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- [00:05]
Haviv Rettig Gur
Hello, everybody. Welcome to Ask Khabiv Anything. This is kind of an exciting episode. We're going to try a little bit more of a conversational approach. Please let us know if this format works. We'd love your feedback. We have here someone that we have learned a tremendous amount from, Mark Dubowitz, the CEO of the foundation for Defense of Democracies, a man who has the illustrious true honor of being sanctioned by both Putin's Russia and Khamenei's Iran. I have to say, Mark, I'm jealous. You know, the only sanctions I've ever faced are from my kids. But that really reflects on Mark's work. And what we're going to try and do for this episode is have a broader conversation. I begged and begged and managed to convince my wife, Rachel, who is the executive producer behind the scenes who has made this podcast, developed it, built it out from something that at the very beginning we had no idea how to do. And now we know how to do a lot more. And we of course have plans to do even more than that to come out from behind the curtain. Two really important things. One is our sponsor, to whom we are very, very grateful. Julie and Frank Cohen have sponsored this episode and asked us to say that they believe that this podcast is a way to teach our story because understanding our past and present is key to building a better future. And Julie and Frank have also dedic this episode, as many sponsors have. It's one of the most beautiful things that has developed around this community that this podcast has become to someone who died on October 7. This episode is dedicated to First Sergeant Elirana Birjil, who was 29 when he died fighting the Hamas terrorists who invaded Kibbutz Be' eri. He is from Khadera and on the morning of the attack he was with his wife at her parents house in Tiberias in Tveria, up north on the Sea of Galilee, celebrating the Shavuot holiday. He rushed down south to join his comrades, met them on the front lines and volunteered to be one of the first officers entering Kibbutz Be' eri, which was one of the real major, one of the three major massacres of October 7, one of the most dangerous places to be. He was driving one of two armored jeeps inside the kibbutz in the early afternoon. His story is told in the Times of Israel's great project that really tells the story of everyone who died that day. And he was, he was killed in a firefight, his wife was pregnant and he did not know it when he died. So he died never knowing that he has a son. We remember Eliran Aberjil, and thank you, Frank and Julie Cohen, for giving us also that opportunity. Welcome to our new episode. We're going to talk today about Iran, Iran, Iran, why it's so important, what it all means, where it's all going. I'm throwing the baton over to Rahel. Thank you so much for joining us and doing this and coming out from, as I said, behind the curtain.
- [03:11]
Rahel Shavit
Thank you. And thank you especially to Mark. If you want to know more about Iran, obviously, the Iran Breakdown, Mark's new podcast is the place to go. Everything from the women's rights protest to exactly how much enriched uranium you need in order to make a bomb. All the details are there. So let's start from what's going on in the news. Basically, the US Is in talks with Iran, trying to talk Iran away or down from the nuclear ledge. According to reports that have come out recently, the US Is asking Oman and to mediate, Saudis also are reportedly part of this negotiation. And the main question seems to be will Iran be able to preserve the ability to domestically enrich uranium, which is obviously part of the infrastructure required if it wants to make a sprint for the bomb. A possible compromise, according to news reports, is in the works in which there'll be some sort of regional uranium enrichment consortium, multiple countries enriching uranium for Iran. But once again, Iran wants to keep it in house. There was a recent report that came out by the International Atomic Energy Agency accusing Iran of non compliance with its international obligations. And so the world is rightly worried about Iran's intentions. Its nuclear program is too large for a research program, but too small for an energy program and seems to be sized just right for a military program. So where do we take it from here? Can. And Mark, we'll start with you. Can an agreement between Trump and Khamenei change that? What can the Americans hope for can come out of this deal? And perhaps most importantly, what should we be looking for? We, the ordinary person looking from the side, what are the red lines? How do we know if these talks are succeeding, if Iran is spitting Trump or if Trump is truly creating some great breakthrough here? What should we be looking for?
- [05:04]
Mark Dubowitz
So, Rahel and Javi, thank you so much for having me on. It's great. Love your podcast. I'm a huge fan. And yeah, we're back in, in these Iran talks. We've seen them before. We saw them in 2015. We saw them in 2013. We saw them in just after 911 when the Europeans were negotiating the Iranians. The Iranians love to talk. They love to negotiate. They love to pull us into an endless negotiation and they love to run a rope, a dope on American presidents and U.S. negotiators. And so here we're back at these negotiations. I think we're at the fifth round, waiting for the sixth round, where basically the Iranians are unfortunately, I think, dictating the pace of these negotiations. The Americans have essentially conceded enrichment, despite the fact that President Trump, all his officials and 52 of 53 Republican senators and 177 House GOP members have said the only deal that's acceptable is zero enrichment and full dismantlement. Now, President Trump just a couple days ago said the deal will be zero enrichment. You know, you have my word on that. And the deal that has been proposed to the Iranians, you could spin it actually as zero enrichment, because what has been proposed, and again, it is not a detailed proposal, it's about one or two pages that have been presented by US Negotiator Steve Witkoff to Iranian negotiator Arakchi, essentially says what you've mentioned. There's going to be some kind of international consortium, some kind of joint enrichment facility involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, the uae, anyone else who wants to join, it'll be under IAEA supervision. The United States will be involved in some capacity. And we're going to build that consortium. And the offer is it has to be built outside of Iran. It cannot be on Iranian soil. But while we're building it, because it's going to take three to four years, we're going to give you temporary enrichment. So you'll be allowed to enrich above ground to 3.67% enriched uranium. And the below ground enrichment facilities have to be rendered, quote, non operational. We can talk about what that actually means. Does that mean you just switch the lights off or do you rip out the infrastructure and the centrifuges from those facilities