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[00:00]
A
Foreign.
[00:06]
B
Welcome to Books, to Battles where we explore academic insights for real world air and space strategy. I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb, professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. And before we get any further, we want to note that all opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily represent the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, the US Government or any other affiliated organizations. Unfortunately, Colonel Holland, my usual co host, is unable to join us today, so I am thrilled to be joined by another of our SAS faculty who is no stranger to the show, Dr. Wes Hutto.
[00:40]
C
Happy to be here.
[00:41]
B
Thanks for being on stepping in at the last minute. And we're also changing up our conversation today and turning our attention to an issue that has attracted a lot of attention this summer and that is the Israeli and American bombing campaigns against Iran. To do so, we are joined by some of our colleagues from the air War College, Dr. David Sorensen, professor of National Security Studies and Dr. Carl Forsberg, Assistant professor in the Department of Strategy. Welcome gentlemen.
[01:07]
D
Thank you.
[01:07]
A
Thank you for having us.
[01:09]
B
Before we get too far into this, I'd like to ask you guys to just tell us a little bit about yourselves, your background and how you got here to Air War College and Air University.
[01:18]
D
I'm David Sorensen. I've been here since 1991. I was at Ohio State's Prashon center and a little place called Denison University. I came here because it's a great opportunity to teach highly talented students and it's a great opportunity to do research. So the time I've been here I've published eight books, a few on the Middle east, one textbook on the Middle east, one on the Syrian Civil War, one on the politics of Lebanon. I was also active during the formation of the so called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Obama era nuclear agreement with Iran. I did some advising on that back in 2012. So I'm happy to be here. Thank you for having me.
[01:59]
A
And I'm Carl Forsberg. I'm a Professor of Strategy at the Air War College. I'm a historian by background and training, working on the modern Middle east, the Cold War, US Foreign policy, finishing a book manuscript right now looking at the transformation of Middle Eastern international relations from the 1967 war through the Iranian Revolution and the Iran Iraq War in 1980. I, once again similar to Dr. Sorensen, was drawn to the War College by the spectacular students we have. It really is rewarding having them in the classroom. I've been here for four years now and it's been a great experience.
[02:36]
B
Great. Well, thank you for being here with us today. And it sounds like we have the exact two people we want to have on to discuss this issue. So before we get into what happened this summer, could what would one of you like to speak to? Maybe some of the background. What is pertinent for our listeners to know in order to understand what happened this summer?
[02:52]
A
Well, I think that the relevant background is much of it is Iran's security strategy. For, I'd say Approximately the last 20 years, going back to the early 2000s, Iran has had a strategy for security, for defense, and deterrence for regional influence that has roughly three prongs. Much of this has been kind of shaped by the ideological influence of the Iranian revolution, the experience of the Iran Iraq war. I think either David or I would be happy to talk more about some of that deep history. But the 21st century Iranian strategy has really relied on three pillars, one of which has been the so called axis of resistance strategy. Iran has inculcated a series of regional allies and proxies, Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria going back to the 1980s and then more recently, the Houthis in Yemen and the popular mobilization fronts in Iraq. So the Iranians have seen these groups both as a means of gaining regional influence, but also as a means of coercion and deterrence against the US Israel and the Gulf Cooperation states. The axis reason strategy for 20 years turned out to be fairly effective. It provided the Iranians a relatively cheap form of, of deterrence. It was, I think, fairly effective in keeping the United States from strikes on Iran. You think back, the US has been talking about direct strikes in Iran basically since the George W. Bush administration in roughly 2007, 2008. It's been talked about time and time again. It hasn't happened. So the Iranians, their strategy, even if it fell apart in the last year, managed to get some things right for a while. And we could talk maybe later about what fell apart in that strategy. A second prong of the Iranian strategy has been the nuclear program. They've essentially, as far as we can tell, pursue something of a nuclear threshold strategy determining not to actually break out and get a nuclear weapon, but to develop the program far enough that they are in close reach of developing a weapon and can use the implicit threat of making that nuclear breakout to forestall any sort of US Or Israeli attack. Now, I think there's some questions about did that strategy change in the last few years? What exactly where have they been over the last 15, 20 years when it comes to their resolve to actually get a bomb versus being a threshold status. And then a third pillar of the Iranian strategy has been asymmetrical ballistic missiles. More recently drones as another form of essentially a threat of punishment against the United States or Israel to deter any sort of direct attack, which once again is for a country like Iran that's probably a cost effective strategy. It doesn't really make sense to go toe to toe with the United States or Israel. And so the threat of kind of asymmetrical retaliation once again for 15 years was fairly effective I think 10, 15 years ago. There's a fourth pillar to the Iran's strategy threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz that's become no longer relevant since China, not the US is now the major importer of Middle Eastern oil.
[05:54]
D
I think that's a great strategic summary of Iran's overall strategy. I agree. I think that Iran did develop a fairly successful deterrent strategy with the so called Axis of resistance or as the King of Jordan called it, the Shia Crescent, made mostly of Shia oriented countries tied to the Shia in Yemen who were actually of a different Shia branch than the Iranians, but still they claim to be Shia to Hezbollah in Lebanon which has been around since the end 80s and a very effective, very deadly militia until it wasn't. And the Assad regime in Syria which has an interesting kind of political tie to the Shia. They're not exactly Shia, they're known as Alawi, but again it's close. So Iran generally picked Shia countries. The exception was Hamas which is a Sunna oriented organization but happy to take anybody's money. But again the strategy was reasonably successful until it all very quickly collapsed. And I don't think any of us saw this coming. I will be honest, I've looked at this region for a long time as Dr. Forsberg and I don't think any of us really expected the rapidity of the collapse of Syria and then the dramatic success that the Israelis carried out against Hamas, Hezbollah and ultimately Iran.
[07:17]
C
Can you give us a timeline on U. S Israeli, Iranian relations during the Axis of Res and sort of just the big sort of events that have marked the last 25 years or so and have defined the character of the relationship between these states.
[07:36]
D
You know, it all started off badly when Ayatollah Khomeini, for largely political survival reasons, authorized the takeover of the US Embassy which again certainly has poisoned relations ever since. The Iranians accused the United States of having foisted a coup d' etat against their democratically elected leader while back, Mohammad Mossadegh, which brought in the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was the US supporter, if not an ally, who ruled from 1953 until 1979 when he was overthrown. The Iranians were very unhappy with the United States for supporting him. We are very unhappy with the Iranians for the takeover of the embassy. And that relationship has really continued up until now. There have been brief efforts to try to break the stalemate. The other event was the invasion by Iraq, Saddam Hussein's Iraq of Iran. In starting 1981-1988, the United States tacitly supported Saddam Hussein, who directed poisonous gas and ballistic missiles and lots of other things into Iran. Iran fought back, but again the charges were that why did the United States support this brutal dictator whom we worked to oust in fighting against Iran? And that again was another one of those seeds. US shot down an Iranian Airbus by accident, but the Iranians are convinced it was done on purpose. It was around 1988 which Ayatollah Khomeini used to justify signing a peace agreement with the Iran Iraq war. So there have been a number of instances that have really contaminated the relationships between the United States and Iran. US has supported Israel almost unconditionally relative to its policies towards. Towards Iran.
[09:28]
A
Yeah, I'd add the really the Iranian revolution was premised to some degree on. It was in part an Islamic revolution, but was also defined itself as an anti imperialist revolution. Khomeini and his followers very much were the belief the United States was in ways overt and subtle, essentially trying to strangle Islam in Iran and across the Middle East. And so in the mindset of the founding generation of the Islamic Republic, it was an anti imperialist republic. And one of its great objectives was to maneuver the United States out of the Middle East. And that has been a consistent trend in Iranian policy. Now some of the initial ideological zeal of the Islamic Republic, of course, has waned since the 1980s. But that foundational belief that Iran's security depended on ultimately getting the United States out of the Middle east has remained a key element of Iranian strategy. As to the US Iran, Israel relationship, it was really quite actually interesting and complicated in strange ways in the first decade. The United States, despite the Iran hostage crisis in the early 80s, initially thought the biggest threat in the Middle east remained the Soviet Union. And so for a few years actually tried to restore decent relations with the Islamic Republic all the way through the Iran Contra scandal, which at its core was in part an effort to build some sort of working relationship with the Iranians. Israel in the 1980s was actually a supporter of Iran in the Iran Iraq War. The Israelis at that point judged Saddam Hussein by far the greater threat. So was providing Iran with much needed spare parts and weapons for its war with Iraq. The Israel Iran relationship changed pretty abruptly in the 1990s after the Gulf War. But really, it wasn't until the 21st century that Israel and Iran really began to focus on each other as major security threats. The 1990s for the US reliant relationship I think it is worth noting that there have been periods of relative detente, and that was one of them. There were attempts by two Iranian presidents, Hashemir Rafsanjani and Khatami, to restore better relations. These were pragmatists who wanted to focus on Iran's economic development. Those attempts made a little bit of progress, but unfortunately did not eliminate the bad blood and mistrust and paranoia that reasserted itself after 2003 in the US Iran relationship. So I'd say 2003 was really a period in which the US and Iran went back to the sort of antagonism that had defined relationship at times in the 1980s as a result, first of all, of the revelation of the Iranian nuclear program in 2002 and as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Iranian response, which was to try to develop proxies to capture the US in Iran.
