometer's answer to what shape is, which is it's the limit of a solid, okay? So he knows the Pythagorean tradition, the geometrical tradition. He accepts it. The definition he gives is the limit of a solid. You could, you could pose a similar question to Meno, and he doesn't care which is what's a solid, right? Because we don't know what a. And I think it's much more difficult actually, if you think about younger students to explain what a solid is, because you got to talk about three dimensions, etc. Than to start with color, right? This is an important point that Plato's trying to make, is that human knowing has starting points which are non demonstrable starting points, and color is like this, you either have four formed a concept through seeing of the colors and you can attach a name to them and can express that in speech, or you haven't and you can't. You know what I'm saying? So I think he picks a geometrical answer to answer your question or a geometrical puzzle. Because first, because this is where Maino's coming from and he wants to try to help him. I do think he sincerely would like to guide me know, to, to a true appreciation of virtue and the life of virtue, which he clearly thinks is to pursue knowledge, you know, so that's one answer. Also, this is a really special mathematical example. Did you guys work through like the details of what Socrates. So I can do that a little bit. And that might actually help us answer your question here too.
- [47:26]
A
Yeah, let me, let me make one kind of caveat here. No, because that gets, I'll be really honest with you, that starts to get way outside my ambit. So I would. But I would love to learn more, actually. You will perplex me and I will try to do my best to be open to the truth. You know, I went to law school for a reason. So there's, you know, one thing I just want to note kind of what you said. I love that. I love the fact of tethering that into the text and saying, look, the geometric example, at least in one aspect, is pedagogically tailored to Mino. And I love that because there's such an antecedent to that. We've. In the Platonic corpus. So we saw that in First Alcibiades, they start talking about what justice is. And I love it because finally Socrates convinces him that he doesn't know anything about justice. And the first time reader is like, oh, finally. So now he's going to tell us what justice is. And Socrates just moves on. Because the whole point wasn't to explain justice, it was to explain to you that you did not know, right. And that you need a teacher. And so he tailors that, right? Alcibiades, he's kind of like meno. He wants the chaos, the glory. I think at the beginning of First Alcibiades, Socrates makes this like really loaded phrase of like, oh, you, you like glory, you like, you like taking over the world, right? You like, you want to be the best, the best. You know, I can give you that.
- [48:40]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [48:40]
A
And so it's, it's Socrates as the master teacher, right? So if you talk about this as our educational theme, the teacher's ability to step into the Desires of the student. And we kind of saw that too in Euthyphro. Because I, I, the more I read the Euthyphro, the more I'm convinced that he's only explaining piety to the degree that he needs to, to get Euthyphro to realize that he's wrong. Because we don't ever get, I think, the real robust understanding of piety that we could have, if that makes sense. And so I love, I love the idea here that the geometric formation is pedagogically tailored to me know, because I think again, that steps into, if you look at that student teacher relationship, the brilliance of the teacher stepping into the desires of the student to try and lead them to truth, particularly if the truth is not. The truth to them is something that's not even desirable. They want something else. So can we paint it? Can we put a certain veneer on it that actually makes it desirable to the student? Now that's really good, but no, I would love. We mainly talked about, last week, we mainly talked about the geometric formation, you know, in the role of like, pedagogy insofar as like, contrasting Mino's receptivity to being taught with his slave boy. But we didn't really talk about like the brass tax of the geometric formations. And if there's like lessons embedded in there, which considering it's Plato, I'm assuming there are.
- [50:07]
B
Right.
- [50:08]
A
So anything there I would, I would be very open to.
- [50:10]
B
Awesome. Yeah. I'll. Let me say a few things and I'll jump into that. I have to. I love the use of road too. I, I'll throw one thing out there. It's like a somewhat alternate interpretation. You know, my interpretation of that dialogue is, you know, at the outset he wants the definition, he, he supposedly wants that definition so that he can answer the charges. Right. Because if he has the, if he can say what impiety is, piety is, then he'll be able to say, this isn't me. Or at least he could have claimed ignorance. You know, in the apology, I tend to think that, that, that, that last definition that he gives, which is that it's the part of justice that pertains to our service to the gods, which Euthyphro can't explain, what services. But a really interesting thing there just to like, chew on is when you read that, you'll notice that it's not Euthyphro. Euthyphro does not propose it, which is odd. It's actually Socrates proposing that definition. So that kind of jumps out at you that it's his, it's coming out of Socrates mouth and that suggests to me it's come. It's really kind of Socrates as a mouthpiece for Plato. And then when you read the apology, you can kind of see Plato going to great lengths to show that Socrates actually meets the, the, the. That's that criteria. Right. Which is kind of interesting. So, but he does leave it open ended because you're like, yeah, well, he never gives a satisfying account of what that service would look like that doesn't somehow violate how we think about the gods as transcendent, you know. So anyways, I'm throwing that out there. It's kind of a fun.
- [51:46]
A
I, no, I'm going to send you a bottle of scotch because I, because when we read the Euthyphro, I know, like, so. Because a lot of times, like, you know, in a lot of ways I'm a first time reader of these. You know, I've read some of, in the past. And so when we read the Euthyphro, I, I did notice like, wait, it's Socrates. And I was like, Socrates?
- [52:02]
B
Yeah.
- [52:02]
A
At that time I was like, oh, Socrates is trying to push him forward to do something because it came from Socrates, which was odd in that dialogue, right. He doesn't pull it from Euthyphro. But then, you know, he, Euthyphro says something hilarious where it's like, yeah, this is service. Like a, like a man takes care of cows.
- [52:16]
B
Right.