and then blow them up? So somewhere between switching off the lights and blowing up the facilities, what does non operational mean? Also the conversion facility, which is a facility in a place called Isfahan, which converts uranium ore, or yellow cake, into uranium hexafluoride, which is the gas form of uranium, which is then pumped into these centrifuges and enriched to enriched material that will have to be cut in some way. So that's sort of the deal. And we're going to give Iran significant sanctions relief, but the sanctions relief will be restricted in some way that Iran can't use it for malign activities. So the Americans can say with a straight face, at the end of the process, Iran is going to end up with zero enrichment. The Iranians have already rejected the offer, by the way, but they reject the offer in a typical regime way, which is no but, no but. And so that means that the negotiations will continue and we're waiting to hear the detailed Iranian response. But effectively the US can say at some time in the future there'll be zero enrichment, but temporarily, for the next few years, while they're building the enrichment facility, you're going to have enrichment on your soil to this low level. I'll just finish with this. Low level is something that the person on the street needs to understand is not low level. If you're enriching its 3.67% enriched material, you are 70% of what you need in order to get to weapons grade material. Right. If you are at 20%, you're 90% of the way there. So as long as the Iranians have any enrichment capability, they can dial up from 3.67% to 90% weapons grade. How do we know that they can do that? Well, under the Biden administration when they feared no reaction from the United States, they went from this low level to 20% to 60%, all the way up to 84%, which is effectively weapons grade uranium. And they were able to do that without any consequences from the United States. Give them any capability and they'll dial up to a bomb's worth.
- [09:18]
Rahel Shavit
So just as a follow up, is there something in this agreement also about ballistic missiles that is. Right. It's not just about making the bomb, it's about sending the bomb. Right. So sending it to Israel and sending it possibly as far as the United States. Is that included or not included?
- [09:34]
Mark Dubowitz
My understanding, I again, I don't have the, you know, the one or two pager in front of me and there's been some reporting on it and it's, it's not clear exactly what is included. I haven't heard any mention of that. Now it certainly that has been talked about by US Officials, including Secretary Rubio and others, that we need to capture Iran's ability in terms of the range and the payload of its missiles. I mean, it's worth reminding listeners, including those in Israel, you know, Iran has the largest missile inventory in the Middle East. They have somewhere in the neighborhood of 2,000 to 3,000 ballistic missiles. Of course you remember because you were there in April and October when Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles at Israel. So it's deeply concerning, and I think it's a concern by Israelis and American officials that can Israel withstand a massive ballistic missile attack by Iran if there were Israeli and or American strikes against Iran's nuclear facility? But capping those missiles, especially the range and the payload, should be very important to Americans, not just Israelis, because Iran has an active intercontinental ballistic missile program. ICBMs are not used to develop conventional warheads. They're used to develop and deliver nuclear warheads. And that is a significant threat to the American homeland. So we need to cap that missile program in some capacity.
- [10:59]
Haviv Rettig Gur
Mark, can I just. What you basically just told us, if I understood correctly, was that because of this delay, this three, four year delay in building the facilities off Iranian shores, and Iran is also arguing that maybe this consortium should actually enrich in Iran. What the Trump administration is doing is kicking the can down the road, road to the next administration.
- [11:23]
Mark Dubowitz
That's exactly.
- [11:24]
Haviv Rettig Gur
They're not going to be around in three and a half years. And that's when people are actually going to have to come to Iran and say, okay, now stop. So they're developing an agreement in which enforcement is the next administration. Is that the Iranian gambit? Is it possible Witkoff or the Americans don't grasp that? Am I completely off base?
- [11:44]
Mark Dubowitz
No, you're exactly on base. In fact, you'll notice American presidents often say the following phrase, Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. And then they'll say, on my watch.
- [11:54]
Haviv Rettig Gur
On my watch, on my watch, which.
- [11:56]
Mark Dubowitz
Is always the very important end to the sentence. And I think this idea of this consortium of building this joint enrichment facility, whether it's on Iranian soil or off Iranian soil, the Iranians, by the way, have very publicly rejected the idea that it's not going to be on Iranian soil is exactly that. It's kick the can down the road. Because January 2029 is, you know, is what I would call the most important sunset. We used to talk about the Sunsets and the JCPOA, when the restrictions would go away. Well, in January 2029, Donald Trump goes away. And I think the idea is that the Iranians, whatever they agree to, they just have to honor that agreement until January 2029. And then they get a Republican or a Democrat in the White House who is not Donald Trump or is not certainly not willing to contemplate military force in any way, and then they can essentially use their infrastructure to move towards nuclear weapons. I, by the way, I think this whole idea of this consortium is kind of a diplomatic fiction. I don't think it'll ever be built anyway. But I think it's a useful fiction for being able to sell the idea that we've conceded enrichment to Iran, but only temporarily until the consortium builds this enrichment facility, at which point Iran has to end enrichment on its soil and get fuel rods from this new facility.
- [13:14]
Haviv Rettig Gur
So we're in the Obama years. We're going to do everything it takes to prevent Iran from getting a nuke except removing the program, removing the infrastructure and removing Iran's capability of building a nuke. But everything other than those things we're going to do to prevent Iran. In other words, we're back in this sort of fictional la la land where the diplomatic, I mean, I mean the jcpoa everybody got very upset that Trump pulled out of it. But enrichment would have already sun. The enrichment restrictions would have sunset this year. Iran would now be enriching under the actual rules of JCPOA and permissibly. In other words, a ten year horizon for freezing enrichment while all the infrastructure remains in place is not. Anyway, I'm getting upset. What's wrong with Americans? Why is this not obvious? I genuinely. Either Iran can or it can't.
