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Foreign.
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Welcome to Books and Battles, where we explore academic insights for real world air and space strategy. I'm Colonel Corey Holland, a professor of Strategy and Security studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Now, before we get any further, we want to note that all opinions expressed here are ours or our guests and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or War, or the United States Government. And because we have a very special guest with Dr. Peter Layton from Australia, we want to say that they do not represent either the Griffith Institute or the Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. But with that, I would like to say welcome to Dr. Layton and thanks for having me, Peter, it's great to have you here. Those of you who are regular listeners will note that Dr. Whitman Cobb usually does the introduction. And it's taken me a year, but I finally convinced her that to let me fly solo. But just this once. I'm joined by Dr. Layton, who is a visiting fellow at the Griffith Institute out of Brisbane, Australia. He has a PhD in grand strategy, is a retired Royal Australian Air Force F111 and P3 air crew member, and is here on the cast because you were in town for the Air Power Conference, right?
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C
Yes, that's correct.
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B
All right, so tell us a little bit about yourself. How did you come to be here?
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C
Okay. I suppose that the Griffith Hazer Institute looks around the Australian or the Indo Pacific region, if you like. So it is a regional think tank in that sense. And I do strategic studies. And as part of the strategic studies, I've been thinking about the grand strategy and in particular the national security strategies of middle powers. Obviously, the Indo Pacific is full of middle and small powers, with the exception of China, which is a great power, and not just middle powers, but also in the impacts of emerging technologies as the world's changing around us. So that that partially sort of brought me here to see what the latest thinking is, the Air Commander and a staff college here, because I'm very interested in something I call heterogeneous air power that we'll doubtlessly talk about.
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B
Yes, absolutely. And you also, it's not your first time, obviously, in America. You also taught up at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
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C
Yes, my final job in the Royal Australian Air Force was selectoring on grand strategy at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, now called the Eisenhower College. And that gave me real interest about grand strategy. And in particular, grand strategy in the United States tends to be, if you like, internally focused about only the grand strategy of the United States. But I was very interested about grand strategy for middle powers from a generic point of view. So obviously warfare, if you like, flows out of grand strategy. Clausewitz says warfare is all about politics. So my little spin was that grand strategy or I study grand strategy from an international relations viewpoint, from a political science perspective. But that's very useful for air power as well because obviously air power is all about achieving a political effect.
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B
Yeah. And I just want again, our regular listeners, usually I'm the first one to mention Clausewitz and it's three minutes into the podcast and we've already got it and it wasn't me this time, so I think we are equal fanboys on that. I'm also very interested in grand strategy and the strategy of small and middling powers as well. But what brought you here today was this article that we've got coming out in the Air and Space Power Journal, its first journal issue coming up here shortly.
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C
Coming out shortly and developing, if you like, and expanding upon a new model for air power called heterogeneous air power. Now this particularly, if you like, as we just discussed there about, about middle powers, bear in mind middle power air forces, of which most air forces in the world are, suffer from a particular problem and that problem is of attrition. Now attrition of air force aircraft has not been a problem for the last 20 or 30 years because we haven't been fighting major wars. But the world is now becoming a much more complicated and determinant place and the possibility of a major war is out there once more. So middle power air forces are suddenly Starting to think, OK, will our Air Force only last for the first 30 days? If we have a protracted major conflict, what do we do then?
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B
And how do we resupply or reconstitute a force if it's, if it's taken out by, you know, either in the air or on the ground from an attack.
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C
Yeah. And, and of course all of us know that, that modern combat aircraft take several years to build. Usually the F35 line is the hottest line in the world as far as numbers of aircraft being sort of being, being sort of pushed out. But, but that's only about 150 aircraft a year for the whole world. And each aircraft takes about 18 months to build. The Rafale fighter in France takes about two years. A Typhoon fighter in Europe takes about three years. The F15EX I see takes about two years as well. So we're talking years. So that's a long time after you've been wiped out in the first month before, before your air force returns. But the fascinating thing, I suppose over the last sort of few years since 2022 has been this particular problem has been, if you like dressed seen by both the Russian Air Force and the Ukrainian Air Force because after the first couple of months of their war, back in 2022, both sides were losing aircraft or manned aircraft at an unacceptable rate. So both sides decided they would, if you like, withdraw their manned aircraft somewhat, use them very prudently, husband them and be really careful with them and move across into using a lot more rockets, missiles and drones. So air power, if you like, has been expanded from not just manned aircraft, but the means of air power has expanded to now include a lot more power from rockets, missiles, drones.