[12:16]
C
So, David, what would you say were the driving forces behind the JCPOA and the US negotiations with Iran in the JCPOA? Was Iran's strategy directly connected to the US's interest in this agreement, or were there other forces at play?
[12:35]
D
I think Iran's real concern was its collapsing economy. And the economy in Iran is bad for many, many reasons, some of them natural. There have been terrible drought, a lot of it just clerical mismanagement. Clerics may be able to lead sermons, but they're not very good at economic management. And they have in many ways run the country into the ground. They're daily blackouts in a country that has plenty of energy but can't make its power work. For example, Iran was under sanction. US held over $30 billion, which is real money for the Iranians, as a consequence of many things that the Iranians did. So I think the Iranians were really interested in getting relief from the sanctions. The other pillar was the election of Hassan Rouhani as president. The President has limited power in Iran, but not no power. Hassan Rouhani was a reformer who was dramatically elected with 57% of the vote in 2017 against some very conservative candidates. And I think this was a signal to the clerical leadership that the Iranians were tired of the old system. They were tired of the corruption, they were tired of the bad economy, and they wanted change. And I think that helped push the Iranians into recognizing that an agreement on limiting their nuclear program would get them relief of sanctions. And that's really the way it was tailored. There was always the question about what should we include in the negotiations? Should we include the long range ballistic missiles? Should we include support for terrorism? My answer when I was working on the project was no, let's take the model that we use for the former Soviet Union and let's pick a topic that we both agree needs negotiations, and that's nuclear weapons. And in the end, after long, protracted, painful negotiations between the Iran foreign minister, who went to the same graduate school I did, New Americans, and then Secretary of State Kerry, the agreement was finally finalized in 2015 and, and was working. President Trump, before he took the US out of the agreement, actually certified that it was in fact working. And I think it was working because all sides had an incentive to keep it working. It was also supported by the European Union, by Russia, by China, by Britain, by France. So there was broad support for some kind of limitation on Iran's nuclear program. Again, President Trump took the US out of the agreement. Right or wrong, I think different people will reach different judgments, but I think the incentive really was for the Iranians. It was, it was their, their economy. It is still failing today.
[15:10]
B
And just for our listeners who might not know, the JCPOA dictated what, what did Iran have to do and what, what was the relief that was given to them in return?
[15:19]
D
Okay, that's a great question. They were told they had to stop enriching uranium above about 3%, which is essentially reactor medical grade uranium. They had to take the enriched uranium they had and have it destroyed, which the US Did. And they also had to admit inspectors to the nuclear sites. Now, there's disagreement about how effective those inspections were. The International Atomic Energy Commission said it's generally been working. There were a few hiccups here and there. Both sides accused the other of kind of breaching around the edges. But the bottom line was that in exchange for what were essentially intrusive inspections limiting the centrifuges and getting rid of their enriched uranium, Iran got about $30 billion back. Now, some said, well, we gave Iran money. That money was actually held in escrow in US Banks. It was Iran's money all along. We released it again in exchange for Iran's abiding by the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
[16:22]
B
And maybe I'll turn to you, Carl, since then, since President Trump pulled us out of the jcpoa, rightly or wrongly, what did Iran do in response to that?
[16:32]
A
In 2019, in response to the Trump administration pulling out of the JCP oa, the Iranian government announced they were also no longer constrained by the agreement and so began accelerating uranium, getting some uranium up to over 60% enrichment, which has no practical civilian purpose and is really a sign of moving towards weapon grain grade uranium. So The Iranians since 2019 accelerated their enrichment. The IAEA in the last couple of years has brought a lot of attention to the extent to which they are. They were amassing a large amount of weapons grade uranium. There were inconclusive talks during the Biden administration about this question. Those were slow to start. And then the October 7, 2023 war happened which essentially ended any progress on those talks. All the while, of course, the Iranians kept up the enrichment. So this led to the situation at the beginning of 2025 where the Iranians and the Trump administration began talks this spring. Of course, those did not go very far before the events of June.
[17:37]
C
Just to clarify, it seems like to sort of say the quiet part out loud, we're connecting the US Israeli action against Iran in 2025 directly to the abrogation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of action in 2017. Or are other things at play here?
[17:58]
D
I would say other things are at Play. Clearly, as Dr. Forsberg said, the Hamas invasion of Israel changed the equation. Now Hamas is indirectly connected to Iran, but they do receive Iranian funding. And as the Israelis began to retaliate and to fight against Hamas, they expanded the battlefield. They realized that Hezbollah was vulnerable. They got inside of Hezbollah's heads, they, they sold them pagers, realizing that in many ways Hezbollah was probably the more serious enemy, while Hamas clearly inflicted terrible damage. Hezbollah was largely regarded as one of the most efficient militias in the Middle east, took credit for driving the Israelis out of southern Lebanon in around 2000. So I think Israel realized that while they were going after Hamas, they needed to curb Hezbollah as well before Hezbollah fought back at them. And they were very, very successful, much more successful than they were in 2006 when they fought a brutal war to a bloody standstill. I think Israel did a lot of studies on Hezbollah and realized you don't fight them tank on tank, weapon on weapon, troop on troop, you go after them. Asymmetrically, which is what they did. They limited much of their leadership. They used some very advanced technology to go after and find their missiles and ultimately assassinated Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. And it left Hezbollah in a badly weakened. They're still there, to be sure, but they're certainly been badly weakened. And then I think the question was, okay, we're making progress against Hamas, we have badly decapitated Hezbollah. What next? And I think then within the cad, the decision was made, let's go after the Iranian nuclear. We for said they have been threatening to do this for years. And I think that Netanyahu thought time was running out and made the decision to ultimately attack the Iranian nuclear site, something the US had warned him not to do out of for a whole variety of reasons.
[20:05]
A
I would agree with Dave that the Hezbollah dimension was definitely also a contributor to the events of June 2025. Within a few days of the October 7 attack, Hezbollah began launching missiles into Israel as a form, essentially trying to deter or coerce the Israelis and shape their response to the Hamas attack. Netanyahu considered the option in the first weeks of the war of immediately striking Hezbollah in retaliation, decided against it basically on the premise that he thought and feared that Hezbollah was too strong. That changed in 2024. And the Israelis, having controlled the situation in Gaza, refocused their attention on Hezbollah and on Lebanon. And then there were a series of actions that I think kind of set the psychological barriers, destroyed the psychological barriers contributing to the Israeli attack in June. In April of 2024, the Israelis killed two ROGC generals in Damascus who were supporting Hezbollah. In response, Iran for the first time directly launched missiles at Israel from Iranian territory. The Israelis responded. That was definitely a major development that had basically the first time it happened in 45 years that Israel and Iran traded direct strikes. And then another run to this happened in October of 2024 when Iran we talked some about the Axis resistance strategy, one of its weaknesses that it created a problem of extended deterrence for Iran. They had to make credible the threat to defend Hezbollah against Israeli responses. And so in October 2024 launched an even larger attack against Israeli soil, which was largely negated by Israeli air defenses. The Israelis struck back in October 2024, were surprisingly successful in destroying much of Iran's air defense. And so these two events, I think, set the stage for June 2025. The Israelis realized the weakness of Iranian air defense. And that, I think, was also a critical contributor to what happened.
[22:08]
B
So then for either one of you, take US into June 2025, what did Israel do? And then what did the US do? As a not necessarily response, but perhaps follow up is a better, better term to use there.
[22:22]
D
Israel went after the known nuclear facilities. Now there's always been a question about where are the nuclear facilities and how deeply are they buried, et cetera. Some of this is classified, with which we'll stay out of. But what the Israelis lacked was the ability to strike the deeply reinforced bunkers. Iran is one of the world's best makers of concrete. For example, they have earthquakes and so they need to make good concrete. It's a remarkably technologically robust country. And so the question was, how does one destroy these deeply buried bunkers? And that's when Netanyahu and Trump had a discussion and the President demurred, kind of whether or not this was purposeful strategy or not, said, well, we'll think about it, we'll get back to you. And then direct to the B2s with the massive ordnance detonator to attack these sites. Again, how good the damage assessments are, I need to be careful. But that was the first time that the US has really attacked Iran directly in a while.
[23:22]
B
So how did Iran respond to these attacks back in June? What was their response to both Israel and the United States?
[23:29]
D