- [52:16]
A
And the whole thing just. Euthyphro's brain has melted by that point and we're done, like we're not getting anything. But because, and this is the, this is the, this is one of the benefits of the podcast, one of the benefits of reading the great books in chronological order and kind of having this dedicated study is that I didn't really find an answer to that question. But then when we read the apology and all of a sudden Socrates is just going left and right about being in service to the gods. Excuse me, the God and the daemon and all these things. I'm like, oh, when you read them next to each other, it's like one continuous text. Yeah. Socrates becomes the example of what true piety is. And what's in my. The theory was that I was throwing out is that service to the gods, you know, is not for the benefit of the God, it's. It's to the benefit of the one doing the serving and to what they're attached to. Right. So Socrates's service to the God is, is not to the God's benefit. It's to his own benefit and to the benefit of Athens. And I think that's. No, I'm very happy to hear you say that because I think I love it.
- [53:17]
B
I love it.
- [53:18]
A
But I think it's one of those things that you, you can tell. You can show people that reading these texts in chronological order, at least a pedagogical order, and reading them in a dedicated way, you. You start to see these. These teachings kind of arise and it's, it's very beautiful. So, anyway, I, Yeah, I would talk more about that, but. No, I'm very happy to hear you say that.
- [53:36]
B
I, Yeah, I would. And I'll just say another sign here, which is this is he. He. Socrates. We can talk about this in the main, too. When he gives that definition, it meets the standard that he sets for Euthyphro when he's deconstructing Euthyphro's definitions, which is to define something, you have to locate it in a genus, a common kind, and then you have to differentiate it. And so he gets the genus, which is justice, and then he adds the difference in. So it's another reason. And he never refutes. So you notice, like, he refutes what. What Euthyphro says, but Euthyphro's long checked out of the dialogue. He doesn't care about the truth and he's not really there, like you said. But he never. That definition never gets refuted, really. It just. They move on. And yeah, like you said in the apology, you know, I mean, so I take a Platonic point here to be. This is a kind of critique of. Of, you know, a pretty damning critique of Athens. If anyone in Athens should know what piety is, it's this guy, Euthyphro. He claims to be a mantis, a religious expert, and he doesn't. And then Socrates goes in and he gets a. Convicted of this thing that no one can define. And also, it's incoherent. Right. Like the beginning of the. Euthyphro is very important there too, because he shows that you can kind of get whatever you want from the gods. You know, Zeus thinks patricide's cool, but, you know, his dad sure as heck doesn't. So anyway, sorry, I couldn't resist because I love those. Those dialogues too.
- [55:07]
A
No, that is very good. All right, so what do we need to know?
- [55:10]
B
Yeah, so back to the main example. Yeah, so. So here's the thing, Meno. What comes out in this process is that he's obsessed with mathematical knowledge. It's his standard for what knowing is. I would call him a reductionist in this sense. So he doesn't accept Socrates definition of shape as that which is always with color. Really important. Socrates tells him, by the way, if you. I'm not giving. I'm trying not to be overkill here with stephanous numbers, but I. If you want them, tell me. Okay, if the audience wants them, I can tell you where this stuff is, but I'm trying not to be overkill there. But Socrates tells him that if he could define virtue this way, this is kind of a key to the dialogue. Hermeneutically. If he could define virtue this way, he'd be satisfied. It's a fascinating way. It seems like a silly definition, right? It's that because we're like, well, I can know shape through touch that students common, you know, response. So saying that it's what's always with color doesn't make sense. But if you limit what he's saying just to our, our seeing of shape, this definition is very revealing of what he's looking for because color is a necessary condition for. And in a way, Cohen's co extensive with logically our apprehension of shape, if that makes sense. So what he wants Maino to do is to define by attaching an attribute to what you're defining with necessity. Like he keeps saying it has to always be there, go along with it is basically what he's saying. So interestingly, Meno just brushes that definition on. If you, if you do the exercise of kind of thinking it through, though, about your phenomenally how you see shapes, you're going to realize like, oh, there's something to this. Like, if I take away shade and color differentiation, I don't see any shapes. So Socrates is a point like, when you think about seeing shapes, there has to be color there. Okay? These things will always be together. And he tells, he tells Meno, this is like a paradigm, it's a model for him. So what does Maino do? He's like, no, that doesn't work. What if you're blind? And he regurgitates this geometrical definition these given because he has an obsession with that kind of knowing. And of course there are other kinds of knowing, you know, and this is part of, I think what. This is another reason Plato would use this particular example in geometry, because it's a geometrical example that's going to rely on knowledge that's not mathematical. That's where I'm going with this. It's kind of interesting. So what he does in this Example with. I mean, so to set up the context, right, he's given the theory of recollection, and we can talk about that more. I don't put much stock in that. I think, again, he's appealing to that theory because it's commonly accepted by the Pythagoreans. And he knows that Meno knows that theory and likes it. He's heard it before, he's comfortable with it. You know, there's no defense of that theory, really. And the theory presupposes the theory of ideas or forms. It can't work without it. And he doesn't even mention that theory in the dialogue. Like, Mayno could have asked him if he was being critical. How on earth in death do we come to know all things? You know what I'm saying? He doesn't. They just like, move on. So at this point, he tells Meno, look, I'll give you. I can't prove this, but I'll give you a kind of showing an exhibit that we learn. And he calls over the house servant, and he uses this geometrical problem. So he. He imagine he's like drawing, you know, the stick. He draws a square in the sand, and he tells the servant, you know, that the square has a side length of two. And he asked the servant, what's the area of that square? And the servant studied math a little bit and is able to say it's four, right? Okay, so that's pretty cool. So then he. He then asks him to solve this puzzle, which is really