Bill Kristol (4:04)

go through those, maybe in that order, actually talk about the implications because people are, as I said, the geopolitics, geostrategic side of this has been slightly under analyzed, understandably, you know, in a way compared to the kind of day to day stuff and what's in Trump and excess mind and all that. So you want to begin with Europe?

Bob Kagan (4:21)

Yeah, let's talk about Europe. Because of course, you know, for the Europeans, they face a, an existential threat from Russian aggression. Right now. If you ask the Europeans what's the biggest, by far the biggest strategic challenge they face, it's not Iran, and certainly not a depleted and impoverished Iran, which was what existed before the war. But it is very much Russia which is committing aggression. And Europe is now gearing itself pretty much almost entirely to try to make sure that Ukraine doesn't lose that war because they see it as a sort of the first step toward further Russian aggression, which Americans, including Republicans, used to believe too, Mike Johnson made a whole point about how Putin is not finished when he gets done with Ukraine, he's going to keep going. And the Europeans definitely believe that. And so from their point of view, the war has been a real strategic disaster because there have been two major consequences of the war. One is obviously the skyrocketing oil prices, which are only. Which even before Trump took the action of lifting sanctions against Russia, was going to increase Russian income. But then when Trump, by the way, over the unanimous objection of the other G7 leaders, which they had a phone call, he overruled them and lifted sanctions on Russia, which is now going to provide Putin, depending on how long the war lasts, with tens of billions of dollars for his war chest. And so, you know, whatever else is true, this is buying significant amount of time at a time when, when Russia was really suffering economically, running huge budget deficits. So this is a real lifeline to Putin. And meanwhile, on the other side, the American forces are, I would say, somewhat unexpectedly, perhaps, burning through major stocks of weaponry and particularly Patriot and other forms of interceptors on which Ukraine depends heavily, because those are the interceptors that defend their major cities from constant Russian attack. So, so on both ends, both in terms of helping Russia and hurting Ukraine, this has been a major setback for Europeans. And it's also clear in the way the Trump administration has handled this that the Trump administration, neither before the war nor now, could not care less about the effect on Europe. They didn't consult with the Europeans before the war. In fact, even Trump's best buddy, best non authoritarian buddy, I would say out there, Giorgia Maloney, the prime Minister of Italy, you know, she was also not given a heads up and she was quite unhappy about that and embarrassed, sort of humiliated. In Italy, she's supposed to be Trump's buddy and he didn't tell her. So for the Europeans, this is unquestionably a strategic setback.

Bill Kristol (7:27)

I think the unilateralism of it, I mean, is maybe less important in terms of going to war and the conduct of the war maybe less important than the actual substantive results. You've just outlined very well. But it is striking. I mean, we were, we remember the Iraq war. We were accused of acting unilaterally, but in fact, we tried very hard to get Europeans on board. We failed with Schroeder in Germany and I guess Iraq and France, and that was, you know, we went to the Security Council. I mean, there was twice. Twice. And we did get other Europeans on board, incidentally, but Anyway, I think it's one thing, don't you think, if you're an ally, to have, okay, we disagree on this particular action and choice, and we're just going to not participate. That was kind of their position. That's very different from just thinking you can go to war, a big war, not too far from Europe and not even talk to them. I mean, it is kind of stunning. Well, it just means that he doesn't think of the US as leader of an alliance. He thinks that the US Is.

Bob Kagan (8:25)

And that's the conclusion the Europeans have sensibly reached. You now see many, many more Europeans. There's a really smart European scholar named Ivan Krastev who's written this, but many others have written that it's very clear, and this is the bottom line, it's very clear that the Trump administration no longer regards the transacrand relationship as anything of importance, no longer regards Europe as an important security interest of the United States. You know, they've told. They've told the Europeans that they have to be able to defend themselves by 2027. I think that's what Secretary Hegseth told them last year. And so they've really cut the Europeans loose. And the thing about this war is it really drives home the degree to which the United States no longer cares about fundamental European security. And then, of course, the same, you know, we can move on and go over.

Bill Kristol (9:16)

Let's go to Asia. Yeah.

