BREAKING: Trump Makes Profane Threat Against Iran, New Attacks on U.S. Assets (w/ John Kirby)

Summary

Bulwark Takes: BREAKING – Trump Makes Profane Threat Against Iran, New Attacks on U.S. Assets (w/ John Kirby)

Podcast Date: July 29, 2026
Guests: Rear Admiral John Kirby (Ret.), Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling (Ret.), Host: Ben Parker

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Episode Overview

This episode of Bulwark Takes dives into breaking news from the escalating conflict between the U.S. and Iran. Following a reported Iranian missile attack on U.S. forces in Jordan, President Trump made a highly charged, profane threat against Iran. The show unpacks the significance of these developments, operational challenges for U.S. naval forces, the role of fear in Middle East shipping, the readiness crisis in munitions, and the messaging struggle facing the administration. Insightful analysis is provided by Rear Admiral John Kirby and Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, drawing from their deep operational and public affairs experience.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Firsthand Military Perspectives: Then and Now

(01:53–06:02)

• Kirby’s Experience in the Gulf (1988):

  • Described convoy escort missions during Operation Ernest Will, protecting oil tankers from Iranian threats.
  • Recalled the “narrowness and danger” of key choke points like the Strait of Hormuz.
    Quote: “At its narrowest, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide. Now, that sounds like a lot, but boy… that feels pretty confined.” (03:41, Kirby)
  • Emphasized the high volume of daily ship traffic (100+ ships) even back then.

• Comparison to Today:

  • The contemporary threat environment now includes advanced Iranian drones and missiles.
  • U.S. Navy currently struggles to protect convoys without strong allied support.
    Quote: “We’re not protecting the convoys. And, and one of the reasons is because the US Navy just simply can't do that alone… Right now the French and the British just yesterday rejected another call to… potentially get involved in convoy operations.” (07:16, Kirby)

2. Evolving Threats: Iranian Drones and Swarm Tactics

(06:19–10:32)

• The introduction of drones represents a “uniquely challenging threat” to U.S. ships—difficult to detect, easy to swarm, and capable of overwhelming ship defenses. Quote: “The drones present a very unique challenge now for the US Navy and for the military and we are seeing the Iranians use that to fairly well.” (07:16, Kirby)
• Iran increasingly launches combined missile and drone attacks, testing U.S. integrated air defense at a scale “twice the size of the United States.”
• Swarm attacks force defenders to allocate limited resources across varied targets: ships, airbases, assets.

3. Psychology of Maritime Operations: Fear as a Weapon

(10:32–14:01)

• Iran shut down the strait “through fear alone,” causing commercial shippers to avoid the area. Quote: “In the first few days of this war, Iranians effectively shut the strait down through fear alone. They didn't fire a single shot, and shipping companies were like, yep, we're not going through there now.” (10:32, Kirby)
• Merchant sailors—not trained military—are “scared to death,” more vulnerable to intimidation.
• Economics drive decisions: high insurance, business interruptions, and the practical defenselessness of tanker crews (no weapons, slow speed, poor maneuverability).

4. Blockade Operations: Purpose and Mechanics

(14:01–18:22)

• The U.S. blockade aims to choke Iran's economy, physically preventing ships from departing Iranian ports.
  • Blockade is “zone defense,” not a tight wall of ships but a layered, technologically enabled barrier.
• Tools: destroyers, amphibious ships with helicopters, drones, ISR assets, warning radio calls, flyovers, and sometimes kinetic action. Quote: “A blockade is a military operation… designed to choke off the economy of your adversary… unlike an embargo or sanctions, which are likewise designed to do that. It is a physical blocking of a country's nation state's economy.” (14:34, Kirby)
• Not all ships are stopped, but fear and uncertainty make it effective.

5. Strain on U.S. Naval Assets and Personnel

(19:48–24:55)

• Two U.S. carrier strike groups (Lincoln, Bush) have been deployed for unusually long times; continued presence is mentally and physically taxing.
  • Ships cannot safely pull into regional ports for resupply or crew rest, straining logistics and morale.
  • Prolonged operations mean “ships are tired, crews are tired, equipment is stressed.” Quote: “There is a stress on logistics and sustainment. Number two, there’s a stress on the ships… The third thing is, of course, the sailors themselves.” (20:38, Kirby)
• Fleet size has dramatically shrunk since the Cold War, with more global commitments and fewer specialized shallow-water ships.
• Impact also felt back home among families; long deployments become a “readiness issue in a big way.” (24:55, Hertling)

6. Missile & Munitions Readiness Crisis

(25:07–29:26)

• U.S. stocks of key missile interceptors (Patriots, THAADs) are at “dangerously low levels”—leaks indicate concern in the Pentagon.
• Munitions expenditure is imbalanced: costly interceptors used to shoot down cheap drones. Quote: “You’re talking 3 million at a pop for a patriot knocking down a drone that costs less than a used car to make and put in the air. So the balance isn’t right either.” (26:13, Kirby)
• Recent U.S. hesitation for major combat is linked to these shortfalls.
  • Implies strategic debate: "Maybe we go all out… or not, because we can’t keep going back to this tit for tat.” (29:51, Kirby)