complex. What he asks him is, what would the side length of a square with double the area of this square, the one with four, what would the side length be of that square? Okay? So we know that we're looking for. Since the area of our first square is four, and he wants the doubled area, we're looking for a square that has an area of eight, right? Okay. So the servant is, you know, not totally unclever. So he just tries to double it, right? And he says that it's four, okay? And Socrates is like, well, if you do that, what's the area gonna be? And he says 16. So that's twice the size of the square that we're looking for, right? And this. Now, the servant doesn't give up, right? There's still an option here in terms of whole numbers, okay? And he's clever. He knows it's gotta be between four and two, and in whole numbers there's only one, right? So it's three. So he says, three, okay? A clever servant. Of course, the problem There is. The area of our square now is not eight, but nine, right? Okay. That's the point at which you have the same moment. You have a parallel between the house servant here and what had happened to Meno. When Socrates shows he didn't really know what virtue is, he reaches the moment of aporia, perplexity. He knows that he doesn't know. Right? And that's because it's not a whole number, okay? You can't quantify this thing. Okay? So just to move a little quickly there, what Socrates does is I'll try to draw. I have a white sheet of paper here. I'll try to draw this picture real quick. My hand's a little shaky and I'm going to do terrible. But basically, imagine a diamond kind of shaped like this. Socrates, Each square is a. Is a square with an area of four, okay? And you put those together and you get that first answer that the. The servant had given, which you get a square with an area of 16, if that makes sense. And what Socrates does is he asks him questions, and he starts by saying, well, if I draw a diagonal through one of the squares like this, what's the area of that triangle? And the servant's smart enough to know that we've just divided this square with an area of four and a half. So the. That area has to be two, right? So you do that to the other squares, right? Okay. And each one has an area of two. You add those four up and you get a square internally. This is terrible. I'm well known for not being able to draw pictures. Okay, my children, I don't get past the stick figure, but hopefully you can see the point. You end up with an internal square, right, Composed of these triangles, right, which has an area of eight. That was the one we're looking for. And what does that tell you? It tells you that the answer to the question, what is the length of the side of a square with an area double the square that I've been given? The answer is the diagonal, okay? And if you're a geometer, you know the diagonal and the side is incommensurate. That means that if one of those is a whole number, the other one cannot. It will be, you know, an infinitely repeating fractional number, if that makes sense. That's really fascinating. This is a humbling moment for the mathematician, the one who thinks that the only kind of knowledge that we can have is limited quantity. Right? Because the point here is that here's something I know. You can't doubt this after this showing that We've been through, it's clear that the answer to the question is the diagonal. And yet you can't give a limited quantitative answer. Right. Because it's not a whole number, if that makes sense. So it's, it's a nice geometrical. It's. I say it's not an accident. And by the way, this is Klein's insight also, so I have to give credit to that master of this dialogue. So it's a nice way of making this point. Right. Even in mathematics there are things we know that strictly speaking we cannot perfectly quantify. Right. And there's a way in which they will remain mysterious to us. So you relate this to our inquiry into other objects of knowledge. I think a point here is we shouldn't reduce all forms of knowledge to mathematical knowledge and we need to come up with a criteria that's more about reasonableness and what can and can't be doubted. If that makes sense, then, then it has to be a numerical form of understanding and knowing. I think that's very important also for, for modern and contemporary times because we're overly obsessed with quantitative learning now. And you know, even, even in quantitative studies there are probably principles and there, there's knowledge that we have that is, is not strictly speaking quantitative. It, it, it escapes us in quantitative terms. PI is another example, right. We use it. It's a, it's great, but we can't really know it, right. It's impossible to capture it. It's infinitely repeating. So that, that, that's. I guess that's a quick. Not all that quick, but that's my response to why geometrical example in Meno's case. And to get. If Plato was famous for wanting. You saw this in the Phaedo, for wanting knowledge to be mathematical, I think all around. But also clearly that's not like a static position of his. And he, he's trying to point in the direction of there are sources of knowing. Like we know what color is starting with experience and we can use it to talk about shape that aren't reducible to quantity. And virtue is like that. It's not that kind of thing, you know. So if you started by thinking the only way we can know is in a mathematical way, you're never going to answer this question.
- [64:49]
A
No, I really appreciate that. No, thank you for walking us through that. Because, I mean, that shows like the brilliance of Plato. Right? Because what you get then, if I understood correctly, is you get this geometric example which on its face is trying to answer the question of recollection. But the actual species of the example given is actually tailored pedagogically to Meno to show him the limits of the type of knowledge that he has a predilection towards. And so that, that's. This is again the brilliance of, of Plato and the way that he writes in the dialogue format. So no, I, I deeply appreciate that. And you kind of like uncovering that for us. Do you think that. Or what are we supposed to take away from Mino compared to his own slave? Yeah, because, you know, so there's two. So we're running with this theory or we're focusing, I should say, on like the strata of education. So you get Mino, who just doesn't. He seems to be very recalcitrant, he's not malleable, etc. And then the speed, that's another thing. The speed at which Socrates can teach the slave boy.
- [65:52]
B
Yep.
- [65:52]
A
Is phenomenal. The slave, he's like. Yes. No, in, in like you mentioned, which I thought was very good, is that you even get like this little example of, you know, aporia, of the perplexity in the middle of the example. And so we see how that can help him. Course. Correct. So, like, it seems like to me on its face that like, Mino. And by the way, I'm not sure Mino gets any of these lessons.
- [66:12]
B
I don't think so. But we're. Right.