Bob Kagan (9:18)

You know, very few countries in the are more dependent on Middle east oil and including the oil that comes directly through the Strait of Hormuz than Japan. Japan, I think defense depends for something like 95% of its oil supplies come from the Middle east, and 70% of that runs through the Strait of Hormuz. So once again, the Japanese were not consulted. In fact, as late as late last week, they were still complaining that no one had talked to them about any. Diplomats have not been. Have not been contacted. It's clear that the new prime minister, who is a conservative, you know, is supposed to be sort of trumpy, although I don't think that's really what she is. But nevertheless, she's very upset. She's talked about how this crisis has severely impacted Japanese interests and so that the huge oil prices are really damaging our allies. On top of which, the Japanese will notice that the United States has sent significant forces that are dedicated both to the defense of Japan and are sort of critical to any response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those forces are now being sent. Some of them are already there, and some are being sent to the Middle East. Particularly people are writing these days about this 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and what's known as the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, both of which are sort of critical parts of defending against the Chinese attack in the region. Those have been sent now to the Middle East. So once again, we see Americans having to sort of strip the West Pacific theater of significant capability in order to deal with this. This is something, by the way, that Elbridge Colby used to be very concerned about. He used to talk a lot about how we were degrading our capabilities in the Western Pacific because of all our activity in the Middle East. But apparently now, now that's a good thing. So the Asian allies have been, have been very badly hurt by this and will continue to be badly hurt. And then finally there's the question. I mean, we can get to Israel in a second.

Bill Kristol (11:31)

What about China? I mean, China itself.

Bob Kagan (11:33)

Yeah.

Bill Kristol (11:34)

Are they being heard at all intimidated or, you know.

Bob Kagan (11:39)

Well, I, I mean, this is funny. I mean, I read in some articles in the Wall Street Journal about how the Chinese, you know, this is going to be a great deterrent to the Chinese, but I don't really see how they view it that way. I mean, first of all, on the oil. Yes, they are very dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but they've built up huge stocks. I think they have something like a billion barrels of oil in their reserves so that they can kind of make it for months. But also, Iran is shipping oil to China right now. I mean, the, the ships that are allowed through the straits through the Hillamu Strait is, are ships that are oil bound for China. So they're not even particularly, they're not even particularly suffering. But from a military point of view, also, it's interesting what are the lessons that the Chinese should learn from this? Now, obviously they're going to be very impressed with some of the performance of our fifth generation aircraft. And you know, American capability of hitting targets is obviously, you know, unparalleled. On the other hand, if in a contingency with China, is the United States going to send the Israeli air force in to take out all the air defenses before the Americans have to start risking their craft? You know, that was, it's not exactly clear how the Iran operation is replicable in the case of China, again, partly because of the Israeli role, which was very important. I don't think the United States would have gone into take out those air defenses from Iran by itself if the Israelis hadn't done it for them. But also, you know, the Americans have shown that they're afraid, understandably. I don't mean. I don't mean to be critical of it, but I mean, they are clearly unwilling to send their Americans, are unwilling to send their naval vessels into the Strait for fear, as Pete Hegseth has pointed out, that the Iranians will shoot at them. Well, I think in most Taiwan scenarios, there will be people shooting at American ships and probably with greater capability. Not probably, but definitely with much greater capability. So I don't know whether the Chinese are given pause by this or whether they're encouraged by it, quite honestly.

Bill Kristol (13:48)

Yeah, if you just, if you can't beat Iran very quickly when you have everything on your side and Israel and it's against Iran, which is, as you say, sort of been impoverished and depleted by 12 days of war last summer and other things, are we really going to. How successful will we be in deterring or defeating China or something if they try something with Taiwan? I mean, it just seems like it's infinitely harder for us to do.

Bob Kagan (14:10)

Right. And, you know, a lot of these questions are not only about capability. America has extraordinary capability, but it's a willingness to take risks, it's a willingness to use them in dangerous situations. And certainly in this situation, the United States has been very cautious. So I don't know what that. I don't know what signaled that sense of the Chinese. And then finally, of course, the Chinese can also see that in order to conduct this war against a much lesser power, the United States has had to strip, you know, the Western Pacific of significant forces which are supposed to be dedicated to dealing with a potential China threat. So, you know, I don't see why the Chinese should be any more worried about the United States before this than they were before the war.

Bill Kristol (14:53)

Yeah, I think that sounds right to me. And in the region, in the Middle east itself.