7. Strategic Failure: Clarity of Goals and Interconnected Conflicts

(29:26–32:02)

• Kirby reflects on the importance of clear strategic objectives before entering war—a “failure” in current circumstances.
• U.S. involvement in Ukraine and Iran are now intertwined, partly due to Russia’s role in aiding Iran. Quote: “This is an example of why you don’t enter a war without a clear sense of your strategic outcomes and goals. And they have been all over the map.” (29:26, Kirby)
• Senate-advanced sanctions against Russia seen as positive, with increased support for Ukraine as a critical counter to Russian and Iranian collaboration.

8. Communication, Public Affairs, & Transparency Shortfalls

(32:02–40:36)

• Kirby critiques the administration’s communications: CENTCOM’s “degrading” messaging is losing credibility as Iran’s military capacity persists. Quote: “How long do you keep on saying, well, we’re degrading, don’t worry about it, we’re, we’re still degrading before you have to say, I don’t know, it’s not degraded.” (33:15, Parker)

• Speculates that deliberate disclosure of strike start/end times on CENTCOM’s Twitter may aim to support diplomatic channels—“giving the pragmatists in Iran a little bit of leash.”

• Strongly criticizes lack of Pentagon briefings and general transparency with the American people: Quote: “The Pentagon has an obligation to explain itself to the American people, to our allies, even to our adversaries.” (35:43, Kirby)

  • Public and press dialogue is not just transparency—it improves policy by inserting outside perspectives and sharpening internal analysis.

• Encourages allowing military voices to speak directly: “It is not simple. This is not a video game.”

• Suggests embedded journalists can provide essential context and understanding. Calls for more “tough questions.”

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the Narrowness and Danger of the Strait of Hormuz
  “At its narrowest, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide… When you're operating with Iranian missiles, mines, and fast boats, that feels pretty confined.” (03:41, Kirby)

• On New Threats:
  “We didn’t have to worry about drones. Drones present a uniquely challenging threat… They can be swarmed.” (07:16, Kirby)

• On Iran’s Use of Fear:
  “In the first few days of this war, Iranians effectively shut the strait down through fear alone. They didn’t fire a single shot, and shipping companies were like, ‘Yep, we’re not going through there now.’” (10:32, Kirby)

• On the U.S. Blockade:
  “A blockade is a military operation… designed to choke off the economy of your adversary.” (14:34, Kirby)

• On Readiness and Fatigue:
  “Now we've got some ships that have been there for many, many months and they’re tired. There’s just fatigue. It's a grind.” (20:38, Kirby) “We now have less than 300 ships in the US Navy. And we don’t have ships that are particularly adept at operating in these shallow waters.” (23:17, Kirby)

• On Munitions Shortages:
  “You’re talking $3 million a pop for a Patriot knocking down a drone that costs less than a used car to make… the balance isn’t right.” (26:13, Kirby)

• On Lacking Strategic Clarity:
  “This is an example of why you don’t enter a war without a clear sense of your strategic outcomes and goals. And they have been all over the map.” (29:26, Kirby)

• On Administration Messaging and Public Affairs:
  “How long do you keep on saying, well, we’re degrading… before you have to say, I don’t know, it’s not degraded.” (33:15, Parker) “The Pentagon has an obligation to explain itself to the American people… They’re just, in my mind, completely failing on that score.” (35:43, Kirby) “It is not simple. This is not a video game. So the military needs to get back into the discussion of this as well, in my view.” (38:56, Hertling) “A big part of winning a war is words. And… our president says he has the best words, but we haven’t heard them lately.” (40:37, Ben Parker)

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Key Timestamps of Important Segments

• 01:53 Introduction of John Kirby and his background
• 03:41 Kirby recounts Strait of Hormuz operations, tightness, and danger
• 07:16 Discussion of Iranian drones, increased threat complexity
• 10:32 Iran’s use of fear, impact on shipping lanes and psychology
• 14:34 U.S. blockade of Iranian ports explained
• 20:38 Prolonged deployments and their effects on ships and crews
• 26:13 U.S. munitions crisis and Pentagon concerns
• 29:26 Strategic goal confusion in the current conflict
• 33:15 Messaging failures—CENTCOM’s “degrading” line questioned
• 35:43 Critique of Pentagon transparency, calls for open briefings

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Conclusion

Through palpable urgency and unvarnished analysis, Kirby, Hertling, and Parker dissect a dangerous moment both tactically and politically. The crew explains how modern warfare’s complexity, fear as a weapon, and resource strains intersect, all under a communications vacuum that leaves the public—and soldiers—uncertain about objectives and progress. Clear, consistent strategic communication is presented as not only a necessity for public confidence but as a component of national security itself.

“A big part of winning a war is words… I really wish we had someone who could articulate what we were trying to accomplish.” (40:37, Ben Parker)

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End of summary.