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B
Right, and you say in the article that you've got a non western sort of answer to the traditional Western model of air power, which decreases the dominance of manned aircraft in the, the force structure, but it also increases the digital technology that is applied to commercial off the shelf unmanned aircraft as well.
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C
That's the technological change that has happened over the last say five, 10 years because all of us know that air forces, generally speaking, have been using rockets, missiles and drones for several decades now. But the big change has been that with digital tech, especially from the consumer sector, makes it very affordable, makes it cheap if you like, and low cost. The complete reverse of the trends of a manned combat aircraft that have got considerably more expensive under Augustine's law. So we have a, for middle power air forces, there's suddenly an out. If we do lose our air force in the first 30 days, there is some option there that we can fall back upon. Previously this was completely unavailable to us.
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B
Right. And the Augustine's law that you're talking about is how Every generation, every 20 years you get a, an order of magnitude increase in complexity and cost. Is that the one, is that the one you're referring to?
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C
Yes. And the thing about Augustine law was it was published, I think in the middle 1980s, sort of, and people have looked at this ever since then and each generation of aircraft has followed his curve. What that means is by about 2045 the entire American defence budget will only buy one aircraft. It'll be so expensive, it'll be fantastic. It'll be a death star. But they'll only be one of them.
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B
Right, and you're hitting on all the cylinders here that I like to talk about Star wars and grand strategy. I'm a big fan. But I do have a question for you and that's when you quote General Slife, the former vice chief of the Air Force in your article and where he says that, quote, if it operates in the air domain, it is air power. My question would be at what altitude? So is the bullet out of a gun considered air power now or how do we draw that distinction?
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C
It is, it is a difficult make from a pedantic point of view, if you like. And artillery shells, are they air power? And when you think that an artillery shell now can travel 50, maybe 100 miles, you know, sort of suddenly you were talking about air power sort of mileages anyway. So I'm not too sure that we can necessarily draw a particular line there that gets onto one of the big issues of the day, of course is the littoral zone, if you like the littoral air warfare business. And, and littoral air warfare I think comes out of an airspace management idea whereby if sort of, if you like army helicopters operate up to 10,000ft, so drones will operate sort of low level as well. That airspace management idea doesn't really flow very well once you try and apply it to the waging of war. It is just a management idea. But I think I sort of like to put this into perhaps thinking sort of longer term. And if we think that there was a. There's a very famous article written at the end of the 1990s by a British army general, Jonathan Bailey, and he said that the birth of modern warfare dated back to 1916. In 1916 the British army moved from, if you like, only direct combat, which is pretty much what the Romans did or the Greeks did with their swords and their spears. The Napoleonic wars where chief soldiers marched into battle or a cavalry sabres attacked, went from that direct warfare to indirect warfare where you did not necessarily see the enemy and it was not that sort of close quarters combat. And indirect warfare starts from the artillery world. That starts to use maps. They can actually map things accurately and fire out to grid squares. Suddenly there are aeroplanes. And I think the history of warfare since 1916, I think that he has a point. The history of, of warfare is indirect fire gets more and more important. And you think of, I mean cyber warfare is the classic example, it is global. So I think that's sort of moving away from direct sort of whites of their eyes bayoneting people into now global power application.
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B
Yeah, and I think the, when you bring up cyber, there's a variety of problems, one of which being that human brains function by analogy and there isn't really an analogous sort of domain to cyber because if I close off one path, you can just create another one. And it is instantaneous where, you know, everyone around the world is at most three and a half, four seconds away from someone else based on the speed of light. And so I can see where that domain I think gets into a lot of these really sort of esoteric debates. But for airpower itself, you claim that the heterogeneous model is demonstrably effective. Can you help me out with what you mean by effective?
