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Part One: The Men Who Might Have Killed Us All

Behind the Bastards

Tue Dec 02 2025

Summary

Behind the Bastards — Part One: The Men Who Might Have Killed Us All

Podcast: Behind the Bastards
Host: Robert Evans (A), with guest Margaret Killjoy (B)
Date: December 2, 2025
Duration covered: Approx. 00:04:00–01:24:35 (excluding ads, intros, outros)

Episode Overview

This episode kicks off a multi-part exploration into the often-overlooked architects of the nuclear doomsday machine—a system that perpetually hovers over humanity with the threat of annihilation. Rather than focusing on notorious war criminals or infamous leaders, host Robert Evans and guest Margaret Killjoy examine the scientists, generals, and theorists on the U.S. side who built the nuclear arsenal and the war doctrines underpinning Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Through dark humor, historical deep-dives, and reflections on the moral ambiguity of these men’s choices, the episode lays out the complex, sometimes sympathetic, but deeply troubling legacy of those who “might have killed us all.”

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why Is this Topic Important? (04:06–07:40)

At any given moment, the world is only “30 minutes away from the entire planet being wiped out” by nuclear weapons.
The Cold War doctrine and hardware remain, and the nuclear threat has not lessened since the Cold War; if anything, it’s become more precarious.
- “Absolutely nothing has been done to make this system safer since the end of the Cold War. In fact, it’s significantly more dangerous.” — Robert (08:37)
Many who built these systems were not villains by traditional standards—their personal body counts are minimal, but collectively they engineered a system that could functionally end humanity if triggered.

2. The Paradox of ‘Schrödinger’s Bastards’ (07:40–10:15; 18:42–18:52)

Unlike “typical” bastards, many nuclear architects may actually have saved lives (by deterrence) or doomed us all (by proximity to apocalypse)—and we won’t know which until/unless the worst happens.
- “These people are heroes or bastards, and we will never know. And in half the timelines, they’re one and then the other.” — Margaret (18:46)

3. The Real World Inspiration for the Atomic Bomb (10:16–14:39)

H.G. Wells was among the first to fictionalize an atomic bomb with devastating precision in his 1914 novel The World Set Free, which later influenced key figures like physicist Leo Szilard.
Szilard, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, becomes a principal architect of the Manhattan Project after real-world fears of a Nazi atomic bomb race.
- “You can’t blame Szilard, right? ...His attitude is: ‘We need to have this, because Hitler might have it.’” — Robert (13:01)
The Manhattan Project drew many people who saw the bomb as the ‘lesser evil’ compared to fascism.

4. The Messiness of Motives and Espionage (16:30–18:03, 18:47–18:52)

Discussions include stories (some apocryphal) of physicist slowdowns in Nazi Germany—possibly intentional sabotage by scientists to delay the bomb.
Soviet spies within the Manhattan Project justified their actions similarly: giving the USSR bomb secrets would prevent the U.S. from gaining overwhelming destructive power.

5. From Armies to Doomsday: How ‘Safety’ Systems Backfire (20:11–25:25; 33:39–44:12)

The arms race is likened to the “doomsday device” that triggered World War I, where military buildup and interlocking alliances, meant to prevent war, instead mechanized its outbreak.
- “World War I is itself the result of a doomsday device going off..." — Robert (22:32)
In moments of crisis, decision time is short, and the loudest advocates for ‘use’ are typically military men obsessed with preparation for worst-case scenarios.

6. The Deep Roots of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ — Strategic Bombing Theory (38:22–52:40)

Giulio Douhet, Italian general, essentially ‘invents’ strategic bombing theory: the belief that air power alone can destroy civilian morale and win wars.
- Douhet’s thesis: “If you destroy what a man has ...it becomes impossible for him to defend himself.” (70:52)
Douhet advocated mass bombing of civilian populations as a war-winning tactic—a theory embraced by interwar and WWII planners on all sides despite being technically wrong and morally horrifying.
- “He is the guy writing in a book: ‘The systematic destruction of civilian populations through strategic bombing.’ ...That’s upon his soul.” — Robert (47:26)

7. Strategic Bombing in World War II: Ideal vs. Reality (52:43–77:48)

WWII military leaders, particularly “Bomber Harris” of the UK’s RAF, attempt to enact theories of mass city destruction.
- However, over and over, results don’t match predictions: bombed cities (e.g., London, Hamburg) don’t capitulate, civilian morale hardens, and industrial capacity persists.
- “No plane or tank failed to be built for lack of ball bearings.” — (Quoted from Albert Speer, 75:01)
U.S. “precision bombing” was a fantasy: at best, a 22% hit rate for B-17 bombers within 100 yards of target.
- “You can drop a bomb from 25,000 feet and hit a target the size of a pickle barrel, [they claimed]...In combat...within a football field only 22% of the time.” — Robert (71:24)

