Behind the Bastards

Episode Title: Part Four: The Men Who Might Have Killed Us All
Date: December 10, 2025
Host: Robert Evans
Guest: Margaret Killjoy

Episode Overview

This episode continues Behind the Bastards’ deep dive into the architects of our apocalyptic nuclear arsenal, focusing on the transition from bomber-based to missile-based deterrence in the 1950s. Robert Evans reveals how close humanity came (and continues to come) to annihilation—not through calculated brinksmanship, but through terrifyingly routine accidents, bureaucratic oversight, and hubristic techno-militarism. The episode details near-calamities, institutional madness, and how close we repeatedly came to surrendering the fate of the world to chance or incompetence.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Eisenhower Doctrine & The Myth of Nuclear Control

The U.S. response to Soviet threats shifted in the 1950s under President Eisenhower, from "massive retaliation" rhetoric to a more nuanced, but still incredibly dangerous, stance.
Eisenhower's administration allowed certain field commanders the authority to use nuclear weapons without explicit presidential approval, though the public was led to believe only the President could authorize such use.
- (05:41) Robert: “It was never really true during this period of time... that only the President could order a nuclear strike.”
The idea of “massive retaliation” was more a psychological strategy than a practical plan; actual use of nukes was far less likely, as even Eisenhower was deeply reluctant.

2. Horrifying Regularity of "Lost" Nukes

With the boom in nuclear stockpiles in the mid-to-late 50s, the U.S. had nuclear weapons everywhere: at airbases, on bombers, on training flights.
Bombers routinely flew exercises with live nuclear weapons onboard—leading to frequent accidents and bomb losses, many of which were covered up.
- (10:24) Robert: “It happened constantly. This happens so much more often than you would have guessed.”
Notable incidents:
- July 1957: B47 bomber with nuke crashes in Texas; no official documentation of lost nuke. (12:13)
- 1957: C124 cargo plane jettisons two atom bombs off New Jersey coast to avoid crash, neither recovered. (13:20)
- February 1958: Bomber drops live nuke(s) near Savannah, Georgia after mid-air collision to avoid disaster on landing—never recovered. (24:05)

3. Project Reflex & Operation Fail Safe: Living on a Hair Trigger

“Reflex” missions meant bombers were kept on rotating alert, with nukes armed and ready to take off in minutes.
- By 1957, 11% of SAC's fleet was always on ground alert, nukes ready to go; some bombers were always airborne. (15:35)
The innovation of failsafe (thanks to RAND’s Albert Wohlstetter) reversed the default order: bombers should return unless they received the code to attack. This might literally have saved humanity.
- (18:41) Robert: “You could argue this guy may have saved all of humanity in doing so.”

4. Nuclear Security and Institutional Madness

For years, U.S. security for deployed nuclear bombs was disturbingly lax. Sometimes, the only security was a lonely, young private with a rifle.
- 1959, Los Alamos scientist Harold Agnew finds four nukes at a NATO base guarded by “one very young US Army private armed with an M1 rifle with eight rounds of ammunition” and surrounded by foreign troops.
  - (28:57) Margaret: “I like those odds.”
The solution to this was, belatedly, to develop coded locks and the "nuclear football"—but only after years of vulnerability.

5. The Rise of the ICBM and Its Horrible Consequences

Introduction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) increased the potential for rapid, irreversible, accidental apocalypse.
- Early ICBMs were stored above ground and required fueling before launch; this changed with the Minuteman missile’s solid-fuel design—capable of firing within a minute.
There is no failsafe for ICBMs; once launched, they cannot be recalled.
- (32:40) Robert: “There was and is no fail safe for ICBMs. The idea that we can cancel them is just disinformation.”

6. A System Built for Armageddon by Default

Each underground ICBM control team (just two people) could launch 10 missiles by both turning keys. No locks or electronic safeguards in early systems.
- The Air Force solution to a rogue missileer: the two men are separated by bulletproof glass, each armed with a gun.
  - (36:09) Margaret: “So they’re just ready to go. Insane.”
System design prioritized launch over any prevention of unauthorized, accidental, or insane launches.
- (41:55) Robert quoting Rubell: “Equally important considerations such as flexibility of command and control of these weapons, provisions to prevent unauthorized or accidental launch... [were] treated little or not at all.”

7. The Specter of Automation: Launch-on-Warning

The logic of “launch-on-warn” dictated that if the Soviets appeared to be attacking, the U.S. had to fire back before being destroyed—leaving almost no room for human intervention or error correction.
- Rubell, a Pentagon civilian, realized the system was “dangerously unstable,” citing an example from WWI to illustrate how mutual suspicion can escalate to catastrophic, automatic violence.
  - (47:18) Robert quoting Rubell’s WWI canal mining metaphor, summing up the danger of our nuclear posture.