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C
Well, effective is sort of, I suppose, having a political impact. But we'll just sort of talk about being militarily effective at the present time. Now you mentioned before, I started out talking about non western air power. And over the last 5 years non Western countries have embraced this particular heterogeneous air power. Cause they haven't got a large air force with the exception of the Russians. But even they had troubles. Aircraft are expensive, hard to get and can't be and can't be replaced. So they had to move across to rockets, missiles, drones. I want to say from demonstrably effective. I think the Ukraine war at the moment is a good example in that you have both sides now running astonishingly a strategic air campaign principally based upon drones. There are some rockets and missiles tossed in there as well, but it is principally a drone warfare, if you like. On the other hand, be careful with what I'm saying and especially when you're talking about cyber, there, there is an interconnection here between space and heterogeneous air power. Because a lot of these drones, they have small warheads, they rely upon very much upon very accurate targeting. Now the Russians have poor targeting, you can see what they are attacking. Cities. There's a reason for this. The Ukrainians have better targeting. They are attacking oil refineries. There's quite a different mode of war there. And secondly, many of these drones, at least for their mid course guidance, use gps. Some use Starlink as well. So there is a connection there between space linking in through cyber into these drones, rockets and missiles penetrating hostile airspace.
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B
But specifically it would be the drones, right? It would be the data lake.
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C
Well, certainly the rockets, missiles have a gps, of course, and their targeting comes out of the, of the varying sources if they're using your terrain matching. There are drones now of course, that avoid GPS jamming by steering themselves by using maps and imaging sensors. Again, so much of that stuff comes out of space, they are preloaded. But the brains of all these systems is digital technology. Targeting information, et cetera, sort of comes from direct from cyber. But they're all smart systems in that regard.
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B
Was Duhe right? Is the bomber always gonna get through or is the rocket, missile or drone always going to get through?
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C
Well, that's the interesting thing is one thing that these systems give you, and perhaps the most noticeable military thing, is that they give you mass. So you can fire very large numbers of them. I mean, you could reasonably expect that this evening in Ukraine that the Russians may launch 900 Shihed drones, 50 ballistic missiles and 50 cruise missiles. I mean, you have a thousand bomber raid if you like, except it's completely automated. I mean those sort of numbers, even 50 rockets and missiles each is impressive. But 900 jihad drones, I mean that's just an order of magnitude almost beyond our imagination. And they can probably do that, you know, sort of once a week. So that's where you get that sort of bomber always gets through. On the other hand, this cuts both ways. You can suddenly have mass interception forces as well. And the Ukrainians have interceptor drones, but they are producing hundreds of weekly. So you have mass fighting mass. But if you don't have the mass to defeat their mass, their mass will get through if you're not lost amongst the mass. And it was particularly noticeable in the middle of last year with the Indian Pakistan four day air war. The Pakistani drones were not penetrating because they just weren't using enough of them. Indians had a very large number of MANPADs and a thousand AAA guns. So the Pakistanis were trying to penetrate through a very heavily defended area. You need mass to defeat mass at the moment.
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B
Okay, and so that would sort of. One of our students wrote a thesis where she argued that the United States has fallen into this precision paradox where we think that very precise munitions allows us to have a smaller force and apply it more surgically and achieve political objectives more readily with a precision force. Would you argue that the heterogeneous force sort of replaces us thinking now where does precision fall? I guess in the heterogeneous force that you're advocating.
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C
So the heterogeneous force by its very name there includes manned aircraft and they would be used prudently and carefully to try and avoid losses. As I said before now I'd be careful with the rockets, missiles, drones argument to have to be too precise. A lot of these systems are not terribly precise. It's mediocre accuracy if you like. And the Shihad drone is, if you like, the signature weapon of our age. This very simple propeller driven drone flies at 100 miles an hour produced by Iran. Who would have thought this was A signature air power weapon at the time, this is completely ridiculous, has a small warhead, its accuracy is a CP of probably 20, 25 meters, sort of something like that on a good day, a warhead of 50, 60 sort of £70. So it has mediocre accuracy and a small warhead. So the, and so the interesting thing about that is that that really restricts it to particular classes of targets. And obviously area targets like cities and soft skin targets like cities, air bases to a point fit in there as well. And Obviously if your E3 is parked in the flight line and a she had drone runs into it, it causes considerable damage. It's almost a bit of a are you lucky hit there if you like. Although the technology is advancing with mesh communications, so there can be a man in the loop as well. But when you have a weapon like that, I think that to a certain extent has driven Russian strategy. Its strategy for its strategic air campaign is that the only thing we can hit are cities, if you like, or large power plant areas or large sort of targets like that and will only cause mediocre damage. So what we need is to keep the pressure up to keep firing 900 drones every sort of few nights, if you like to wear the Ukrainians down that way. It's not precision in the conventional sense that we think of a 2,000 pound bomb hitting within sort of 2 or 3 meters. This is a different approach.
