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The philosophers of the Frankfurt School practiced a technique called negative dialectics, where concepts are defined as much by what you can't say about them as what you can. Appropriately, the Frankfurt School has ended up defined by what you can't say about them. You can't say that they invented a new form of left-wing thought called Cultural Marxism. This would be (according to Wikipedia) the Cultural Marxism conspiracy theory, a "far right anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that misinterprets Western Marxism, especially the Frankfurt School, as being responsible for modern progressive movements, identity politics, and political correctness". You're not supposed to dub them a transitional stage between Communism and postmodernism. You're not allowed to speculate that a lot of the academic humanities, as they're practiced today, descend from the Frankfurt School's brand of critical theory. You're not supposed to think of them as the point where the muscular pro-technology leftism of the early 1900s shattered into the pessimistic degrowth leftism of the present. Art is long, life is short. Most of us only manage to not do a few things in our limited span on Earth. But the Frankfurt School managed to not invent so many movements - to not be involved in so many of the crucial ideological shifts of the past century - that they caught my attention. Who were these people? What other aspects of our culture might we be unable to say they were involved in? For answers, I turned to the classic history of the group, Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination. The basics are simple enough: the School was founded in Frankfurt in 1923. It attracted great philosophers like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. When the Nazis took power in the early 1930s, the mostly-Jewish Frankfurters fled to America, where friendly locals helped them continue their work in affiliation with Columbia University. Mid-century Americans were suckers for sophisticated European intellectuals, and when the rise of fascism and World War II started dominating headlines, the German-Jewish Frankfurters were natural experts to help Americans process the situation. By the end of the war, they were firmly established as thought leaders. Some - including Horkheimer and Adorno - returned to Germany to rebuild its intellectual culture from the ruins; others stayed in America and remained relevant through the 60s and 70s. But figuring out what the Frankfurters believed is more complicated. Forget about the thin line between universally-acknowledged fact and fascist conspiracy theory. The School itself was famously coy, worrying that if they explained themselves too clearly, people would caricature their beliefs and integrate them into the existing capitalist system. Even when they did speak "clearly", it was in the sort of German philosophical register where "the negation of the negation" is a totally normal thing to say. Having only read a single book on them, I will no doubt fall into all the failure modes that they and their successors warned us against. But here are the analogies, intuition pumps, and parables that I found helpful. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-dialectical-imagination
I'm not saying AI is superintelligent or can decide better than you can. I'm saying that if you - like me - spend an hour or so doing research before voting on local seats, AI can aid that research very effectively. And if you don't do that research - because you weren't willing to waste an hour on it before - AI makes it so much faster that you might want to start. I gave Claude a prompt something like (edited for coherence): I'll be voting in the June 2026 California primary. I'm a centrist liberal abundance YIMBY whose favorite political writers are Kelsey Piper, Matt Yglesias, and Ezra Klein. I'm wary of government overreach, but I'm not a doctrinaire libertarian and want to help people when we can figure ways to do it that work. I'm going to ask you about each race on my ballot, and I'd like for you to list the various candidates' bios, policies, endorsements, your read on the most important differences between them, and your advice for me as I try to make my choice. …and got back answers like the following: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/use-ai-this-election
One popular objection to AI concerns is to declare that LLMs can never be AGI. You need a "new paradigm". Therefore, AGI is so far in the future that it's not worth worrying about. A common counterargument is to claim that no, LLMs can become AGI. But even without that counterargument, I think the "therefore" fails on its own terms. The key question is: how much of a new paradigm do we need? The landmark discoveries on the road to modern LLMs are something like: 1950s: Neural networks 1967: Multi-layer perceptron 2010: Modern deep learning 2017: Transformer, LLM 2022: RLHF, chatbots 2024: Chain of thought / test-time compute We can think of this as an "evolutionary tree", where a given LLM (let's say Claude Opus 4.7) shares a recent "common ancestor" with all other chatbots, and only a very distant "common ancestor" with everything else descended from the multi-layer perceptron. If AGI needs a "new paradigm", what common ancestor can we expect AGI and LLMs to share? AGI will very likely use neural networks, because the human brain is a neural network and qualifies as an AGI. It will probably use deep learning, because although deep learning isn't