8. Targeting, Accidents, and Inevitable Near-Misses

Pre-assigned missile targets meant some countries would be nuked "by default," no matter what; e.g., both USSR and China would be automatically targeted.
- (50:03) Robert: “Like, there’s a very high chance with this that we wind up nuking a country that has not fired at us because we’re just launching all of our shit, and some of it’s targeted towards them.”

Memorable Quotes (with Timestamps)

On the madness of cold war nuclear posture:
- Robert: "The evolving nature of nuclear warfare meant that units across the globe are now, by the mid to late 50s, armed with nukes meant for defensive purposes... This becomes an obsession for the military as a whole." — (05:41)
On the perils of routine nuclear flights:
- Robert: “From this point on, thousands of nuclear weapons are flying across the US and the world every year. There are always nukes flying around at all times. Tons of them. That’s so scary. It’s fucking insane.” — (09:04)
On fail-safe design:
- Robert: "The default is, in all instances, return home without bombing unless you’re given the code. And that’s a meaningful distinction... Tech proof. It doesn’t matter if your comms are out. Right." — (18:41)
On security (or lack thereof):
- Robert: “What this meant was… custody of the Mark 7s was under the watchful eye of one very young US army private armed with an M1 rifle with eight rounds of ammunition.” — (28:57)
- Margaret: “I like those odds.” — (28:59)
On missile control protocols:
- Robert: “Both guys in the silo have guns, and they’re separated by bulletproof glass... This way, one guy can't threaten to shoot the other guy if he doesn’t launch a missile. Right, like, that’s literally the plan…” — (36:09)
On accidental escalation:
- Robert quoting Rubell: "Instability arises most dangerously in the contemporary world when vast arsenals of horrendously destructive weapons end up ready to go in minutes... If one side does go for any reason, or even for none, the other is set to respond and must respond." — (45:42)
- Margaret: “It just seems so obvious to me, you know?” — (44:55)
On the targeting protocol:
- Robert: “There’s a very high chance with this that we wind up nuking a country that has not fired at us because we’re just launching all of our shit, and some of it's targeted towards them.” — (50:03)

Notable/Memorable Moments

Absurdist banter about "life vests" (suicide vests):
Margaret and Robert joke darkly about rebranding suicide vests as "life vests"—echoing the madness of nuclear deterrence logic.
- Margaret: "They're called life vests now." — (04:31)
The missing Savannah bomb(s):
Robert details the story of a live nuke dropped accidentally near Savannah, Georgia, never recovered.
- “It may have been two bombs. It's a little unclear to me. These are never found. This bomb is never found.” — (24:05)
- Margaret: “I'm gonna write terrible fiction about a crew of people who go and find these things.” — (24:05)
On the callousness of nuclear management:
Robert: “The only thing stopping it from happening, if indeed it was stopped from happening, is that no one was ever crazy enough to try.” — (27:37)
A dry summary of military logic:
Robert: "Make it illegal to put any safety measures in. Fuck it." — (29:27)

Key Segment Timestamps

03:10-07:49: Eisenhower, nuclear posture, and the “massive retaliation” doctrine
09:00-15:35: Reflex missions, lost nukes, operation failsafe, always-on nuclear alert
24:05-27:13: The Savannah bomb(s) story, Air Force obfuscation, and government secrecy
29:00-36:31: Nuclear security, coded locks, and the advent of the ICBM
41:09-48:43: The Minuteman system, automation, and John H. Rubell’s reckoning
48:37-52:09: Rubell’s “dangerously unstable” system, the WWI metaphor, and targeting nightmares

Tone & Style

The conversation retains the podcast’s trademark blend of gallows humor, irreverence, and clear-eyed horror at bureaucratic stupidity and military hubris. Robert and Margaret often oscillate between black comedy and earnest, incredulous dread—an effective tone for the absurd, terrifying realities discussed.

For New Listeners

This episode is essential for understanding not just the technological and bureaucratic accidents that defined the Cold War, but also the enduring insanity built into nuclear protocols. Robert and Margaret provide both a clear chronology and the necessary context to grasp why, even after decades, the doomsday clock has never felt far from midnight. If you want to understand the true “bastards behind the button,” there’s hardly a better primer.

For more, visit Cool Zone Media or find Behind the Bastards on your favorite podcast app.

