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- [00:00]
A
Foreign.
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B
Welcome to Books, to Battles, where we explore academic insights for real world air and space strategy. I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb, professor of Strategy and Security Studies and Deputy Commandant at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
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C
And I'm Colonel Corey Holland, professor of Strategy and Security Studies, also at sas. Before we get any further, we want to note that all opinions expressed here are ours and our guest and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or war, or the United States government. And today we have an interview with Lieutenant General Retired David Deptula of the Mitchell Institute, and we recorded it on Wednesday, April 8, when he was in town, and we wanted to give that to y'.
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All.
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C
So without further ado, here it is. We are joined today by Lieutenant General Retired David Deptula. He's the world's foremost expert on military aerospace issues and a pioneer in conceptualizing, planning and executing national security operations, from humanitarian relief all the way to major combat. Featured in the book Air Power Pioneers, From Billy Mitchell to Dave Deptula and several firsts, along with a multitude of commands, academic and professional titles. But your overall area of focus now is as the first Dean of the Mitchell Institute. So welcome to Books to Battle.
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D
Hey, thanks very much for having me here. I'm looking forward to our discussion.
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C
We're really excited to have you on the podcast and want to say thank you for coming. So let's start first with the Mitchell Institute. What is the vision and the mission of the Mitchell Institute?
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D
Well, it's a good place to start, and what I'd tell you is the Mitchell Institute exists for a very specific reason, and that's to make sure America's leaders understand the indispensable role of air and space power in securing our nation's interests. Now, our mission rests on three core educating the public about the virtues and values of exploiting the advantages of operating in air and space, informing the national security debate, which is shorthand for securing as many resources as we can for the Air Force and the Space Force inside the Beltway, and then cultivating the next generation of air and space minded leaders. Now, that's not recruiting. Department of Defense does a good job of that. We're talking about folks in the policy environment. What makes the Mitchell Institute different is that we're the only think tank in the United States focused exclusively on air and space power. And that matters because for too long, air power and now space power have been misunderstood, undervalued, or the most egregious example, treated as merely supporting Arms instead of what they really are. And that's fundamental instruments of national power. So if you do not understand air and space power, then you don't fully understand modern warfare, deterrence, or how to secure America's global interest. So our job is not to echo conventional wisdom, is to challenge it. And that means questioning established doctrine, outdated organizational constructs and stale operational concepts, and, and asking a very simple question, is there a better way to meet America's national security objectives? And we think that we owe it to the nation to provide honest answers grounded in history, operational experience and data, not bureaucratic inertia, service parochialism, or intellectual fashion, which quite frankly tends to be dominating the discussion space. And I know we're going to talk a little bit about some of that later on.
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B
Yeah. So one of the areas I study quite a lot is public opinion of space exploration. And I know probably better than most how little the American public and even our elected leaders know about the space domain in that sort of mission of educating the public and the D.C. area. And let's just say at large, what are some of the biggest barriers you've encountered to really carrying out some of these educational activities?
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D
Probably the biggest one that comes to mind is the lack of interest on the part of the American public, and quite frankly on the Congress as well, of national security writ large, much less understanding the key rules that operations in space play, not just to informing and accomplishing our national security objectives, but the impact of space on their daily lives.
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B
Absolutely.
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D
Now, we all understand that if that space stuff goes dark, no one can buy gas, no one can get money out of their ATM machine.
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B
I always.
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D
No one can deposit. No one can deposit money in their bank, much less pull it out or buy stock or get stuff, purchase anything. I was going to use a commercial name, but you know, you know, purchase stuff online. And not to mention the number of
- [05:38]
C
people that are going to be lost in and around major cities.
- [05:41]
D
Yeah, all of that. So that's the biggest. That's the biggest obstacle. So, you know, back to what we do at Mitchell Institute. When the Space Force stood up, I stood up a Space Power Advantage center of Excellence. And So we have three senior fellows dedicated 100% of the time that are producing products, not just written products, but engaged in podcasts, engaged in space workshops, war games, to lend an eye toward the importance of the space domain.
