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Hi, friends. This is a episode of Ask Khabiv Anything, a podcast that focuses on history. It is Saturday night in Israel, and I have gotten a great many questions by podcast subscribers to comment on the astonishing scenes that we saw in Gaza and Dir al Balakh in central Gaza earlier today. Three horribly emaciated Israeli hostages brought out onto a stage surrounded by Hamas gunmen. Scenes that have just set Israeli debates on fire. I mean, just the Israeli media, the Israeli public, everybody you know, everybody you're talking to in Israeli society in the Hebrew language, talked about nothing else. And it was a profound moment. It was a moment that I think is going to be remembered as a pivot. And I wanted to. Very quickly, we have a regularly scheduled podcast episode coming out on history, on events of 135 years ago that are deeply relevant to what's happening today, but not actually about what's happening today. So I wanted to just step in and answer some of those requests to talk about what's happening, what happened on Saturday. I think that what we saw will tell us a great deal about what's going on in Gaza right now and also a great deal about what's about to happen in Gaza going forward in the next weeks, months, and even years. And I want to lay that out for you. What we learned, we learned on Saturday because Hamas built that stage and because of the condition of the Israelis and because of how Hamas handled that event. We learned a few things and we learned a few things about Hamas's messages to a few different audiences that I want to lay out for you. And I think there's an important and profound conclusion to be drawn. First of all, that there's purposeful starvation of hostages. We learned that there's some reports of Hamas officials saying that it's a response to mistreatment of Palestinian detainees or prisoners in Israeli prisons. It's not a response to any of those things. They have been starved for 16 months. It wasn't something that began, you know, a month ago because of some news report. There's purposeful starvation of hostages as part of Hamas's handling of those hostages. Folks, this is a really important point because there are, as I said, multiple audiences. There are at least four audiences that Hamas was speaking to on Saturday with that event. One of them was Israelis, for example. It had a huge banner across the stage that read absolute victory. It was mocking Benjamin Netanyahu, who started talking a few months ago about absolute victory. It was a political posturing. He was trying to hold the far right in his coalition together. He was promising Israelis, he would lead to a great victory. It came after many months in which he wouldn't speak to the Israeli press at all, not even Israeli press that supported him for weeks and months at a time. It was him trying to stabilize his political position and it was him locking himself for those political reasons into essentially a commitment, into a strategy of continuing the war. I have criticized him a few times that he didn't pursue absolute victory enough. But when you declare something like absolute victory, you make yourself mockable, you open yourself up to being mocked. This is a classic guerrilla war in which the kind of warfare we're talking about is long and slow degradation war. It's not clear at the beginning who wins. And, you know, over the course of the fighting, there's compromises, there's ceasefires. And so it's the kind of war where there will be moments where the enemy will be able to mock you for saying something like absolute victory. So there was this sign. It was, you know, seized upon by Netanyahu's opponents. It is something that, you know, it suggests certain things that I myself have criticized Netanyahu for, but it's not really important. It doesn't prove that Netanyahu has lost or that Israel has lost or that Hamas will win. It doesn't prove any of those things. It just shows that Hamas did have Israelis in mind when it built this arena, when it built this sort of stage, when it built this theatrical moment. So I want to lay out the non Israeli audiences what Hamas was trying to say, and then get back to that point that Hamas was talking to Israelis. Hamas had essentially three audiences. The first audience that it had was the international community, chiefly Donald Trump, but not only. And when it comes to Donald Trump and when it comes to the international community writ large, the Muslim world, the Europeans, Hamas's message was very simple. Everyone is starting now to talk about the day after, about whether or not there's going to be mass exodus from Gaza, as Donald Trump has suggested, whether or not there's going to be some kind of Saudi client state, as others have suggested or some Israelis have hoped for. And Hamas's message to all those people, because we're very much into