Transcript

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[Ben Parker]

N hi, I'm Ben Parker from the Bulwark. Welcome back to Command Post. And the Bulwark takes feed, joined as always by our very own Lieutenant General Mark Hertling and our special guest, Rear Admiral John Kirby, retired rear admiral, former Pentagon press secretary, former spokesman for the National Security Council and director of the Institute of Politics at Chicago. Is that right?

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Yeah, that's right. Just started about eight months ago.

[Ben Parker]

Congratulations, Admiral. Thank you so much for joining us.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

It is great to have John with us today. We are old friends. We first met In Iraq in 2006, seven or eight, I think it was when John came over with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, and we were walking on a market walk somewhere in Tikrit province or in south. There's a picture. Yeah, there's John. There's a flash from the past with Nancy Youssef taking notes and you making sure that I was saying the right thing. So I appreciate that.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

I remember that day.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Yeah, it was a rough day. But anyway, it is great to have you, John, and you have not only been a voice of reason, but a phenomenal, not just military analysts because of your background in the Navy but also just a national security maven. You're an expert at this stuff. You've seen various administrations do different things, especially in the Middle East. We're going to talk a little bit about that today. But you know what? I'd like to start off, if you don't mind, because this is a show about the military. You know, we try and provide insights to the 99% of the American public who really don't understand much about how the military works or what they do. And I'm going to knock you down a couple of pegs from your time as a senior strategist in different administrations to back a long time ago when you were a brand new ensign or lieutenant JG on a ship, because you've been in this area as an operator. Can you tell us a little bit about the view from a sailor's perspective as a, as an officer on a ship, what it looks like in the Gulf, what it looks like in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab El Mandab, some of the other places, and what kind of effects it has on crews of some of these naval ships.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

I think the first thing that struck me, I deployed there back in 1988. I was just a brand new lieutenant junior grade. When we got over there. Ronald Reagan sent the. The Navy on an operation called Ernest Will. And our job was, it was right at the end of the Iran Iraq War when they sort of became. It became what they called the Tanker war. And our job was to escort commercial ships in and out of the strait. So we pick them up in the Gulf of Oman south of the strait, pick up a convoy, usually have about a half a dozen or so U.S. navy ships and some allied ships. And we'd space ourselves around this big old longa conga line, almost think like a line of ducks. And we'd flow them into the strait, protecting them, and then get them up to the north there. They'd load up and then we'd pick up a fresh load of ships, of fresh convoy ships in the north that were already loaded and bring them back south. And it was back and forth, back and forth for months at a time. And the first thing that struck me when I did this back then is how small the space is. At its narrowest, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide. Now, that sounds like a lot, but boy, when you're, when you're operating with Iranian missiles, with Iranian mines and Iranian bog hammer fast boats constantly as a threat, that feels pretty confined. And so you want to get through that straight as efficiently and as quickly as possible and get into open water. And that separation scheme, think of it like a two lane highway in the strait. So you got 21 miles, but really you've got, because there's a separation scheme that exists right down the middle for ships to go in and out safely. So it gets real tight real fast. And that strikes you. The other thing that struck me was the volume of traffic. And we've been talking about that a lot since the strait became a story here since February, you know, 100 to 135 ships per day before the war started were going through that strait. And that was about what it was when, when I was there in 1988, it was over 100 ships a day. That's a lot of traffic to go through that narrow waterway. And again, it's, it's quite dangerous. There's no way to do it without coming under the window of Iranian missile and drone threats now. So that's what struck me, was again, the proximity of it, the danger of it, and just the volume of the traffic.

[Ben Parker]

Admiral, speaking of Iranian missile and drone threats, we have to ask you, you know, we've sort of had some sort of a ceasefire these last few days, but it's totally broken down again with renewed Iranian attacks on American bases in the region. And we'll play the President's latest threats against Iran here real quick.

[News Reporter]

Reacting to that Iranian attack on US Forces overnight in Jordan, President Trump tells Fox News about Iran. We are going to beat the effing s out of them. He went on to say, we'll be hitting them hard. They're going to get a beating. So clearly the United States is going to respond to what the President described as a surprise attack. He says U.S. forces had just minutes to shoot down these incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. The President says he has reviewed video of the shoot down and it was US Forces conducting this operation to defend that area. He said it was real time. They were calling out coordinates and ensuring that none of this incoming Iranian fire got through.

[Ben Parker]

So, you know, you talked about the convoy operations through the strait, but that was before Iran had such a, such an advanced drone arsenal, such an advanced missile arsenal. What is it like to be on one of those ships and try to protect those convoys then and now?