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C
Speaking of education, in a recent interview on Fox News, you said that you were trying to educate the public about what air superiority meant in light of the shoot downs that occurred over the weekend. Of end of March, beginning of April, you said that air superiority does not mean zero risk. In the age of cheap, mass produced one way drones and short range ballistic missiles, what does air superiority mean?
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D
Well, yeah, let me reiterate that it doesn't mean zero risk. And what it does not mean is the total absence of enemy air and missile threats. I mean, you can take it the extreme. I mean, there are some people out there that would say, well, as long as the enemy and he is shooting bullets, then you don't achieve air superiority. I mean, that's the absurdity of some of these statements that are being made now. I think Air Force doctrine defines it correctly. And it's that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. So that's an enormously important definition because it captures the reality that air superiority is not absolute or permanent. It's achieved and maintained in specific places in time frames in what I often describe as windows of opportunity that provide freedom to attack. Okay, back to your implied point in your question. And that's the proliferation of low cost cruise missiles, first person video precision guided munitions. I call them precision guided munitions because that's what they are. I'll talk a little bit about the just the horrible implication of the term drone, but for now let me just talk about the fact that other uninhabited aircraft certainly complicate the problem, but it doesn't invalidate the concept. Air superiority is a condition. Persistent hostile drone or missile activity may mean the air defense remains contested in some sectors at some altitude and some moments. But the real issue is whether those threats create prohibitive interference. And that's why definitions are important, because if they do not. I'm sorry, let me turn that around. If they do, then yes, you do not have air superiority in that place and time. If they do not, then you may still possess air superiority even though threats remain. So the answer is not to redefine the objective. The answer is to adapt the means by which we achieve it through offensive counter air operations, suppression, enemy air defenses, resilient command and control, EW, missile defense, and so on and so forth. So air superiority remains the goal because it's what enables operational freedom and strategic access or strategic success.
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B
So. So Jones, you mentioned that you take issue with sort of the implications of the term. Can you elaborate a little bit on that?
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D
Implications?
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B
Well, you just said know the, the term drone. Oh, drone, yeah.
- [09:30]
D
It's not the implications, it's the lack of Definition, people apply the term drone to everything from a micro vehicle that could be operating inside this room that we don't know about, that's recording our every word and transmitting it back to the bad guys, all the way up to a 100,000 pound vehicle that can employ force. So what is it? And then the, the problem is this ubiquitous nature of the term that's applied to everything confuses discussion and understanding about particular topics. You know, in, in again, we'll talk about it a little bit later on. But you know, the application and the use of quadcopters with lethal force in Ukraine has had a huge impact, but they're not, I, I don't know what people in a, in a common public square think the definition of a drone is, but these things that are affecting land warfare are really personal precision guided munitions.
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B
So what might be some benefits then of, of being a little bit more specific in our definitions about these, these systems? What do we get? What does the public get out of that? What do we get out of it strategically, do you think?
- [10:54]
D
Well, it's better definition of what it is you're talking about. Again, this convoluted language of one way kamikaze attract drones on Tuesday afternoons after 3 o'. Clock. I mean it's ridiculous when you're talking about, you need to talk about these systems in the context of what they actually produce or outcomes. What we're really talking about in this case are cruise missiles. Why the convoluted terminology? You mean because they're powered by a propeller instead of a turbojet? They're cruise missiles. But that's very different in terms of application and impact than a quadcopter with a hand grenade that has a five kilometer range that's being used as a precision guided munition in a battle that they don't have sufficient artillery around. So they came up with an alternative.
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C
Yeah, and at the risk of poking the bear, you talked earlier about air power may be treated as a support asset only. And there was a, been an effort lately to try and redefine what we do. And there's been some standard wailing and gnashing of teeth about the presence or the, the even the existence of an independent Air Force. Lieutenant General David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel, they're professors of practice at John Hopkins. SAIS published an article about two years ago and the title of it was Drones the Air Littoral and the Looming irrelevance of the U.S. air Force. Now they really helpfully defined the air littoral as from the surface to several thousand feet, which I don't really know exactly where the top of it is, but it's out there somewhere. And they argued that in the wake of the Ukraine war and the emergence of the mass produced, as you say, cruise missiles, they said, quote, the air Force needs to learn that air superiority has fundamentally changed. Do you agree?