- [66:15]
A
But we're trying to. So that's what we're trying to do, not be like, me know, is that. Yeah, there goes back to that docility, to that humility. The slave boy seems to have an absolute humility in front of Socrates and Socrates too. Maybe you could speak more into this, because I'm pulling from again, this one by Eva Brand. You know, she is a student of Klein, of Jacob Klein, so she credits his commentary on the Mino in this as well. And if anyone's. I really liked your pictures, but if anyone would also like diagrams, this one has some really good diagrams to try and follow what's going on. But yeah, the Mino just seems very docile or. Excuse me, Mino slave boy seems very docile. And one of the footnotes here explains that Socrates actually uses like familial or parental terms referring to the slave boy. There's like a certain intimacy that kicks in between the two as opposed to the Mino, who just seems to like. Socrates does all this. And the Mino's response doesn't even seem to clue in that he's even observed anything. Like, it's like, yeah, he Just wants.
- [67:26]
B
To go back to. He just goes right back to, can we teach virtue?
- [67:31]
A
Right. Which is. It's really reminiscent of that part in the Euthyphro where Socrates is like, okay, well, we've come full circle, right? Because we have that here too. We have a full circle. So, I mean, any. Any thoughts there on. On Mino and his slave boy? I mean, it really just seems like they're being contrasted as different types of students.
- [67:48]
B
Yeah, I think that's absolutely right. Great insight that. That, you know, and how embarrassing is that? I suppose, because this slave, you know, it's. So there's a. I mean, I call it. I kind of use like, some Aristotelian terminology here, but it's not totally foreign to Plato. But this is a kind of demonstration of the fact that. That learning is possible because he just watched it happen. And also, based on what he's told us, that means we've just seen virtue taught in some sense, right? So it's a kind of demonstration of the fact that, yeah, we can do this. And Socrates actually says to Meno in this section at one point, he says, look, I don't really care if everything I've said is true. And at that point, what he's told us is he's presented the theory of recollection, and then he's given this geometrical example with. With the servant. So I'm. My interpretation is everything else is the theory of recollection. I mean, I. I think it kind of is irrelevant whether that's true or not. It's a plot, it's a possible. Maybe a plausible account, you know, but it doesn't have to be true. When you go through an exercise like this where Socrates uses his method to just ask questions, to answer this question, like, yeah, in some sense, learning happens, right? Whether it's recollection or something else. But let's just start there. That's like an opening to get you to be a virtuous person. Because if you start by saying learning's impossible, you can never achieve the human good, which is to learn, you know, so. And I think you're exactly right. I think the slave is then an example of being virtuous, right? And he has the humility and he has the courage, and look how quickly he learns. Whereas we spend pages and pages of pages reading about Mayna, who just seems to be stuck in the same place, you know, so, yeah, I. I agree with that. And I think that's a great thing for. For students to think about and to show that anybody doesn't matter what, you know, because here you have this guy in the. The aristocracy or whatever, very wealthy. I think he's from Thessaly, and then Thessaly, and then you've got his slave that learns, you know, so. And is virtuous. So I think that's a cool part of the dialogue that, of course, virtue is teachable in some sense. We still don't know what the sense is, I don't think. But later I think that comes to the fore and it has to be the case because we just watched it happen, you know.
- [70:13]
A
Yeah, no, I really appreciate that. The. I do want to lean into, because on this read, I. I very much saw and had a greater understanding of the fact that the theory of recollection was simply being used for a greater purpose. And one thing that's interesting, I mean, obviously we can have debates about how much we're supposed to, you know, believe him on certain things and et cetera, but it is interesting when Socrates tells you, like, he does give commentary on his own teaching at times. And even in this dialogue, you know, at one point we should contrast with the theory of recollection. He says, you know, I'm not sure how much I would insist on this.
- [70:49]
B
Yes.
- [70:49]
A
Yeah, it's a religious myth that he's kind of picked up. And I like that because I really like it, because when we were reading the Phaedo, it was unclear to me whether or not Socrates was willing to separate the theory of forms from the theory of recollection, whether those two things would actually be able to be divorced from one another. Because in Christianity and like, Christian Neoplatonic thought, Right. It will drop the recollection, but retain the theory of forms. And so the theory of ideas endures. Right. Particularly in, say, like, St. Augustine and these things.
- [71:19]
B
Yeah.
- [71:20]
A
So here I really liked that comment because it. It kind of softened something that I. I'm not really sure There's. I have all questions if we really wanted to lean into the theory of recollection as, like, a metaphysical reality. I think it raises a million different questions. But what do you think about, you know, the conversation restarts. So that's around an 86B. It restarts.
- [71:43]
B
Yep.
- [71:43]
A
And I love it because the response is like, okay, well, let's. Like, Mino's just not tracking. So, like, it's funny to me because I think sometimes you have to laugh in the dialogues if you're really reading them as, like, this, this, you know, interlocutors and these dialogues.
- [71:56]
B
Yep, yep.
- [71:57]
A
He just, like, restarts of like, well, okay, so is virtue something teachable? Let's, let's assume that it is something teachable and talk about it right after we gave a whole example of the fact that it's only recollection. So that even further kind of shows you. But I guess to round off that thought, he later in the dialogue, not to jump to the end, but later in dialogue when he says the relationship between knowledge and right opinion. It's interesting in that section, he says, by the way, this is something that I know. Like he makes a positive statement. I think it's really interesting to contrast those two statements of the theoretical recollection versus the distinction between knowledge and opinion. One he wouldn't insist on one. He says, yes, this I actually know.