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Well, we're not doing that right now. We're not protecting the convoys. And, and one of the reasons is because the US Navy just simply can't do that alone. We have to have support from other navies and we don't have that support Right now the French and the British just yesterday rejected another call to, to potentially get involved in convoy operations. Convoy think of that as like a, that's kind of a man to man defense. I mean you are right there with those ships. As you know, you are, you are, it's, you have skin in the game. And you're right, it was easier for us in 1988. We, we had missiles to worry about, we had the fast boats and we had the mines. We didn't have to worry about drones. Drones present a uniquely, a uniquely challenging threat for the U.S. navy. Yes, they fly slow relatively, and they fly relatively low in order to make, to become effective. But they can sometimes be hard to pick up and to find. And as Mark knows this very well, they can be swarmed. I mean you don't have to just do a one off drone. You can launch a bunch at a target with the expectation that they're not all going to get defended. So the drones present a very unique challenge now for the US Navy and for the military and we are seeing the Iranians use that to fairly well. A lot of their hits on commercial ships in the strait have been through drones.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Yeah. And if I can bring this up Ben, because I think both John and I have experienced this both on shipboard and I was on the Mount Whitney one time in the Mediterranean. And talking about integrated air defense, if you're just concerned about drones or missiles striking ships, that's a hard problem to tackle. But what we're seeing is a requirement for integrated air defense across the region. So they are launching drones and missiles not just at ships but at bases around the area against targets like Patriot missiles and some of the smaller air defense systems, short range air defense system systems. So what Iran is attempting to do is not just swarm drones, but swarm attacks. So you're forcing the individuals who are trying to integrate the air defense around the region to basically manage an area the size twice of the United States of where are the missiles going to go? What are they going to strike? How do we shoot them down with limited resources and at the same time how do we protect ships? And, and I'm going to go back to what John was talking about, the escort. I mean that's a gaggle when you're talking about ships from various nations that are living by the law of the sea and suddenly they find themselves in a combat zone. For the Navy to piece that together and say, okay, we're going to make a run for it through the strait, let's go. You're talking 10 different languages, if you have 10 different ships and all kinds of different procedures depending on what type of ship it is. So this isn't as easy as just getting ships through a strait. What Iran is doing, I think, and what they did last night, we'll talk about that in a little bit, is continue to test and show that they have the upper hand in terms of attacking, in terms of maintaining the tempo and the operations. John, can you comment on that a little bit?

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Yeah. So I think a couple of points. Number one, we ought to also remember that in the first few days of this war, Iranians effectively shut the strait down through fear alone. They didn't fire a single shot, and shipping companies were like, yep, we're not going through there now. And you get attacks like we've seen in the last few days, all that does is reinforce that fear. So it's making it very hard. No matter how hard. The Navy's trying to conduct what they're calling sort of a shepherding process. They're not convoying, but they're. They're helping provide an alternate route and oversight of that route. It's still difficult for them to convince every shipper to want to take that route just because of the fear alone. The Iranians know that we have integrated air defense. They are also integrating their capabilities to shut down the strait. So sometimes they'll use a drone, sometimes they'll use a missile. They obviously have mines that they've put in the strait, and they still have, although much fewer, they still have fast boats available to them to harass shipping. The other thing they're doing is just getting on the. On the shortwave radio and calling up these ships as they begin to enter the strait or get close to the strait and threatening them. That alone, as I said, back to fear. So they are using an integrated approach of themselves to manage control of this, and they still have that capability. I think it has surprised everybody. And I. I can't verify this, but I would guess I'm accurate that it's probably a surprise. Some people at Central Command down in Tampa, the degree to which the Iranians still have capability left. We knew they were going to squirrel things away and bury it. We knew they were going to obfuscate their capabilities. We knew that they would have some restorative defense industrial base capability. But I think it surprised everybody in the region that they have as much left as they do. And we saw that on stark display just last night.

[Commercial Narrator 2]

Yeah.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

If I could add something, Ben, I know you got a question, but the comment you made Just now, John, about the fear factor involved in ships wanting or not wanting to go through the straits. I think we all got to remind people these are not military sailors. I mean, these are merchant folks. They don't have any experience with this kind of stuff, so they're scared to death. Plus, they're business owners, they're merchants. The guys that are renting these ships to transport goods, they're saying, hey, this is an insurance problem. If I lose a ship, it's going to cost me x millions of dollars to replace that ship or to pay the people who don't want to work there anymore. So there is more of a factor of fear than what I think most Americans would think. Well, it's the Navy. Just send them on through the water, you know, and devil may care.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

These ships are big. Even when they're empty, they're slow. And they can't maneuver the way a destroyer or a guided missile frigate can. Back when I was doing it, you. You've got to be careful, and you've got to be deliberate. And they don't have defenses on board. They don't have machine guns. They don't have, you know, missile defenses. They're just big old tankers and freighters. And. And so they are virtually defenseless once they start making that run. And there's not, again, there's not a lot of room, you know, for them to maneuver. And they don't have a lot of power and speed. So that's why it's a. It's a very careful calculation. And what you're seeing now is not only the insurance going way, way up for these guys, but their companies, their shipping companies are finding alternate routes or they're trying to find alternate routes so that they don't have to transit the straight.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Ben Parker]

All right. If I can ask you two questions. The first is this is something that at a sort of detailed, tactical level has not been clear to me ever since we announced that we were going to blockade the Iranian blockade. And Trump said, we're going to shut down the strait. And then CENTCOM said, well, actually, no, we're just block. Blocking the Iranian ports. What is the purpose of all this? How does that work? Iran's trying to shut down the street of Hormuz, so we're blockading the Iranian ports. Is that just to prevent the fast boats from getting out to the strait, or is that to block off their trade? What exactly is the operation and the goal there?