Bob Kagan (14:58)

Well, I mean, I just wonder whether the Gulf states in particular are wondering whether they've joined the right team here because they have, by the way, been very, on a background, very vocal in saying that they were against the war, they did not favor it. They thought they had a pretty good deal going with the Iranians, that kind of an agreement that they would get to. They would leave each other alone for the most part. So they were not really in favor of the war. They were overruled. And then it turns out the United States can't really protect them. I mean, they have suffered the worst in some respects because it's not only that they've been targets and that they're shipping. You know, they've lost money on oil, but, you know, they. With the tremendous cooperation of the Trump. And I would say in this case, the Trump family and social circle have been very deeply involved in the United States making investments in AI and other things, but particularly AI. They're hosting data centers for all kinds of companies. And in general, they've been trying to make themselves an attractive place for investment and also tourism. And that's a big. That's basically their whole game right now. And this is devastating for that. It's funny, you watch, the UAE is basically arresting people for taking pictures of damage that may have been done by Iranian drone strikes and other things. On things in Dubai, for instance, I think they've arrested foreigners who took pictures of these things. Why? Because they don't want people to see that it's risky to be in Dubai because then people won't invest and they won't come. And so it's kind of a disaster for them. So, again, the bottom line for the Gulf is, is that the United States undertook this war and then was not able actually to protect them. So. And here, now Trump is calling for the Chinese maybe to help keep the strait open. I don't think it's hard to persuade certain Gulf states, like the UAE and others, that maybe China's also a pretty good partner, or at least as much of a reliable partner as the United States has turned out to be. So I don't really see how the United States is gained a great advantage in its relationship with those. With those allies.

Bill Kristol (17:14)

Some people have written, they're very big on US Israel cooperation, which has been very close, I gather, and I guess militarily effective. That's. Some of. That's gonna. That's a model for. What is it a model for? I mean.

Bob Kagan (17:26)

Well, that's the thing. I mean, it's very sui generis. You know, America doesn't have Israel with it in every region of the world. It only has its. Is it with its here. And I must say, I find it a little bit. It's kind of a syllogism when people talk about what a great ally Israel is. It is a great ally in defense of Israel, you know, I mean, which is fine.

Bill Kristol (17:50)

I mean, they're entitled to put that first, you know.

Bob Kagan (17:53)

No, no, no. Right. That's their great concern. And look, I mean, let's face it, at the end of the day, Iran is a much greater threat to Israel than it is to the United States. So when they say that people. When people say that Israel is a great ally in the fight Against Iran. I mean, I, it's kind of like saying that South Vietnam was a great ally in the fight against North Vietnam. You know, I mean, it was, but weren't we there to defend South Vietnam? You know, so. But I think Israel also has got, I don't know what, I can't speak for what's in Bibi Netanyahu's head, but if I were the Israelis, I would also be worried about the reliability of the American commitment over the long term. I mean, Israel has used its power with the United States now to really create a kind of hegemonic dominance in the region. Let's say that they do get rid of this Iranian regime and therefore is sort of involved in Iran to make sure that it doesn't come back. It is involved in Lebanon, is involved in Gaza, et cetera, et cetera. Can Israel sustain that without the United States? So that's why we get back to this decision that Trump has to make. I mean, if the United States is now going to sort of establish itself as a major long term military presence. And by the way, Netanyahu has talked about this, something he's talked about when he spoke to Congress in 2024. He talked about turning the Abraham Accords into the Abraham alliance, which would be a kind of NATO like long term American with the Arabs and the Israelis, interoperability and intelligence, etc. Etc. Is the United States really ready to make that kind of long term commitment to a larger military presence in the Middle East? And if it's not, can Israel, as I said, can Israel sustain this position?

Bill Kristol (19:50)

Yeah, it seems like Israel was in good position after the June, you know, 12 day war and the US had come in to help finish, more or less finish the job with the new Iran's nuclear program. So there was, you know, good ally and there was, the alliance structure was working. But on the other hand, Israel didn't ask the US to run many risks or do too much. And Iran was weakened and Hezbollah, thanks to Israeli action before it, but very much weakened. Yeah, it is. And now they've sort of, I don't know, overextended. They've extended the effort so far that they're now in a position if they don't replace the Iranian regime and if they don't, if the US doesn't succeed in opening the strait. How does that work? How does that look? I mean, is that, yeah, some of the deterrent effect is less, not greater. I would say, after all, now maybe they just feel they so weakened, decimated Iranian military capabilities and the IRGC and so forth, that it's kind of worth it for a couple, two or three years. And that would be, I guess they could make that argument. But if we're not reliable, go ahead.