8. The Air War’s Lessons for Nuclear Doctrine (59:45–66:50, 78:51–81:46)

The technical failure of bomber-centric war plans is masked by eventual Allied victory, but the assumed lesson—bombing (and especially now nuclear bombing) can force surrender—is carried forward.
Firestorms (unleashed at Hamburg and later on Japan) and nuclear chain reactions are theorized as “bonus damage,” amplifying the devastation and making the “doomsday machine” concept even more catastrophic.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

On quantum immortality and historical luck:
- “It might just be pure raw luck that we didn’t annihilate ourselves.” — Margaret (05:36)
On the unstable nature of peace:
- “If this happens, like, 15 minutes after you finish listening to this podcast, you’ll know who to be angry at in your last couple seconds of consciousness.” — Robert (18:52)
On the fundamental flaw in deterrence thinking:
- “History is written by the victors. And there’s no victors [in nuclear war].” — Margaret (07:46)
- “There’s gonna be no victors of a nuclear war. Simply no history written.” — Robert (07:48)
On the ‘armed society’ analogy:
- “An armed society is not a polite society …it’s just not.” — Margaret (23:30)
On strategic bombing’s cruel calculus:
- “The aim is the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers …and the disruption of civilized community life throughout Germany.” — Bomber Harris (quoted, 66:50)
- “No, no, no—this is about killing women and children and rendering them homeless. That’s what we’re doing.” — Robert (77:31)
On post-apocalypse government bunkers:
- “None of the facilities we have to protect our government will work. …It’s a much worse death than the people topside will have.” — Robert (81:28)

Noteworthy Timestamps

00:04:06 — The ticking clock: how close we always are to nuclear annihilation.
00:10:16 — H.G. Wells’s atomic bomb and his influence on Szilard and the Manhattan Project.
00:13:01 — Szilard’s sympathetic case for building the bomb to counter Hitler.
00:22:32 — The WWI “doomsday device” as a parallel to nuclear standoff.
00:34:46 — Lessons unlearned: the Franco-Prussian War and the ticking clock of mobilization.
00:38:22 — Strategic bombing theory explained: Douhet’s influence and errors.
00:52:43 — How WWII military planners put Douhet’s theories into practice—and failed.
01:03:00–01:14:00 — Precision bombing myths and the reality of inaccuracy and horrific civilian tolls.
01:21:28 — Nothing, not even government bunkers, can meaningfully survive “doomsday.”
01:23:10 — The system of alliances and military escalation as history's original “doomsday device.”

Tone & Style

The hosts blend dark, often gallows humor (“Maybe do it yourself, you know, pruners, sure… Rubber band. That’s how we do it on the sheep.” — Robert, 00:01:06) with rigorous history and pointed political and ethical analysis.
Dialogue is informal, conversational, and regularly digresses into personal anecdotes and hypothetical scenarios, but always returns to the central theme.
Honesty about moral gray areas is foregrounded; neither host lets listeners forget the horror and absurdity at the heart of nuclear planning.

Summary — For New Listeners

This episode traces the intellectual and institutional roots of the doomsday device, showing how well-meaning (and in some cases outright villainous) individuals created a system that threatens all life on Earth. From the first imaginings of the atomic bomb in pulp fiction, through WWII’s disastrous faith in bombing as a war-winning tool, to the continuing, precarious standoff of the nuclear age, the hosts lay out the technical miscalculations, hubris, and ethical traps that define ‘the men who might have killed us all.’ This context is vital in understanding how close humanity remains to self-destruction, not because of singular villains, but due to systems built by people convinced they were preventing catastrophe—right up until they might someday cause it.

For Next Episode

Part Two will explore the application of these foundational doctrines to the Pacific theater, the use of nuclear weapons on Japan, and the post-war evolution of the U.S. and global doomsday mechanisms.

If you want to feel more informed—and more existentially anxious—about how close we always are to nuclear apocalypse, this is a must-listen.

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Transcript

A (0:01)

Coal Zone media. Ah. I was just doing the atonal screaming for you, Robert. What'd you think? Well, now you fucked up the introduction, Sophie. It doesn't feel good now, does it? Feels bad. Well done, Magpie. It's harder than it sounds, you know. You know what? Honestly, kind of fun. I'm just hoping that the listeners here will appreciate how much work goes into my atonal screeches. Because to be polite, they sound a lot better than your atonal screeches. That's all I'm saying. I absolutely agree. So give the listeners one. No, no, no. I think they've gotten enough atonal screeches. Okay. Instead, let's talk about. I don't know. I'm not. We're not on video this week, folks. I'm not feeling well. I just had a vasectomy, which brag I debated on. Cause I don't like talking about my private life on the show too much. But I also think it's a good thing to encourage, so. So guys out there, if you're thinking about getting the vasectomy, if you're like, should I get a vasectomy? Go do it or do it yourself. You know, it doesn't look that hard. I can't do that. The doctor wasn't down there very long. You could figure it out. You know, pruners, pruners, sure. You know, whatever it takes. Rubber band. That's how we do it on the sheep. Anyway, Margaret Killjoy. How are you doing?