that day after the Israeli war, aims essentially aren't kinetic anymore. And now it's a question of what else we can do to get at Hamas. Hamas's message is we are the day after. One of the ways you saw that was the simple fact that they chose a part of Dir El Balakh in central Gaza that was not destroyed, a part that was probably avoided by the Israelis, not destroyed by the Israelis in either with demolitions or with airstrikes, because there's an intelligence that there were Israeli hostages there. But Hamas made a point in previous events built out like this. It did them in areas that are rubble, that are ruined and demolished. And here it wanted to show that there is a lot of Gaza that's still standing and the Hamas are in charge of that part of Gaza that's still standing. And therefore also the Gaza is rebuildable. So don't start having any fantasies about moving all the Gazans out, taking over as America and rebuilding it. It was a message to the international community that Gaza is going to be rebuilt and Hamas is going to be in charge of that rebuilding. There's a second audience, and that second audience is the Gazans themselves, folks. One of the very few institutions that have reopened in Gaza as the ceasefire took effect, I think it was the first institution that reopened as the ceasefire took effect were the courts. A few hours before the ceasefire, Hamas was already putting out public notices that the police would come back into the streets as soon as the ceasefire is actually in place. The law enforcement system, not justice system, it's Hamas appointed courts, but the law enforcement system of Hamas. Hamas's law was put in place immediately, as quickly as possible. And Hamas produced videos that they posted online of themselves chasing down their enemies in the streets and gunning them down in broad daylight. And folks, we've heard a lot of anti Hamas voices in Gaza over the last 16 months. Gaza is 2 million people. There's a huge diversity of opinion. I know that that's not always visible from the outside, not if you're on one side and not if you're on the other. But there is in fact diverse opinions among the Gazan population. But all those voices have gone silent since the ceasefire took effect. Hamas wants to show that they're still in charge, that they're still dangerous, that they can still kill or silence all of their opposition. The third audience after the international community and Gazans themselves as Hamas tries to reassert control, are the patrons of Hamas, especially in the Muslim world, mostly Qatar. Hamas has actually lost most of its allies, most of its backing. It lost Iran, it lost Hezbollah. As actionable elements who can now step in and fight for it. It basically lost the Houthis of Yemen. They still sometimes pretend to be fighting, but they've taken tremendous costs for their support for Gaza. They've shot these rockets at is the Israeli responses after 120 or so rockets and missiles, ballistic Missiles and drones. The Israeli response was the destruction of their major oil exporting facility at Hodeida and essentially taking robbing them of their main source of foreign currency income. There's another natural gas port at a place called Ras Issa in Yemen, but the Israelis can bomb that very easily too. And so the Houthis, instead of being a great ally of Gaza, have become a cautionary tale for what happens when you face Israel and make Israel feel it has no downside in destroying your economy to end your attacks. So Hamas really has very few allies willing to fight for it. But on Saturday we saw that it still has patrons willing to go to bat for it in non military ways. Al Jazeera had exclusivity in the entirety of the event, produced the event. Essentially, an Al Jazeera reporter was in the Hamas vehicle, interviewing alone in the Hamas vehicle, the only reporter there interviewing the three hostages as Hamas brought them to the Red Cross to the site of the hostage release. Al Jazeera got an exclusive, a different part of Al Jazeera from the Hamas commander. In the scene, an Al Jazeera reporter, a guy named Tariq Abu Azoom, talked about in the English language, Al Jazeera. Again, another section of Al Jazeera talked about how the hostages appeared well dressed and looked in good condition. Everyone else on earth watching the same footage saw starvation. He saw good condition. Al Jazeera had that exclusivity, that deep integration with Hamas's operation. Al Jazeera is the Qatari regime. It's owned and operated and gets its marching orders from that regime. And that integration into Hamas's PR strategy. I mean, Al Jazeera basically is Hamas's PR strategy. That was on full display and that was also a message. Hamas still has allies, it still has backup. And that brings us to the fourth audience. All these different groups that Hamas was speaking to and using and saying we're in charge. The fourth audience, the