- [72:39]
B
Yeah, no, that, that's great. Yeah. So he's not, he's not quite as ignorant as he comes off to be, you know, so I mean, you can make a big deal. Like he has a very rigorous account of what a definition is. It's supposed to tell us what kind of thing something is. It's supposed to give us. It's what belongs to it is usia, its properties, the things that belong, you know, and he does use that term ados form, but he doesn't propose the theory of ideas, like you said here, which I think is really interesting. And we know, you know, via Aristotle, that that theory was not Socrates and he did not, he did not subscribe to that theory. So. And the term ados or form has a, a pedigree in the Presocratic tradition that Plato, but Socrates and Plato develop, you know, so you, and it doesn't have to be connected to the, the Platonic theory of ideas that existed, if that makes sense. They pick it up from the Greek mathematical, grammatical and oratory tradition. And it already, what it means is a classificatory concept. Eidos or form or species is because in Aristotle it gets translated species. Usually it's, it's, it's a, it's a concept of concepts that classify things, if that makes sense. So he's picking up, you don't have to connect it to the theory, the supposed theory of ideas. And I don't think you should in the maino. And I mean, I, I, we can't go into this in great detail, but my reading of Plato is that he abandons the theory of ideas later. And there's famously, he gives Aristotle's, it's attributed to Aristotle, the third main argument against the theory of ideas and the Parmenides. And there's no response To. To it. And I think a lot of the later dialogues, he's. He's trending towards an Aristotelian position. So I take Plato to be kind of. I take Aristotle to be a kind of Platonist, but not with, you know, not accepting the theory of ideas and Plato to be the first Aristotelian. I think there's a kind of organic continuity between them that could get me in trouble in some circles, but that's my reading, if that makes sense. So when you read the maino, yeah, you're right. I think textually there's good reason to say Plato downplays this theory. It doesn't seem that he. That he cares. He says, I don't really care much about this theory. What he does care is to show Meno that you can learn is something that we can do. And I do think he really cares to show in a minimal way that. That it is teachable. And in what sense? In accord with his own model of definition. And then also he's interested to show us in what sense it's not teachable, if that makes sense. And so when you, when you talk about that distinction between episteme and orthodox right opinion, there's a lot more to say than this. But the account of knowing that he has. If he tells you he knows something and he can answer it sufficiently, it means that he's able to follow his own method in the dialogue, which is to say he was able to define it and use the definition as a principle to draw the conclusion, if that makes sense. And I would argue that he pulls that off in a limited way. He doesn't give us a full account of virtue. But if you remember, after this point, he tells Meno, okay, I'll try to show you that it's teachable if you grant me these hypotheses. Again, he's using mathematical language here, and you kind of have proto scientific methodology going on here. It's another cool point about the dialogue. He says, look, if you grant me some hypotheses, all show you that it's teachable. And these are the kinds of statements that you can't really reject. You know, basically what he says is he identifies what's the relevant feature of something being teachable. When I teach this in my classes, students always pick this up pretty quickly. Like, the relevant feature of teachability is knowability. Like if somebody can learn something or know something for him or herself, it's. They can express it in language and teach it. So he's picked up on that, and he Says, look, here's a conditional hypothesis. If virtue is a form of wisdom or knowing, then it's going to be teachable in some. In that sense, if that makes sense. And he makes an argument that it has to be a form of wisdom or knowable because it's good, right? And all good things are only really good if you. Because they're. They partake in knowledge. Because if I don't know how to use health or beauty or strength, they're not actually good, right? They become. I abuse them, if that makes sense. So you got to connect them. So notice what he's done here. He's connected an attribute to the thing we're defining, which is virtue. That has to be with it. Just like he connected color and shape in his model to. To Meno. I think that's pretty cool. I think he thinks he knows this, right? I don't think it's not something he wants to question. So that I would argue that he has achieved that epistemic level of understanding, right? That he, that he really knows. But it's not an exhaustive account that's really important like he has. There's so much more to say. In fact, it's so limited. This is why students are really disappointed normally, because we don't know what virtue is beyond the fact that it's a form of knowledge. But at least if it's a form of knowledge, it will be teachable, you know, so that's an important point. The point about if you want to talk about the right opinion. I think what that's about when he. The term for knowledge he uses when he says that virtue is a form of knowledge is actually not episteme. I think Socrates or Plato have that. It's phronesis, which is like practical wisdom. And I think what he's doing here is he's saving the possibility that good people with good leaders. I think this actually starts to become political, which becomes clear at the very end of the dialogue. Good people with good leaders who have an account, account of virtue could still transmit virtue, teach it, even if they don't have like a full blown scientific account, if that makes sense. So having the like, just like having, you know, an authority figure tell you the way to Larissa will get you there if it's true, you know, having a teacher that can give you the right account of virtue is going to be sufficient for you to transmit it to other people. But as he says, it's really nice and good to have that proper epistemic account, right? Because if you don't know the reason why, the cause, your knowledge isn't tied down and you can lose it, like, politically. I think that translates into you need to have good educational leaders that can explain why we're doing these things, or, you know, the populace will behave like bad children and abandon them for, you know, probably hedonistic desires or. Or power, if that makes sense. So. So I think that's what's going on there. And there's. The one thing you can add, of course, is there's another. This is where, you know, it gets really interesting because he. He turns around and. And argues in the context of the discussion he has with. With Anatus, who shows up in the dialogue. Who. Who. Who Meno is hanging out with. Right. And of course, he's staying with him. And of course, this guy's a shady figure.
- [79:43]
A
He's one of.
- [79:43]
B
Of Socrates's accuser. He clearly does not. Like, Socrates accuses him of some nasty things. And they have this discussion about these good fathers, you know, Pericles in the Athenian state, that if anyone knows what virtue is and could teach it to be these guys, but they're famous also, in a way, for having bad kids, bad sons, you know, so what happened there? You know, what do you. I mean, I'll ask you the question. What did you guys, in your discussion like, what do you think the point of that conversation is? What's he trying to tell us about virtue and teaching it at that point?