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D
No, absolutely not. Well, I think Abarno and Ben Shahel got the central issue exactly backward. What the Ukraine wars demonstrated quite clearly is not that air superiority has become irrelevant. It's that low cost quadcopters carrying explosives what are in practical terms what I just told you. Personal precision guided munitions have fundamentally changed the character of land warfare, especially infantry and armor combat. Multiple assessments put drones causing 70 to 80% of frontline casualties in Ukraine. That's a profound development. But it's a development affecting ground combat, not proof that the logic of air superiority has somehow collapsed. So why isn't Barno and Benshahel talking about that? This distinction matters. These systems have made infantry concealment vastly more difficult, exposed armor and driven major tactical adaptation at the forward edge of the battle area. Ukraine withdrew its US provided M1A1 Abrams tanks from frontline employment after losses and vulnerability to Russian drone surveillance. An attack made them too exposed in that environment. United States army still has over 7,000 of these tanks. What are we going to do with them? I don't hear them talking about that. What this says is much about the survivability of tanks in close combat. It says nothing whether air superiority remains a foundational condition for successful joint warfare. So the right lesson is not move beyond air superiority. The right lesson is that attack quadcopters and similar systems have transformed infantry and armored warfare while not altering the advantages of control of the air. In fact, Ukraine proves the opposite of what Barno and Benshahel argued. When neither side secures air superiority, the result is attrition, paralysis and a brutal stalemate. Tactical adaptation under constraint is not a substitute for control of the air. Let me make one other point that's routinely overlooked. It. It baffles me why I don't hear anything from Air University talking about this. After years of Russian attacks on Ukrainian air bases using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and so called one way attack drones, Russia has still not succeeded in shutting down one Ukrainian air force base for more than a couple hours at a time. Fixed air bases on land are hard to kill. That is not evidence that air warfare has been overturned by cheap drones. It is evidence of resilience, dispersal hardening, and enduring difficulty of translating strikes into descent defensive control. So. And, you know, we. I don't know if we're gonna. You're gonna go back to it, but my response is pretty direct. The air littoral thesis confuses a revolution in close land combat with a revolution in air warfare. It's a parochial and unsubstantiated leap from one battlefield symptom to a sweeping doctrinal conclusion. Quadcopters with explosives have changed the nature of infantry and armor warfare. They have not invalidated air superiority as a fundamental tenet of warfare. If anything, Ukraine reinforces why air superiority remains indispensable. And absent it, even extraordinary courage and innovations leave you trapped in a costly war of attrition. US And Israeli air operations against Iran, as we've just seen over the last month, in contrast, shows what happens and what you can accomplish when air superiority is achieved and exploited. So, sorry for the long answer. You asked for it.
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C
Yeah, I did. I did. So I'm a sam's graduate, so I got really into operational art and planning. And one of the things that I came away with, besides adding to the list of heresies that I hold, one of the other heresies that I developed at sam's, was that I don't believe there is such a thing as the operational level of war. Now, we will leave that aside for the moment. We can talk about that later.
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D
Yeah, I got to think about that one, but I look forward to hearing your perspective.
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C
But do you think that the air littoral should be something that we incorporate into doctrine and we start looking at either as a. From the ground force perspective, from the Air Force perspective, from the joint Force perspective. Is the air littoral a useful concept?
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D
I think the term air littoral is unnecessary, misleading, indoctrinally unhelpful. First, the term itself, I would really
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C
like it, sir, if you would not pull your punches like that. So, yeah, sorry, go ahead.