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

A blockade is a military operation. Usually it's a naval operation, although it is not Exclusively confined to just maritime assets. But it's a military operation designed to choke off the economy of your adversary. Unlike an embargo or sanctions, which are likewise designed to do that. It is a physical blocking of a country's nation state's economy. And so what the US Navy has got in place in the Gulf of Oman is a blockade. Now this blockade is multi assets, multifunctional. It is surface ships, destroyers, even some amphibious ships because they have helicopters. So you have aviation capabilities. You also have constant eyes on, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, drones, satellites, the whole works. So they have got constant eyes on what's going on in the strait. And they know that they can identify, because we're watching all the time, what ships are trying to get through and where they're coming from. So you can know whether a ship is coming from an Iranian port. That's the trigger. If it's coming from an Iranian port, then that's the trigger for the blockade to go into effect. They try to stop these ships through warnings the same way the Iranians are doing. They, they try to stop them through non kinetic means. It means like, you know, fly over, you know, have a helicopter buzz over overhead or a jet, you know, something to intimidate them, to turn, to stop them and turn around. If that doesn't work, then the US Navy obviously can use kinetic fires to disable a ship. What they typically try to do is shot across the bow, literally. It's not just the Navy, it's not just a term from the movies. It's a real thing to again intimidate and to get them to stop. And if that doesn't work, you can disable a ship usually by going after its engineering spaces, maybe the rudder or something like that, so that it can't maneuver and then, and, or board it if you feel like you need to board it to take control of it. It really depends on how fast the ship is going, what you think it's carrying, and how determined that ship is to make the blockade or to run the blockade. The blockade's been pretty effective. And that's not to say they've gotten every one they have missed. Some ships have gotten through, but not a lot. There's a fear factor here that the US Navy is also trying to apply to, to Iranian shippers. And it has had an effect. The, the regime wants survival. Key to their survival, they believe, is a nuclear weapons capability. But it's also, you know, the economic lifeblood that comes from their, their oil industry. And so the blockade has an effect. On their economy. There's no question about that. It is a unlike the man to man defense we talked about. A blockade is kind of a zone defense if you want to, if you want to look at it that way, you got assets kind of deployed in the Gulf of Oman where they need to be. So it's not like there's a line of destroyers cutting off the strait. They're where they need to be. And they're more located sort of towards the northern part of the Gulf of Oman because that's where the Iranian ships are going to be coming out of. But it really is an opportunity to try to stranglehold the Iranian economy. And again, they know that the regime is sensitive to that. I do want to put a caveat on that though. The hardliners, the ones who are popping off these drones and these missiles, they're not pragmatists and they could care less about the economic needs of the Iranian people. And so while the regime itself I think is sensitive to economic targeting and that kind of messaging, the hardliners, the ones who are not interested in sitting down at the table and, and don't want to necessarily see this war and really aren't that affected by the economic measures that are in place.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, we, we have to go show our ad real quick, but when we come back, let's trade another question because I've got, I've got more I want to ask and I know you do too. Let's show the ad real quick.

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[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

yeah, John, I'm gonna. I'm gonna promote you now. You know, we've been talking about Lt. J.G. kirby for a while and talking about the tactical operations. Let me promote you to rear admiral, lower half. And you're now part of this fleet that's gone in and out of there. We have two carrier strike groups. I think it's the Lincoln and the Bush in the region right now. They've been there a long time. And there are indicators that depending on how the negotiations go, they may be longer. Can you talk from a senior leader perspective, what that means toward the sailors, the ships, the maintenance, the resources that we have in the Gulf for a long period of time, and what you would be concerned about if you're on the flagship of one of these aircraft carriers.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