B (1:23)

I'm good. I didn't have surgery this week.

A (1:26)

That's also good. That's better than having surgery. As a general, I love that for you, Magpie. I certainly prefer the weeks when I don't have surgery. Even if it's minor surgery, it's never very fun. This is an iHeart podcast. Guaranteed human. Season three of Sniffy's Cruisin Confessions is here. Hosts Gabe Gonzalez and Chris Patterson Rosso are going deeper than ever with bold new conversations, fresh guests, and and unfiltered takes on queer sex and cruising. This season, they're also looking out for the community covering smart cruising in a chaotic world, including information on prep. And yes, their call in segment is getting even hotter and they'll react to your wildest cruising confessions on air. No pressure. Tune in to Sniffy's Cruising Confessions, sponsored by Healthy Sexual from Gilead Sciences, with new episodes every Thursday on the iHeartRadio app or wherever you get your podcasts.

C (2:18)

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A (7:48)

There's gonna be no victors of a nuclear war. Simply no history written. But they are interesting in that. Cause a lot of them are not, like, bad. And some of them are even deeply sympathetic. There's a guy we're gonna talk about who may have saved all of human life, but also helped, still did help build the machine that could at any moment, end it. All right? Because it's. And I need to correct this from the start, all of this is still relevant because absolutely nothing has been done to make this system safer since the end of the Cold War. And in fact, it's significantly more dangerous than it was at the end of the Cold War. In part because Russia's no longer pretending to not be in a launch on Warren situation, which is where both, both Russia and the United States is launch on warn. Which means that the policy of both governments is to start shooting everything they have when they have a credible warning that they're being nuked. Right? And our best case scenario would be like one crazy country like North Korea decides to fire a single ICBM at the United States. But that would still trigger a massive nuclear response. And if for some reason we couldn't get in touch with the Russian government. And as a heads up, there have been times where we've been out of touch with them for as much as 48 hours when there's been like, critical things to like the. That happens, the gaps and comms like that, especially since Ukraine happen. And if we started launching missiles the way that most of our missiles would work, a lot of them would go through or at least appear to be going towards Russian airspace or Chinese airspace for a while. And none of these radar systems are perfect. So there's a very good chance, even if we didn't have it set up to cross Russian or Chinese airspace, they would think that for a period of time that is longer than the amount of time they know they have to choose to launch their arsenals in response. As per the way deterrence theory works, this could happen at any moment. This could have started happening seconds ago. Right. So that's what we're talking about this week is how we got to this point that we have not ever stepped back from. We are just as close as we were during the Cold War. That's very important for people to understand. So these next couple of weeks we're going to talk about how this all came to be. Right. Because all of the men we're talking about this week, most of whom again, have no body count and probably lived otherwise decent lives, all of these guys put the work in to make this machine, knowing that they were building a system that if used, would lead to planetary genocide. And they built it anyway. They built it because they knew it would work that way. Right?

A (10:16)

So we're gonna talk about why, we're gonna talk about. Cause they thought they were doing the morally right thing. And up until now you could make a case, up until the missiles fly, you could continue making a case that it was the right thing to do, which is part of one of the fucked up things about it. Right, right. So this is a complicated topic, but I do think these people are worth discussing in part because these are all people who sat down and had conversations about like, okay, we do this and that'll kill about 600 million people. Yeah, build it. You know, like these are the talks that they were having. There's a joke that gets made online today a lot a meme about a tech company building the Torment Nexus in imitation of classic sci fi novel. Don't create the Torment Nexus. It's kind of a joke about the way a lot of tech projects feel now, where it's like, this is exactly what the sci fi that inspired you was warning against. Right. But that really is the reality of the atom bomb. And this is not something I knew until I read the book Command and Control by Eric Schlosser, which is one of the sources, one of several books that I used as sources for these episodes. And at the start of his book, Schlosser points out that the first person to conceive directly of an atomic bomb was H.G. wells, who wrote a 1914 novel titled the World Set Free. I was not aware of. Now there's some other candidates, but this is like the first. I'll tell you why this is, I think, the best candidate for like the first guy to imagine an accurate, a semi accurate conception of an atomic bomb. In it, Wells puts together a story that is weirdly like the backstory of the Federation in Star Trek. Scientists create the ultimate explosive, a Radioactive bomb that allowed someone to carry in a purse or suitcase an amount of latent energy sufficient to wreck half a city. As Schlosser writes, these atomic bombs threaten the survival of mankind as every nation seeks to obtain them and use them before being attacked. Millions die, the world's great capitals are destroyed and civilization nears collapse. But the novel ends on an optimistic note as fear of a nuclear apocalypse leads to the establishment of world government. And this is Wells. The catastrophe of the atomic bombs which shook men out of cities, shook them also out of their old established habits of thought. Wells wrote, full of hope and. Yeah, I think that's fascinating. I didn't know any of that.