It's been muted partly because, as Dr. Fariffe said, the Israelis did a very effective job in eliminating a lot of Iran's military capability, particularly their air defense. They fly very old aircraft, so they can barely keep in the air. Their, their military has been weakened. They do have the so called Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is key to understanding Iran. But their military, the Artesh, the regular military, has been badly weakened. It's been gutted through paranoia by the leadership that the generals are not Islamic enough. So Iran's response has been muted. There have been discussions again, as Dr. Forsberg pointed out, Iran has frequently elected, when they allow for open elections, reformist oriented, pragmatic presidents. There is one now and Peskanidi and he has talked about, well, let's, let's talk. Nothing as far as I know has really come of that. But to me it's an opportunity at least to see whether or not even after the destruction that both the US And Israel caused to the nuclear program, whether or not there can be some kind of rapprochement, some kind of understanding that to let this continue ultimately could escalate to the point where everybody loses.
[24:47]
A
The Iranian leadership certainly seems to be aware of just how bad its situation is. From a security and defense perspective, it seems like one of the first responses has been to focus on consolidating their internal security. There was recently an announcement that the Supreme National Security Council, which is essentially the key decision making body for foreign security affairs, that its mandate now is going to focus on domestic security as well. So they are clearly worried about that, which that is for a regime like Iran's. Really one of its first concerns. There have been mass arrests and trials. There seems to be a certain paranoia about infiltrators. Obviously the Israelis, as it was clear from the strikes on senior Iranian officials, do have networks in Iran. So they seem to be focusing on that. Their rhetoric, as David said, has been more muted. They've made subtle suggestions, they're open to negotiations and detox with the United States. Now how much they're willing to concede is a different question if he talks were to happen. But it seems like at this point there has to be fundamental recalibration in Iran because elements of its security strategy of the past 20 years have clearly failed. So I think there's probably a process going on, discussions about how to recalibrate the strategy. I think they will try to rebuild elements of the axis of resistance. I think Syria and Hezbollah are for the time being lost, but they still have the Houthis and the popular mobilization fronts in Iraq. They will have a decision to make on whether to try to go ahead as fast as they can to some sort of a nuclear breakout. I think that will probably depend on what the status of their nuclear program is after the US attacks. Are they set back a year or five to 10 years? So I think the Iranians are probably probably trying to recalibrate a new strategy and that's probably made harder by the fact that they have lost a number of their senior generals. In particular, a lot of senior IRGC leadership was killed in the strikes. So my prediction is the Iranians are going to probably lay low for the next year, avoid too provocative a strategy, at least make motions towards talks in order to allay international pressure as they try to rebuild, potentially try to rebuild the nuclear program, try to re establish some sort of effective deterrence.
[26:59]
C
It also seems like Israel's political objectives in the region have come into play more recently. The US's support of Israel in these Iranian strikes. Since then, Israel's objectives within the larger Palestine have, have sort of come into play. I'm curious how you see a possible detente between the US and Iran occurring given sort of the growing political objectives of Israel in the region.
[27:26]
D
Yeah, I think Israel's political objectives and indeed Its security objectives are increasingly coming under under criticism. Well, a lot of even the Gulf Arab countries cheer Israel's attack on Iran and on Hezbollah. There's a lot of concern about what's going on in Gaza. Interesting to note, Gallup survey today found that only 39% of Americans support Israel policy in Gaza. So Israel is losing at least public support for the conditions in Gaza. Again, I don't want to get into too much detail, but the question is what is Israel's overall strategy and how much does that have to do with Prime Minister Netanyahu's bid for survival? He has been charged with corruption multiple times. Some argue that the Gaza campaign is partly designed to keep him in power, partly designed to try to forestall the corruption trial, also to try to keep together a very, very fragile ruling coalition in the Israeli Knesset. He's got one or two members, and if he loses any, he faces a vote of no confidence. So he relies on some very conservative right wing members of his coalition who have demanded that Israel essentially take control of Gaza. And that seems to be his latest move. So he seemed to be focused a lot on Gaza. I think there's some in Israel who argue that, well, we've kind of dealt with the Iranian problem. For now. We don't have to worry about Hezbollah so much because we've decimated them. We need to focus on Gaza. So I think one could argue that Israel is really focused so much now on Hamas and on Gaza that they're beginning to lose focus on their position in the rest of the region. Before all of this started, Israel had been working on better relations with the Gulf Arab countries. During the first Trump administration, Israel signed with several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, something called the Abraham Accords, which essentially established diplomatic relations, recognition, and in many ways marginalized the Palestinians, or at least so they said. So whether or not Israel is going to get back to those paths or not, I think it's hard to say right now.
[29:39]
A
I'd agree that the Gaza question, the Palestinian question in the last few weeks has really shifted the world's attention from Iran. There's a really interesting question as to whether the Trump administration will engage and push for some sort of talks with the Iranians, and then that will kind of raise the question of how the Israelis relate to those talks going forward. Certainly the Israelis have some influence, as was clear in June, over the US Iranian talks and negotiations. So this a lot of uncertainties persisting in the future on these questions.
[30:12]
B
Indeed, as we come to an end here, is there anything you would want our listeners to especially know about in order to understand what happens with Iran, the greater Middle East, Israel, and even the United States in the months and years to come.
[30:27]
D
One of the things that's important is the deep unpopularity of the Iranian regime, particularly in the urban areas. People think of Iran as very conservative, kind of Shia oriented, clad in black. That's really not true. The Iranian public, again, mostly in the cities, is highly modern. They're Western oriented. They deeply resent the restrictions that the regime has. They like rock and roll. They like alcohol so much that they have Alcoholic Anonymous chapters in many big cities. They like American culture. They like blue jeans. They love American cars. They have a Ford Mustang club in Tehran, and they go cruising just like Americans do. And it's typical of the problem clerics have, because Iran in many ways was a very kind of pro modern, pro Western country during the Pahlavi regime. And people have not forgotten that. And so you can find alcohol readily in anywhere in Iran, despite of the prohibition by the clerics. And that's the struggle for the regime. They understand that they are unpopular. One of the reasons why the Israelis have been so successful in infiltrating The Iranians, as Dr. Forsberg said, the Israelis have done remarkable things by infiltrating the Iranian security services, even being able to locate the bedroom where a Hamas member was staying in Iran and blowing it up, killing the guy. So the regime has to recognize that at some point they face another 2009 Green Revolution, where people are simply going to say, enough clerical support, enough humiliation, enough restrictions, open up the economy, get things back together and stop picking fights with your neighbors. In many ways, some of these fights were picked by Khomeini. Very good book called Islamic State Crap by Mohammed Ayatollah Tabari at Texas A and M, who looks at this and says, a lot of this was Khomeini's fight for survival. He was not a senior cleric. He did not have the following of his more senior clerics. And in order to stay in power, he simply picked fights with the countries around him. Us, Israel, the Soviet Union, the Gulf, Arab states, just about everybody. So in many ways, his policies have been carried on by Ayatollah Khamani. And it's been devastating for Iran.
[32:43]
A
I'd say the Iranian government really is at a crossroads. For the last 20 years, they've had a security strategy that has come at some cost, particularly the cost of sanctions, but has achieved what the leadership under the Supreme Leader Khamenei has wanted it to achieve. And the regime has been more entrenched in battles with the domestic opposition going back to 2009. The green movement waves of domestic opposition 2017 and 19 and 2022 with the women Life Freedom movement. Now they're at a situation where they still have the problems of domestic opposition, but also have a security strategy that completely collapsed. So they'll have to think, I think, really hard about how they're going to adjust. Do they try to rebuild the same strategy that they've used the last 20 years and hope it works better next time? Or do they more fundamentally rethink? Is this nuclear program getting what we want out of it? Can we get a nuclear weapon? Or is that too far at this point? What is the future of the Axis of Resistance strategy? Adding to all this, the Supreme Leader is 85, presumably in ill health. It's not really clear he has much influence anymore, especially after the events of June. He spent a lot of time in a bunker, and it seems possible that the IRGC wants him to stay in a bunker out of policymaking. So who replaces him is obviously a huge question.
[33:56]
D
How?
[33:56]
A
The relationship between the stratum of clerical leadership and the irgc, who are probably the most powerful influence in Iran's government right now, will be fascinating going forward. So I think there could be interesting shifts going forward in the strategies dynamics of the Islamic Republic, or it's possible that things will go back to the same as they have surprisingly often in the last 20 years in terms of Iran's political structure.
[34:22]
C
Thank you so much for your time.
[34:23]
B
Thanks for being with us today.
[34:24]
D
Thank you, Brian.
[34:25]
A
Thank you.
[34:27]
B
Thank you for tuning in to Books to Battles. We hope you enjoyed today's discussion. If you enjoyed today's episode, please be sure to like and subscribe and even tell a friend about us. Also, don't forget to send us any questions you'd like to have answered or suggest future episodes. You can find our contact information under the faculty tab on the SAS website airuniversity af edu saass for Colonel Corey Holland, I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb, and don't forget, strategy doesn't stop on the last PA.