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B
Okay, well in the article you mention that today's air power model is, and it's a quote, built around highly sophisticated, technically complicated aircraft and is inherently not resilient. And then you go into and talk about the Russia, Ukraine war and how they shifted to this heterogeneous after the start of the war. Why should we build up a heterogeneous force now if this is something that we can shift to on the fly?
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C
Okay, and excellent question. So my argument in the, in this article is that heterogeneous air forces have three big advantages over our traditional air force built around manned aircraft. They are resilient, they are scalable and they have mass. The resilience, as we've said, you can lose 900 sort of, sort of one night and come back with another 900 the next night. If you like. Scalability is the same. So one of the good points, if you like, about rockets, missiles, drones, is that you can have a very quick innovation cycle. And in Ukraine at the moment there's about a three month cycle from having a good idea to being fielded. And you have to keep up with the other side. If you like. It is an innovation war going sort of backwards and forwards as both sides adapt. But to be able to produce resilience, scalability and mass, you've got to have a factory, if you like, that is churning these things out. They have to be designed in a way that they can be modified easily. And as you know, there's nothing harder to modify than software. And that has to happen from day one, if you like. You have to have all the skilled people available who can change things quickly and think of brand new ideas. The world is constantly evolving. In the Ukraine, the Russians suddenly come up with first person view drones fitted with fibre optic cables. So rather than being jammed, the wireless networks of the Ukrainians were being jammed. So the Russians came up with a fiber optic cable and overcame the problem completely. But you need to have the industrial capacity and the capability and the skilled staff. But there is a powerful argument to say, well, let's just wait until the war starts and then we can do that. I think in the case of the Russians and the Ukrainians, both of them have taken about three years to get up to speed. They have worked themselves, if you like, through a particular pathway of innovation and they've driven each other down this particular way. So I think that would be the same during another conflict. It will very much be an innovation war. Now it becomes a particularly difficult problem here, if you're following along with this, is that what I'm talking about is mass production of newly minted equipment that, if you like, goes from the lab and the test field is into operational service very quickly. Now, that kind of fast turnaround. There is something which I have to say China, with its large manufacturing plant, is extremely good at. It can take new design, work out the bugs, work out how to make it really, really easily and really, really cheaply and produce large numbers of them. So heterogeneous air power, while it gives you resilient scalability and mass, it works for both sides. And in the case of China, as I said, very good at innovation, a
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B
huge manufacturing system with as resilient as aircraft or the drones, specifically rockets and missiles as well, with as resilient as they are and as cheaply as they can be mass produced. Is the age of one belligerent having air superiority over another one. Gone is our common conception about the ability to operate inside the air domain and prevent the adversary from doing the same. Is that, should we be leaving that in the past or how does this sort of play on our concept of air superiority?
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C
I think our concept of air superiority has gradually grown up over the years. And all of us admit that air superiority doesn't actually mean that. It means varying shades of grey, a little bit of air superiority, a medium amount, or sort of lots and lots of amount, you know, air or dominance, if you like. I think the term in itself is a bit confusing and confused and doesn't really help us understand. I think we sort of perhaps need to sort of think more along the control of the air. That means we can do something with it. Now, if you think back to, say, the navies, they have this strange term called sea control, control of the sea, if you like. And all they're interested in sea control is being able to use the sea for their own purposes, which is generally trading and merchant ships, if you like, sort of using the sea. So I think for us, control of the sky, we want to be able to use the sky for our own purposes. Part of that, of course, is obviously stopping the other person doing it. But I don't think now that you can stop the other side using the air for 100% of the time. The classic example is Operation Rough rider, where the U.S. air Force and the U.S. navy put an awful lot of effort into defeating the houthis. And after 30 days, basically, they, the United States and the Houthis came to an agreement. They wouldn't attack each other, but the Houthis kept on firing drones against ships in the Red Sea and ballistic missiles against Israel. Now, the Houthis are a ragtag bunch, but the advantage of rockets, missiles, drones is that they can be hidden, dispersed, really hard to kill, as we're seeing in Iran. So that's another dimension about resilience. A manned aircraft might need a large air base that can be taken out, but rockets, missiles, and drones can be very widely dispersed. So I think you've got an interesting development here about sort of air power. It's stopping from being fragile now to being much more resilient.