A really timely question for where we are in this conflict right now, Mark. As you know, naval forces are very flexible and nimble, agile. They don't need permission slips from countries to operate. So you can put them where you want them, and you can normally keep them there for months at a time. There's a caveat on that. The ability to sustain naval forces at sea means you've got to have logistics and sustainment capabilities at sea. And the Navy does have underway replenishment chips and all that, but you also, for extended periods of time, you want to be able to pull them into port so they can get fueled. They can, you know, get a little bit of rest and relaxation. And that's not happening right now. And so one of the things we're seeing is a strain on these naval forces as they basically have to stay at sea all the time because there's no safe place for them to pull in. They're much better at defending themselves if they're at sea. Which means that the limited at sea underway replenishment capability of the Navy is being strained and stretched. I mean, there was a story a couple of months ago about sailors on one of the aircraft carriers complaining that they were, you know, they didn't have as much food to eat and as many meal choices. And that's because the ship was shepherding its stores for the possibility that they were going to have to remain at sea for that much longer. So there is a stress on logistics and sustainment. Number two, there's a stress on the ships. I mean, ships are made of metal, salt, Water is corrosive. And just over time, a ship will develop rust, it will develop corrosive activity on some of its equipment. I mean, it takes constant effort to keep a ship in fighting trim at sea when it's been there for that long. We saw that with the Ford. They finally got home after, I think 11 months. It was the longest deployment ever since the Vietnam War of an aircraft carrier. That ship, I mean, she looked like she'd been at sea for quite a while. There was a lot of wear and tear on her and her equipment and her aircraft. The third thing is, of course, the sailors themselves. And I have never been on a deployment longer than six months. Back when I was doing this, they were much more regimented. We had a bigger Navy, so we could afford to do that. But even after six months, you get tired and, you know, just like I'm sure it is the same case in the Army Mark. But, you know, a unit's readiness, combat readiness, is at its peak when it gets on theater, when it gets. Because it's just finished all the training. Everything is fresh, everything's in condition. Sailors have been rested and trained. They're ready to go. And then over the course of that deployment, that readiness will go down. And the longer the deployment, the more that readiness dips. And so now we've got some ships that have been there for many, many months and they're tired. There's just fatigue. It is. It's a grind. And it's particularly a grind in that part of the world. The seas aren't necessarily rough, but it's very, very hot. It's an unforgiving environment. And these guys are going from peaks of activity to then almost doing nothing. So you go 100 miles an hour and then down to zero. And that also takes a wear and tear on the crew and the readiness. So I am concerned about long term readiness here for these naval forces that are deployed. Obviously the Navy is and will continue to replace them. But I think it's important for people to understand, you know, when I did this in 88, we had almost 600 ships in the United States Navy because Reagan had the 600 ship Navy. So we had. There was a lot of assets available to do what we needed to do. We now have less than 300 ships in the US Navy. And we don't have ships that are particularly adept at operating in these shallow waters. The destroyers are great. They're multipurpose, they're wonderful ships. We don't have that many of them. When I was doing this, I was on a guided missile frigate, which was a shallow draft escort ship. The whole reason for that ship to exist was for what Reagan sent us over there to do. We don't have that capability anymore. And as I said, other allied navies aren't necessarily willing to get involved in this at this time. So it's going to be harder for the Navy to keep this up over a long period of time just because there's just not that many resources and we have global responsibilities. We've got ships in the Indo Pacific, we've got ships in the, you know, in the South Atlantic. There's a lot going on and there's just not a lot to replace.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

And we haven't even mentioned family members too back home waiting for their sailors to return. So it is a readiness, it becomes a readiness issue in a big way. Ben, I know you got more questions.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, no.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Are we going to promote the admiral to strategic yet or is that coming?

[Ben Parker]

Well, I do want to talk about, you know, how you, how you talk about these things to the American people. I want to ask you about your specialty, Admiral Kirby, which is public affairs and explaining the military and military operations and our foreign policy to the American people. And so I want to start by talking about these, this now series of reports. We've seen this alarming series about the dwindling stockpiles of key munitions, especially missile interceptors, some precision munitions, things like that. Just CNN is the latest to report on this that like things like Patriot and Thaad missile interceptors are at dangerously low levels. These are not, you know, publicly announced numbers. Someone is leaking to cnn. But I think we're seeing these leaks because people in the Pentagon, people in the military are worried about it. That is also a readiness crisis. And you know, how do you decide if you're trying to make a decision about being in the middle of a war, what's worth it? And then how do you talk about it to the American people?

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Yeah, two issues very much related. So we dealt with a little bit of the stockpile challenges in the Biden administration. As you know, we were very aggressively supporting Ukraine and that required in certain instances, artillery shells, interceptors, drones. It required lengthy and what we thought were productive conversations with the defense industrial based defense contractors to restore some of those capabilities. It was artillery shells was something we did not anticipate having to go buy in bulk again. But those first couple of years of that, of the fight in Ukraine was basically a gunfight. And so we, we started to reinvigorate the defense industrial base here in the country. But clearly more needed to be done even when we left office. And I think anybody on the national security team back then would have admitted the same thing. We, we did a lot, but more needed to be done. And clearly now with this Iran war, you're seeing that same defense industrial base being strained and stretched with the pace of the interceptors that they are, they're using. And let's remember these interceptors, I mean, you're talking 3 million at a pop for a patriot knocking down a drone that costs less than a used car to make and put in the air. So the balance isn't right either. And so this is a real readiness concern. And I know that the administration understands this. They may not be publicly talking about it, but they're having the meetings, they're having the discussions. I think they know this is a challenge. And if the reporting is accurate about the reason why President Trump did not go back to major combat operations last weekend, that I think shows at least some healthy debate and discussion in the national security apparatus to think about pacing these things and to think about the expenditure of munitions and stockpiles. It sounds to me like he got good advice from military leaders, and I was glad to hear that he heeded that advice. Now, again, we'll have to see what happens now that the Iranians decided to pop off these attacks over the last 24 hours. But it is a real readiness issue.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Yeah. And on that popping off of the attacks over the last 24, I agree with you, John. I think the various staff members of the Joint Staff got to him in terms of resources and said, we can't do this anymore. So I think that was certainly a contributor to the ceasing of hostilities as of Friday. But Iran continues to pump missiles and drones at us. And then the president gets on Fox News, as we showed earlier this morning, and says, I'm going to knock the F in and S out of them. Let's now promote you to the strategic level. You're now the dean or the CEO of the University of Chicago center for Politics. What are you telling your students about this? What are the factors that play now that we're talking about, not just who does what to who between Iran and the United States, but the other factors involved, which, which could be called a nexus of a bunch of different global factors that are playing a role in this.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Now, two thoughts. One is, and what I have told students here is this is an example of why you don't enter a war without a clear sense of your strategic outcomes and goals. And they have been all over the map. And if you don't have the end state in mind then you are going to run into resource problems. It's, you know, you know, it's, it's ends, ways and means. Right?