Summary7 min read

Books to Battles: "Iran Redux"

Podcast: Books to Battles (School of Advanced Air and Space Studies)
Date: April 8, 2026
Host: Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb
Guests: Dr. Wes Hutto (SAASS), Dr. David Sorensen (Air War College), Dr. Carl Forsberg (Air War College)

Episode Overview

This episode, "Iran Redux," brings together leading Middle East and strategy scholars from Air University and the Air War College to examine the causes, execution, and aftermath of the recent Israeli and American bombing campaigns against Iran in the summer of 2025. The panel provides in-depth historical context, explores strategic decision-making by Iran, Israel, and the US, and considers the future stability of Iran and its regional relationships.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Introductions & Expertise (00:39–02:35)

Dr. Sorensen: Deep research on the Middle East, author of books on the region and advisor during the Obama-era JCPOA talks.
Dr. Forsberg: Historian, expert on post-1967 Middle Eastern international relations, manuscript underway on regional transformations through 1980s.
The panelists’ backgrounds underscore their experience analyzing Iranian strategy and US policy decisions.

2. Iran’s Security Strategy: Pillars and Evolution (02:52–07:16)

Three main prongs of Iran’s 21st-century security strategy:
- Axis of Resistance: Backing of regional proxies/allies (Hezbollah, Assad regime, Houthis, Iraqi militias) for influence and deterrence. "The axis resistance strategy for 20 years turned out to be fairly effective." (A, 03:35)
- Nuclear Threshold Strategy: Developing a program close to, but not crossing into, actual bomb production as a deterrent.
- Asymmetric Capabilities: Ballistic missiles and, more recently, drones to threaten retaliation against US or Israel.
- Fourth, now irrelevant pillar: Threat to close the Straits of Hormuz, less relevant post-China's regional economic engagement.
Notable shift: This composite strategy "all very quickly collapsed" in 2024–2025, surprising even area experts. (D, 07:01)

3. Timeline and Breakdown of US-Israel-Iran Relations (07:16–12:16)

Roots of hostility traced back to:
- 1979 embassy takeover (Khomeini's regime consolidation)
- US coup in 1953 (propping up the Shah)
- US support for Iraq in the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War; downing of Iranian Airbus in 1988.
Cycles of Attempted Détente: Some pragmatic Iranian presidents (Rafsanjani, Khatami) tried to improve relations in the ’90s; mutual suspicion always returned.
Changing alignments: Israel was actually supportive of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War to counterbalance Saddam Hussein but by the 21st century, saw Iran as a primary security threat.

“Khomeini and his followers very much were the belief the United States was…trying to strangle Islam in Iran and across the Middle East.” (A, 09:27)

4. The JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal): Formation, Collapse, and Consequences (12:16–17:58)

Motivations for JCPOA:
- Iran’s economic collapse under sanctions prompted movement toward negotiations — “their economy…is still failing today.” (D, 15:10)
- The 2013 election of reformist President Rouhani signaled popular desire for change.
Core Provisions:
- Iran capped uranium enrichment at 3%, dismantled enriched uranium stockpiles, allowed intrusive inspections.
- In exchange: ~$30 billion in sanctions relief (Iran’s escrowed funds).
US Withdrawal & Aftermath:
- Trump administration abrogated the deal in 2017; Iran progressively ramped up enrichment to weapons-grade stockpiles.
- Attempts to restore negotiations under the Biden and second Trump administrations faltered, especially after regionally destabilizing events in 2023–24.

5. Regional Events Leading Up to Summer 2025 Strikes (17:58–22:08)

Catalyst Events:
- Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel—shifting regional dynamics.
- Hezbollah's escalated involvement—missile launches against Israel.
- Israeli decapitation strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian IRGC generals.
- Escalation: For the first time, Iran directly launched missiles at Israel; Israel retaliated effectively, revealing Iranian air defense weakness.

“It was the first time in 45 years that Israel and Iran traded direct strikes.” (A, 21:30)

6. Execution: The Summer 2025 US-Israeli Strikes on Iran (22:08–23:21)

Israeli Strikes:
- Targeted known Iranian nuclear facilities; some facilities hardened against attack (Iran’s expertise in reinforced concrete).
US Role:
- After initial hesitation, US employed B-2 bombers and "massive ordnance" to attack deeply buried Iranian sites.
Outcome: First major US strike on Iran in decades; the full extent of damage remains classified.

7. Iranian Response & Regime Instability (23:21–26:58)

Muted Immediate Response:
- Iran’s military capacity weakened; focus shifted to internal security, mass arrests, and paranoia over infiltration.
- Government signals vague willingness for talks, but is focused on regime survival and recalibrating security strategy.