Behind the Bastards

Episode Title: Part Four: The Men Who Might Have Killed Us All
Date: December 10, 2025
Host: Robert Evans
Guest: Margaret Killjoy

Episode Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Eisenhower Doctrine & The Myth of Nuclear Control

The U.S. response to Soviet threats shifted in the 1950s under President Eisenhower, from "massive retaliation" rhetoric to a more nuanced, but still incredibly dangerous, stance.
Eisenhower's administration allowed certain field commanders the authority to use nuclear weapons without explicit presidential approval, though the public was led to believe only the President could authorize such use.
- (05:41) Robert: “It was never really true during this period of time... that only the President could order a nuclear strike.”
The idea of “massive retaliation” was more a psychological strategy than a practical plan; actual use of nukes was far less likely, as even Eisenhower was deeply reluctant.

2. Horrifying Regularity of "Lost" Nukes

With the boom in nuclear stockpiles in the mid-to-late 50s, the U.S. had nuclear weapons everywhere: at airbases, on bombers, on training flights.
Bombers routinely flew exercises with live nuclear weapons onboard—leading to frequent accidents and bomb losses, many of which were covered up.
- (10:24) Robert: “It happened constantly. This happens so much more often than you would have guessed.”
Notable incidents:
- July 1957: B47 bomber with nuke crashes in Texas; no official documentation of lost nuke. (12:13)
- 1957: C124 cargo plane jettisons two atom bombs off New Jersey coast to avoid crash, neither recovered. (13:20)
- February 1958: Bomber drops live nuke(s) near Savannah, Georgia after mid-air collision to avoid disaster on landing—never recovered. (24:05)

3. Project Reflex & Operation Fail Safe: Living on a Hair Trigger

“Reflex” missions meant bombers were kept on rotating alert, with nukes armed and ready to take off in minutes.
- By 1957, 11% of SAC's fleet was always on ground alert, nukes ready to go; some bombers were always airborne. (15:35)
The innovation of failsafe (thanks to RAND’s Albert Wohlstetter) reversed the default order: bombers should return unless they received the code to attack. This might literally have saved humanity.
- (18:41) Robert: “You could argue this guy may have saved all of humanity in doing so.”

4. Nuclear Security and Institutional Madness

For years, U.S. security for deployed nuclear bombs was disturbingly lax. Sometimes, the only security was a lonely, young private with a rifle.
- 1959, Los Alamos scientist Harold Agnew finds four nukes at a NATO base guarded by “one very young US Army private armed with an M1 rifle with eight rounds of ammunition” and surrounded by foreign troops.
  - (28:57) Margaret: “I like those odds.”
The solution to this was, belatedly, to develop coded locks and the "nuclear football"—but only after years of vulnerability.

5. The Rise of the ICBM and Its Horrible Consequences

Introduction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) increased the potential for rapid, irreversible, accidental apocalypse.
- Early ICBMs were stored above ground and required fueling before launch; this changed with the Minuteman missile’s solid-fuel design—capable of firing within a minute.
There is no failsafe for ICBMs; once launched, they cannot be recalled.
- (32:40) Robert: “There was and is no fail safe for ICBMs. The idea that we can cancel them is just disinformation.”

6. A System Built for Armageddon by Default

Each underground ICBM control team (just two people) could launch 10 missiles by both turning keys. No locks or electronic safeguards in early systems.
- The Air Force solution to a rogue missileer: the two men are separated by bulletproof glass, each armed with a gun.
  - (36:09) Margaret: “So they’re just ready to go. Insane.”
System design prioritized launch over any prevention of unauthorized, accidental, or insane launches.
- (41:55) Robert quoting Rubell: “Equally important considerations such as flexibility of command and control of these weapons, provisions to prevent unauthorized or accidental launch... [were] treated little or not at all.”

7. The Specter of Automation: Launch-on-Warning

The logic of “launch-on-warn” dictated that if the Soviets appeared to be attacking, the U.S. had to fire back before being destroyed—leaving almost no room for human intervention or error correction.
- Rubell, a Pentagon civilian, realized the system was “dangerously unstable,” citing an example from WWI to illustrate how mutual suspicion can escalate to catastrophic, automatic violence.
  - (47:18) Robert quoting Rubell’s WWI canal mining metaphor, summing up the danger of our nuclear posture.

8. Targeting, Accidents, and Inevitable Near-Misses

Pre-assigned missile targets meant some countries would be nuked "by default," no matter what; e.g., both USSR and China would be automatically targeted.
- (50:03) Robert: “Like, there’s a very high chance with this that we wind up nuking a country that has not fired at us because we’re just launching all of our shit, and some of it’s targeted towards them.”