- [18:50]
D
You know, I just state the facts. The term itself is imprecise, and it's not applicable. Littoral by definition, refers to the intersection of land and sea. And now, last time I checked, there's no water in the air except for water vapor, and so there's no true analog in the air. The airspace people are trying to describe already has names and control measures in existing doctrine. We do not need new terminology to describe low altitude, contested airspace. It's been around since the airplane's been invented. Introducing new language without doctrinal, rigorous risk confusion, more than providing clarity. Second, and more importantly, the Concept often reflects a deeper analytical mistake, confusing tactical adaptation in a constrained environment with a strategic model for future warfare. What we're seeing in Ukraine is not proof that air superiority has become obsolete. It's proof that when neither side can achieve it, warfare devolves into attrition, improvisation and enormous human cost. The air littoral argument also tends to conflate low altitude drone saturation, near ground combat with the broader question of aerospace control. Small drones and loitering munitions have unquestionably reshaped close combat, but they don't replace the strategic value of air superiority. They're tools in warfare, not substitutes for control of the air domain. I would also caution, and this is a big one, tying every future conflict to a ground centric template. Joint warfare is about applying the right force at the right place at the right time to achieve desired outcomes or effects. It's not about assuming every war will look like the forward edge of the battle area in the Ukraine, Russia conflict. So my response is simple. The challenge posed by proliferating small quadcopters with lethal force is real. But the solution lies in better capability, better integration and better doctrine, not in inventing new terminology that obscures enduring principles.
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B
You know, one of the other, I think arguments we've heard in relationship to Ukraine and even some more recent conflicts is that this is, and again, I'm going to do the same thing as Corey and poke the bear a little bit here. And the argument has been this has actually shown the limits of air power, that if you can't establish air superiority or you can achieve independent war winning effects, that this is actually a demonstration of the limits of air power. How would you respond to that?
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D
Ukraine in many respects is a stark illustration of what happens when neither side can establish effective control of the air. I think the result is not some new desirable equilibrium by virtue of not having the ability to employ air power, whether because of insufficient capacity, which is the case on Ukraine's part, or improper doctrine, training and application, which is the Russians part, or problem is you end up in a grinding, lethal war of attrition. So that's an impact of the limits of air power in the context of not having it or not employing it in the proper context. Now people, I mean, it is really interesting though that you even asked the question. I'm not questioning your intent in asking the question, but it's interesting. We always talk about the limits of air power, but no one ever talks about the limits of ground combat. No one ever talks about the limits of sea power. No one Ever talks about the limits of space power. What is it that causes people to attack the utility of the advantages of exploiting operations in the air domain? It's like, you know, no one said you can accomplish every military security objective with air power alone. So we're, you know, we constantly hear these questions and I think I go back to the. My fundamental belief that, well, I'm, as you might figure out, a pretty strong advocate for the employment of air and space power. I've also had the privilege of being a joint task force commander twice. And for airmen that doesn't happen very often. So I truly believe in the value of joint concept of operations in using the right force, right place, right time. And so we need to have the strongest Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force and Air Force in the world if we want to maintain our position as the world sole superpower, which by the way is rapidly being eroded by our friends in China. But that's another subject. So I hope that answer your question.
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B
Yeah, and I, you know, I would just push back a little and say, at least in the space domain, I, I hear discussions of limits of space use of space power particularly, maybe, maybe limits isn't the right word, but the appropriate use.
- [24:35]
D
Well, there you go. I won't argue with the appropriate use. Matter of fact, that's my fundamental perspective is no matter what domain you're talking about, if you're talking about the use of military force, we ought to be capitalizing on the uses of that force from each domain's perspective as it's relevant to the particular contingency at hand. And this is part of the problem that I've seen unfold since 911 in the Department of Defense and even before that, because, you know, the, the ground power zealots out there, I don't think ever bought into the utility of jointness. They still believe and you see it all the time. I saw it on blog the other day, you know, quoting T.F. ferenbach's quote that you know, you can only accomplish your objectives by standing with your foot on the chest of your adversary with a bayonet at his throat. I mean, come on, really? Their view is land warfare is dominant in all the other service elements are simply ornaments on their Christmas tree. That's not the proper interpretation of jointness. To wit, I go back to using right force, right place, right time.
- [25:54]
B
So what do you think are the better lessons that we should be taking from Ukraine?