- [14:12]
Mark Dubowitz
Yeah. So let me try to put, let me put a positive spin on what the administration would say. They would say haviv, don't worry, this is not jcpoa. First of all, JCPOA allowed enrichment all the way through the deal. Second of all, it allowed all the infrastructure in the enrichment facilities to remain. Fordeau remained open, the towns remained open. Isfahan, the conversion facility remained open. There were restrictions put on the amount of enrichment you could do, on the percentage of enrichment you could do. But you're right, exactly right. Under JCPOA, you know, year 10, which is right now 2025, Iran can begin to install advanced centrifuges, it can begin to expand its nuclear infrastructure and more importantly by 2030 most of it goes away. So Iran at that point has an industrial sized nuclear program. It has near zero nuclear breakout. It can enrich to any level and by the way, it collects a trillion dollars of sanctions relief through the lifespan of the jcpoa. So that why that agreement was fatally flawed. And the Trump administration would say that's why we withdrew in 2018. This time around, Havib, don't worry, we're going to give them limited enrichment capability for a temporary period of time. It'll be above ground, but we're going to make those facilities non operational. And the real question is what does non operational mean? If non operational means switch the lights off and keep the entire infrastructure in place underground. That's a really bad deal if non operational means we take out the infrastructure. Remember, if you have an enrichment facility, 80% of that facility, the time and the resources are actually the infrastructure and 20% are the actual centrifuges. So if we go in there and we rip out the entire infrastructure and we shut down the facility, maybe we even blow it up. Well, that's a lot better deal than jcpoa. And it's not clear at this point what non operational means in the American offer. Now I am equally pessimistic. As Iran negotiates and grinds down the US negotiating team, I find it hard to believe the Iranians are going to agree to make those facilities truly non operational. They will negotiate some way where they can just very easily with a turn of the switch, turn it back on. Once President Trump is no longer in office.
- [16:30]
Rahel Shavit
What should we as Israelis be looking for in a deal? And is that different than what Americans need to get out of the current negotiations?
- [16:40]
Haviv Rettig Gur
I think I'll just, I'll start with Prime Minister Netanyahu has said, and this is really also a follow on to a question mark. You disagree with what the Trump administration is doing right now and I'm constantly sort of, I'm badgering you to defend them. So I apologize to the Trump administration. Administration, that's not fair. But it's not explaining itself well and we actually don't, I don't know the answer to these problems. Netanyahu made a point about North Korea and Libya. Right where his point, I think his point was essentially infrastructure. In other words, in the North Korean nuclear deal with the Clinton administration, the infrastructure remained in place. There was this big deal and then North Korea just went and built a nuke, right? And, and in Libya, the infrastructure itself was torn up and ripped out. And that's Netanyahu's argument. The infrastructure can't remain. If the infrastructure remains, you have not accomplished because you're basically relying on a future administration being willing to exact massive costs from Iran that will deter Iran constantly, permanently, because Iran will always be trying. And that's not a reasonable thing to rely upon going forward to the future presidential administrations. Think in presidential terms. And that's not how you prevent the collapse of the international non proliferation regime. So I think the Israeli red line is infrastructure. Otherwise we're still in a nuclear rising Middle East. I mean, the Middle east is still nuclearizing as long as Iran has the infrastructure because Khamenei won't give it up ever. In Any situation unless he has absolutely no choice. And holding onto it is far worse than giving it up. And, and that option has to be clarified. So just for example, what you have just said to us twice, we don't know if remove, if turning the below ground facilities mean you turn off the lights, come back to it in four years and everything's still there, or it means ripping out and blowing up the infra. That's the only question. That's the only thing that what else matters? Does anything else matter other than whether or not this massive infrastructure, and I don't know what, a dozen sites all over Iran. Iran has been doing nothing for 15 years but trying to obfuscate and hide and build facilities and capabilities that we can't find because we've already found so much. We have found vast facilities that nobody knew about and suddenly everyone discovered already. So infrastructure, it's all about infrastructure. I guess you've already answered the question, so I apologize for asking it again, but this does really seem like the fundamental red line and the Trump administration has already surrendered it. So that's it. We've lost this round and this particular round of negotiations is not going to get what we need. Is that something Israelis should be thinking or have I gone too far?
- [19:30]
Mark Dubowitz
Well, again, you've put me in the position, an awkward position, as you've acknowledged, of defending the Trump administration on this issue. So let me do my best because I think it's fair to your listeners to hear all sides. I think the Trump administration position would be no Aviv. We've made it very clear that there will be zero enrichment and full dismantlement. We've made it very clear repeatedly, the President, the Secretary of State, Steve Witkoff, the Secretary of Defense, and By the way, 52 Republican senators are on the record, 177 House GOP members, full dismantlement and zero enrichment. That is our position. And the President has said Iran has a choice. It can either, quote, blow up its facilities on its own under our supervision, or we will blow it up for them, end of quote. Okay. And President Trump, as I said a couple days ago, zero enrichment. So they would say we have not surrendered on enrichment. And when we talk about removing infrastructure, that's exactly what we're proposing. Now, the Iranians obviously are rejecting it, but we are proposing removing infrastructure, in other words, rendering these dangerous facilities non operational and not allowing Iran to engage in centrifuge manufacturing, which is very important because if they engage in centrifuge manufacturing, it doesn't matter how many centrifuges you rip out how many you destroy or how many you warehouse. If Iran can make more, then they can take those centrifuges and they can put them in some other clandestine facility. And now they have another enrichment facility. And this time it's not 70 meters underground, it's 100 meters underground and it's heavily fortified. Therefore we're in the zone of immunity, as Ehud Barak used to say, which is where Iran's nuclear program is now immunized against Israeli or even American strikes. So they, you know, be patient, we're negotiating. This is what a diplomatic process is all about. But we are going to stick to our red lines of zero enrichment and dismantlement and removing critical infrastructure. And by the way, when we proposed this deal to the Iranians, we knew they would reject it. So, you know, not to worry. We're setting this up for either the Iranians accepting our, our clear red lines or laying the predicate for US and or Israeli military strikes at the appropriate time. I would say that's kind of my best defense of the current US position and offer.