Memorable Quotes (with Timestamps)

On the madness of cold war nuclear posture:
- Robert: "The evolving nature of nuclear warfare meant that units across the globe are now, by the mid to late 50s, armed with nukes meant for defensive purposes... This becomes an obsession for the military as a whole." — (05:41)
On the perils of routine nuclear flights:
- Robert: “From this point on, thousands of nuclear weapons are flying across the US and the world every year. There are always nukes flying around at all times. Tons of them. That’s so scary. It’s fucking insane.” — (09:04)
On fail-safe design:
- Robert: "The default is, in all instances, return home without bombing unless you’re given the code. And that’s a meaningful distinction... Tech proof. It doesn’t matter if your comms are out. Right." — (18:41)
On security (or lack thereof):
- Robert: “What this meant was… custody of the Mark 7s was under the watchful eye of one very young US army private armed with an M1 rifle with eight rounds of ammunition.” — (28:57)
- Margaret: “I like those odds.” — (28:59)
On missile control protocols:
- Robert: “Both guys in the silo have guns, and they’re separated by bulletproof glass... This way, one guy can't threaten to shoot the other guy if he doesn’t launch a missile. Right, like, that’s literally the plan…” — (36:09)
On accidental escalation:
- Robert quoting Rubell: "Instability arises most dangerously in the contemporary world when vast arsenals of horrendously destructive weapons end up ready to go in minutes... If one side does go for any reason, or even for none, the other is set to respond and must respond." — (45:42)
- Margaret: “It just seems so obvious to me, you know?” — (44:55)
On the targeting protocol:
- Robert: “There’s a very high chance with this that we wind up nuking a country that has not fired at us because we’re just launching all of our shit, and some of it's targeted towards them.” — (50:03)

Notable/Memorable Moments

Absurdist banter about "life vests" (suicide vests):
Margaret and Robert joke darkly about rebranding suicide vests as "life vests"—echoing the madness of nuclear deterrence logic.
- Margaret: "They're called life vests now." — (04:31)
The missing Savannah bomb(s):
Robert details the story of a live nuke dropped accidentally near Savannah, Georgia, never recovered.
- “It may have been two bombs. It's a little unclear to me. These are never found. This bomb is never found.” — (24:05)
- Margaret: “I'm gonna write terrible fiction about a crew of people who go and find these things.” — (24:05)
On the callousness of nuclear management:
Robert: “The only thing stopping it from happening, if indeed it was stopped from happening, is that no one was ever crazy enough to try.” — (27:37)
A dry summary of military logic:
Robert: "Make it illegal to put any safety measures in. Fuck it." — (29:27)

Key Segment Timestamps

03:10-07:49: Eisenhower, nuclear posture, and the “massive retaliation” doctrine
09:00-15:35: Reflex missions, lost nukes, operation failsafe, always-on nuclear alert
24:05-27:13: The Savannah bomb(s) story, Air Force obfuscation, and government secrecy
29:00-36:31: Nuclear security, coded locks, and the advent of the ICBM
41:09-48:43: The Minuteman system, automation, and John H. Rubell’s reckoning
48:37-52:09: Rubell’s “dangerously unstable” system, the WWI metaphor, and targeting nightmares

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Part Four: The Men Who Might Have Killed Us All

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Summary

Behind the Bastards

Episode Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Eisenhower Doctrine & The Myth of Nuclear Control

2. Horrifying Regularity of "Lost" Nukes

3. Project Reflex & Operation Fail Safe: Living on a Hair Trigger

4. Nuclear Security and Institutional Madness

5. The Rise of the ICBM and Its Horrible Consequences

6. A System Built for Armageddon by Default

7. The Specter of Automation: Launch-on-Warning

8. Targeting, Accidents, and Inevitable Near-Misses

Memorable Quotes (with Timestamps)

Notable/Memorable Moments

Key Segment Timestamps

Tone & Style

For New Listeners

For more, visit Cool Zone Media or find Behind the Bastards on your favorite podcast app.

Summary

Behind the Bastards

Episode Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Eisenhower Doctrine & The Myth of Nuclear Control

2. Horrifying Regularity of "Lost" Nukes

3. Project Reflex & Operation Fail Safe: Living on a Hair Trigger

4. Nuclear Security and Institutional Madness

5. The Rise of the ICBM and Its Horrible Consequences

6. A System Built for Armageddon by Default

7. The Specter of Automation: Launch-on-Warning

8. Targeting, Accidents, and Inevitable Near-Misses

Memorable Quotes (with Timestamps)

Notable/Memorable Moments

Key Segment Timestamps

Tone & Style

For New Listeners

For more, visit Cool Zone Media or find Behind the Bastards on your favorite podcast app.