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

And that's not been, that's not been followed here. And that's why I think we are in this resource constrained environment that we're in right now, because they didn't, it wasn't an adequate discussion and debate about what they were actually trying to achieve. And I think part of the discussion, again I wasn't in the room, but I'm guessing that part of the discussion over the last weekend was it's either go all out because we've got maybe weeks left of stuff to fire. So either we go all out, topple this regime and be done with it or not. Because we can't keep going back to this tit for tat, you know, periods of strikes and then periods of calm, periods of strikes. That, that takes awareness as we've been talking about, not only on the people and the, and the platforms, but the stockpiles itself. And so I think number one is it's have a good discussion about strategy and what you're trying to achieve before you actually enter a war. And that didn't happen. The other thing is, to your point is we are now seeing this sort of interconnectivity between the fights in Ukraine and the fight in Iran. They are two different conflicts. I think we need to be careful we don't over compare them obviously completely two different wars. But they are starting to become intertwined. And largely that's because of Russia. And I was really glad to see that the Senate voted on this package of sanctions last night. Very aggressive. I hope the President signs it quickly and we can get that in place because Russia is benefiting from this war in Iran. They're benefiting from the high price of oil. They're benefiting from their increased relationship they have with Iran which developed over their fighting in Ukraine. I mean Iran is now they've allowed Russia to build shahed drones in Russia. And of course there's reports that the Russians are providing intelligence and targeting data to the Iranians. So there is a nexus here. And again it all comes down to one country in my mind and that's, and that's Russia. And again, I think it's important these sanctions get put in place. But more critically, I think it's important that the President and the administration finally start taking support to Ukraine more seriously than they have in the past because that also will help put a crimp on Putin's war machine.

[Ben Parker]

Well, it does seem lately like the administration has been a little warmer to Ukraine than some of us expected. Maybe they're just still listening to Laura Loomer and that's why. But, you know, whatever the reason, I guess we'll take it. I wanted to ask you again, using your expertise as a public affairs officer, about what you would do if you were in charge of the Twitter account for centcom. Because I've mentioned this before and our, I mentioned this before and yeah, I know command post listeners well, this is a sort of bugbear of mine. But we see every time we have more strikes by the United States in and around Iran, CENTCOM puts out a tweet that says something like, we're doing this to degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. And we've been degrading and degrading and degrading for coming up on six months now. And you mentioned this earlier. Right. I think everyone's surprised by how, how survivable Iran has been. I think a lot of it is help they're getting from the Russians and Chinese. But like, how do you, at a certain point, how long do you keep on saying, well, we're degrading, don't worry about it, we're, we're still degrading before you have to say, I don't know, it's not degraded.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Yeah, that's a, another great question. I, I think there is, I would not want to be a communicator right now because I think my guess would be Central Command wants to do more. I think they probably my experience with them when I was at the Pentagon was they were a very forward leaning public affairs apparatus and they have to be sometimes more forward leaning than I was comfortable with at times. But they, but they were always on their toes, not on their back feet. I think they don't have that ability right now. I suspect they're being pretty well micromanaged about what they're able to put out when they can put it out. And I'm guessing there's a lot of hand holding there. And that's unfortunate because I know Admiral Cooper well. I've known him for many, many years. He not only is a great tactician and naval strategist, but, but he's a good communicator and I suspect he's not really being allowed to communicate the way he would normally like to do in a, in a typical situation. So I, I, I understand that they have to put out certain things. One of the things I found was interesting was about a week ago, you were starting to see on the Centcom Twitter account where they were for the first time, and I've never seen this ever in my, my career. They were, they were putting on Twitter exactly when the strikes were starting, like the hour at 7:00pm Eastern, blah, blah, blah. We start, and then they would put out when it was over. Now, again, I'm just guessing here, but I think the one thing I will give centcom good credit for here in Kansas, I think they figured out a way to partner their comms with the diplomatic process. I can see a world in which they're telling themselves, hey, if we advertise when the strikes are happening and we advertise when they're ending, maybe we're giving the pragmatists in Iran a little bit of leash to run with in terms of trying to get things back to the table. That, that we're, that we're being so deliberate in the, in this and specific in the comms that we're giving them some time and space to maybe get back to the table. Now, I may be overly generous on that, but I think that's part of what's going on here.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