- [21:46]
Haviv Rettig Gur
So Mark, you campaigned fiercely against the Obama administration, jcpoa, against that process. Just bottom line, can we trust the Trump administration's process? Those are reasonable arguments. Maybe they'll deliver. Maybe they wanted to show that Iran isn't willing even when they compromised so much and left infrastructure, some infrastructure in Iranian soil for a few years, that there isn't a deal to be struck. Maybe the Trump administration is actually trying to prove that there's no deal to be struck and Trump is good for his actual threat, that so to speak, all options are on the table, which Obama said a hundred different times in my own hearing back in the day. And I never believed him and he never believed himself. So are all options on the table.
- [22:33]
Rahel Shavit
Maybe even as a follow up from a technical perspective, can, can an American strike actually take out Iran's nuclear facility? Do we have an option to walk away from the negotiating table? Is, and I mean it could take for sure and there's no question that, that a, an American action, American military action, right, could roll back the clock. But could it roll back the clock at this point to the point where the Iranian N was actually non operable. Right. Not take it back, you know, six months or two years or 10 years, but take it back to zero, to near zero? Is there actually a viable military option that could be used by America or by Israel? Right, that's a question that we've been debated a lot. Could Israel go it alone if there is an actual viable military option.
- [23:23]
Mark Dubowitz
There is a viable US military option. I have no doubt about it. I mean, given the firepower that we have, the B2 bombers, the 30,000 pound Massive Ordnance penetrators, the carrier strike groups just off the coast of Iran, we have ability. It's a multi day bombing campaign, but we could do massive damage to their nuclear program. I don't know technically whether it's a year or two or five or ten or forever. But I think the more important point is that we can hold Khamenei's regime at risk. I mean, we can put the Supreme Leader to that fundamental choice. It's either your nuclear program or your regime. And by the way, we can take both down. And the United States in a bombing campaign would not limit itself necessarily to nuclear sites, but we could go after leadership sites. And so I think American firepower with a credible threat that we could take down the regime means that Khamenei then, after that bombing, that day, after, would have to calculate whether firing hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel, attacking US troops, or trying to rebuild his program would then precipitate another round of US strikes that would take down his regime. So I think the US option is very compelling. The Israeli option is complicated. I've often said when people ask me about the Israeli option is that those who know don't say, and those who say don't know. And I think that's been particularly obvious now in the wake of what Israel has done in the past six months against, particularly against Hezbollah and against Iran. I think that no one knew about this incredible beeper operation that Mossad had been planning for a decade. Right. Nobody knew that Israel could fire ballistic missiles from its fighter jets from Iraq and strike and destroy Iran's strategic air defenses. Right. No one knew about Israeli capabilities. Everybody was surprised. I was surprised about Shaldag Israeli special forces ability to go into Syria and by the way, go underground and destroy a precision guided munitions factory that Iran was building on Syrian soil to produce more precision guided missiles for Hezbollah. So Israelis have surprised us. And I would expect, and I would hope over, you know, decades of planning for an Israeli strike, they've got more surprises up their sleeves. But there's no doubt we can do more damage than the Israelis do. The Israelis don't have B2 bombers. They don't have those 30,000 pound bombs that can slice through concrete and destroy the underground facilities at Natanz and Fordeaux. But I have no doubt that Israel could set back the program, do serious damage and then the Credibility of an American retaliation becomes much more important because that's when the US has to step in and say, number one, if you retaliate against Israel, they'll be held to pay. If the Iranians do respond, then the Americans would have to step up, as they did in October and April of last year, and help on that Israeli response. And by the way, again, the credibility of American response to say to Khamenei, after that Israeli strike, if you rebuild or if you cross a certain threshold in the retaliation, we are going to intervene militarily is a way to potentially deter an Iranian response.
- [26:42]
Rahel Shavit
So the Americans have the ability, do they have the will, do they have the stomach to get it done right? And maybe that's a question also for the Israelis. Does Netanyahu have the stomach, right, to get it done, to do something dramatic, something bold, something dangerous?