Bob Kagan (20:56)

I wouldn't think we're reliable because, I mean, first of all, I don't think that Donald Trump is a reliable ally to anyone, including people who think that they're his buddies. But also because I'm not sure the American public is really that pro Israel right now, honestly. And depending on how the war goes, they might be even less pro Israel by the time, by the time we're done.

Bill Kristol (21:23)

You know, important point. If I could, just as someone who's been involved in the Israel stuff a little bit over the years, I mean, one of the key talking points for Israel always was and it wasn't. It was a true talking point, an important one. It was very much like Ukraine. I mean, it was, we've Israel depends on, God knows, a lot of US Military aid and high quality, you know, keeping a qualitative edge and et cetera. But they've never asked the US to fight for Israel. They did ask US help in defending themselves against missiles. Obviously, that was, I guess, under the Biden administration. We wouldn't go all the way back, obviously, to the first Gulf War and so forth, but that was pretty much it. I mean, and that was a big advantage for Israel, I think, you know, in sort of making the case in the US that, look, the military aid, the diplomatic relationship, the price you pay for this sometimes and, you know, in the Arab world and so forth and other places is worth it because it's a good ally that isn't asking you to send. It's not Vietnam, if you want to use your early right. They're not asking you to send troops here to fight and die. And suddenly we are in the middle of it. And I'm very dubious that that's good for Israel.

Bob Kagan (22:27)

You know, and I mean, at the largest level, with Israel and with the Gulf and with everybody else, I mean, wherever we get to, let's say we have a decent outcome here. But whatever decent outcome we get, however you want it to be, define it, it will be because the United States brought its enormous power to bear. And what we've learned through history is that it's not enough to bring the enormous power to bear to get the victory. You also need to keep the power there to sustain the victory. You know, the United States won a big victory in World War I, totally transformed the balance of power in Europe in A way that was, that was, you know, favorable to peace and then pulled out and then the European. Because then the balance of power was, was refashioned. It wasn't sustaining a peace anymore. And we got that. And then we wound up in World War II. I mean, a similar thing would happen in the Middle east. If the United States brings great power to bear to create a certain kind of situation, but then it's not willing to keep its power there to sustain that situation. And then, then you go back to. And I think that's, that's the real risk now. And that's why again, I get back to Trump is at a kind of fork in the road now.

Bill Kristol (23:37)

Most explain explain the fork. The choice that really weird.

Bob Kagan (23:40)

Well, again, the choice is we have now expended a tremendous amount of power to sort of restructure the region. That's the, put simply, that's the goal, right? Restructure the region so that there is no longer an Iranian threat, but there's going to be instability in Iran, no matter what happens. Let's say you get a friendly government in place, okay. Let's say you get some even member of the irgc, the Iranian Guard, you know, the current regime, in a sense, you get the kind of outcome you had in Venezuela. Does that mean everybody in Iran is going to be going along with this? Does that mean that there's not going to be any kind of, you know, rebellion somewhere in Iran? I think that's quite likely. Or that Iran simply falls apart, you know, and then and spreads chaos in the region, which is exactly what the Gulf states have always been worried about. At that point, has the United States sort of said, well, that's not my problem, our problem anymore? Because that will also create terrorism and brutality and closing the strait. I mean, who knows? It's not like the region will all of a sudden just become permanently stable. The United States would still have to play a role. But it has kicked this hornet's nest. It has upset one balance. So is it going to sustain the other? So it seems to me the one choice that Trump faces is to, as I say, really establish a long term large American military presence in the region to sustain whatever gains have been made by this war, or to pull back and to pull out and then let things take whatever course they're going to take. I find both of those courses are highly unlikely. But, but he's going to have to choose between them or do something in the middle. But in the middle won't solve the problem. You know, either you're there being dominant enough to suppress these forces or you're not. And so this is the. You know, I have to say, in fairness to the Bush administration, and this is something that people are now making this, the analogies between the Iraq war in 2003 and this. But here's. Here's a big difference. Whatever else is true, Bush did feel responsible for leaving behind an outcome in Iraq that could be sustained. And if you look at Iraq since the American invasion in 2003, there have been six elections, parliamentary elections. There's been a change of government. There are seven. There have been seven prime ministers. Iraq has been stable. It hasn't committed war against anybody, hasn't committed atrocities against its own people. I mean, we would dream of an outcome like that in Iran. And I just don't get the sense that Trump feels that kind of responsibility. In fact, you know, Colin Powell famously said, you know, he had the Pottery Barn rule about. About these kinds of conflicts, that if you break it, you own it. I think Bush took seriously the idea that he owned Iraq, even if he did break it, and even if they did were incompetent in the conduct of the war, which I don't think. Which was certainly true, he did ultimately feel responsibility. The other day, Lindsey Graham, who's pretty much the Trump whisperer on this war, I mean, he seems to be played. He's certainly boasting about his role in getting Trump to do this. Lindsey Graham specifically said, I don't believe that if you break it, you own it. Which means that, yeah, we can break it and just walk away. And I think, by the way, that is what much of the world is likely to think that we're going to do.