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B
You're talking about in the scalability section of the article, you discuss this numerical churn that folks are going to have to sort of start becoming accustomed to. And you mentioned three months as sort of this cycle that we've got on the Russia, Ukraine front. Given that, given those timeframes, how do we plan? How do we sort of conceptualize the capacity and capability that an air service can bring to the fight if every three months we're fielding something new?
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C
I think it's even more complicated than that.
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B
That's not helpful. I thought I was making it complicated enough.
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C
And so an example that I give in this, in this particular article was, and forgive me for the figures not being completely right, but, but The Russians make two manned aircraft a month. They make, they make 50 cruise missiles, they make 100 ballistic missiles, they make 500 Shi' a drones, they make 300,000 first person view drones. So you've got a very differential rate of production which means that they're, that they are arriving sort of in your air force to use at very differential rates, sort of. Your air force today is not going to have the force structure it'll have tomorrow or next week. As these things arrive with sort of various timings, I think it brings in a whole new idea about organisation and how air force is organised. The Ukrainians have this unmanned systems force for a very particular reason, both for production but for operational employment. Perhaps we need to sort of think about sort of organizational matters. I attended a very interesting lecture at the Air Command and Staff forum at this Air Power forum and there was a USAF major arguing, and this was a bit, a little bit science fiction, saying sometime in the future air forces may be composed of autonomous systems. We don't know Whether it be 50 or 100 years time, it is really hard to say. But if they were composed of autonomous systems in that sort of line, the most important thing for an air force would be to get the organization right because you would be as you say, commanding all these systems. And so your command has to be really good, your command and control. So I think it's probably a matter of getting back to grand strategy where we started from this is to be really sure about the outcome you are seeking. Now in my grand strategy I think about we are building a new relationship with ie another nation. If you're using war for that, you are building it using force, but you can also build it through using trade or diplomacy, et cetera. But you'll have to have a very clear idea of the outcome you are seeking because I think as the air force is evolving all the time and using mission command, you really need to know what the end point is, where you are going to.
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B
Yeah, and it's not just that we need to have an idea of what the end goal in mind, the new political relationship that you want to have with the adversarial state. You also need to have some kind of conception about how applying violence in this particular way will lead to that objective. And that from a perspective of drones now and missiles and rockets, you're saying they have mass but they lack the precision. Do you think that there is any kind of Sustainable, lasting peace that can come from violence that is so imprecisely applied.
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C
Yes. So violence, I suppose, has been precisely applied for an awfully long time, even now with precision guided weapons. And I suppose that really got started during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. The precision has not necessarily led to are you better piece, if you like, sort of at the far end. So you have to think about things a lot more. But there is a train of thought, as you know that famous saying that air power is all about targeting. So I think perhaps need to think a little bit beyond there about what the targeting's for, if you like targeting at the tactical, operational and strategic level. In the Ukraine case, for example, they're targeting Russian oil refineries, but they're targeting the export side of the Russian oil refineries. So that has economic impact. Now, by having an economic impact and if you like, hoping the Russians will sort of run out of money for the war that's a little less violent and a little less impact upon the population, although we'll still have an impact on the population, clearly then. So the Russian approach about attacking cities, because the attacking cities mode is very much trying to influence people through killing them, if you like.
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B
Yeah. What do we call? It's a punishment.
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C
It's a punishment.
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B
It is reason by the punishment.