- [27:01]
Mark Dubowitz
Well, you mentioned will and capabilities. You know, I've been floating this idea about how you marry Israeli will with American capabilities. I mentioned a couple times this B2 bomber, this is our strategic bombers, nuclear capable bombers that carry these 30,000 pound massive ordnance penetrators. You know, if you wanted to do a real Trump flex move, what I would do is I would invite the Israeli Air Force to send a number of Israeli pilots to Missouri. I would train them up on the B2 bomber, I would put them in the cockpit. I would load the B2 with 30,000 pound massive orange penetrators. I would call a press conference and then I would have President Trump say, Ali Khamenei, you have a choice to either do a deal of full dismantlement, zero enrichment, or I am going to allow the Israelis to integrate our B2s into their strike plan. And as a result, they will blow up your facilities. And that would be a way to sort of cast a shadow of power across the negotiating table, as Ronald Reagan's former Secretary of State George Shultz used to say, because that would marry Israeli will. The Israelis clearly have the will. I think they have the will. Haviv can comment on Netanyahu with American capabilities. By the way, all those planes that Israeli pilots have been flying, including the planes they use to bomb Iran's strategic air defenses and ballistic missile production capabilities, are American planes. So it's not as we don't, you know, now we sell those planes, it's very different. But in this case, I think it would be a great flex move, even as a negotiating tactic. Never mind whether President Trump actually gave the green light for Israeli pilots to fly our B2s.
- [28:35]
Haviv Rettig Gur
I want to take a bit of a step back and just sort of tackle this at the larger 30,000ft. We've had multiple events on the question of non proliferation over the last three or four decades. One was North Korea, where the lesson seems to be never give up infrastructure. Make any deal you want with the Americans, hold on to infrastructure. The other one seems to be Ukraine, arguably Ukraine. Ukraine has all these American security guarantees. It gave up nukes. It turned out that those were not actually useful. If it had nukes right now, arguably Ukraine would be safer. And when you go sort of step by step, I'm a little bit concerned that the world has slowly been teaching through these different events and through basically backing down and not having the will, has been teaching a lot of states like Iran that nuclearization is very useful. So going forward, for example, if Iran does have a nuke or enough of a nuclear, military, nuclear program to functionally be very close to having a nuke, you know, or it pulls the trigger and just builds a nuke, who is going to bomb it? Who is going to stop it? Trump maybe will because he's a little unpredictable, but that's what we're relying on. Nobody actually knows and I'm not sure Trump knows. So let's imagine they build a nuke and then the Saudis say, wait a second, I can't afford not to have a program. The Turks say, the Israelis have, the Iranians, I can't afford not to have. And suddenly the Middle east begins to go nuclear. And the international community's response taught the region and taught many other regions in the world that you actually need nukes to be safe and nukes to have your regime survive. And so there's a huge question here with Iran about the survival of the npt. And you hear that a little bit. The IAEA board of Governors is meeting and there's a resolution, as Rahal said, a resolution to talk about Iranian non compliance. But resolutions aren't going to get the job done. Is the MPT in danger? In other words, there's a larger question of there's Iran specifically, which is my bitter enemy, the one to destroy me. So I'm very, very concerned about it in my narrow sort of vision as an Israeli. What about the world question? If Iran goes nuclear, is there an npt?
- [30:54]
Mark Dubowitz
Well, I think that's right. I mean, I don't think there is in any meaningful way. And Iran doesn't even have to go nuclear to really put immense pressure on the npt. All we have to do again is concede to Iran enrichment. Because the Saudis have made it very clear, look, if there's a deal that concedes enrichment to Iran the way that the JCPOA did, we want enrichment too, right? We want anything that the Iran has. I mean, there's a gold standard. The gold standard has. For a number of years, we have negotiated with our allies, like the Emiratis, like the South Koreans, and we've said, we will help you financing, technical help build a civilian nuclear program. You must agree, for no enrichment or no plutonium reprocessing on your soil. And by the way, there are 23 countries in the world who have no enrichment, no reprocessing, and have civilian nuclear energy programs, including, as I said, the Emiratis who have agreed to a gold standard have spent about $20 billion on their civilian nuclear program, and that program now powers 25% of their electrical needs. The Iranians, by the way, have spent hundreds of billions of dollars, and they're only using their enriched uranium for 3% of their electrical needs. So, I mean, it goes to show you that if you really want electricity and you want civilian power, there is a economically efficient, commercially justifiable way to get there is do what the Emiratis and South Koreans did and 21 other countries. By the way, there are five countries that have enrichment and reprocessing but don't have nuclear weapons. They are Argentina, Brazil, the Netherlands, Germany and Japan. Any of them sound like the Islamic Republic of Iran? Any of them in egregious violation of their NPT obligations? Any of them in state sponsors of terrorism? Any of them have been engaged in, you know, aggressive activities across the Middle east or in their region? No. I mean, they're all reasonably peaceful countries and they're U.S. allies. So this whole notion that we are going to give the Iranians the Iran standard as the leading state sponsor of terrorism in violation of their obligations, but we're going to have the gold standard for responsible countries sounds ridiculous to the three of us, and it sounds ridiculous to the Saudis and others who are going to say, forget it, we want the Iran standard as well. And then you get the proliferation cascade that you have alluded to. And that is why it is very, very important that whatever deal is reached does not give Iran the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons on their soil. Because, yes, you can absolutely bet on it. The Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, potentially the Algerians, by the way, in the Indo Pacific, the most important region for the United States at that point, the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Taiwanese, the Taiwanese who, by the way, gave up their military nuclear program after the fall of the dictatorship there. They all fear China. They fear a Chinese nuclear program. They're all looking for their own element of deterrence. They too are going to demand enrichment or reprocessing on their soul. And now you're going to have a cascade of proliferation globally, not. Not just in your region.
- [33:58]
Rahel Shavit
Why should Iran and the question of Iran's nuclear capacity keep us up at night? Is it because nuclear weapons are scary and bad and dangerous? Or is it because Iran is scary and bad and dangerous?