final audience, is the Israelis. And here's the thing. I listened to a lot of Israelis, I read a lot of Israelis, I watched a lot of Israelis, I talked to a lot of Israelis in the hours since those ceremonies. They believe Hamas, they believe that Hamas are still in charge. They believe the Hamas can still impose their will in Gaza, can still kill dissidents, retain control of the governing of Gaza, and are still able to coordinate with their ideological allies, for example, Qatar. And that means they believe the Hamas are still dangerous to Israel and still need to be destroyed. And that simple fact that the Israelis watched the events on Saturday, watched The Israelis come out having been intentionally and willfully starved by Hamas fighters who were not starved. That fact is a disaster for Gaza and I'm going to explain why it was a disaster for Gaza. It means that Gaza under Hamas cannot be rebuilt. Everything Hamas tried to explain by showing a beautiful and built up part of Diran Balakh as the backdrop of this ceremony is a lie because of the message sent to the Israelis. Folks, before October 7th, Gaza was not an open air concentration camp in a humanitarian catastrophe. And all of the rest of the verbiage that Palestinian, Palestinian supporters or, or international press was, was pushing out its GDP per capita, look this up. Was higher than Morocco's, higher than Lebanon's, higher than Egypt's. Gaza was a place of tremendous potential that was under an Israeli, Egyptian blockade, that was under the rule of hamas, who for 17 years had bent Gaza's entire economy to the building of those tunnels. A tunnel project that absorbed all of the concrete in Gaza, that absorbed all of Gaza's economy, that created the funding of that tunnel project meant a taxation of the Gazan population that sparked rioting in 2017 and 2018 by small shopkeepers. Gaza's entire economy was bent to that tunnel project. It is the single biggest thing Palestinians have ever built. And despite that and the blockade, Gaza was a livable and beautiful place. And that's the point. Hamas is now weakened profoundly. It was already weakened at the beginning of the war. I mean, it has taken massive blow in its fighting forces, in its ability to run the place, in its ability to operate strategically. It desperately needed this deal. How do I know it desperately needed this ceasefire deal. It allowed the Israelis to remain on the Philadelphia corridor, the Egypt Gaza corridor, throughout phase one. Phase one of the deal is the first 33 hostages released. It's the part of the deal that'll last 42 days, the first 42 days. And the Israelis will get those hostages out and pay nothing. There's very little that the Israelis actually are giving Hamas. They're not getting a resupply of weapons through the Philadelphia corridor. They're not getting any kind of rebuilding of Gaza, any kind of real planning for the rebuilding of Gaza. And so a weakened Hamas, weakened enough to agree to this deal, that's taking every possible step it can to show that it's still in charge, did everything it possibly could on Saturday to bait the Israelis, to tell the Israelis we're still in control, we're still dangerous. There were signs saying the flood continues and there's going to be more attacks like October 7th and these signs were on Israeli TV. All Israelis saw them. And this is the same Hamas that created this war. And I don't mean it sparked a war because of October 7th that then turned into this devastating war for Gaza. I mean, it carefully planned this specific kind of devastating war. The purpose of those tunnels, tactically, the tactical purpose of those tunnels is to force the enemy to cut through cities to get to you. The war Hamas started, and based on what they think of Israelis, they could only have expected it to have been much worse, was a war in which the only option the Israelis had to fight Hamas, if they decided they had no choice left but to do so, was to cut through cities. That's a simple fact of military strategy. It doesn't matter how you judge it morally, it remains true as a military strategic fact. You could say, therefore they shouldn't have, or therefore it was. Okay, that's the moral debate. But the simple strategic fact is Hamas planned this specific kind of war to look like this. And now that they're weakened and they've taken a ceasefire and they're trying to show that they're in control, they're baiting the Israelis, folks. Hamas's investment of Gaza's entire economy in those tunnels. Here's a funny statistic for you. Between the 2014 war and the 2018 war, something like 5.3 million cubic meters of concrete, enough to build 16 Burj Khalifas. That's that unbelievable skyscraper, the tallest building in the world, 160 stories, were sent into Gaza. But there are no skyscrapers in Gaza. Hamas built almost nothing above ground. The concrete went underground. Hamas