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C
Yeah, it's a punishment. It's deterrence by punishment. That certainly the role of strategy is still there. But when you have mass and it's hard and you need mass to say defend it, what you end up is with the military force on the other side, effectively are going to live in forts where they can defend themselves in the mass using perhaps laser beams, directed energy weapons, surface to a missile, a whole array of different systems. If you have a large country, you can only defend a small number of points inside that very large country. So the advantage of mass in that case is it suddenly opens up a vast array of other targets that we've never thought about. Now, a little example of that is Ukraine about battlefield air interdiction. We think of battlefield introduction as cutting railways, destroying the roads and cutting the bridges along which the reinforcements are coming to the front line. The Russians, their drones are small. They can't destroy roads, railways or bridges. So their drones are being used to pick off individual Ukrainian forces approaching the battlefield, individual forces down to individual people. So while it's imprecise in one sense, it's much more precise in that sense that rather than destroying the infrastructure, you are destroying just the military equipment. And you think of, you know, of Your air base or of your fort, if you like. It might be very well defended, but forts require provisioning from outside, whether it's fuel, food, people. So that mass gives us a different way of looking at things. And I think that we need to sort of think a bit more about the strategies and the concept of operations here because of course, your implication is, I think, correct. This gives us different ways, different ways to apply power. Therefore we need to think differently.
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B
Right. And that kind of leads to the last question that I like to ask is what are the implications of heterogeneous air force model for air strategy and for air theory? So I look at your article and I see that you are in conversation not just with the doctrine writers of today and you know, 10 years ago, but you're also in conversation, conversation with folks like Duhay and Mitchell and other thinkers about this new domain at the time of air power. What are the implications?
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C
I think at the moment it's relatively difficult to say. So my talk at the airpower forum here, I looked at six air wars that were held in six weeks last year. In the middle of last week, there were six air wars underway. Amazingly, three of them involve countries fighting each other that did not have a land border, which is a trend in itself. You know, that's sort of an example of air power. So I think sort of some of the implications are that air power is democratised. There sort of really is air power for everybody. Now, if you like, the Ukrainians are undertaking a strategic air campaign using what are fairly simple and primitive aircraft. This is a middle power doing something that previously required a great power with large, long range, sort of long range bombers. So suddenly air power theory perhaps applies now not just to say great powers, but to sort of everybody. And that example I gave about battlefield air interdiction, I think it changes close air support. As we've seen with these first person view drones. There is now, if you like, a weapons engagement zone. The battlefield is not, is not linear in that sort of long battlefront. It is now 20 sort of 20 miles wide, a weapons engagement zone where forces are very widely dispersed and the drones are precise enough that they can seek out the operators of them, can seek out targets down to, down to individual level. So I think it's both a democratisation and if you like, much more precise, right down to sort of individuals in that, in that sort of warfare. Now where this takes us for an air power theory is sort of, is sort of a little bit difficult to say. I mean, Douay's argument about Attacking the population. Do you have a mass, a mass drone raid on the first day of the war? Certainly Douay would say, would say something like that. But then if you have it in mass, these are small, not have sort of not going to have very much sort of damage, if you like, or do you go down as the Germans did, and go down the tactical route? So rockets, missiles and drones very much are battlefield weapons so that you can assist surface forces and do land and naval warfare better. So I think there's sort of ample space here for a theory, but as I said for the strategy part, I think this opens up new possibilities that we need to think about.
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B
Absolutely. And thinking about things like the mismatch potentially between our current force capabilities or capacities and the political appetite or the strategic objectives that we've got, how is this a manufacturer's problem? Is it a cost and speed, or is there a storage and obsolescence cost that comes along if we try and build up this stockpile? And how does this mess with traditional air to surface missions like close air support and what kind of effects we should realistically suspect or expect from air power are all things that I think are wide open and we're going to be exploring for the next several years, I imagine. And with that, Dr. Leyton, I would like to thank you for being here with us today.
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C
And thanks for having me.
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B
It's been lots of fun, had a great time. And for everybody else, we will see you next week.
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A
Thank you for tuning in to books to battles. We hope you enjoyed today's discussion. If you liked today's episode, please be sure to like and subscribe and even tell a friend about us. Also, don't forget to send us any questions you'd like answered or suggest future episodes. You can contact us@bookstobattlesu.af edu. For Colonel Corey Holland, I'm Dr. Wendy Whitman Cobb. And don't forget, strategy doesn't stop at the page.