A (14:39)

Maybe don't write about the torment nexus. I mean, it's. I think Szilard probably was. I think he probably was into Welles because he, like, people had theorized before Welles that something like an atom bomb might be feasible on physicists. Had. And I think Szilard was impressed that Welles had gotten something so close. And also he clearly wanted to warn the world about this thing, which I think is why he was interested in purchasing the rights to this. And we'll talk a little bit more about him later. But it is so tragic. Cause you can't blame him. His attitude is like, we need to have this. Cause Hitler might have it. Right. Which, like, yeah, maybe, I don't know. But that's the same logic that, like. And you know, the USSR is not Nazi Germany. Obviously, we can. The proof of that is as simple as what happened in the Cold War. Right. And to be fair, neither is the United States. Neither country used the damn things on the scale that would have ended civilization. Right. You know, we'll talk about Hiroshima and Nagasaki too. But it's. You understand, like, Szilard's motivations are deeply sympathetic. Right. And a number of scientists behind the Manhattan Project, some of them are refugees. Right. But the ones that aren't still get into it because they're reading the news, they're aware of how dangerous the US's enemies are during World War II. And it's legitimate threat that Germany in particular might get the bomb before we do. Right. And those stories are like, half the reason this happened. Because a lot of people of goodwill got involved with the Manhattan Project because they were like, well, this is probably the lesser. It's probably better that the US has this than that a fascist country is the only one with a nuke. Right, Right. Like, that's their logic here. And they had to operate on we know that the Nazis were never going to get a nuke. Right. Just based on the choice. Because they didn't. Right. They went in different directions. They did not make the choices, ultimately, that would have given.

A (18:52)

I guess part of why I'm doing this is that if this happens, like, 15 minutes after you finish listening to this podcast, you'll know who to be angry at in your last couple seconds of consciousness. Assuming you're not near ground zero for one of these things. Yeah. You know, and you probably want to be at ground zero. It's the least painful option available. The road is optimistic in terms of, like, the aftermath of thermonuclear war on a planetary scale anyway. So those guys. But guys with that logic, basically, that, like, well, this is a messy thing. I don't really want to be building a giant bomb, but it might save a lot of lives in the long run. That's like a sizable chunk of the Manhattan Project. Right. That's like a big amount of the logic behind the reason individual people got involved. Right. The other half, though, is a military. And this is largely on the military side of things. It's not exclusively military thinkers, but this is how the military thinks of these weapons, both when we're starting to plan one and then immediately after we start using them. Right. And the military logic for why this is why building this system, why getting as many of these things as possible is a good idea, is based on a military theory that starts to take hold after the end of the First World War. And this is ultimately the theory that leads us to the system of international mutually assured destruction that we live in today. Right. And there's an element of historical rhyming here that we. We build this global, real, literal, global doomsday device as a result of a theory that takes off in the end of World War I, based on what happened in World War I. Because World War I is itself the result of a doomsday device going off, a device that was never supposed to go off, and a device that a lot of people, right up until the start of World War I, if you talked about this system of alliances and military buildup, right. And arms buildup, you've got all these munitions, refit schedules and whatnot. Interlocking alliances, was meant to ensure that there wasn't going to be a colossal European war. Right. That was. The people who would defend it would say that, like, well, if everyone's really well armed and if everybody's always. And if we have all these alliances between different powers that make it an unwinnable situation. We won't have this war. Right. People would make that argument. You know, now, obviously, the technology at the time, they didn't have access to ICBMs and nuclear submarines. So they had to make do with defensive alliances that promised one country would enter a theoretical war on another's behalf. And these do work like a machine, right? And that is what happens. You know, you have Austria declares war on Serbia. That brings France and Germany into it. The German plan that they had built meant that, like, well, the only way we can possibly win this war is we have to do this specific kind of invasion that takes us through Belgium, that brings Great Britain into the. You know, and so on and so forth, right? And they have the Maxim gun, and they've got the. Everyone's got a version of the Maxim gun. And everyone's also thinking, well, we just refurbished and upgraded our artillery, and France has just upgraded this thing, but they haven't upgraded this thing. And if we go now, they won't have the new version of this thing, and ours will still be like. That's a big part of the thinking, too, Right? And this is, like, always the case, and it had been for decades prior to World War I and prior to World War I, the fact that it would be so costly and it was like, everyone's plan for victory rested on so many, like, assumptions and was sketchy enough. No one really wanted to do this, right? I mean, with the exception of the military thinkers who had spent their entire lives building and planning out this system of, like, this is how we're going to activate our troops. This is the order at which we'll get them marching, and this is where they'll move in. So you have this mix of. Nobody on the civilian side of governance wants to think about this seriously, because it would be a calamity, and they know it. And everyone in the military is thinking about it constantly. So the instant you start having leaders need to make a decision as to whether or not they're going to go to war, the loudest voice in the ear is this general who's thought of nothing else his entire professional life. And by the way, in the six minutes a US President would have to decide whether or not to launch the nukes, the loudest voice in his ear is going to be a guy who thinks about using the nukes nonstop.