- [34:11]
Haviv Rettig Gur
Israel has had a nuke since the 70s, allegedly, according to foreign sources, as we Israeli journalists keep having to say. Colin Powell alleges that Israel has had nukes since the 70s. Nobody decided they needed a nuclear program because Israel has had a nuke. Nobody thought Israel's nuclear program was aggressive. It was defensive. It was clearly defensive. None of our enemies, no matter what conspiracy was contained in their heads, ever assumed otherwise. Iran, everyone is now starting to say, wait a second, this is not a nuclear program. The world that I can be safe from without my own nuclear deterrence. Maybe the problem is the regime. Maybe the problem is the nature of Iran and therefore maybe that should be the focus. In other words, maybe because of all this infrastructure stuff we're talking about, it doesn't matter what a deal says or what deal we reach, or even if we bomb it, bombing it successfully is a 10 year break, but then it comes back. Maybe the problem fundamentally is the regime.
- [35:07]
Mark Dubowitz
There's no doubt the problem is the regime. And there's no doubt the problem is the Islamic Republic of Iran. It's why at fdd we spend half our time working on the Iran Nuclear Regional Proxy missile part, and then the other half of our time spent working on how do we figure out maximum support for the Iranian people. Millions of them have been on the streets since 2009 yelling, Death to the dictator. America, are you with us? Are you with a dictator? Every US President writes letters to Ayatollah Khamenei and says, hey, let's engage, let's negotiate. And has provided no support to these Iranians who literally have been on the streets from repeatedly, including as we speak, as we record this podcast. There are massive strikes in Iran as truckers have gone on strike and protest. So the nature of the regime is.
- [35:51]
Rahel Shavit
Give us some details about that. I mean, the Iranian people have demonstrated incredible bravery in protests since 2006. Huge, huge waves of protests, but none of that has toppled the regime. How could America, how could we, in Israel, how could we support the Iranian people in their efforts to reclaim their destiny?
- [36:12]
Mark Dubowitz
So the problem in America is that too many people think about regime change. They think about 500,000 mechanized troops invading Iran, like Iraq or Afghanistan. And Trump has certainly made it clear there'll be no more of those, quote, endless wars and no more. There's certainly no more appetite for regime change. But of course, that's not what we're talking about. And Raheli, that's not what you're talking about. I mean, what you're essentially talking about talking about is what Reagan did, right? Reagan ran a strategy in the 1980s against the Soviet Union, a much more formidable enemy than Iran that already had nuclear tipped ICBMs pointed at our cities. The Red Army, a massive army around the world. The economy had globalized faster than or industrialized faster than any economy in history. And Reagan came in and made it very clear, we win, they lose. And then he implemented a strategy of maximum, maximum pressure on the regime and maximum support for anti Soviet dissidents behind the Iron Curtain. And Bill Casey, his CIA director, flew around the world and figured out ways to support these anti Soviet dissidents, both rhetorically and materially. And it was a combination of the pressure from the outside and the pressure from the inside against this ideologically and economically bankrupt regime that ultimately led to a fall above Berlin Wall under Reagan's watch and the collapse of the Soviet Union a couple of years later. So the Reagan strategy is a strategy that we should be adopting for Iran. And the good news is, so what.
- [37:39]
Rahel Shavit
Does that look like? Is that sanctions? That's dissidents, that's spiriting people out, that's smuggling arms in. That's. I don't know what's startling communications.
- [37:50]
Haviv Rettig Gur
We have been told many times, we journalists, one of the reasons the Mossad has so easily penetrated the Iran Iranian regime and the Iranian nuclear program is that so many Iranians hate this regime. And a great deal of those Iranians are minorities. There's an Arab minority, is an enormous Azeri minority. Rebellions. What would it look like? What is maximum pressure campaign if you're the Iran czar of the Trump administration?
- [38:11]
Mark Dubowitz
So first of all, I wouldn't play around too much with that minority issue. I think first of all, there are millions of Persians who hate this regime. I think the regime is very good at saying, you don't like us. Well, coming after us is the collapse of the Iranian state into separate warring ethnic and tribal regions. And I think Iranians are nationalists and you want to actually Reinforce Persian and Iranian nationalism over Islamic fundamentalism. And I think, so you can operate in a covert way. But again, remembering that it's not just the minorities who hate this regime. It's 80% of Iranians, including the. The second thing is, and Rahel, you've alluded to this. I mean, I think number one is every time they protest, the regime shuts down the Internet, there's blackout. You can't communicate. If you can't communicate, you can't mobilize. If you can't mobilize, you can't launch labor strikes. You can't do the kinds of things that Iranians have done and want to do. Starlink terminals, other technology devices that Israel with its technology, innovative capability, could get into the country. So Iranians could communicate during a blackout. Labor strike funds, right? Get money into the country. These truckers are on strike right now. They don't have independent trade unions. They don't have. There's no histradut. There is no way you can have a strike fund where you're getting paid while you're on strike and you're risking your life and your livelihood. Why don't we create independent labor strike funds? Things were done like this during the Soviet Union. This is something that could be done. The question of arming them is a complicated one. And I know there's a lot of disagreement within the Iranian diaspora about the wisdom of that, but at the end of the day, that there may be some merits in thinking about whether you want to arm the Iranian opposition. But certainly with, you know, with Israel's cyber capabilities, I mean, you could. You could blind the security services. So when they. When they send the thugs out to go crack down on Iranians right through cyber, there are ways that you can actually blind the ability of this security services to surveil and target and crack down. There are a whole host of things. We've put out a detailed report on this. There are many, many ideas. And I have no doubt with the creativity of Mossad and CIA, we could come up with a lot of other ways to support the Iranian people. But even just rhetorically, I mean, what Reagan did was he used the bully pulpit and he spoke about Sakharov and he spoke about Sharansky, and he spoke. Spoke about Vaclav Havel, and he gave rhetorical support to Polish Solidarity and to dissidents across the Soviet Union. And they knew that he had their back. And that was very important because they were facing a brutal regime. Similarly, the Iranians are facing a brutal regime. But every time they go out there and as I said, yell, death to the dictator. President Obama, Biden, Trump, are you with us or the dictator? We find US Presidents, for whatever reason, deciding to not support them and engage with their oppressors.
