Ask Haviv Anything, Ep. 38: "What Will it Take to Defeat Hamas?"

Host: Haviv Rettig Gur
Guest: Prof. John Spencer
Date: August 27, 2025

Episode Overview

In this urgent, in-depth episode, Haviv Rettig Gur welcomes back Prof. John Spencer—a leading expert on urban warfare—to analyze the IDF’s evolving strategy in Gaza in light of a looming major operation in Gaza City. With the new “Gideon’s Chariots 2” operation underway, Gur and Spencer address questions at the core of Israeli and global anxiety: What constitutes victory against Hamas? What are the unique military, political, and humanitarian barriers to defeating them? How do previous counterinsurgency campaigns compare, and has Israeli leadership risen sufficiently to the challenge—both on the battlefield and in the information war?

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. IDF’s Shift From "Raiding" to "Clear, Hold, Build"

[05:00–11:40]

• Historically, the IDF conducted repeated raids into Gaza, targeting infrastructure (e.g., hospitals such as Al Shifa) but departing once narrowly-defined objectives were met, rarely “clearing” or “holding” territory.
• Prof. Spencer:

  “The IDF at its culture and at its core is a raiding military... Eventually, by really at the beginning of late last year, they started going into areas and holding them and clearing them more methodically.” [04:59]

• The recent "Gideon’s Chariot" campaigns aimed to move beyond this—toward a “clear, hold, build” approach influenced by U.S. and coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• However, Israel faces unique constraints: chiefly, it lacks a local partner (unlike U.S. forces working alongside Iraqi police or Peshmerga). The demographic and reservist nature of the IDF also makes prolonged “holding” impossible without massive social and political upheaval.

2. What Does “Clearing” Really Mean?

[44:00–46:30]

• Spencer emphasizes the difference between the tactical IDF “clearing” (no active enemy fighters) and a more robust definition (complete removal of enemy infrastructure, weapons, tunnels, and the ability to regenerate).
• He is skeptical of claims that 75% of Gaza is “under control”:

  “To say you clear an area for the IDF, that means that there’s no active military enemy forces fighting you. … You can’t control and clear something unless you’re there for a very long amount of time.” [44:00]

3. The Uniqueness—and Brutality—of Gaza’s Conflict

[31:20–33:20]

• Civilian entanglement is near-absolute: civilians cannot flee, and the urban tunnel environment—with as many as 60,000 reported tunnel entrances—creates unprecedented complexity.
• Gur:

  “There isn’t a war zone in the world or possibly ever in the history of war zones where civilians were unable to flee.” [31:20]

• Hamas “weaponizes” suffering, banking on international pressure as much as direct military resistance.

4. The (Non-)Possibility of External Local Partners

[12:47–17:15]

• Unlike in Mosul (with Iraqi and Kurdish partners), there is no feasible, coherent non-Hamas alternative to “take over” Gaza post-clearing.
• External Arab players (e.g., Saudi Arabia) are unlikely to commit peacekeepers under realistic threat of Hamas attack.
• Both discuss the dangers and impracticality of mass civilian displacement—internally (in Israel) or externally (into Egypt/the Sinai), citing legal, logistical, social, and security problems.

5. The Myth and Math of Humanitarian Zones

[22:13–35:53]

• Both hosts explore and dismiss proposals for "humanitarian bubbles," whether in Israel or Egypt, as unworkable—politically, militarily, and practically.
• Egypt’s steadfast refusal to accept refugees, despite hypocritically facilitating the departure of wealthy Gazans, strikes Spencer as a double-standard the world ignores.
• Spencer:

  “It’s so ahistorical … there’s never been a history where a military who is trying to overthrow a government, a force to remove us, takes its population into its own territory and then houses it…” [25:42]

6. Sanctuary and the Timing of Operations

[38:14–48:06]

• The concept of “sanctuary” (i.e., Hamas-held urban zones where it can regroup) is stressed as the ultimate obstacle to a lasting defeat.
• Both agree: the current commitment of five divisions to Gaza City is historic, but Israel’s social model (reliance on reservists, family strains) makes maintaining that level of presence unlikely.
• Gur:

  “Denying sanctuary is the key to the old strategy and to the new strategy and to every strategy. Then it should have been done much sooner…. This could actually be the beginning of the end.” [42:44]

• Spencer:

  “You can't control and clear something unless you're there for a very long amount of time...” [44:00]

7. Hostages and the War’s Human Dilemma

[52:06–57:50]

• Hostage negotiations critically shape public opinion and strategy. Hamas’ survival depends on keeping this “card;” Israel’s national psyche pays a terrible price.
• A deep, painful split persists in Israeli society over whether to risk soldiers' lives or hostages'.
• Gur:

  “We need to teach our enemies that our hostages are their strategic Achilles’ heel. They cannot survive this.... It doesn’t end until then, because we can’t have another strategic [failure].” [54:12]

• Spencer avoids black-and-white answers, stressing calculated risks:

  “I don’t think it’s binary…. But you’re reaching a point where...the cost will be great. But does the cost outweigh… Because there will be loss of IDF life as well…” [54:45]

8. Information War—Israel’s Neglected Battlefield

[57:51–68:30]

• Gur launches an impassioned critique of Israel’s information failures: lack of coordinated messaging, weak English-language outreach, and the elevation of extremist voices by default.
• Both agree it is “foundational” for Israel to get this right—comparable in importance to cyber-warfare, and a core component of Hamas’s strategy.
• Spencer:

  “You need a hierarchy of almost an army to fight in the information operations domain…. The information space is Hamas’s foundational strategy.” [65:32]

• Both lament Israel’s cultural tendency to reform only after catastrophic failure.
• Gur:

  “For some reason, Israeli culture is … you drive off the cliff, you’re falling, you’re still bickering, …and then an inch before you smack on the ground, look at your bloodied body and say, ‘we should fix this.’” [68:30]

9. Are Victory and Defeating Hamas Still Possible?

[70:11–71:35]

• Spencer expresses optimism for Israel’s survival, resilience, and strategic achievements post-Oct 7, but caveats that societal willingness to “pay the price” will ultimately determine if Hamas is decisively defeated.
• Spencer:

  “The Israeli society decides whether they continue and will are willing to pay the price. ... Am I optimistic for Israel? 100%.... But in the actual final things that need to be done, the taking of the sanctuaries from Hamas, the getting a day after plan...I have apprehensions because it’s not—It’s very complex at that point.” [70:11]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Gideon’s Chariot was briefed to be different as in the hold portion. Right. So this clear, hold, build...” (Spencer, 05:00)
• “There isn’t a war zone in the world ... where civilians were unable to flee.” (Gur, 31:20)
• “To say you clear an area for the IDF, that means that there’s no active military enemy forces fighting you… You can’t control and clear something unless you’re there for a very long amount of time.” (Spencer, 44:00)
• “The goal in war is never to the death of every enemy fighter. The goal is to convince the enemy to do your will.” (Spencer, 48:10)
• “You need a hierarchy of almost an army to fight in the information operations domain.” (Spencer, 65:32)
• “For some reason, Israeli culture is … you drive off the cliff, you’re falling, ... then an inch before you smack on the ground, look at your bloodied body and say, ‘we should fix this.’” (Gur, 68:30)
• “Am I optimistic for Israel? 100%.... In the actual final things that need to be done...I have apprehensions because it’s ... very complex.” (Spencer, 70:11)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• IDF’s evolving strategy – [05:00–11:40]
• Comparisons to Iraq & counterinsurgency math – [06:49–12:47]
• Unique challenges of Gaza: tunnels & civilian entanglement – [31:20–33:20]
• Sanctuary denial and timing of the offensive – [38:14–48:06]
• Hostages, societal divisions, and moral dilemmas – [52:06–57:51]
• Information warfare failures – [57:51–68:30]
• Future of the conflict and prospects for victory – [70:11–71:35]

Tone and Takeaways

This episode is candid, analytical, and driven by a deep sense of urgency but also humility before the complexity of war. Both host and guest combine blunt realism with cautious optimism regarding Israel’s ability to “see it through,” but underscore that ultimate victory—militarily and morally—will depend on hard, possibly unprecedented choices by Israeli society, its government, and its allies.

The information war—neglected at serious strategic cost—is flagged as a crisis unto itself, and both agree change might only follow disastrous failure.

Best For: Listeners who want a sober breakdown of the military, humanitarian, and informational dimensions of Israel’s campaign against Hamas, along with comparative lessons from other counterinsurgency campaigns and a nuanced look at what “victory” might require—and cost.