A (27:13)

Them, but, you know, I see a logic in what they're doing. I don't think they're crazy. Right. And I don't. Which is there's a. What I think is. I don't think his book is as good, but there was another book that came out a year or two previously by another, like a scholar interested in the nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction System. That was also a North Korea US Exchange hypothetical, but that didn't rely on North Korea being crazy. In fact, everyone was performing logically. Right. Basically, the premise was North Korea does something that kills some South Korean civilians. Right. I think they either shoot or they fire a missile and it hits, which has happened before. Right. North Korea has in fact killed South Korean civilians not all that long ago. Right. And as a result, the North Korean president, without seeking US approval, fires missiles at military targets, non nuclear missiles at military targets in North Korea. But the leader of North Korea doesn't know that the US didn't approve of the firing of missiles. And their system can't entirely tell what's incoming and what's not. And they see once South Korea fires missiles into North Korea, the US starts raising its alert level and North Korea becomes aware. And anyway, it's this whole cycle of escalation that doesn't require anyone being crazy. It just requires. And by the way, one of the things we found out very recently is that the currently imprisoned former president of South Korea, who is being charged with, I believe insurrection at the moment, actually did send drones into North Korea illegally without getting US approval or anything while he was president as part of some boondoggle to basically get to declare martial law. Right. So like this stuff like shit like that happens all the time and just hasn't escalated. But like we have had the first couple stages of a few different apocalypses occur. This is not crazy and it doesn't require any power. Russia, the United States, North Korea with nukes to be like a mustache twirling madman. It just requires them to all be have incomplete, imperfect information and focused on their own survival. Right. Yeah, it's good. I love.

A (34:50)

Oh man, I mean, we have not had a good European war since those two got their shit together. And that's why I think we should start tweaking them both. You know, just, just start, see who we can make angrier at the other, you know, Germany, I hear France has been talking hella shit. You know, just set the ramp, maybe invade a little bit. Yeah, set the Ryan on fire. Fuck it, let's see what happens. Only France has nukes, so we should be fine. Anyway. The great land powers of Europe, namely France, Russia, Germany and to a lesser extent Austro Hungary knew that the instant war was declared. There was this clock ticking, right, because most of your army is reserves, right. The largest amount of manpower you have isn't your active duty. It's this, this Mass of, like, reserve troops. These guys who, when they're 18 or whatever, they're basically drafted. They sometimes serve like a year, and then for a period of time, they have to do. It's basically, they're all in the National Guard, Right? That's the norm in most of these states. You have some version of that. And so it takes a period of time to call these guys up from civilian life, to issue them their gear, to get them moved into their units, and then to get them moved to the front. So everyone is working. Not just. Not only do you have this interlocking series of alliances, but once war starts, every side knows I have to be able to get my reserves ready for active duty before the enemy can. Otherwise they're going to invade before I have my army, which means I have a ticket. Like, once the Archduke of Austria, Hungary, is assassinated, and then people start to realize that, general, European war is in play. It's not just a matter of diplomatically, can we smooth this? It's that all of my generals are shouting that, like, if we don't mobilize now, we don't know that France isn't mobilizing. Right? We can't tell they might be mobilizing. And if they're mobilizing, we only have this period of time to start mobilizing in turn. Right? That's a big part of everybody's thinking here. And that's the same with nuclear war, right? Where you don't know entirely what the other side is doing. We, the US have pretty good data on when people are. Because we have this nuts, insane, like, level of, like, spy satellites and shit like that. Although all of it has errors, all of it has things that can go wrong. Right? None of it's perfect.

A (41:23)

