Asianometry – How the Communists Took Afghanistan
Host: Jon Y
Date: October 5, 2025

Episode Overview

In this episode, Jon Y of Asianometry dives deep into the tangled history that led to the Communist Party’s surprising takeover of Afghanistan in 1978. The episode traces the nation’s social, ethnic, and economic complexities, the influence of foreign powers, the rise and fall of its monarchs and reformers, and how these threads culminated in a Marxist coup that shocked the world. Listeners are offered not just a recounting of events, but a textured explanation of Afghanistan’s underlying vulnerabilities and the far-reaching consequences of the 1978 revolution.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

Afghanistan’s Geographic and Social Complexity

[00:04–04:22]

• Afghanistan is landlocked at a crossroads between Indian, Chinese, Turkish, and Persian worlds.
• Geography: Dominated by mountains (80% of the land), divided into north (Turkic peoples, plains), central (Hazaras, valleys), and south (Pashtuns, deserts).
• Historically decentralized power: Local tribes distrust the central government, preferring self-rule and clan-based community organization.
• Chronic inability to tax or mobilize resources due to geography, lack of infrastructure, and social fragmentation.

Quote:
“They are basically self-functional and difficult to tax. Even who we might call Afghanistan’s king is less of a William the Conqueror type and more like an arrangement amongst the various tribal heads.” – Jon Y ([03:49])

Early Modernization and Foreign Influence

[04:23–13:30]

• British and Russian empires compete for influence; Afghanistan acts as a buffer state.
• Afghan rulers received foreign subsidies (British then Soviet) to cement their power and fund modernization.
• Early 20th-century attempts at reform: King Amanullah Khan’s modernization (ending slavery, civil rights, integrating women) backlashes, triggering civil war.
• Power passed to Nadir Shah, then Zahir Shah, who steered 40 years of slow-paced reforms to balance modernization with conservatism.

Quote:
“Though my soul will go to God, my spirit will remain in Afghanistan. My last words to you, my sons and successors are, never trust the Russians.” – Reported last words of Abdur Rahman ([09:55])

Economic Underdevelopment & Dependence

[13:31–22:19]

• Economy: Stagnant agriculture, dependence on foreign-controlled trade pre-1920s, limited industrialization.
• Afghanistan remains unable to establish a tax base or financial independence, remaining reliant on aid and extractive tribute.
• Soviet aid in the 1950s–1970s: Built key infrastructure, but mostly benefitted Kabul’s elite and failed to address rural poverty.

Quote:
“And they were still turning a deficit. So in the mid-1960s the Soviets shifted to encouraging export growth and developed Afghanistan’s natural resources to export back to the Soviet Union.” – Jon Y ([21:25])

The Pashtunistan Issue & Geopolitics

[22:20–27:55]

• Partition of India (1947) creates Pakistan, sowing lasting tension over the “Pashtunistan” issue — unifying Pashtuns over the new border.
• The U.S. sides with Pakistan, rebuffing Afghan attempts at alliance, opening the door for closer Soviet ties including substantial aid and arms sales.
• By the 1970s Afghanistan: One of the largest non-communist recipients of Soviet aid.

Political Unrest and Rise of the PDPA

[27:56–33:50]

• Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan (a Pashtun nationalist) pushes faster reform, but is eventually sidelined. A new 1964 constitution bans royal family from politics, indirectly sidelining Daud.
• Fragmentation worsens: New Marxist-Leninist party (PDPA) emerges in 1965, splitting almost immediately along ethnic and ideological lines (the hardline Khalk and more moderate Parcham factions).

Quote:
“Unlike with many other countries, communism reached Afghanistan rather late. Founded by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal, the PDPA began in January 1965 with a meeting of 27 to 30 people in Kabul.” – Jon Y ([32:09])

Rural Decline & Urban Crisis

[33:51–36:40]

• Severe droughts (1970–72): Huge fatalities, livestock loss, mass migration to Kabul, worsening urban inequality, and social tensions.
• Daud Khan seizes power in 1973 with backing from Soviet-aligned army officers, but quickly turns on both communists and Islamic factions, alienating allies.
• Increasing paranoia and attempted coups weaken Daud, while Islamic opponents flee to Pakistan or the countryside, germinating future resistance.

The Communist Coup (Saur Revolution)

[36:41–47:05]

• In 1978, after assassination of leftist leader Mir Akbar Khaiber, massive protests erupt.
• The government’s hesitant crackdown allows PDPA to coordinate with Soviet Embassy and act. On April 27, 1978, army officers loyal to PDPA seize strategic points, execute Daud Khan and his family.
• Radio broadcast proclaims the “Great Saur Revolution” – the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Memorable Moment:
“At 4pm Daoud and 30 of his family members are executed. More people are killed in fighting in the rest of the city. How many? Estimates range from 400 to 10,000. Radio Kabul is seized and a broadcast goes out in the Dari and Pushtu languages saying Dawud has been eliminated forever by the will of the people of Afghanistan.” ([45:38])

Soviet Culpability and Misconceptions

[47:06–49:00]

• The Soviets are surprised but not uninvolved; they give tacit approval at a critical moment but did not orchestrate the coup.
• The PDPA’s seizure of power was by a tiny urban elite with little rural support.

Quote:
“The PDPA, a Communist party that scarcely anybody had heard of, took power with Taraki as its first president. Most people agree the Soviets had expected something like this to happen, but they didn’t outright plan or start it. Brezhnev told Jimmy Carter that he first heard about it on the radio.” – Jon Y ([47:41])

Fragility After the Revolution

[49:01–End]

• Despite revolutionary rhetoric, the PDPA lacked deep roots or popular legitimacy, especially outside Kabul.
• The rural majority, conservative and Islamic, was unrepresented. Had Daud held elections, the Communists “would have likely had a very poor showing.”
• The Communist regime “moved forward like as if they had all the power and credibility in the world. But they didn’t. And what happened next would be a fiasco.”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “They are basically self-functional and difficult to tax.” ([03:49])
• “Never trust the Russians.” – Abdur Rahman ([09:55])
• “Though its various factions remain divided. The imposition of secular norms onto the traditional rural areas creates backlash.” ([31:55])
• “At 4pm Daoud and 30 of his family members are executed… Estimates range from 400 to 10,000.” ([45:38])
• “The reality? The PDPA was a small party of 4,000, all of whom are urban, well-educated intellectuals and Soviet-trained army officers. They had little in common with those in the rural areas.” ([49:13])

Timeline of Crucial Events

• [00:03] Introduction and Afghanistan’s demographic/geographic background
• [13:00] Early modernization under Amanullah and rise of foreign aid
• [27:30] Pashtunistan issue strains Pakistan–Afghan relations, pivot to the Soviets
• [32:00] PDPA emerges, splits into Khalk and Parcham
• [36:40] Daud Khan’s 1973 coup, crackdown on rivals
• [43:00] 1978: Assassination of Mir Akbar Khaiber, mass protests
• [45:00] April 27–28, 1978: Saur Revolution, PDPA coup, execution of Daud

Conclusion

Jon Y presents the Communist coup in Afghanistan not as a sudden aberration, but as the product of decades of failed reforms, ethnic tensions, economic dependence, and geopolitical maneuvering. The Marxist-Leninist PDPA’s ascendance was less a genuine revolution and more a desperate, internally fragile gambit—one whose aftermath would precipitate further turmoil and ultimately Soviet intervention. The episode ends with Jon’s characteristically crisp, skeptical tone:
“But they didn’t [have legitimacy]. And what happened next would be a fiasco.” ([49:25])