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D
Well, there are a bunch of them. I mean, I just went through and in the interest of not repeating myself. It's the extraordinary value of air superiority. And you would not have seen four years of trench warfare if either the Russians or the Ukrainians had the ability to accomplish air superiority. And one of the reasons that you've seen Ukraine develop and rapidly innovate is. And succeed, I would add, is because they had to come up with an alternative to not having the capability of securing control of the air in the close fight. And so they come up with this alternative of using small drones as precision guided munitions. And I think that in and of itself is something that we really ought to take away as a lesson. It's not the use of which everyone else is focusing on. Oh my God, drones, drones, drones. That's what we need to do. No, what's really a value that the Ukrainians have demonstrated is the ability to rapidly innovate and to capture the circumstances and what they can do to rapidly counter the mass, although very, very ineffectively used. But how to counter that and not just hold their own? But now we see the Ukrainians turning the fight around. That's the real lesson out of Ukraine.
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B
Are there any lessons for the space domain? I mean, we have, in this case, we have space power in the form of Russia, we have a smaller space power who's leveraging commercial systems. You know, neither has been able to use it to independent or winning effect. So are there any lessons for us to take out of the use of space in this conflict?
- [27:49]
D
Well, I think one of the major lessons is the commercial application of space and see how well Ukraine's been able to tap into that to their advantage. And conversely, some of the commercial uses of space that the Russians have now prohibited amongst the use of their own forces that have essentially negatively affected their ability to operate. But the leadership of the, you know, from Putin on down is more concerned with retaining control than they are with enabling their forces, the latitude and the versatility or the delegation of authority to be able to effectively operate.
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C
So we're a book based curriculum at sas. So I'd ask you, what book or books are you reading right now that you would recommend and what would you say has been the most influential book on you in your career? Clausewitz is Assumed, sir. So.
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D
Well, you made. Maybe that's a wrong assumption. I mean, the Dead Prussian may not be the model that we want to follow in the 21st century.
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C
Burn the Witch. Burn the Witch.
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D
I thought that might get a response. Yeah, look, I found that just in general, the most valuable books are the ones that force one to think more clearly about the relationship between military power, strategic effects, and institutional adaptation. I kind of alluded that to you in my last question or answer. So I tend to recommend books that combine history, operational insight, and strategic relevance rather than books that simply chase the latest trend. And in that regard, I think there are too many book recommendations coming out of Air Force institutions that chase the latest trend rather than focus on air and space power. So my recommendation for your audience is to go to the Mitchell Institute website and pull down a copy of our Aerospace Power recommended reading list, look it over and pick out 12 that strike you to read over the next year. All right, now, to directly answer your question, what I'm reading right now that are interesting and perhaps I'll recommend them when I'm complete, are 33 strategies of war by Robert Greene. And it's got a kind of an interesting twist. It's a comprehensive guide to the subtle social game of everyday life, informed by the most effective military principles in war. What's kind of the reason I'm holding back on making it a recommendation is, you know, 33 is a big number and it's maybe too short, but one that the second one that I'm reading right now and listen to a good portion driving up here today from Northwest Florida is Mobilize how to Reboot the American Industrial Base and Stop World War three. It just came out last month. It's written by the CTO of Palantir, and it's a call to arms for resurrecting America's industrial base. Now that's desperately needed to correct the errors of US Defense leadership after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And it's a daunting challenge if already not too late, already too late. That said, I would just on the basis of what I've heard so far, because I do a lot of this reading, listening to books on tape while I'm driving. It's fascinating and I wholeheartedly recommend it. So that's the answer to that question. Your second one was you want to know over my entire career, if you want to listen, that's a pretty major question. Okay. And a lot of things come to mind. As a matter of fact, I was in thinking about that. There's some that pop out, but they were before I entered into active duty. I'm going to tell you those two just as a an extra treat. And then I'll answer the all right, the big one, but Thud Ridge.
- [32:12]
C
Oh yeah.
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D
When I was in high school, Black Thursday, when I was growing up, about the Schweinford and Regensburg raid. And I think, if you pardon me for digressing, but I think it's important that particularly folks going through professional military education understand these fundamentals. We tend to move beyond this. Well, you know, that was, you know, we. Let's. They're always searching for. I won't name the institution, but there was an Air Force institution that last year came out with a reading list and there wasn't one frapping book on the list that had anything to do with air power or space power. You know, it was all kind of popular stuff.
- [32:59]
C
Everybody's chasing the new hotness.