But ideally, close air support is less high altitude because you can't do it as accurately. Right. Like, you need to be closer to not hit your own guys as much. This is one of those things. Technology has made this kind of true because, like, even a lot of what we'd call close air support today is still pretty high altitude because you can fire a missile from pretty high altitude, right? Like if, like modern, like modern weapon systems, you can shoot from higher up. But he's wrong. And in spirit, right? Which is that, like, this is not the way. Most most effective combat use of airpower in World War II is not high altitude bombing. Right. And even if you look in the. The Pacific theater, right? Like, it's a lot of naval aviation being used to knock out other ships, but it's not really high altitude bombing. You know, Pearl harbor isn't high altitude bombing. Right. Like. Like it's. It's a different kind of use of aircraft. But Duhei is certain that high altitude bombing is going to be like almost the. Not just like critical, but basically the only thing that air power will be used for. Right. And he is so certain of this that he becomes kind of an asshole about it. Right. Like he illegally orders the construction of bombers without getting like approval to actually spend the money. And it burns out his career. He gets forced into the infantry and he spends the early stages of World War I basically screaming that Italy can win. We can break this deadlock, you know, in the mountains and make the enemy harmless if we could just gain command of the air. And he calls for the construction of 500 bombers to drop 125 tons of bombs on Austria daily in order to break the stalemate of trench warfare now. Yeah. So this is the kind of thing it seems ahead of its time. Right. Because this is sort of where military thinking went. Right. Like it was certainly the way military thinkers were thinking in World War II because of Duhe, but it's not. Not correct. Ahead of its time in part. Like Italy simply couldn't have built 500 high altitude bombers to drop that kind of tonnage on Austria daily. They did not have the capacity like the Italian industry. The Italian military in the middle of World War I was not going to be able to do that. Right. It's just not a realistic ask of the country.

A (48:01)

No. Nor does it erase your culpability in making it. Now, one of my sources for this episode is an article by Colonel Everest Riccione of the. One of the more who's one of the more influential pilots in US combat aviation history. He's an interesting guy. He was a key member of what became known as the Fighter Mafia, which is a group of guys in the Air Force who argue, and this is in the latter half of the 20th century. They argue that the branch's bureaucracy was corrupt and lying about. This is right before the birth of, I think, the F16. They're saying the Air Force bureaucracy is corrupt and it's lying about how well certain weapon systems work for corrupt reasons. And as a result, they have all these complaints about hybrid role fighters as opposed to dedicated anti aircraft aircraft fighters. There's a lot of debate as to whether or not the fighter mafia was right. I'm just bringing this up because this is a guy who has a history of being on controversial sides of arguments. Right. And he wrote an interesting article about the history of strategic bombing for the Air Force, right. Where he is kind of laying out his thinking as to why Duhei was wrong. And he summarizes Duhei's arguments this way. He also believed that air forces would dominate surface forces on land and at sea, and that an enemy's ability to sustain a war could be eliminated. He preached the destruction of enemy Air power in the air and on the ground. The need is not only to kill the enemy's eagles, but also to destroy their eggs and their nests. Duhay wrote enemy aircraft production plants were defined as prime strategic targets. He believed that bomber attacks were inevitable and that defenses against them were useless. He believed that attacking populations with relatively small amounts of explosives, incendiary and gas weapons would make populations force their leaders to sue for peace. He believed that a powerful strategic bombing force could deter potential enemies from attacking. Now, a lot of this is the way very influential people in military planning still think to this day. Duhei's thinking is incredibly common, or at least a descent descendants of Duhei's thinking is incredibly common within military planners to this day. And this is the root of Mutually Assured Destruction. It starts with these ideas, right? Particularly the idea. Yeah.

A (57:44)

Yeah, 300 tons of bomb. All you need. That'll wipe out any city's will to fight. So German war planners, influenced by duhei, built a bomber fleet that was tailored for the attack, not operations on enemy cities, but providing close support to their advancing infantry and armor. And this is, you could call this an adaptation of some of Duhe's certainly influenced by it. This idea that like air power should just be for the offense. Right. Like that's its primary purpose. And so it's kind of an adaptation. Right. England also, duhei's attitudes have a lot of influence on how the Royal Air Force is constructed in the interwar period. And England spends a lot of resources creating a bomber command that was meant to deter German action on the continent without requiring another painful mass conscription for British kids. You know, that does not exactly work out. Here's how Colonel Riccione describes what happened next. Germany then turned to the invasion of England. In its first test of Yuhey's theories, the Battle of Britain was engaged to gain air superiority for Operation Sea Lion. Britain's bomber command had failed to deter the war the attacks on England. But Germany's bomber fleets also failed to bring England to its knees. The Luftwaffe tried to gain air superiority over England. The initially frail Fighter force of the Royal Air Force under the competent command of Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding and using the nascent technology of radar, was able to inflict unacceptable losses on the German bombers and their fighter escorts. After the Battle of Britain was won by England, Hitler turned his aerial weapons on London to bring the population to its knees. Churchill cheered quietly. The bombing only stiffened the morale of Londoners and brought England's war effort to a higher pitch. So from the start, duhe is proven wrong just immediately on both counts about. Yes, yeah. Having a big bomber fleet does not deter enemy action. Also, you can defend from a bombing attack and aircraft are great on the defense. Having fighters to intercept bombers works really fucking well.

