Bitcoin Audible | Read_913 – The Quantum Threat to Bitcoin

Host: Guy Swann
Released: November 8, 2025

Episode Overview

In this episode, Guy Swann reads and discusses a recent report by the Human Rights Foundation (HRF), “The Quantum Threat to Bitcoin.” The focus is on the growing perception and debate around quantum computers potentially undermining Bitcoin’s cryptographic foundations, their looming risks to global financial freedom, and the complex challenge of preparing the Bitcoin ecosystem for a post-quantum world.

Guy delivers a comprehensive deconstruction of the HRF article, summarizing expert views from the recent Presidio Bitcoin Quantum Summit, and offers his own reflective commentary on the technical and social implications of advancing quantum technologies for Bitcoin’s future.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Growing Concern Over Quantum Threats

• Summit Influence:

  • At the summit’s outset, 25% of attendees were unsure if quantum computers would ever pose a real threat, but that dropped to 8% after in-depth discussion (00:00, 21:36).
  • Attendees who believed the threat was 5-20 years away rose sharply from 49% to 69% (00:00).

• Guy’s Framing:

  • “The asymmetry of this problem is too great to ignore... if I'm wrong, the cost is literally the destruction of Bitcoin.” (03:23)
  • Emphasizes that the threat is not just technical (cryptographic signatures), but encompasses complexity across infrastructure and user coordination.

2. Potential Impact of Quantum Computing Breakthroughs

• Technical Milestone:

  • Recent Google research demonstrated a quantum computer running an algorithm 13,000 times faster than classical supercomputers, accelerating the timeline of concern (06:25).
  • Experts forecast cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) could emerge within 5–20 years.

• Vulnerabilities Identified:

  • Old and reused Bitcoin addresses—especially early formats—are highly exposed.
  • Quantum attacks could seize funds from these addresses en masse if the network is unprepared.

• Human Rights Angle:

  • For activists and dissidents relying on Bitcoin, CRQCs could compromise security, privacy, and access to funds—a human rights imperative.

3. Types of Quantum Threats to Bitcoin

A. Long-Range Attacks (20:33)

• Description:
  • Target coins whose public keys are already exposed (e.g., old/reused addresses, some Taproot).
  • “Approximately 6.51 million bitcoin, representing almost a third of the total supply, is vulnerable to long range attacks.” (21:20)
• Migration Solution:
  • Owners can move funds to quantum-safe addresses, but the 1.72M BTC in dormant/lost addresses (like Satoshi’s) remain exposed.

B. Short-Range Attacks (23:12)

• Description:
  • Occur during the window between transaction broadcast and confirmation, when public keys are revealed.
  • “A CRQC could intercept... derive the private key... and broadcast a conflicting transaction to steal funds” (23:30)
• Mitigation:
  • Only addressed by upgrading to post-quantum signature schemes.

C. Infrastructure Risks (24:25)

• Third-Party Vulnerabilities:
  • Wallet apps, portfolio trackers, and multi-sig solutions that manage and store public keys could become attack vectors if hacked in a quantum world.

4. Preparing Bitcoin for a Post-Quantum World

A. Quantum-Resistant Signature Schemes (25:22)

• Options:

  • Lattice-Based (e.g., Crystals Dilithium, Falcon): Smaller signatures, better for multisig, but newer crypto assumptions.
  • Hash-Based (e.g., Sphinx, XMSS, Lamport): Mathematically mature, but signature/data sizes are 10–38x larger than current ECDSA/Schnorr.

• Problems:

  • Larger signatures = fewer transactions per block, higher storage and bandwidth cost for nodes.
  • Any protocol-level change will require years of consensus and education (28:27).

• Current Proposals:

  • BIP360: Quantum-resistant and signature-scheme agnostic proposal to secure Taproot addresses (28:55).

B. Social, Technical, and Educational Hurdles (31:49)

• User Education:
  • Non-technical users may not know their coins are at risk due to prior address reuse.
• Coordination Required:
  • Wallets, hardware and software infrastructure must be overhauled; protocol upgrades are complicated by “decentralized and ideologically divided ecosystem.”
  • Past upgrades, like SegWit or Taproot, show slow adoption even for non-controversial changes.

5. The Burn-or-Steal Debate: Ethics, Game Theory, and Governance (38:13)

• Burn Proposal:

  • Render vulnerable, dormant BTC (e.g., lost/Satoshi addresses) unspendable after a migration period—preventing CRQC-aided theft, upholding market integrity.
  • Counter: Violates Bitcoin’s core tenet of censorship resistance and property rights.
    • Lao Lua Tsuntakan: “We must resist groups trying to coordinate to effectively redistribute wealth.” (40:20)

• Let-Theft-Happen (Neutrality):

  • Accepts that those holding vulnerable addresses bear the risk (“no guarantee you're not going to lose coins”).

• Hourglass Proposal:

  • Protocol limits how fast vulnerable coins can be spent, slowing down theft and incentivizing defensive action, but criticized as normalizing theft and adding governance creep.

• Community Division:

  • After the summit, support for burning coins decreased (45% → 38%), a third favored “hourglass,” and support for doing nothing rose (22% → 29%) (41:40).

• Memorable Quote:

  • Taj Dryja: “Who wants to be the person to push the button to merge the code to steal Satoshi’s coins?” (42:08)

6. Guy Swann's Reflections & Analysis

A. Technical Reality Check (54:05)

• Are We Near a Quantum Threat (Practically)?