- [41:15]
Haviv Rettig Gur
Can I just ask what you said about President Obama in 2009? I was once a spokesperson for Nathan Sharansky, and I remember the deep frustration that this dissident who faced down the KGB, went to the Gulag for nine years and, and the Iranian people were rising up and President Obama refused to side with them and help the regime through. Refusing to actually raise the voice of these Iranians and refusing to pressure the regime at that moment actually helped defeat, I think, the uprising. I don't know if the uprising would have been successful, but I know where the US President, President should have been and wasn't. Do you think if a 2009 kind of event happens now and we're seeing the truck drivers, we're seeing also an Iranian civil society, just civilian society, that is really crushed by this regime. They just went through a terrible winter without gas, even though it's one of the most oil rich countries or gas rich countries in the world. So there's a lot of hatred of the regime, a lot of sense. The regime has dragged them out into terrible wars that have spent all their resources and is mismanaging the country. However, if there is another 2009, do you think Trump would react differently?
- [42:30]
Mark Dubowitz
I worried that he wouldn't. I worry, I mean, he might, you know, everybody would be sort of 20, 22, 2023, woman, life, freedom. Everybody's on Twitter. Everybody's, you know, sending out best wishes to these poor Iranian women who are getting killed and jailed and raped by this regime. I just don't think. I worry we're not ready for it. We need to be ready for it. I think your folks are getting more ready for it. And I think that that's good. I think it's important. I think, listen, at the end of the day, I think Israel's got to lead the way on many things. I think if you're going to have a comprehensive Iran strategy, supporting the Iranian people needs to be a fundamental pillar of that strategy. I get really frustrated with people who say, well, what's the point of doing this? I mean, how do we know the regime will collapse and then what will come afterwards? And my answer to that always is Ali Khamenei is now spending 80% of his time and resources trying to kill you and us and 20% of his time and resources trying to defend his regime against his own people. At 80, 20, he wins. At 20 80, he goes down. But by the way, at 50, 50, that's actually pretty good if he's now spending additional resources and time having to deal with internal instability and therefore has less time and resources and focus to deal with killing Israelis and Americans. So if we can go from 80, 20 to 70, 30 to 50, 50 to. And maybe we get to 2080, and maybe the regime does come down. But isn't it better to weaken your enemy? Isn't it better to be on offense than to be on defense? And by the way, it's not just about the 80% of the people in Iran who hate the regime. What about targeting the 20% of the people in Iran who are the support base of the regime? I bet you that there are many fractures and fissures within the support base of the regime amongst the 20%, amongst the 1% of the elite. I mean, why are we not in any way trying to intensify those fractures and fissures? Because people say, well, that may not work. Well, guess what? The Iranians, the Chinese, the Russians, the Qataris are running massive influence operations in the United States, intensifying the fractures and fissures within an American, within American society. By the way, the Iranians and others are doing this within Israeli society. And so they're running these influence operations against us because they understand that if they can intensify those fractures and fissures and if they can divide us and turn us against each other, they weaken us. And when we're weak, that means we're not more susceptible to their offensive activities. So amazing that we do very little to defend against that. And then we do nothing to, like, flip the playbook and run it against them. So my approach would be, if I were the Iran czar, I would be running maximum pressure on the regime. I'd be providing maximum support to the Iranian people who hate the regime, and I'd be going after the support base of the regime. The regime is incredibly paranoid, both in terms of how it deals with the outside world, but it's incredibly paranoid about the inside world. It thinks that it's been penetrated by Mossad at every level. Wouldn't it be nice to actually.
- [45:36]
Haviv Rettig Gur
In its defense.
- [45:38]
Mark Dubowitz
Well, in its defense, it has been penetrated. But isn't that a good time now to reinforce the paranoia inside the system so that the people that support the regime, and again, there are true believers, hardcore revolutionaries, people will be with Khamenei until the bitter end? And then there are a Bunch of people there who are making a lot of money and they're, you know, they've got connections to the regime, they're living a nice life. But at the end of the day, as they see which way the wind is blowing, are those the kind of people that you can start to play with or flip against the regime? There's a generational divide, there's a regional divide, you've said there's an ethnic divide. There are many fissures and fractures. And it is, it is absolutely strategic malpractice that we have not gone after that in any kind of way the way Reagan did against a much more powerful enemy.