I've had that same feeling, John, to

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

be honest with you. There's something weird about it. Like, we would never do that, say, when we're starting and when we're, There has to be a diplomatic angle to that, which I think if that's, if that's what's happening, that's, I think, pretty smart on their part. But beyond Twitter, I mean, what has concerned me from the beginning of this conflict is the lack of public transparency and communications. Whether it's casualty counts, whether it's just operational details. There's been, I think that last Pentagon briefing was like, in May, and, and that's really, that's not just a shame. That's a travesty. The, the Pentagon has an obligation to explain itself to the American people, to our allies, even to our adversaries. They have an obligation to explain what they're doing with the men and women who have raised their right hand to serve and the tax dollars that are being spent on their behalf. And they're just, in my mind, completely failing on that, on that score. And I also feel like it would both, I mean, I don't know how to, I don't know how I can put this easily, but it actually helps you as a policymaker to be out there on two counts. Number one, you get a chance to. To be involved in the narrative. You get a chance to shape it and to provide your context. Number two, by getting tough questions from the press, you get smart. You get to realize where the story's going and what reporters are hearing. And it makes you not only a better tactician, but it makes you a better policymaker in my mind. And I've seen many times in my experience where my interactions with the media and the questions I was getting helped me inform my bosses, whether that was Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or even a president, United States, to say, hey, here's what's really going on out there in the information environment. Maybe we need to tweak the way not only we're talking about something, but the decisions we're making. And so I feel like Mr. Hegseth and Mr. Trump are missing opportunities by not being out there more, not being faced with tough questions to make better decisions.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Can I add one thing to that, Ben? And I know you got another question. You know, I think we talked about this when we were. When we first met in. In Iraq. And it's not just the policymakers, John. It's allowing the military to. To talk as well.

[Commercial Narrator 2]

And.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

And we're seeing kind of a. A chilling of that. You know, truthfully, as a commander, it was a pain in the ass for me, me to talk to the press, but. And some of. Some of them were rabid. Some of them you could build trust in, but they were representing the American people. So it's not just the politicians or, you know, the Mr. Hegseth or Mr. Parnell or the president, but it should be the military folks being kind of unleashed to say, hey, here's what's really going on. And, yeah, it's a tough fight. I mean, your explanation this morning of some of the things that happened in a naval operation, I think would allow the American public to understand just how tough this is. It is not simple. This is not a video game. So the military needs to get back into the discussion of this as well, in my view.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

I mean, I couldn't agree more. And when you hear, for instance, the president's clip that you guys just showed on Fox, I mean, clearly he's frustrated. And look, I get that he's angry about what happened. I can't take anything away from him there. But he has. He has in the past complained about press coverage. He's complained about the. The lack of understanding and appreciation by the American people for what he's Trying to do, whether you agree with him or not, that that's not a, he's not wrong about that. But he, he, himself and the administration can, can, can solve that problem by just communicating more and being more open and more transparent. And, you know, like we did with you, Mark, interact, embed reporters in some of these units. Let reporters on some of those ships, let them talk to the pilots, let them talk to the sailors, let them talk to the, to the airmen and the pilots that are involved in this as well, so that they can get a better sense of what the challenges are. And again, I think, and I say this not trying to be overly critical, I think they are missing an opportunity and I hope they can revisit that. At the very least, start to do Pentagon briefings. You know, more often. You, you've got to. This is a huge story which cries out for context and understanding and just, just make yourself available to tough questions.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Well, that picture that we showed earlier was with Nancy Youssef, who became president of the White House Association. She, you know, she was embedded with me for a while, and she was a pit bull, and it was hard sometimes talking to her, but I realized she was going to write a story whether I talked to her or not. So I better talk to her and let her give her some context, as you just said.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Right.

[Ben Parker]

I think that's. If we learned one lesson from this whole war, then it should be that, you know, a big part of winning a war is words. And, you know, our president says he has the best words, but we haven't heard them lately. And I really wish we had someone who could articulate what we were trying to accomplish consistently, what we were willing to sacrifice to, to make it worth it and, and how we were doing to get there. But unfortunately, we don't. Admiral Kirby, thank you so much for enlightening us. I wish we had more time, but this has been great. I learned a lot. And thank you for joining us on Command Post.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

I'm enjoyed. I've enjoyed it very much. I'd be happy to come back anytime.

[Lieutenant General Mark Hertling]

Great. Thanks so much, John. Appreciate it. Really insightful stuff.

[Rear Admiral John Kirby]

Thanks, guys.

[Commercial Narrator]

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