“It seems like…one of the first responses has been to focus on consolidating their internal security.” (A, 24:47)

Future Uncertainties:
- Iran weighs whether to rebuild old strategies (proxies, nuclear deterrence) or rethink its posture.
- Loss of senior IRGC leaders complicates recalibration.

8. Israel’s Political Objectives and Long-term Region Shifts (26:58–30:11)

Israel’s Focus Shifting:
- After weakening Hezbollah and striking Iran, Israel redoubles efforts in Gaza, potentially for domestic political reasons (Netanyahu’s personal and coalition survival).
- Loss of international popularity—e.g., “only 39% of Americans support Israel policy in Gaza” (Gallup, 27:26).
- The Abraham Accords demonstrated Israel’s previous diplomatic gains; its current focus on Gaza may undermine regional normalization.

“The Gaza question…the Palestinian question in the last few weeks has really shifted the world’s attention from Iran.” (A, 29:38)

9. Future Prospects for Iran and Regional Dynamics (30:11–34:22)

Internal Tensions and Potential Unrest:
- Iranian public (especially urban, younger) is Westernized, frustrated by cleric-imposed restrictions, and open to reform.
- Regime’s legitimacy at stake; risk of future opposition movements reminiscent of the 2009 Green Revolution and subsequent unrest.

“You can find alcohol readily anywhere in Iran…they like rock and roll…Ford Mustang club in Tehran.” (D, 30:26)

Strategic Dilemmas:
- Regime at a crossroads: double down on or rethink regional strategy, nuclear aims, reliance on proxies.
- Supreme Leader Khamenei aging and isolated, possibility of transition or power struggle with IRGC.
- Next months/years pivotal for both regime stability and US/Israeli regional aims.

Notable Quotes

Dr. Forsberg (A):
- “The 21st century Iranian strategy has really relied on three pillars…” (03:00)
- “Khomeini and his followers very much were the belief the United States was…trying to strangle Islam in Iran and across the Middle East.” (09:27)
- “The Iranian government really is at a crossroads.” (32:43)
Dr. Sorensen (D):
- “The axis resistance strategy for 20 years turned out to be fairly effective.” (03:35)
- “I don't think any of us really expected the rapidity of the collapse…” (07:01)
- “Their economy… is still failing today.” (15:10)
- “You can find alcohol readily anywhere in Iran…They have a Ford Mustang club in Tehran.” (30:26)
Dr. Whitman Cobb (B):
- “We're also changing up our conversation today and turning our attention to an issue that has attracted a lot of attention this summer…” (00:40)

Timestamps for Key Segments

02:52 – Iran’s Security Doctrine and Axis of Resistance
07:36 – Timeline and Major Events: US-Israel-Iran Relations
12:16 – The JCPOA: Formation and Justifications
16:32 – Iran’s Reaction & Nuclear Program after US Withdrawal
17:58 – Linkage between JCPOA Collapse & Summer 2025 Strikes
22:22 – The Execution: Israeli and US Strikes on Iran
23:21 – Iran’s Muted Immediate Response to Strikes
26:58 – Israel’s Political Objectives Post-Strikes
30:11 – Internal Iranian Dissent and Demographics
32:43 – Iran’s Strategic Crossroads & Potential Transitions

Tone & Language

Throughout, the discussion balances academic rigor and strategic analysis with real-world policy implications, offering clear, accessible explanations without losing nuance or depth. The speakers frequently draw on their experience, candidly admit surprises, and ground bold claims in both recent intelligence and deep history.

Memorable Moments

The frank appraisal: “Clerics may be able to lead sermons, but they're not very good at economic management.” (D, 12:35)
On popular culture in Iran: “They have a Ford Mustang club in Tehran, and they go cruising just like Americans do.” (D, 30:26)
The pivotal assessment of regime stability: “The relationship between the stratum of clerical leadership and the IRGC…will be fascinating going forward.” (A, 33:56)

Summary

"Iran Redux" offers a highly detailed and engaging exploration of Iran’s evolving strategic position following unprecedented US and Israeli military actions. Drawing on history, analysis of current events, and firsthand expertise, the episode explores the collapse of Iran's once-formidable deterrence strategy, the domestic and regional consequences of these strikes, and the uncertain future for both the Islamic Republic’s regime and the broader Middle East. For listeners seeking clarity on the shifting strategic landscape, this episode is essential, bringing together clear explanations, surprising anecdotes, and expert forecasts for what comes next.