A (63:00)

That gives us punk rock. Sure. Yeah. But, yeah, that is an important point. Again, just how wrong Duhay is. Like, yeah, we took more than twice as much as he said would break any city in a month and a night. London did. And people don't break under bombing, you know, which is also going to influence nuclear thinkers. Because then the attitude becomes, well, you just have to kill all of them then. Yeah, yeah. So despite the fact that Duhei is right out the gate proven wrong, war planners on the Allied side continue to give a great deal of credence to his now badly marred theories. One advocate was Sir Arthur Harris, also known as Bomber Harris, who became head of the RAF's bomber command. He was a huge advocate of area bombing, bombing, precision bombing, which is another thing people are. The strategic bombing side also breaks down to a couple of broad schools. And as is always the case, most people are, you know, have, are a little. Take some from column A, some from column B, but there's you've got area bombing and precision bombing, right? And the idea behind precision bombing is that you can hit just the target you want, that is like the factory making bombs or the factory making planes, right? Or a barracks, and not hit the high rise apartment structure near it. Now, precision bombing is a lie, right? Especially it's not all that true today, but it's especially a lie. In World War II, right? It's a lot. Now you can kind of do it, although it never works as well as planners like to claim it does. But in World War II, it's just a fantasy, right? And so there's a lot of that gives a lot more push to people like Bomber Harris who are like, well, fuck precision bombing. Just bomb. Saturate an area with bombing, right? You accept greater civilian casualties so that you can cripple their industrial capabilities, right? That's the public argument. In private, they're saying something different. But the public argument is that this is just the way it has to work. The first area bombings by the RAF on German cities was in 1941, in 1942, and they did not work very well. Right. They're spun as wins, but on an actual strategic level, they're not huge hits. They cause some shock to the German citizenry, but they don't accomplish the stated goal, which is to damage war production. Right. And the RAF suffers high casualties because German air defenses are excellent. You know, duhei continues to be very wrong about air defense. It is possible, I mean, in Vietnam, North Vietnam. Part of why the war goes the way it does is that North Vietnam has excellent, very advanced air defenses. Right? Yeah. Something that gets lost in the hole. It was just some farmers in the jungle that beat the U.S. no, they had an army. They had radar guided missiles and everything, you know. When Arthur Harris took over Bomber Command for Great Britain, he immediately organized a much bigger area bombing campaign, operation millennium. On May 30th of 1942, nearly 1,100 Allied bombers hit Cologne, annihilating some 600 acres of the city and rendering 100,000 people homeless. Harris declared the raid a success. Yes, the British press did too. But they focused on the destruction of war industry, not the civilian cost. And this frustrated Harris in part because it was inaccurate. While dozens of factories had been damaged or destroyed, the city only lost the equivalent of a month's war production. The real cost to Germany, as Bomber Harris saw it, was human. Here's how he later described the purpose of Bomber Command. In his eyes, the aim is the destruction of German cities. The killing of German workers, and this, the disruption of civilized community life throughout Germany. It should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and on the battlefronts by the fear of extended and intensified bombing are acceptable and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not byproducts of attempts to hit factories.

A (67:30)

That's just how people be, homie. I don't know what to tell you. They don't like having their families killed by bombs. And there's as. We'll talk about a lot of debate as to the influence of strategic bombing on the German civilian population. But what we can say is that it's not why they lose. However, whatever it does to morale doesn't end the war, you know, so Bomber Harris is wrong in his primary attitude, right, as to, like, what would work to actually end the war. And he never gets called on that because we win the war anyway. And everyone kind of thinks, fuck those guys. Low key, high key. And, you know, fuck him. But it doesn't work. That is important now. There's not agreement. And in fact, a lot of conflict between the US and Great Britain over this strategy. Initially, the guys in the U.S. army Air Command do not all agree with Harris. And in fact, we keep conducting. The Brits are doing nighttime raids, which allows you to lose the least aircraft while killing the most civilians or killing the most people. We do daytime raids for a long time, which are way more dangerous because the idea is it gives the civilians more of a chance to get away. Right? That's part of why you're doing it. It's more honorable, basically. Right. Which it is. But it also means you lose a lot more guys, Right? Like it's way more dangerous. Yeah, it's a very admirable thing I think, that we're doing for a while. We're not always going to be that way. So, yeah, this, this debate really starts to erupt after this point. And on one hand you've got these area bombing strategic bombing advocates saying like, you know, I know it hasn't quite worked yet, right. Like we haven't knocked Germany out of the fight. They're not giving up yet. But if we just get more bombers, bro, it'll work. Right. And on the other side, and again, a lot of people do kind of wind up in the middle here, but the other side broadly are like, well, close air support is what's most important, right. Air power's primary use is its ability to augment conventional forces in taking and holding territory. Right. And close air support works really well. It had proved to be tantalizingly potent in North Africa and guys in the US like General Pete Cassada were bullish about its potential in a future invasion of France. An early test for the strategic bombing advocates, on the other hand, came prior to the invasion of Sicily. There's this island called Pantelleria, which is garrisoned with about 11,000 Italian troops that we need to take before we invade Sicily and then invade Italy. And I'm going to quote from an article in National Interest by James Stevenson here. The bombing of Pantelleria became an experiment, one anticipated to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that bombing would ratify what up to then had been a matter of fate, but would soon offer proof. Through bombing alone, surrender was a certainty. All these forces were assembled to test the assertion that if you destroy what a man has and remove the possibility of his bringing more in, then in due course of time it becomes impossible for him to defend himself. Major General Jimmy Doolittle said if bombing alone did not force a surrender, the Allies planned to invade the island by June 11. In an attempt to avoid the need for an invasion, The Allies generated 5,284 sorties, dropping a total of 12.4 million pounds of bombs on Pantelleria. Jesus. Did it work? Kinda. After a month of unopposed round the clock bombing, the Italians surrendered after Allied ground troops had approached the island. Right. They didn't surrender on their own from the bombing. They surrendered before ground troops came in. Now you can still say, but that still worked, right? However, there's a couple of other issues. For one, Italian defenses were remarkably Intact still, given the force deployed against them. Because nearly every bomb missed, the B17s were most accurate, with a 22% hit rate. That's defined as landing a bomb within 100 yards of its target. So the B17s hit 22% of the time. And that's our best bomber.