built Gaza into a battlefield for this destructive war and now is doing nothing but trying to show that it's still in charge while baiting the Israelis for a more war. And that's the tragedy of Gaza. A deal, this hostage deal is Hamas's least bad path forward at the moment because its allies are weak, because Gaza is in ruins, because its cause is in decline in terms of international attention. The way it released these hostages triggered in the Israelis a deep and visceral reminder of what's at stake for them. For 16 months, folks, I can't emphasize this enough. The world raged that Gazans were starving, that Gazans had no water, no electricity, that Gazans were living in ruins and rubble, that every single death was a child. Somehow, 80% of the parents who died were men, but all the dead are somehow women and children. Hamas, of course, never distinguished its own fighters from the population. This whole numbers game created tremendous rage around the world. At Israelis. But on Saturday, Israelis saw happy and healthy Gazans holding up Samsung phones in order to celebrate emaciated, horrifically treated Israeli hostages. Which images are Israelis going to believe going forward? Israel doesn't need to reinvade Gaza after the deal. Let's imagine the deal that goes all the way through the war ends. Israel doesn't have to reinvade, doesn't need a hundred thousand men to walk into Gaza again. It doesn't need to destroy or demolish. A return to war can be small. It can be the envelope, as they say in military terms. Commandos, air forces, intelligence. It could be mostly from the air. And that small limited war targeting Hamas, much like the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah, even now, is enough to prevent Gaza's reconstruction for years and years and years. Gaza can't be rebuilt and can't be rehabilitated as long as the low intensity kind of low burn war is sustained by Israel against Hamas because Hamas is still there and still threatening it. What Israeli political faction, after seeing Saturday's images, will come rushing to Gaza's defense in that kind of a long term scenario, what Israeli political faction will believe claims have made about suffering Gazans or genocide or any other words anybody throws into the air? This was a stark contradiction to everything that Israelis have heard the world screaming and Hamas engineered it. Folks, our enemies believe that we are strong because we have infantry divisions and weapons systems and clever technologies. That's not what makes Israel strong. We are strong because we plan and we build and invest. Hamas does none of those things. We are strong because our people are free, especially our women. If you compare it with the societies of our enemies around us, politically and economically, they say that we're only strong because we have America's backing. Well why the heck is America strong? How did America ever become powerful and rich? Our enemies follow an ideological vision that believes that geopolitical strength, military strength and wealth will fall down from heaven like mana. If only they're pious enough and show their piety through sacrifice and a willingness to see everything around them destroyed, then God will bring them these gifts. Our enemies can never explain why it doesn't happen. They just assume their faith wasn't strong enough, their piety wasn't strong enough, their self destruction wasn't strong enough. Friends, Hamas talks a lot about the long game. Our opponents in Gaza and Iran and many other parts of the near Muslim world. They talk about how their infinite patience is rooted in unbreakable faith. We Israelis are too modern to have faith. They say the long game doesn't belong To Hamas, the long game belongs to Israel. Gaza's current state means that Israel doesn't actually have to do much to keep the war going indefinitely. And that means that Israel doesn't have to do much to keep Gaza's reconstruction delayed until its demands are met. Hamas's public relations stunts will keep Hamas in power and Gaza shattered. Saturday was a disaster for Gaza, a catastrophe even by the scale of the disastrous times that Gaza is living through. And that's true even if most people living in Gaza right now don't yet understand it. What Israelis saw will stay with them. Hamas is going to make sure of it. And that's why Gaza has no future with Hamas. That's true. Whether you like the Israelis or don't, those are my sad thoughts. On a day in which we have the relief of seeing our people come out, there's still many more that we need to get out. There's still a long road ahead before our hostages, all our people are home and before Gaza can figure out its own path out of this nightmare. And the most important and powerful political force in Gaza, in Gazan society, on the ground itself, insists on keeping it there. Thank you for listening, and I'll see you in the next episode.