- [80:19]
A
Yeah, because it just. It just kind of threw you for a loop in the dialogue when all of a sudden I feel like this happens in dialogues a lot where towards the end, Socrates is like, I'm just gonna start dialoguing with myself because this is more interesting. So he kind of. It's like in the Euthyphro, where he's the one that actually proposes the concept of service here. You know, I felt like it was such a curveball. He's like, you know, but also, there's no teachers of virtue. And you're just like, what?
- [80:42]
B
Right, right.
- [80:42]
A
What are we like? You're like this. You're constantly just trying to grasp onto something in this dialogue that's like, solid. Like, can I actually. So, you know, the way I took it here, I mean, this is. I appreciate your question. You know, first I was trying to wrestle with what is the. Like, what is Anatus an analog of. Right. So we have Mino, we have the slave boy. You know, like, if this is a dialogue that really has this kind of substrata on education, what do we see with Anna's. And it is. Is such an interesting character because Annatus doesn't seem to be able to tell the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist. Like, he can't.
- [81:17]
B
You can't.
- [81:18]
A
Because he says, like, I don't like the sophists.
- [81:20]
B
Yeah.
- [81:20]
A
And you're like, oh, good, you know, points for you, like, this would be great. But then he doesn't, like Socrates, he can't tell. And so he. He then gravitates to these other men who are supposed to be great. So these aren't sophists, these are good statesmen. So now we've got another category, I guess, of people who might be teachers of virtue, like who, who actually has wisdom. But then he does point something, and it's a critique that I haven't really ever been settled with, which is, you know, he critiques them like, oh, well, did they, did they pass this on to their, to their children? And of course, like, you could somewhat throw this critique back and say, well, like, you know, Socrates, how did you do at forming alcibiades? Right, how did. Or I mean, you know, not to heap impiety upon my head, but like, obviously our Lord also had Judas. So, like, do you. Do you put that at the fault of the teacher? And so there has to be one question here that I'm not sure is totally answered, or maybe it's answered in an implicit way and maybe we can draw that out is, you know, is the teaching of virtue reciprocal in some way? Right? So like, the teacher has a role, but the student has a role. So you can have a really excellent teacher like Socrates or our Lord, but that, that's, that that's not the 100%. The journey. There has to be some type of response by the students. That's a question I have because it seems like the dialogue is just there, like it brings you to that thought process. But then the reason that I thought that he brought up distinction between knowledge and right opinion is because it's an incredibly helpful distinction in saying, like, well, wait, I see that guy and he's told me what virtue is, or he's had a good definition, or he's been virtuous. And so this distinction of, between knowledge and right opinion, that you can actually hold to something and act according to something but not actually know what it is. You just happen to have our opinion and he's right.
- [83:12]
B
Right.
- [83:12]
A
It's ephemeral, it's. It's fleeting. And the problem with my opinion is, is that you don't understand its roots you don't understand its. Its substructure. And so you can't really teach it. Well, I'm assuming there would be some kind of memetic power to some degree that. And this is probably why they're good statesmen, so certain people in the state will. Will mirror them, but they can't teach it. Whereas knowledge, right. This is something that's permanent. It's immutable. You know, I would think of the ideas, the Platonic ideas there. Right.
- [83:41]
B
There's.
- [83:42]
A
There's something that just does not change. If we understood this universal well, then we'll understand the particulars. And so that's. I actually found it to be a very helpful distinction in knowledge, something that I find to be maybe an antecedent to the divided line in Plato's Republic. Right. He breaks up this different type of knowledge.
- [84:03]
B
That's.
- [84:03]
A
That's kind of where I am on the. The end of the dialogue.
- [84:06]
B
Yeah, I like that. I mean, I see like a proto distinction here that Aristotle develops greatly between knowledge of facts and knowledge of causes, like you're saying, and that a lot. Some facts you can. You can find causes, some facts. It doesn't make sense to look for causes. I would say knowing what a color is, is like that. I mean, you could do it like a physiological way or talk about light or whatever, but. But you either have a kind of conceptual formation of what red or yellow or blue is, or you don't. You know what I'm saying? And that's a kind of a point of departure for learning, a first principle, if you will. And definitions are often like that, where they describe facts, and then you can use the facts to learn other things or reason. And so I see that there. And I think you're right. I mean, I think that the student often needs to humbly and courageously accept facts that maybe often they're facts that we could explain later, but you have to start by accepting them and kind of live them and see them. That's the other big point you have to. You, right. When Meno says, like, is it teachable or is it by nature or a practice? Right. Well, it. These things aren't all exclusive, obviously. It's not just by nature. That comes out clearly in the dialogue, but it can be teachable in the sense that it's a form of. Of knowing or knowledge, something we can learn. But it also, it apparently is a practice. And I think, like you said, I think this is the point you were driving at is that it requires an action on the part of the student. Right. And that's not something the teacher can give. I mean, of course, this is. So this is connected to our earlier discussion of classical education and its methodology. You know, so this is something that the manual can contribute. There is. What these cases show is that knowing virtue, at least in the sense of right opinion or correct belief, is a necessary condition for transmitting it or teaching it. But it's clearly not sufficient. Right? And the reason it's not sufficient is because virtue, learning, virtue is a practice and the student has to choose to do it himself or herself voluntarily. And Alcibiades is a fantastic example. A little bit. It's in a way a little different