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Transcript42 lines

[00:00]
A
Foreign.
[00:06]
B
Welcome to Books, to Battles where we explore academic insights for real world air and space strategy. I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb, professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. And before we get any further, we want to note that all opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily represent the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, the US Government or any other affiliated organizations. Unfortunately, Colonel Holland, my usual co host, is unable to join us today, so I am thrilled to be joined by another of our SAS faculty who is no stranger to the show, Dr. Wes Hutto.
[00:40]
C
Happy to be here.
[00:41]
B
Thanks for being on stepping in at the last minute. And we're also changing up our conversation today and turning our attention to an issue that has attracted a lot of attention this summer and that is the Israeli and American bombing campaigns against Iran. To do so, we are joined by some of our colleagues from the air War College, Dr. David Sorensen, professor of National Security Studies and Dr. Carl Forsberg, Assistant professor in the Department of Strategy. Welcome gentlemen.
[01:07]
D
Thank you.
[01:07]
A
Thank you for having us.
[01:09]
B
Before we get too far into this, I'd like to ask you guys to just tell us a little bit about yourselves, your background and how you got here to Air War College and Air University.
[01:18]
D
I'm David Sorensen. I've been here since 1991. I was at Ohio State's Prashon center and a little place called Denison University. I came here because it's a great opportunity to teach highly talented students and it's a great opportunity to do research. So the time I've been here I've published eight books, a few on the Middle east, one textbook on the Middle east, one on the Syrian Civil War, one on the politics of Lebanon. I was also active during the formation of the so called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Obama era nuclear agreement with Iran. I did some advising on that back in 2012. So I'm happy to be here. Thank you for having me.
[01:59]
A
And I'm Carl Forsberg. I'm a Professor of Strategy at the Air War College. I'm a historian by background and training, working on the modern Middle east, the Cold War, US Foreign policy, finishing a book manuscript right now looking at the transformation of Middle Eastern international relations from the 1967 war through the Iranian Revolution and the Iran Iraq War in 1980. I, once again similar to Dr. Sorensen, was drawn to the War College by the spectacular students we have. It really is rewarding having them in the classroom. I've been here for four years now and it's been a great experience.
[02:36]
B
Great. Well, thank you for being here with us today. And it sounds like we have the exact two people we want to have on to discuss this issue. So before we get into what happened this summer, could what would one of you like to speak to? Maybe some of the background. What is pertinent for our listeners to know in order to understand what happened this summer?
[02:52]
A
Well, I think that the relevant background is much of it is Iran's security strategy. For, I'd say Approximately the last 20 years, going back to the early 2000s, Iran has had a strategy for security, for defense, and deterrence for regional influence that has roughly three prongs. Much of this has been kind of shaped by the ideological influence of the Iranian revolution, the experience of the Iran Iraq war. I think either David or I would be happy to talk more about some of that deep history. But the 21st century Iranian strategy has really relied on three pillars, one of which has been the so called axis of resistance strategy. Iran has inculcated a series of regional allies and proxies, Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria going back to the 1980s and then more recently, the Houthis in Yemen and the popular mobilization fronts in Iraq. So the Iranians have seen these groups both as a means of gaining regional influence, but also as a means of coercion and deterrence against the US Israel and the Gulf Cooperation states. The axis reason strategy for 20 years turned out to be fairly effective. It provided the Iranians a relatively cheap form of, of deterrence. It was, I think, fairly effective in keeping the United States from strikes on Iran. You think back, the US has been talking about direct strikes in Iran basically since the George W. Bush administration in roughly 2007, 2008. It's been talked about time and time again. It hasn't happened. So the Iranians, their strategy, even if it fell apart in the last year, managed to get some things right for a while. And we could talk maybe later about what fell apart in that strategy. A second prong of the Iranian strategy has been the nuclear program. They've essentially, as far as we can tell, pursue something of a nuclear threshold strategy determining not to actually break out and get a nuclear weapon, but to develop the program far enough that they are in close reach of developing a weapon and can use the implicit threat of making that nuclear breakout to forestall any sort of US Or Israeli attack. Now, I think there's some questions about did that strategy change in the last few years? What exactly where have they been over the last 15, 20 years when it comes to their resolve to actually get a bomb versus being a threshold status. And then a third pillar of the Iranian strategy has been asymmetrical ballistic missiles. More recently drones as another form of essentially a threat of punishment against the United States or Israel to deter any sort of direct attack, which once again is for a country like Iran that's probably a cost effective strategy. It doesn't really make sense to go toe to toe with the United States or Israel. And so the threat of kind of asymmetrical retaliation once again for 15 years was fairly effective I think 10, 15 years ago. There's a fourth pillar to the Iran's strategy threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz that's become no longer relevant since China, not the US is now the major importer of Middle Eastern oil.
[05:54]
D
I think that's a great strategic summary of Iran's overall strategy. I agree. I think that Iran did develop a fairly successful deterrent strategy with the so called Axis of resistance or as the King of Jordan called it, the Shia Crescent, made mostly of Shia oriented countries tied to the Shia in Yemen who were actually of a different Shia branch than the Iranians, but still they claim to be Shia to Hezbollah in Lebanon which has been around since the end 80s and a very effective, very deadly militia until it wasn't. And the Assad regime in Syria which has an interesting kind of political tie to the Shia. They're not exactly Shia, they're known as Alawi, but again it's close. So Iran generally picked Shia countries. The exception was Hamas which is a Sunna oriented organization but happy to take anybody's money. But again the strategy was reasonably successful until it all very quickly collapsed. And I don't think any of us saw this coming. I will be honest, I've looked at this region for a long time as Dr. Forsberg and I don't think any of us really expected the rapidity of the collapse of Syria and then the dramatic success that the Israelis carried out against Hamas, Hezbollah and ultimately Iran.
[07:17]
C
Can you give us a timeline on U. S Israeli, Iranian relations during the Axis of Res and sort of just the big sort of events that have marked the last 25 years or so and have defined the character of the relationship between these states.
[07:36]
D
You know, it all started off badly when Ayatollah Khomeini, for largely political survival reasons, authorized the takeover of the US Embassy which again certainly has poisoned relations ever since. The Iranians accused the United States of having foisted a coup d' etat against their democratically elected leader while back, Mohammad Mossadegh, which brought in the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was the US supporter, if not an ally, who ruled from 1953 until 1979 when he was overthrown. The Iranians were very unhappy with the United States for supporting him. We are very unhappy with the Iranians for the takeover of the embassy. And that relationship has really continued up until now. There have been brief efforts to try to break the stalemate. The other event was the invasion by Iraq, Saddam Hussein's Iraq of Iran. In starting 1981-1988, the United States tacitly supported Saddam Hussein, who directed poisonous gas and ballistic missiles and lots of other things into Iran. Iran fought back, but again the charges were that why did the United States support this brutal dictator whom we worked to oust in fighting against Iran? And that again was another one of those seeds. US shot down an Iranian Airbus by accident, but the Iranians are convinced it was done on purpose. It was around 1988 which Ayatollah Khomeini used to justify signing a peace agreement with the Iran Iraq war. So there have been a number of instances that have really contaminated the relationships between the United States and Iran. US has supported Israel almost unconditionally relative to its policies towards. Towards Iran.
[09:28]
A
Yeah, I'd add the really the Iranian revolution was premised to some degree on. It was in part an Islamic revolution, but was also defined itself as an anti imperialist revolution. Khomeini and his followers very much were the belief the United States was in ways overt and subtle, essentially trying to strangle Islam in Iran and across the Middle East. And so in the mindset of the founding generation of the Islamic Republic, it was an anti imperialist republic. And one of its great objectives was to maneuver the United States out of the Middle East. And that has been a consistent trend in Iranian policy. Now some of the initial ideological zeal of the Islamic Republic, of course, has waned since the 1980s. But that foundational belief that Iran's security depended on ultimately getting the United States out of the Middle east has remained a key element of Iranian strategy. As to the US Iran, Israel relationship, it was really quite actually interesting and complicated in strange ways in the first decade. The United States, despite the Iran hostage crisis in the early 80s, initially thought the biggest threat in the Middle east remained the Soviet Union. And so for a few years actually tried to restore decent relations with the Islamic Republic all the way through the Iran Contra scandal, which at its core was in part an effort to build some sort of working relationship with the Iranians. Israel in the 1980s was actually a supporter of Iran in the Iran Iraq War. The Israelis at that point judged Saddam Hussein by far the greater threat. So was providing Iran with much needed spare parts and weapons for its war with Iraq. The Israel Iran relationship changed pretty abruptly in the 1990s after the Gulf War. But really, it wasn't until the 21st century that Israel and Iran really began to focus on each other as major security threats. The 1990s for the US reliant relationship I think it is worth noting that there have been periods of relative detente, and that was one of them. There were attempts by two Iranian presidents, Hashemir Rafsanjani and Khatami, to restore better relations. These were pragmatists who wanted to focus on Iran's economic development. Those attempts made a little bit of progress, but unfortunately did not eliminate the bad blood and mistrust and paranoia that reasserted itself after 2003 in the US Iran relationship. So I'd say 2003 was really a period in which the US and Iran went back to the sort of antagonism that had defined relationship at times in the 1980s as a result, first of all, of the revelation of the Iranian nuclear program in 2002 and as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Iranian response, which was to try to develop proxies to capture the US in Iran.