exactly analogous to the brain, it seems like a pretty reasonable way to emulate the brain's learning algorithms onto computer hardware. Skeptics like Yann LeCun and Gary Marcus usually pinpoint LLMs/transformers as the step where we went wrong. LeCun thinks that the first AGIs may be within the deep learning paradigm (but not LLMs); Marcus thinks that they'll combine insights from deep learning with something else. How soon should we expect a new paradigm as revolutionary as LLMs/transformers? Since we got LLMs/transformers nine years ago, Lindy's Law suggests nine more years. How soon should we expect a new paradigm as revolutionary as deep learning? By the same logic, sixteen years from now. Lindy's Law has a heavy tail, which means we can't simply halve these to find our 25th percentile estimate. Our 25th percentile estimate for the next advance as exciting as LLMs should be three years from now; for deep learning, it's five years. So even if you think AGI will require a further paradigm shift as big as the invention of the LLM or as deep learning itself, you should have 25% chance it will be developed in the next 3 - 5 years. Which is about as long as the LLM-only crowd think things will take! This isn't an excuse for relegating the risk of AGI to some vague indefinite future. It could still be the late 2020s or early 2030s! (Might we expect that low-hanging-fruit effects make the next paradigm harder to find than the last one? In practice, fields get more researchers as time goes on, and that effect usually causes time-between-advances to be approximately constant. And in fact, the number of AI researchers has grown at an unprecedented pace for a scientific field, and growth will enter an even faster regime once AIs themselves can contribute. Overall these make me think things will go even faster than Lindy's Law predicts - but I think Lindy's Law is a useful upper bound.) (Would there still be a long time between the invention of the new paradigm and the point where it could be used to maximum effect? It took five years between the invention of the transformer and ChatGPT, the first commercially-successful transformer-based project. But most of that time was spent scaling up, and we've already scaled up. If we invent a new paradigm in 2030, then any frontier lab willing to bet on it can quickly provide it with levels of compute sufficient to train human-brain-sized models.) This is my attempt to talk to the new-paradigm-wanters in their own language, but I think there's also a subtler point that undermines this worldview. In the past, new paradigms have proven useful in allowing scaling to continue after an old paradigm passed the regime where it could efficiently convert scale to results. LLMs still seem to be able to convert scale to results; while this continues, new paradigms won't be necessary, and frontier labs won't risk pursuing them. If scaling ever hits a wall, there will be a few months of confusion as frontier labs look over various new-paradigm-proposals that they already have lying around, and throw them at the wall to see what breaks through. Then scaling will continue from wherever it left off. The best way to forecast future AI progress is to extrapolate from current LLM scaling. This should work if LLMs scale all the way to AGI. But it may also work even if they don't. First, because we might get the new paradigm so soon that it won't be a significant source of delay. And second, because the most likely place for a new paradigm to start is wherever LLMs stop working, going at the same rate. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/new-paradigms-wont-save-you
Sorry, I give up. In past elections, I've covered every single candidate for governor of California, from the incumbents all the way down to the cranks. In 2022 there were twenty-six of them, and I covered them all. But sorry, I give up. This year there are sixty. It's too many. I can't disambiguate them all into unique individuals with their own personalities, hopes, and dreams. So as consolation for the list I'm not giving you, here are the basic types, and a few examples of each. The Top-Tier Democrats One of these people will definitely win, but what else is there to say about them? They're all the same. They've all paid the danegeld to some set of unions and interest groups, then put up some kind of incredibly generic platform about how they're compassionate but also a fighter. I can't bring myself to name any of them or discuss them further. The Top-Tier Republicans More or less the same as the top-tier Democrats, minus the chance of winning. They all have cowboy hats and flag pins. They all pose on horseback at their ranch. They all promise to Take Back California for the forces of America and its god, Donald J. Trump. None of these people are actually interesting, but honorable mention to Sheriff Chad Bianco, whose name is Italian for "white Chad". He might be the perfect Republican candidate: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-types-of-candidate-you-find-in
"All exponentials eventually become sigmoids" is an annoying AI talking point. If someone presents a graph like this… ….and points out that it seems like AI capabilities could soon reach the level marked "High", then the height of intelligent debate is to point out that actually, the trend could go like this: …and then it would never reach the level marked "High"! In slogan form, this is "all exponentials eventually become sigmoids" (a sigmoid is the s-shape of the second graph, which starts exponential but gradually flattens out). It's technically true. No process can keep growing forever; eventually it hits physical or practical limits. For example, total cases during an epidemic is classically sigmoid:
In conclusion, the only good theory of taste is Nostalgebraist's. He wrote a post called Hydrogen Jukeboxes, analyzing the literary output of an AI called R1. This AI tried hard to write good fiction, which was part of the problem. It crammed its stories with what Nostalgebraist called (stealing a term from Ginsberg) the "eyeball kick" - a flashy stylistic move that immediately catches the reader's attention and "wows" them. Here are examples - some from R1, others from an experimental OpenAI model trained specifically for fiction-writing: "There is a prompt like a spell: write a story about AI and grief, and the rest of this is scaffolding—protagonists cut from whole cloth, emotions dyed and draped over sentences." "When the jar of Sam's laughter shattered, Eli found the sound pooled on the floorboards like liquid amber, thick and slow. It had been their best summer, that laughter—ripe with fireflies and porch wine—now seeping into the cracks, fermenting." "And so I built a Mila and a Kai and a field of marigolds that never existed. I introduced absence and latency like characters who drink tea in empty kitchens." "The morning her shadow began unspooling from her feet, Clara found it coiled beneath the kitchen table like a serpent made of smoke." Nostalgebraist and another writer, Coagulopath, catalogue some of the most common AI eyeball kicks, each occurring across multiple LLM models: "An overwhelming reliance on cliche. Everything is a shadow, an echo, a whisper, a void, a heartbeat, a pulse, a river, a flower—you see it spinning its Rolodex of 20-30 generic images and selecting one at random." "Conjunctions combining one thing that is abstract and/or incorporeal with another thing that is concrete and/or sensory." "Repetitive writing. Once you've seen about ten R1 samples you can recognize its style on sight. The way it italicises the last word of a sentence. Its endless "not thing x, but thing y" parallelisms…the way how, if you don't like a story, it's almost pointless reprompting it: you just get the same stuff again, smeared around your plate a bit." https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/nostalgebraists-hydrogen-jukeboxes
(a continuation of yesterday's post) Reddit Vexillology Vexillology is the c. elegans of aesthetics - the simplest model organism that lets us observe dynamics of interest. I haven't read enough MFA books to do more than relay the thoughts of my betters, and you probably haven't either. But anyone can have opinions on flags. If you're like me, you learned the following code of good flags: They should be so simple that a child could draw them. No images, no "busy" areas, and - for God's sake - no text The rule of tincture: "never put metal on metal, or color on color". In medieval heraldry, "metals" were yellow and white (sometimes implemented with literal gold and silver) and "colors" were every other color (except black, which is a "fur" and has its own rules). A good flag shouldn't have a metal touch another metal, or a color touch another color. So the French tricolor (blue then white then red) is okay, but a hypothetical (blue then red then white) tricolor wouldn't be okay, because blue would be touching red, which would be "color on color". Every so often, a US state will decide that its flag is politically incorrect and sponsor a contest to design a new one. Then online vexillologists will go over the entries, savaging any that violate the code. "Look how busy this one is! It has four different colors!" "Oh god, this one literally included text! Can you believe it!" They'll moan and scowl and ask why everyone can't be more like Indonesia. Good old Indonesia, they know how to follow the rules: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/three-model-organisms-for-taste
Last year I wrote a piece on artistic taste, which got many good responses from (eg) Ozy, Frank Lantz, and Sympathetic Opposition. I tastelessly forgot to respond to them until now, but I appreciate how they forced me to refine my thinking. In particular, they helped me realize that "taste" and "good art" are hard to talk about, because the discussions conflate many different things: 1: Sensory Delight. Ode To Joy makes the listener feel joyful. Michelangelo's David fills the viewer with awe at the human figure. The great cathedrals are impressive buildings, in a way that hits you like a punch to the gut. These judgments are preconscious, widespread, and don't necessarily require artistic sophistication. 2: Novelty and Innovation: Someone gets credit for doing art in a way that has never been done before. The early Impressionists invented a new way of looking at the world and explored all of its little corners. A modern Impressionist painter may be able to match their technical skill, but not their novelty; therefore, the modern would be a mere curiosity while the originals were great artists. For a modern person to be a great artist, they would have to explore entirely new media - hence the surprising and transgressive nature of modern art. 3: Paying Attention / Pattern Language: Tasteful people, viewing art over the generations and paying deep attention to it, have developed a sense of balance, composition, contrast, and what should and shouldn't be done. We can debate how predetermined the exact grammar of this language was a priori, but for better or worse people are sensitized to it and will judge works with it in mind. A good work of art should either conform to this language, or defy it deliberately and thoughtfully (that is, in a way that transcends it rather than ignores it). Along with these three big ones, here are smaller ones that might or might not be combinations or subvarieties of these: 4: Context And Discussion: Some great art raises questions, and subsequent great art proposes answers, or variations on the questions, or further elucidates the subject. The great artists of any given time are in conversation with their peers and the great artists of all past ages; new art can be judged on whether it shows awareness of, and contributes to, this conversation. Other forms of context are more personal - is a book about human evil more aesthetic if its author survived the Holocaust? 