than. Than Mayno. And I'll say, why? Because I don't think Mayno ever gets it. Alcibiades is puzzling precisely because he does get it. And then he chooses not to live the best life. And this is mo. This is like a. This comes out when Alcibiades comes stumbling drunk into the party in the symposium at the end, because he tells everyone this. It's really fascinating and it's, it's perplexing because he's. He. He tells the audience that he knew that what Socrates was saying was like gold, that he had expressed the truth about the human good, and yet he chooses not to pursue it. You know, I don't know that Meno ever gets it. So. But Alcibiades is a great example here because he's, he was, you know, I think he was reputed as one of Socrates better students. And, and it wasn't enough, right? It's not sufficient because he's got to make the choice to live it himself, and he didn't. So in that other, that second hypothetical argument that he makes, the premise is if virtue is teachable, there has to be teachers, okay? And then they go and they're like, well, there it doesn't look like there are any teachers. So by modus ponens, you can say, you know, there are no teachers, so it's not a teachable thing. That's clearly. Again, this is where it's just like the lights aren't on for Maido. Like, how could you not pause here and be like, are we contradicting ourselves, Socrates? Because he doesn't care about contradiction, because he's behaving like a sophist, you know, so. And I think here, Socrates is just, you know, he's not going to cast pearls to the swine. He just kind of keeps, like, he's just going to move on like he did with, With Euthyphro. So. But he doesn't, it's clear he doesn't believe this. I would just say, you know, make this point that it's. This is a, this is a complex answer to a complex question. Is virtue teachable? Well, yes, in the sense that it's a form of knowledge, right? But also when you look at how we learn to be virtuous, it turns out that it requires an internal contribution on the part of the learner, and that's not something that can be taught. So in that sense, virtue is not a teachable thing. Thing. So I think he wants to give a yes, no answer here. And that's possible because of the fact that virtue is complicated. It's both knowing and it's, It's a practice. It's. It's a habit. Right? And that's something someone has to will. So that's kind of, that's kind of how I interpret that section of the dialogue, if that makes sense.
- [89:06]
A
Yeah, it does. No, I really appreciate that because I think that that really helps understand that what is the role of the teacher and what's the role of the student, right? So the, the, the teacher can offer knowledge to the student. There is an aspect of, of the virtuous life, the good life, that is teachable, right? Here is this thing. Have knowledge of it and not just write opinion, but we have to actually have this knowledge. But then there has to be this response which is, do I then act according to what I now know?
- [89:32]
B
Right.
- [89:33]
A
Is there like a practice here, do you think, though maybe not. The pushback, which is like, from my own ignorance, is that practice element, is that in the meno, Is that in Plato, or is that us looking more at the Western tradition as a whole? Because I don't. Because here's the critique you hear. Sometimes I'm not sure I even agree with it, or if I do agree with it, I still have some questions about it, which is, people read the mino and they say, look, okay, see, this is it. Socrates just believes that virtue is knowledge. If you just have the right knowledge, then everyone will just be virtuous. And, you know, then we wait till Aristotle and then he tells us that, you know, virtue is a good habit. And obviously, obviously Aristotle has a better definition because we've all known the right thing to do and we've all failed to do it because we don't have, we haven't habituated ourselves to this. And therefore Aristotle's better. And so there's a few things there that I, I would you Know, want to kind of punch at one is. Is that, you know, is the. Is the relationship between knowledge and practice that I think the tradition as a whole looks at, Is that present in Plato? Like, because I'll be honest, maybe I missed it. I don't see. I don't see that full answer in the Meno dialogue.
- [90:46]
B
Okay, yeah, that's.
- [90:49]
A
Maybe. Maybe I've missed it, but I didn't see the answer to that.
- [90:52]
B
Yeah.
- [90:53]
A
Is that really. If that's there, then is it really fair to say that Socrates believes that that knowledge is simply a virtue, is just a knowledge, and you just have to have the right understanding? Because if that practice element is there, then that's not a. That's not a real accurate understanding of what he's trying to say.
- [91:16]
B
I tend to the problem I would see is a reduction of. I mean, which I think is present in some sense here. It's also present in ways you can make the case in the Republic of. Of virtue to knowing. But. But I would say that. I mean, so MENO frames the question that way. One of the options for virtue is that it's a type of praxis, if that makes sense. So how does Socrates answer that? I. I interpret these. These later sections of the dialogue to point us in that direction, if that makes sense. So that it. Right. What. What the examples of the good statesman that couldn't transmit virtue to their son show us is that knowing virtue is. There's. At least now he doesn't say this. Right. I'll grant you this, but a choice has to be made on the part of the learner, and it's a particular kind of choice that. That would answer Maino's initial question in the affirmative when he says, is this a practice? Yeah, it's something you have to do, if that makes sense. So, I mean, that's an interpretation off the top of my head right now. I don't have a proof text where he just. But I think it's in there. I'll shoot it to you later.
- [92:35]
A
That's fine. I mean, I really like that picture. I really like the picture that the teacher can convey knowledge and the student then has to convey practice. Practice cannot be conveyed by the teacher. And so we see this dynamic of education. I think we see that. You know, I think that's certainly there in the broader intellectual tradition of the West. I'm just really interested. I mean, maybe it's a question that we can grapple with, you know, on the podcast as we kind of move through Plato is, you know, do we, do we see that duality in his own teachings? Because I really like it. And so it's interesting to me just how much of that is attributed to, you know, Plato.