[12:16]
C
So, David, what would you say were the driving forces behind the JCPOA and the US negotiations with Iran in the JCPOA? Was Iran's strategy directly connected to the US's interest in this agreement, or were there other forces at play?
[12:35]
D
I think Iran's real concern was its collapsing economy. And the economy in Iran is bad for many, many reasons, some of them natural. There have been terrible drought, a lot of it just clerical mismanagement. Clerics may be able to lead sermons, but they're not very good at economic management. And they have in many ways run the country into the ground. They're daily blackouts in a country that has plenty of energy but can't make its power work. For example, Iran was under sanction. US held over $30 billion, which is real money for the Iranians, as a consequence of many things that the Iranians did. So I think the Iranians were really interested in getting relief from the sanctions. The other pillar was the election of Hassan Rouhani as president. The President has limited power in Iran, but not no power. Hassan Rouhani was a reformer who was dramatically elected with 57% of the vote in 2017 against some very conservative candidates. And I think this was a signal to the clerical leadership that the Iranians were tired of the old system. They were tired of the corruption, they were tired of the bad economy, and they wanted change. And I think that helped push the Iranians into recognizing that an agreement on limiting their nuclear program would get them relief of sanctions. And that's really the way it was tailored. There was always the question about what should we include in the negotiations? Should we include the long range ballistic missiles? Should we include support for terrorism? My answer when I was working on the project was no, let's take the model that we use for the former Soviet Union and let's pick a topic that we both agree needs negotiations, and that's nuclear weapons. And in the end, after long, protracted, painful negotiations between the Iran foreign minister, who went to the same graduate school I did, New Americans, and then Secretary of State Kerry, the agreement was finally finalized in 2015 and, and was working. President Trump, before he took the US out of the agreement, actually certified that it was in fact working. And I think it was working because all sides had an incentive to keep it working. It was also supported by the European Union, by Russia, by China, by Britain, by France. So there was broad support for some kind of limitation on Iran's nuclear program. Again, President Trump took the US out of the agreement. Right or wrong, I think different people will reach different judgments, but I think the incentive really was for the Iranians. It was, it was their, their economy. It is still failing today.
[15:10]
B
And just for our listeners who might not know, the JCPOA dictated what, what did Iran have to do and what, what was the relief that was given to them in return?
[15:19]
D
Okay, that's a great question. They were told they had to stop enriching uranium above about 3%, which is essentially reactor medical grade uranium. They had to take the enriched uranium they had and have it destroyed, which the US Did. And they also had to admit inspectors to the nuclear sites. Now, there's disagreement about how effective those inspections were. The International Atomic Energy Commission said it's generally been working. There were a few hiccups here and there. Both sides accused the other of kind of breaching around the edges. But the bottom line was that in exchange for what were essentially intrusive inspections limiting the centrifuges and getting rid of their enriched uranium, Iran got about $30 billion back. Now, some said, well, we gave Iran money. That money was actually held in escrow in US Banks. It was Iran's money all along. We released it again in exchange for Iran's abiding by the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
[16:22]
B
And maybe I'll turn to you, Carl, since then, since President Trump pulled us out of the jcpoa, rightly or wrongly, what did Iran do in response to that?
[16:32]
A
In 2019, in response to the Trump administration pulling out of the JCP oa, the Iranian government announced they were also no longer constrained by the agreement and so began accelerating uranium, getting some uranium up to over 60% enrichment, which has no practical civilian purpose and is really a sign of moving towards weapon grain grade uranium. So The Iranians since 2019 accelerated their enrichment. The IAEA in the last couple of years has brought a lot of attention to the extent to which they are. They were amassing a large amount of weapons grade uranium. There were inconclusive talks during the Biden administration about this question. Those were slow to start. And then the October 7, 2023 war happened which essentially ended any progress on those talks. All the while, of course, the Iranians kept up the enrichment. So this led to the situation at the beginning of 2025 where the Iranians and the Trump administration began talks this spring. Of course, those did not go very far before the events of June.
[17:37]
C
Just to clarify, it seems like to sort of say the quiet part out loud, we're connecting the US Israeli action against Iran in 2025 directly to the abrogation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of action in 2017. Or are other things at play here?
[17:58]
D
I would say other things are at Play. Clearly, as Dr. Forsberg said, the Hamas invasion of Israel changed the equation. Now Hamas is indirectly connected to Iran, but they do receive Iranian funding. And as the Israelis began to retaliate and to fight against Hamas, they expanded the battlefield. They realized that Hezbollah was vulnerable. They got inside of Hezbollah's heads, they, they sold them pagers, realizing that in many ways Hezbollah was probably the more serious enemy, while Hamas clearly inflicted terrible damage. Hezbollah was largely regarded as one of the most efficient militias in the Middle east, took credit for driving the Israelis out of southern Lebanon in around 2000. So I think Israel realized that while they were going after Hamas, they needed to curb Hezbollah as well before Hezbollah fought back at them. And they were very, very successful, much more successful than they were in 2006 when they fought a brutal war to a bloody standstill. I think Israel did a lot of studies on Hezbollah and realized you don't fight them tank on tank, weapon on weapon, troop on troop, you go after them. Asymmetrically, which is what they did. They limited much of their leadership. They used some very advanced technology to go after and find their missiles and ultimately assassinated Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. And it left Hezbollah in a badly weakened. They're still there, to be sure, but they're certainly been badly weakened. And then I think the question was, okay, we're making progress against Hamas, we have badly decapitated Hezbollah. What next? And I think then within the cad, the decision was made, let's go after the Iranian nuclear. We for said they have been threatening to do this for years. And I think that Netanyahu thought time was running out and made the decision to ultimately attack the Iranian nuclear site, something the US had warned him not to do out of for a whole variety of reasons.
[20:05]
A
I would agree with Dave that the Hezbollah dimension was definitely also a contributor to the events of June 2025. Within a few days of the October 7 attack, Hezbollah began launching missiles into Israel as a form, essentially trying to deter or coerce the Israelis and shape their response to the Hamas attack. Netanyahu considered the option in the first weeks of the war of immediately striking Hezbollah in retaliation, decided against it basically on the premise that he thought and feared that Hezbollah was too strong. That changed in 2024. And the Israelis, having controlled the situation in Gaza, refocused their attention on Hezbollah and on Lebanon. And then there were a series of actions that I think kind of set the psychological barriers, destroyed the psychological barriers contributing to the Israeli attack in June. In April of 2024, the Israelis killed two ROGC generals in Damascus who were supporting Hezbollah. In response, Iran for the first time directly launched missiles at Israel from Iranian territory. The Israelis responded. That was definitely a major development that had basically the first time it happened in 45 years that Israel and Iran traded direct strikes. And then another run to this happened in October of 2024 when Iran we talked some about the Axis resistance strategy, one of its weaknesses that it created a problem of extended deterrence for Iran. They had to make credible the threat to defend Hezbollah against Israeli responses. And so in October 2024 launched an even larger attack against Israeli soil, which was largely negated by Israeli air defenses. The Israelis struck back in October 2024, were surprisingly successful in destroying much of Iran's air defense. And so these two events, I think, set the stage for June 2025. The Israelis realized the weakness of Iranian air defense. And that, I think, was also a critical contributor to what happened.
[22:08]
B
So then for either one of you, take US into June 2025, what did Israel do? And then what did the US do? As a not necessarily response, but perhaps follow up is a better, better term to use there.
[22:22]
D
Israel went after the known nuclear facilities. Now there's always been a question about where are the nuclear facilities and how deeply are they buried, et cetera. Some of this is classified, with which we'll stay out of. But what the Israelis lacked was the ability to strike the deeply reinforced bunkers. Iran is one of the world's best makers of concrete. For example, they have earthquakes and so they need to make good concrete. It's a remarkably technologically robust country. And so the question was, how does one destroy these deeply buried bunkers? And that's when Netanyahu and Trump had a discussion and the President demurred, kind of whether or not this was purposeful strategy or not, said, well, we'll think about it, we'll get back to you. And then direct to the B2s with the massive ordnance detonator to attack these sites. Again, how good the damage assessments are, I need to be careful. But that was the first time that the US has really attacked Iran directly in a while.
[23:22]
B
So how did Iran respond to these attacks back in June? What was their response to both Israel and the United States?
[23:29]
D