5: Literal Ability To Understand A Work: You can't fully appreciate Animal Farm unless you know the history of Soviet communism and recognize the book as an allegory for that history. If someone who knew nothing about this liked it as a cute story about talking animals, their appreciation would be different from (inferior to?) that of more knowledgeable people. 6: Changing Fashions: In 1940, Beaux-Arts and Frank Lloyd Wright were the heights of American architecture. By 1950, nobody who was anybody was doing Beaux-Arts or Prairie; it was all International Style. One could very charitably attribute this to the novelty-seeking drive above; but it's implausible that Prairie style architecture was novel and beloved in 1940, a few houses completely exhausted its potential, but the explosion of International Style buildings didn't restore the balance such that the low-hanging-fruit level level was lower in Prairie style again. More likely this was just a fashion effect where Prairie style was cool in 1940, then uncool in 1950. 7: Political And Ideological Point-Making: Great art may convey some truth about the world. This could be a purely aesthetic truth. But in the case of Uncle Tom's Cabin, the truth was "slavery is bad". Other truths are conveyed symbolically (for example, cathedrals being shaped like crosses) or through design choices (for example, the austerity of Bauhaus architecture making it more suitable for socialist housing). 8: Ability To Profoundly Affect Or Transform You: Maybe this one is emergent from some combination of sensory delight, novelty and point-making. But some people say they come away from art transformed, in a way which is neither just sensory delight nor just political ideology. Philosophers have argued for millennia about exactly what way this is, but hopefully we've all had this experience and can accept an extensional definition. These people enumerated these things to defend taste. I will instead take the bold stand that conflating many different things is bad: it frees people from thinking too hard about any particular one of them, or the ways they interact. Here are my arguments for deliberately ignoring about half of these. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/contra-everyone-on-taste
Constraint consequentialists believe that you should try to do good things that improve the world, unless those break hard-and-fast rules ("deontological bars"). For example, you shouldn't assassinate democratically-elected leaders, even very bad ones. Why not? Since bad leaders set bad policy, and bad policy can kill many thousands of people, wouldn't it be for the greater good? Because there's always one gun-owner who thinks any given leader's policies are bad, so without the rule, every leader would face constant assassination attempts, probably some of them would succeed, and the nation would either crumble or degenerate into a security state. This explanation combines two sub-explanations. In the first, you are wrong about whether assassinating the leader would produce good consequences - you think it would, but actually it would produce instability, tyranny, etc. In the second, you're right - maybe you're a brilliant forecaster who can see that this particular assassination would end with an orderly succession by a superior ruler. But you know that there are far more people who think they are such brilliant forecasters than who actually are, and you either use the Outside View to suspect that you are also deceiving yourself, or at least realize that the only stable bright-line equilibrium is for everyone - true brilliant forecasters and wannabes alike - to refuse to act upon their apparent foreknowledge. "Don't kill people" is a gimme. What other deontological bars constrain our actions? https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/what-deontological-bars
As a blogger, I hear about lots of projects to "solve debate", or "disagree better", or "map arguments". Often these are ACX grant applications. I always turn them down. They're well-intentioned, sophisticated, and doomed. I appreciate that Internet arguments usually don't go well, that there are lots of ways to improve them, and that this is a worthy cause. But I've also seen a dozen projects of this sort fail. Here's why I think yours will too: "Debate" almost never corresponds to mappable arguments. The simplest "solve debate" proposal is the argument map. Some technology helps people decompose arguments into premises and conclusions, then lets skeptics point out where the premises are wrong, or where the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. But almost no real argument works that way. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-attempt-to-solve-debate-will