- [33:01]
D
Yeah. Okay, so let me go back to my big one. So during my entire Air Force career, it would have to be the series of Air Force fundamental doctrine publications. Now people might go, what? Yeah, call me, you know, pretty, a pretty doctrinaire person. But fundamentally, that's what is the collection of experiences that worked. That's what doctrine is. The other thing that I've enjoyed is watching how those Air Force fundamental doctrine publications have evolved from critical tenants of air power to having some of those fundamental tenants removed because they were viewed as upsetting by the other services.
- [33:48]
C
Yeah.
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D
Now that happened in January of 2025 with a rewrite of AfDP 3.0 operations. It removed any reference to taking an effects based approach to operations, which by the way, was fundamental to the success of the most successful air campaign in history during Operation Desert Storm. And that's a travesty what happened. And it speaks volumes about the incorrect understanding of what jointness is all about, not to mention how little the institutional Air Force cares about doctrine. At least in January 2025, I don't
- [34:29]
C
think it's changed that much in the last year and a half, so I agree.
- [34:33]
B
Well, as we don't. We know you're busy. We don't want to take up too much of your time. But hearkening back to something you said earlier that you hadn't seen certain lines of research or thought coming out of Air University, what do you think are the problems that our students and other members of Air University should be thinking about, researching and thinking about as we move into the future fight?
- [34:54]
D
Okay, well, let me answer your question about what's the greatest unsolved? I interpret your question in two parts. First, what's the greatest unsolved problem for air and space power? That's what I'm going to answer first. And then what should the students and Air Force members be thinking about? The greatest unsolved problem from air and space power is something I've been talking about for nearly a decade now, and that's unfortunate. And it's the fact that today the Air Force is the oldest, the smallest, and the least ready in its history, and it's on a path to get even smaller. At the same time, China's Air Force is the newest, largest, and most ready in its history, and it's on a growth trajectory. There's no plan to stop the Air Force's decline in force structure. So graduates at all levels here at Air University need to be thinking about how to stop this decline and grow back to an Air Force that can deter conflict and, if necessary, fight and win. And to do that in more than one regional conflict at a time, to include a sustained conflict like Russia, Ukraine. Now, with respect to the other question, I think they need to be thinking about how to preserve and extend decision advantage in an era of contested domains, rapid technological diffusion, and rising pure competition. The old assumption that the United States will automatically enjoy air and space superiority is gone. And that means future leaders must think more rigorously about readiness, resilience, capacity integration, and strategic coherence.
- [36:37]
C
That's fantastic, sir. So, as we close out, I just wanted to ask if you had four. First of all, any closing thoughts? And then second, where do we keep up to date on all the things that you were doing, writing, saying, and that kind of thing?
- [36:50]
D
Well, that's very kind of you. First, I appreciate the opportunity to engage in this kind of a. Of a discussion and encourage folks to have these kinds of dialogues more frequently. And having differing opinions is a great thing, and the ability to talk through them is perhaps even more important. And unfortunately, you know, we're in an era where that kind of collegial dialogue from opposing perspectives seems to have been shutting down, and that's not the way to move forward. With respect to keeping up, I think the best place is through the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which should. You should find of no surprise, but our publications, our podcasts, our webinars, and our public events, because that's where I try to contribute to the ongoing debate over air power, space power, deterrence, and national defense. I'd simply say if you want to follow what I'm writing and saying, Mitchell Institute's the best place to look. So Google us on mitchellaerospace. Power.org I know it's a long word,
- [37:59]
C
but we'll provide the link in the show notes.
- [38:01]
D
There you go. Thank you.
- [38:03]
C
All right, well, thank you very much for coming.
- [38:05]
A
Thank you.
- [38:06]
D
You bet.
- [38:07]
A
Thank you for tuning in to books, to battles. We hope you enjoyed today's discussion. If you liked today's episode, please be sure to like and subscribe and even tell a friend about us. Also, don't forget to send us any questions you'd like answered or suggest future episodes. You can contact us@bookstobattlesu.af edu. For Colonel Corey Holland, I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb. And don't forget, strategy doesn't stop at the page.