It's been muted partly because, as Dr. Fariffe said, the Israelis did a very effective job in eliminating a lot of Iran's military capability, particularly their air defense. They fly very old aircraft, so they can barely keep in the air. Their, their military has been weakened. They do have the so called Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is key to understanding Iran. But their military, the Artesh, the regular military, has been badly weakened. It's been gutted through paranoia by the leadership that the generals are not Islamic enough. So Iran's response has been muted. There have been discussions again, as Dr. Forsberg pointed out, Iran has frequently elected, when they allow for open elections, reformist oriented, pragmatic presidents. There is one now and Peskanidi and he has talked about, well, let's, let's talk. Nothing as far as I know has really come of that. But to me it's an opportunity at least to see whether or not even after the destruction that both the US And Israel caused to the nuclear program, whether or not there can be some kind of rapprochement, some kind of understanding that to let this continue ultimately could escalate to the point where everybody loses.
[24:47]
A
The Iranian leadership certainly seems to be aware of just how bad its situation is. From a security and defense perspective, it seems like one of the first responses has been to focus on consolidating their internal security. There was recently an announcement that the Supreme National Security Council, which is essentially the key decision making body for foreign security affairs, that its mandate now is going to focus on domestic security as well. So they are clearly worried about that, which that is for a regime like Iran's. Really one of its first concerns. There have been mass arrests and trials. There seems to be a certain paranoia about infiltrators. Obviously the Israelis, as it was clear from the strikes on senior Iranian officials, do have networks in Iran. So they seem to be focusing on that. Their rhetoric, as David said, has been more muted. They've made subtle suggestions, they're open to negotiations and detox with the United States. Now how much they're willing to concede is a different question if he talks were to happen. But it seems like at this point there has to be fundamental recalibration in Iran because elements of its security strategy of the past 20 years have clearly failed. So I think there's probably a process going on, discussions about how to recalibrate the strategy. I think they will try to rebuild elements of the axis of resistance. I think Syria and Hezbollah are for the time being lost, but they still have the Houthis and the popular mobilization fronts in Iraq. They will have a decision to make on whether to try to go ahead as fast as they can to some sort of a nuclear breakout. I think that will probably depend on what the status of their nuclear program is after the US attacks. Are they set back a year or five to 10 years? So I think the Iranians are probably probably trying to recalibrate a new strategy and that's probably made harder by the fact that they have lost a number of their senior generals. In particular, a lot of senior IRGC leadership was killed in the strikes. So my prediction is the Iranians are going to probably lay low for the next year, avoid too provocative a strategy, at least make motions towards talks in order to allay international pressure as they try to rebuild, potentially try to rebuild the nuclear program, try to re establish some sort of effective deterrence.
[26:59]
C
It also seems like Israel's political objectives in the region have come into play more recently. The US's support of Israel in these Iranian strikes. Since then, Israel's objectives within the larger Palestine have, have sort of come into play. I'm curious how you see a possible detente between the US and Iran occurring given sort of the growing political objectives of Israel in the region.
[27:26]
D
Yeah, I think Israel's political objectives and indeed Its security objectives are increasingly coming under under criticism. Well, a lot of even the Gulf Arab countries cheer Israel's attack on Iran and on Hezbollah. There's a lot of concern about what's going on in Gaza. Interesting to note, Gallup survey today found that only 39% of Americans support Israel policy in Gaza. So Israel is losing at least public support for the conditions in Gaza. Again, I don't want to get into too much detail, but the question is what is Israel's overall strategy and how much does that have to do with Prime Minister Netanyahu's bid for survival? He has been charged with corruption multiple times. Some argue that the Gaza campaign is partly designed to keep him in power, partly designed to try to forestall the corruption trial, also to try to keep together a very, very fragile ruling coalition in the Israeli Knesset. He's got one or two members, and if he loses any, he faces a vote of no confidence. So he relies on some very conservative right wing members of his coalition who have demanded that Israel essentially take control of Gaza. And that seems to be his latest move. So he seemed to be focused a lot on Gaza. I think there's some in Israel who argue that, well, we've kind of dealt with the Iranian problem. For now. We don't have to worry about Hezbollah so much because we've decimated them. We need to focus on Gaza. So I think one could argue that Israel is really focused so much now on Hamas and on Gaza that they're beginning to lose focus on their position in the rest of the region. Before all of this started, Israel had been working on better relations with the Gulf Arab countries. During the first Trump administration, Israel signed with several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, something called the Abraham Accords, which essentially established diplomatic relations, recognition, and in many ways marginalized the Palestinians, or at least so they said. So whether or not Israel is going to get back to those paths or not, I think it's hard to say right now.
[29:39]
A
I'd agree that the Gaza question, the Palestinian question in the last few weeks has really shifted the world's attention from Iran. There's a really interesting question as to whether the Trump administration will engage and push for some sort of talks with the Iranians, and then that will kind of raise the question of how the Israelis relate to those talks going forward. Certainly the Israelis have some influence, as was clear in June, over the US Iranian talks and negotiations. So this a lot of uncertainties persisting in the future on these questions.
[30:12]
B
Indeed, as we come to an end here, is there anything you would want our listeners to especially know about in order to understand what happens with Iran, the greater Middle East, Israel, and even the United States in the months and years to come.
[30:27]
D
One of the things that's important is the deep unpopularity of the Iranian regime, particularly in the urban areas. People think of Iran as very conservative, kind of Shia oriented, clad in black. That's really not true. The Iranian public, again, mostly in the cities, is highly modern. They're Western oriented. They deeply resent the restrictions that the regime has. They like rock and roll. They like alcohol so much that they have Alcoholic Anonymous chapters in many big cities. They like American culture. They like blue jeans. They love American cars. They have a Ford Mustang club in Tehran, and they go cruising just like Americans do. And it's typical of the problem clerics have, because Iran in many ways was a very kind of pro modern, pro Western country during the Pahlavi regime. And people have not forgotten that. And so you can find alcohol readily in anywhere in Iran, despite of the prohibition by the clerics. And that's the struggle for the regime. They understand that they are unpopular. One of the reasons why the Israelis have been so successful in infiltrating The Iranians, as Dr. Forsberg said, the Israelis have done remarkable things by infiltrating the Iranian security services, even being able to locate the bedroom where a Hamas member was staying in Iran and blowing it up, killing the guy. So the regime has to recognize that at some point they face another 2009 Green Revolution, where people are simply going to say, enough clerical support, enough humiliation, enough restrictions, open up the economy, get things back together and stop picking fights with your neighbors. In many ways, some of these fights were picked by Khomeini. Very good book called Islamic State Crap by Mohammed Ayatollah Tabari at Texas A and M, who looks at this and says, a lot of this was Khomeini's fight for survival. He was not a senior cleric. He did not have the following of his more senior clerics. And in order to stay in power, he simply picked fights with the countries around him. Us, Israel, the Soviet Union, the Gulf, Arab states, just about everybody. So in many ways, his policies have been carried on by Ayatollah Khamani. And it's been devastating for Iran.
[32:43]
A
I'd say the Iranian government really is at a crossroads. For the last 20 years, they've had a security strategy that has come at some cost, particularly the cost of sanctions, but has achieved what the leadership under the Supreme Leader Khamenei has wanted it to achieve. And the regime has been more entrenched in battles with the domestic opposition going back to 2009. The green movement waves of domestic opposition 2017 and 19 and 2022 with the women Life Freedom movement. Now they're at a situation where they still have the problems of domestic opposition, but also have a security strategy that completely collapsed. So they'll have to think, I think, really hard about how they're going to adjust. Do they try to rebuild the same strategy that they've used the last 20 years and hope it works better next time? Or do they more fundamentally rethink? Is this nuclear program getting what we want out of it? Can we get a nuclear weapon? Or is that too far at this point? What is the future of the Axis of Resistance strategy? Adding to all this, the Supreme Leader is 85, presumably in ill health. It's not really clear he has much influence anymore, especially after the events of June. He spent a lot of time in a bunker, and it seems possible that the IRGC wants him to stay in a bunker out of policymaking. So who replaces him is obviously a huge question.
[33:56]
D
How?
[33:56]
A
The relationship between the stratum of clerical leadership and the irgc, who are probably the most powerful influence in Iran's government right now, will be fascinating going forward. So I think there could be interesting shifts going forward in the strategies dynamics of the Islamic Republic, or it's possible that things will go back to the same as they have surprisingly often in the last 20 years in terms of Iran's political structure.
[34:22]
C
Thank you so much for your time.
[34:23]
B
Thanks for being with us today.
[34:24]
D
Thank you, Brian.
[34:25]
A
Thank you.
[34:27]
B
Thank you for tuning in to Books to Battles. We hope you enjoyed today's discussion. If you enjoyed today's episode, please be sure to like and subscribe and even tell a friend about us. Also, don't forget to send us any questions you'd like to have answered or suggest future episodes. You can find our contact information under the faculty tab on the SAS website airuniversity af edu saass for Colonel Corey Holland, I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb, and don't forget, strategy doesn't stop on the last PA.