- [93:13]
B
Yeah, yeah. I mean, so in I would, I mean, here I could go. I mean you can go out of the, the, the meno and go to the Republic where it's very clear that Plato's, you know, anthropology, he gives the tripart division of the soul. Right. As including passions, the spirited part, the appetites and then the intellectual. And you know, the issue is that when you think about virtue it's. And this is on the table in the phaedo also is that it's something that the person has to choose to do. Right. So it's going to be a life practice that you seek. And of course, I would argue there's no. Plato's whole project is. It makes no sense if he doesn't think of virtue like this. He's trying to write these dialogues to kind of persuade, you know, these, these rich kids that the best life is the intellectual life, you know, and it works in some cases and it doesn't. What's the difference? Well, like some of his students choose to pursue the intellectual life and some of them don't. But it's an internal act. It's not something he can give them, if that makes sense. Now does he have. I don't think he's worked out the account to the extent that Aristotle has as far as the meaning of virtue as a disposition and so on, but it's at least there, I think in seed. That would be my position.
- [94:55]
A
Yeah, that's interesting because if virtue is reducible to simply knowledge, then the failure of the student to become virtuous seems to reduce. Lay completely on the teacher.
- [95:06]
B
Yeah, right. 100.
- [95:08]
A
But that can't be correct because. Or we would have to hold that Socrates failed Alcibiades.
- [95:15]
B
Right.
- [95:15]
A
That Alcibiades is a, is a testament to Socrates failure to be a teacher of virtue. But again, like you again. And maybe it's cheating to a certain degree. But then we think of our Lord and Judas that our Lord failed to convey to Judas. That's right. The possible, you know, life of virtue and following him. That's probably not a theory that we're going to hold to anytime soon. So no, I like this. There has to be this reciprocity between the teacher. There's two distinct movements in becoming virtuous. Right. The knowledge that is given and then the practice in response to that knowledge. So no, I like this Picture, I think it's something that we can kind of grapple with as we continue to learn and kind of move, you know, through Plato, you know, anything else, like on the Meno, as you look at it as a whole, I mean, this, obviously, this is a. Well, that we can keep coming to over and over again, but kind of on this, like, theme of education and kind of to the depth we've had it today. Anything that we've missed or anything that you want to circle back to?
- [96:12]
B
No, I mean, I thought you. I think you did a very nice job of kind of organically taking us through, weaving through, through the dialogue. So I thank you very much for that. I think, I mean, my main takeaway would be when you think about this in relation to the classical education model or approach is just that what this dialogue teaches us is that learning is about knowing, so we have to produce knowledge. But that, that is not a passive activity. It's something that from the perspective of the. The learner, the learner has to actively pursue it. And you have these great examples with Meno and his servant in the dialogue. Meno refuses to actually do this. And you can see that it's because he's proud and he's behaving like a sophist. And his, his slave clearly possesses these virtues of courage and, and humility. And he's willing to let Socrates teach him. And he learned something about, you know, this complex geometrical problem and in that sense becomes virtuous. So I think in that sense it's a great way. This is why I start my, my basic, you know, intro class with. It is to get my students on the team of. Listen, I'm not here to just kind of, you know, it's not an information dump, you know, and you're just going to take it in and I'll memorize it. I need you to. To read the material and engage with it yourself and think about it and seek to learn. So I just tell them, don't be a maino, you know, I like that.
- [97:48]
A
Yeah, I. I think I've grown in my appreciation for why this dialogue is often read first. So when I first started on Ascend to get into our studies, into Plato, I asked, you know, my betters, what. What's the first one I should read? And in first, Alcibiades usually popped up towards the top. It was actually surprising me how many opinions there were on this question. But one of the things that surprised me was how much the mino popped up. And at that time, I really did not Appreciate why that would be an early dialogue to read, and now I do. So I greatly appreciate the wisdom that you've brought today. Where can people find more about you and your work?
- [98:26]
B
Great question. I would mention that I wrote a chapter on Plato in my dissertation. The first part is Greek phusis kaito atropinon agathon, which means Nature and the Human Good. But the subtitle is the Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good. That's in English. You can find that on ProQuest. That's like the. It houses all the dissertations. So if you're interested in kind of my approach, which has all my sources. I've mentioned Klein already. I'd also mention John Salas has really good work on. On Plato that was influential for me and Braun also. These are people that I cite and there's other folks too. So I throw that out there as a source right now. And you can find work of mine on realism in our journal Reality. I have several articles in there which are accessible and free online, so I'd recommend that source. And you'll also be able to find other works that I've done in various journals and. Yeah, and you can look me up at Aquinas College. And my email address is there. Feel free to email me if you have any inquiries or further questions. I know. I. I kind of. I. I'm a carpenter's son. I feel kind of embarrassed about spouting out stephanous numbers. So if you wanted more textual evidencing like the true Straussian or something like that, I'm sorry I didn't give it. I can give you all that. I just. I'm. I'm somewhat embarrassed by it anyways, so feel free to email me. I am on sabbatical right now, actually, so it'll bounce back to you, but I do check. Check my email account sometimes and. And I'll get back to you. So I don't know.
- [100:03]
A
Yeah, yeah. No, that's very good. Dr. Ragnar, we really appreciate you being on today. Thank you for coming on and being a numb fish to us. I appreciate that. Hopefully I didn't look too perplexed as you were explaining the geometric problems. And I did appreciate your drawings. But thank you again for coming on.
- [100:20]
B
No, you were. It was. It was a great pleasure and honor. Thank you. You led the dialogue very well and it's. It's great to be here. Thank you so much.
- [100:29]
A
Oh, thank you. All right, everyone. Next week we are starting the Gorgias, and so we'll break it into three parts. The dialogue, naturally, has three parts because there's three interlocutors. One, two, three. And so we'll be reading the first part of the Gorgias. So please join us in that. Check us out on X or Facebook and YouTube and check out our Patreon and visit thegreatbookspodcast.com and we will see you all next week. Thank you.