A (71:24)

Yeah. And that's still within a football field. Yeah. And our medium bomber's hit rate is about 6%. Now, this is a problem because we had been claiming very different things about the accuracy of our bombs. Back at the start of 1943, we'd had something called the Casablanca Conference, in which Winston Churchill sat down with the eighth Air Force commander, Ira Eaker, who promised the British Prime Minister that the B17 Flying Fortress, with its fancy new. We had these things called the Norden bomb site, which was like, this is the shit. This makes precision bombing possible. It's like almost. It's like a little computerized bombing system that, like, we can do things with bombs we never could do before. You can drop a bomb from 25,000ft and hit a target the size of a pickle barrel. Right. That's the promise Ira Eaker makes. Winston Churchill, when he's like, holy shit. Sitting down, he's like, we can hit a pickle barrel at 25,000ft. Now, in combat, a few months later, these things would hit within a football field only 22% of the time. Yeah. So you're getting this. This is going to be also a theme with all of the nuke stuff that the Air Force builds. They will make all these claims about, yes, it's this accurate and it's this safe, and it can only be activated if this and this and this happens. So it could never be accidentally fired. And they're like, oh, wait, but what if this thing happens? That happens every day. Oh, yeah. That could accidentally launch all of our missiles. Yeah. Are you guys going to fix it? We actually don't want to. That's the story of the Minuteman in a nutshell. But we'll talk more about that later. Anyway, with a fleet of these Eaker promised we can disembowel the German Reich and destroy its industrial capacity with no need for ground forces. Right. We can just gut the Reich entirely through precision bombing. Now, Churchill has some direct experience with aerial warfare, and he does not believe Eaker. Right. He doesn't believe him about the accuracy. And the other thing that Ira Eaker is saying is we don't need fighter escorts for our B17s because they have all these guns on them. That'll be enough to deter attack.

A (79:35)

You learned it from a hardcore band. I learned it from Command and comics. Yeah. In November of 1943 and March of 1944, there were vast raids on Berlin which left much of the capital in ruins. And yet German morale continued to hold. This is the thing. Bomber Harris, he's more honest. But what he's saying will happen still doesn't happen. Yeah, he's wrong. No amount of bombing causes Germany to give up. By the time the war in Europe enters its end game, there were very mixed conclusions to draw from the actual efficacy of strategic bombing and precision bombing bombing. Both ideologies had suffered failures and both had claimed successes, although some of those were dubious claims of success. Months earlier, Bomber Harris had considered strategic bombing the same as opening a new front, summarized in a write up for the Juno beach center quote. Until D Day, he was convinced that bombings, if they were destructive enough, could force Germany into submission without the Allied casualties that were bound to result from a massive landing operation in continental Europe. And in Part two. So we're going to talk about what happens next. We'll get to Japan finally, and we'll start talking about the nukes. But this is all necessary. These are the foundational assumptions of the people who build the doomsday device that we all live under right now. Like this second, an incident could have started, maybe just because a radar station was wrong, that will, in 15 to 30 minutes, result in the annihilation of all organized life, human life on the planet. That could have happened, as I say this sentence. And we mostly won't know until the bombs fall. And there's really nothing. Like. One thing that maybe will comfort you is that none of the facilities we have to protect our government will work. None of them are sufficient for the amount, the tonnage, the megatonnage of explosives coming at them. That little. Like, this is a good thing about Jacobson's book Nuclear War. One thing she points out is like, yeah, there's bunkers underneath the Pentagon and the White House. Everyone will bake to death slowly, as if they're in an oven. Like, we know what kind of forces will be deployed against D.C. there's no surviving in those bunkers. It's a much worse death than the people topside will have.