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Welcome to Atomic hobo. To get ad free listening plus bonus episodes, visit patreon.com Atomichobo. In a recent series on Harold Macmillan, I marveled at the weird time warp effect produced by Super Mac, as they called him. It always seems strange to me that Macmillan, a Victorian gentleman, could have been Prime Minister during the Cuban Missile Crisis. How could a Victorian be dealing with the threat of nuclear war? It has always felt odd, incongruous to me, even though simple arithmetic shows us that loads of Victorians live to see nuclear weapons in Britain. As long as you were born before 22 January 1901, then you had existed in the Victorian era. And so a baby born January 1901 would only have been in his mid-40s when the first nukes were exploded. So there would have been loads of Victorians running about then he couldn't move for them. Nonetheless, it has always seemed strange to me. Well, I get the same feeling about the subject of today's episode, which is civil defense in North Carolina. I've never been to America, so have no direct experience of that state. But the image I have of it certainly doesn't sit neatly alongside the idea of nuclear war. Some states go with nuclear war. We might think readily of the nuclear threat if we imagine Kansas and Missouri because of the day after. Or if we think of Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota. Those states, for example, host nuclear missile silos. Alaska has its early warning radar, so there are plenty of states whose name alone might summon a nuclear shudder. But surely not North Carolina. It's on the coast and it's in the South. So therefore, according to this foreigners lazy perception, it's sun kissed and relaxed and has palm trees and everyone must speak in a lovely southern drawl and sip mint juleps on their porch. So how could the people of North Carolina, who are nicknamed Tar Heels, I learned, be bothered by the nuclear threat? It has no place there, just as it had no place bothering the Victorians. Well, today's episode looks at the state's civil defence preparations in the early 1960s, and we'll see that most people weren't particularly bothered, despite the hard work of their local civil defense office. Despite Kennedy addressing the nation on the Berlin crisis, and despite Cuba and its missiles being unnervingly close to this southern coastal state. Okay, so we are all obsessed with civil defense. We find it horrifying and fascinating, but it would seem that the majority of people just want to turn away from the threat and go on with life. That was the case in North Carolina in the early 60s, despite nuclear tensions reaching two worrying peaks then with the Berlin crisis of 1961, and then of course, Cuba the following year. But in my reading and in the newspaper archives, I saw very little evidence of panic or distress amongst Tar Heels. A power cut in Goldsboro during the Cuba crisis did cause a bit of a stir, as some people assumed that it would be knocked out by nuclear missiles. And a slight increase in traffic accidents was put down to nuclear jitters. But there was no statewide panic buying or everyone rushing out to build a fallout shelter. People stayed relatively calm. And this was despite Berlin and despite Cuba, and despite the local civil defense guys actually getting quite frustrated people's indifference. So let's see what happened. The 1960s, of course, began with a new American president. GfK was elected in November 1960. His inauguration followed in January 61. And one of the first big problems on his desk was Berlin. Khrushchev had been grumbling about Berlin since 1958, but things had got worse by 61 because the eastern part of the city was losing so many people, often its highly educated and trained citizens who were departing for the West. This was hideously embarrassing, of course, for the Communists, because if Communism is so great, why is everyone clamouring to leave? So Khrushchev's solution was to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. Of course, East Germany and the Soviet Union were pals, so there was no need for peace to be declared between them. Instead, Khrushchev was thinking that a treaty would legitimize East Germany as a separate state. Because look here, here it is out signing treaties. So it's not simply a, a sad half of Germany hanging about waiting to be reunited with the western half. It would suit the Soviets very nicely for East Germany to be recognized as a state on its own. And that was because of course, the Soviet Union did not want a reunited Germany. As for understandable reasons, they feared a strong, united Germany. And so when the two leaders met at the Vienna summit in July 61, Khrushchev told Kennedy that the Soviets intended to sign a treaty with East Germany and that such a treaty would invalidate all the post war agreements on Western access to West Berlin. If the Americans didn't like that, then they were free to sign a treaty too. You can agree all over again with East Germany. East Germany would be fine, totally cool with signing a treaty with you as well. But the Americans would not countenance that because they believed in eventual German reunification. And that would be undermined if they went around signing treaties with East Germany. So in Vienna, Kennedy said, we are in Berlin not because of someone's sufferance. We fought our way there. If we were expelled from that area and if we accepted the loss of our rights, no one would have any confidence in US commitments and pledges. So there was no way that Kennedy, that America, that NATO, would allow themselves to be frozen out and ejected from West Berlin. So the two men partied at Vienna with things in a very grim state. Khrushchev was still insisting they're going to go ahead with their treaty, meaning the west will be cut off from West Berlin. And Kennedy was insisting they would never allow that to happen. Khrushchev said, it is up to the US to decide whether there will be war or peace. And Kennedy replied, Then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war. It will be a cold winter. These quotes come from the book John F. Kennedy, An Unfinished Life by Robert Dallek. And the author says that the Berlin crisis required very careful handling from Kennedy because he needed to find a balance, he needed to be tough. Of course, he couldn't allow the Western powers to be driven out of West Berlin, but at the same time, he. He could surely recognize that the situation in East Berlin, where the regime was losing thousands of its best and brightest people, couldn't continue. The Communists needed a way to stop that exodus because it was a constant humiliation to them. And of course, Kennedy could recognise that Khrushchev's original idea to stop the haemorrhage had been by bringing in better living standards. Yeah, but how was that working out? Especially when everyone in East Berlin could see with their own eyes, often just a few streets away, Western freedom, Western wealth, and all they had to do to access it was take a little walk. So that was the situation after Vienna, things were looking very grim. And when Kennedy got back home, the position in Washington was, we've got to beef up the nuclear deterrent. At this time of crisis, the Soviets must be in no doubt that America is willing to go to war, yes, even nuclear war, to defend West Berlin and by extension, to defend the west itself, because if we can show we're serious, then they might back down. And the whole idea of being serious did matter because there were. There were fears that Khrushchev did not take the new, young JFK seriously. And JFK felt that after the Vienna summits, which had been their first meeting as chairman and President, JFK said privately that Khrushchev had beaten the hell out of him and treated him like a little boy. And he found he was getting similar insults at Home. Richard Nixon, whom Kennedy had of course recently defeated in the presidential election, said, never in American history has a man talked so big and acted so little. Now, we are wading too far into the Berlin crisis here and haven't heard a peep about North Carolina. So let's skip to JFK's address to the nation on 25 July 1961, where he outlined what he would do about the Berlin crisis. In his excellent speech, he made it clear that America, with her allies, would defend West Berlin.