- [46:34]
Rahel Shavit
So what do you advise? And with this, we'll wrap up. You're right. In Israel, there's been double digit incidents since October 7th in which Israelis, Israeli Arabs, Jewish Israelis have been arrested by the Israeli authorities, authorities for spying for Iran. Iran is, is definitely active on Israeli soil to, you know, some, some greater or lesser capacity. It's also active in the Internet. In the, you know, in the Internet sphere. Right. We, we see Iranian accounts bots, you know, advancing, as you said, divisive and harmful narratives. Especially a, you know, in the post October 7th world, there's been a much greater spotlight on that. There's no question that they are active here in Israel. And my guess is they are very active in the United States as well. But if we focus for a moment on Israel, what would you advise us to do going forward? How do we become more proactive? Right. Rather than simply waiting around and following the reports of the American negotiations if a military strike is not on the table? And ultimately. Right. A military strike is a, it's a short term win. Right. We still have to deal with the basic problem of the Iranian regime, which is, you know, devoted treasure and blood to the goal of wiping us off the map. What would you advise us to do? How do we, how do we win hearts and minds? How do we stand with the Iranian people?
- [48:05]
Mark Dubowitz
So the Israeli Air Force needs to plan what the Israeli Air Force is doing. They've been planning for many years. It's, and it's a tremendous institution, incredible leadership. I have a lot of faith in Israeli Air Force and their planning and their processes and their foresight. Israeli special forces have to be planning, you know, from Shaldag to Sayed Makal to other special forces. I have no doubt that the Israeli special forces have been planning and we've seen some of those missions that they've run which have been tremendous. I have no doubt the Mossad is has been planning again. Mossad is an incredibly capable organization. Great at penetrating Iran, great at blowing things up, great at assassinating nuclear scientists and terrorists on Iranian soil. I think the fourth element that's missing, and I think that's where more needs to be done by Israel, is really on the kind of sort of influence side. Right. And that's what we were talking about earlier, is how do you not only defend against aggressive influence operations being run in the inside Israel, but how do you go on offense? How do you run offensive influence operations against Iran? How do you marry that with material, real support for the Iranian people, getting things in their hands that they need when they're on the streets? So you support the 80% that hates the regime so that the protests become more regular, become larger, and have a greater chance of success against the thugs of the regime. Regime. At the same time, you undermine, you weaken the support base, as I've said, you intensify these fractures and fissures inside the support base of the regime, and you flip the script. You get Khamenei to have to spend a higher percentage of his time and resources defending his own regime against his own people. And therefore less time, less resources, less focus on how to kill Americans and Israelis. I think if you've got those four pillars right, essentially Air Force, special Forces, Mossad, kinetic activities, and then maximum support for the people, as well as undermining the support base of the regime. I also want to sort of circle back to one of Rahal's questions. I mean, yes, the problem with the Islamic Republic is the regime, but the problem with this regime is not just that this regime with a nuclear weapon could proliferate nuclear technology throughout the Middle east and perhaps throughout the world. You mentioned Pakistan earlier. The original centrifuge designs that formed the basis of Iran's nuclear enrichment capability came from the Pakistanis. They came from A. Q. Khan, who helped develop the Pakistani nuclear bomb and then got into business in his private life and began to proliferate centrifuge and nuclear technology to the Iranians, the North Koreans and other and Libyans and other bad actors. So Iran is dangerous because it has nuclear weapons. It's dangerous because it can proliferate technology for nuclear weapons. And finally, Iran is dangerous because even if it never uses nuclear weapons or never proliferates it, God forbid, if there's another October 7th, Iran will do what Putin has done and he'll threaten to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into the battle space. And an American president will tell an Israeli prime minister to tell an IDF chief of Staff, stand down, don't retaliate, because we cannot risk nuclear retaliation and nuclear war in the Middle East. And that becomes the ultimate weapon in the hands of the Iranians to constrain the ability of the Israelis to respond to attacks from its proxies.
- [51:44]
Haviv Rettig Gur
Let me add one final point. The Israelis on October 7th learned that they face enemies who are undeterrable because in fact they are capable of having a fundamental foundational strategy that is deeply, deeply destructive to their own politics. Hamas is, they said it today. We're recording on Friday, June 6th. And Hamas leaders are today talking about how the dead in Gaza are a sacrifice laid on the altar of the great Islamic Ummah. This is an organization whose strategy involves civilian death in Gaza, which is such a shocking, striking thing. But when you look at that tunnel network, you look at the kind of war they have wrought, the kind of war they have fought. And it was the same fundamental strategy that Hezbollah, the Houthis were certainly unmoved by the suffering of the Yemenis and the Iranian regime, which believes it has this revolutionary redemptionist mission in the world and is willing to take down Iran with it, so to speak. It's willing to set vast costs to its own society, nevermind to enemies that it perceives in the world. So one thing I would just add to what you're saying is it wasn't just what Putin would do, which is threatening. They would, I believe, and I think most Israelis believe, and I'm certain Israeli leaders believe, deploy tactical nukes into the battlefield. Thank you so much. Mark, thank you for joining us. And Rachel, you know, welcome to YouTube. Enjoy the comment section and I really appreciate you being with us. Thank you everyone for joining us. This was depressing, but also our astonishing capabilities and the fact that, Mark, I take away that there's so much that we still can do, that there's so much available to us to do. We're extraordinarily strong facing an enemy that is a lot weaker than it looks. We just have to understand that and act and then I think we will be much safer going forward. So thank you for everything you do.
- [53:48]
Mark Dubowitz
Thank you guys for having me. And just remember Reagan victory strategy. No one thought that he was going to bring down the Soviet Union. It collapsed within seven years.
- [53:56]
Haviv Rettig Gur
I remember there was a book about the CIA that said that it believed that Castro would fall in a year and the Soviet Union would last for centuries. And so, yes, things don't necessarily. Thanks a lot.
- [54:10]
Mark Dubowitz
Thanks guys.
- [54:11]
Rahel Shavit
Thank you.