  • Actual quantum computers have only factored very small numbers (e.g., 15, 21; failed at 35).
  • “Quantum is such a convoluted and misrepresented thing because nobody understands it… Just factor something.” (55:17)
  • The majority of media/scientific hype is not matched by real-world, cryptographically-important advances.

• Insurance Principle:

  • Even if CRQCs seem remote, “if I could buy insurance right now against Bitcoin's cryptography being destroyed by a quantum computer, I would do it... the asymmetric loss is way, way, way bigger than the benefit of just zero cost.” (59:42)

B. On the Burn/Steal Debate (1:02:00)

• Historical Perspective:
  • Past vulnerabilities (e.g., wallets with weak random number generators) were exploited, not prevented by burning.
  • Burning coins would create a “DAO-moment” like Ethereum, fundamentally undermining Bitcoin’s “code is law” ethos.
• Final Stance:
  • Let the chips fall where they may; users must upgrade to quantum-safe methods as best practice.
  • “I would UASF (user-activated soft fork) hold the line on we're not burning the coins at this point.” (1:06:30)

C. Philosophical Principle (1:11:19)

• Cites John Adams:
  • “It is more important that innocence be protected than it is that guilt be punished... If innocence itself is brought to the bar and condemned, then it is the end of security whatsoever.” (1:13:38)

D. Pragmatic Outlook (1:10:02)

• Massive Lift:

  • “This would basically be a start from zero... probably still looking at 5–10 years for a broad and widely usable, non-user-ridiculous implementation...”

• Trade-offs:

  • No perfect signature scheme—every candidate has a different drawback (size, signing cost, maturity, or cryptographic assumptions).

• Why Not Ignore It?

  • Because the cost of being blindsided is existential for Bitcoin.

Timestamps for Important Segments

• Summit Polls & Shifting Sentiment: 00:00, 21:36
• The Asymmetric Risk Framing: 03:23
• Technical Summary (HRF Report): 06:25–29:00
• Long/Short Range Attack Explanation: 20:33–24:24
• Signature Schemes Comparison: 25:22–31:49
• Burn/Steal/Hourglass Debate: 38:13–42:20
• Guy’s Deep Technical/Philosophical Commentary: 54:05–1:13:38
• Notable John Adams Quote: 1:13:38

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Guy Swann (03:23):

  “If I'm wrong about where I am on the level of concern... the cost is literally the destruction of Bitcoin.”

• Sho Suigara, Block CEO, (19:45):

  “Quantum computing is real, but there are so many things to do. You don't need to worry too much about it. But at the same time, probably it's not a good idea to ignore it. Five to 10 years is not a crazy number.”

• Terry Rudolph (20:17):

  “Someone is going to transition through this phase. Transition, and it's going to come just as fast as AI came and hit people in the face.”

• Peter Wella (21:02):

  “Quantum Computers and other ECDLP breaks are hypothetical, and if they happen, there will likely be a long series of incremental breakthroughs that give us some time for fundamental solutions.”

• Lao Lua Tsuntakan (40:20):

  “We must resist groups trying to coordinate to effectively redistribute wealth.”

• Taj Dryja (42:08):

  “Who wants to be the person to push the button to merge the code to steal Satoshi’s coins?”

• Guy Swann (59:42):

  “If I could buy insurance right now against Bitcoin's cryptography being destroyed by a quantum computer, I would do it because the asymmetric loss is way, way, way bigger...”

• Guy Swann (1:06:30):

  “I would UASF hold the line on: we're not burning the coins.”

• John Adams (read by Guy, 1:13:38):

  “It is more important that innocence be protected than it is that guilt be punished... if innocence itself is brought to the bar and condemned... that would be the end of security whatsoever.”

Structure of Risks, Solutions, and Debates

• Risks:

  • Large-scale theft of dormant/old coins; loss of trust in Bitcoin’s security
  • Infrastructural and technical hurdles for mass upgrade
  • Socio-political decoordination

• Potential Solutions:

  • Soft forks to introduce quantum-safe signatures
  • Massive user migration to new addresses/types
  • Either freezing or allowing theft of quantum-exposed dormant coins (burn vs. neutrality)

• Ongoing Debates:

  • Burn vulnerable coins vs. let a "quantum thief" take them vs. compromise “hourglass” proposals
  • The slow, contentious process of consensus in a globally-diverse, decentralized community

Conclusion

Guy Swann’s big takeaways:
Quantum computers remain a theoretical—though increasingly acknowledged—threat to Bitcoin’s cryptography. Preparing for this threat isn’t just a cryptographic challenge but a profound social, educational, and infrastructural one that will take years of debate, engineering, and consensus. Any approach—especially those involving burning coins—must be weighed carefully against Bitcoin’s core values of neutrality, property rights, and censorship resistance. Ultimately, the risk is asymmetric and merits proactive, insurance-like efforts, even if the dawn of quantum attacks remains mostly out of reach, for now.

Further Reading:

• “The Quantum Threat to Bitcoin” – Human Rights Foundation (linked in show notes)
• Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 360 (BIP360)
• Presidio Bitcoin Quantum Summit materials
• "Replication of Quantum Factorization with an 8-bit Home Computer, an Abacus, and a Dog" – Peter Gutman, Stefan Nieuhaus (Sept 2025)