Bill Kristol (27:16)

Yeah. I mean, one thing that strikes me, I want to come back to those two choices, that, as you say, neither is attractive, but I guess he has to make one or take one or the other or try to muddle through somehow. But what strikes me is that if we had had this conversation the day the war began, we would have said, I mean, the maximalist, if you want to call it that, the in it for real choice, in for a dime, in for a dollar choice would be to insist on regime change, basically. Maybe not full regime change to some kind of democracy, but to at least a Venezuela level of, you know, of someone who clearly is willing to work with us, however, you know, for at least a while and. And have at least some modicum of stability for a while, I guess. Or not, if. And if not, that it's just about the weapons and defer the degrading their nuclear and missile capabilities and stuff. It's funny, it was interesting to me is that we're sort of beyond that in the sense that now the more adventurous goal is just to reopen the strait. I mean, when you think about that for a minute, that's itself very telling. Right. I mean, this is. We're going to require all this effort two weeks in to reopen a strait that's been open for forever, basically. Right. I mean, with some exceptions, but basically for 40 years or something like that. And that's a pretty including during the

Bob Kagan (28:36)

Iraq war, by the way.

Bill Kristol (28:39)

So that's a kind of, I mean, now I don't know which way that pushes someone like pushes Trump. Exactly. I guess he could reopen the stray or try to. But even that does seem to be require a pretty big. Well, as we can see by the movement of troops and by hexa saying, well, by the fact that we don't seem able to keep it open by bombing alone. And then you are talking ground troops. And so that's even leaving aside the regime question. Right. Which is so it's a pretty astonishing. I think people haven't quite, I even haven't quite focused enough on how that's not good, you know, that we're in for over two weeks and this, our goal now is literally to reopen something that was open 16 days ago, you know.

Bob Kagan (29:16)

Right. I mean, it's pretty funny to watch supporters of the Trump administration say, well, this is only demonstrated what a threat that Iran posed, that they have closed the strait. But of course, they were like deliberately not closing the straits for all these years precisely because we did not confront them with the prospect of complete annihilation. You know, for the Iranians, it's always been a last resort to try to wreak this kind of damage, both closing the strait and on and on and on the Gulf states, that was not ever their, their number. That was not their first move in a conflict. And in fact, they took a fearful bombing in June without doing this. It was only when both the Israelis and the United States made it clear that their goal was the annihilation of regime assassinated the entire leadership with a bombing strike, that they then did this. So we are now solving to solve a problem that we clearly provoked. You know, we created this problem by conducting this in the way that we've conducted it. So but as you say, more importantly, I mean, I'm not an expert on this, but every expert that I read says the only way to guarantee keeping the strait open is by controlling the coastline of Iran from where a lot of these. Where a lot of the attacks would be coming from. And you can only control the coastline with ground forces. And I imagine that that has something to do with why they're sending the 34th 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit to the region. Possibly because one of those. One of the things that that unit is expert at is amphibious landings. And it could be that that's what the plan is. And I guess if you had to ask me right now, I would say Trump is going to send ground troops, he is going to use ground troops, and we're going to be engaged in this war now for months. If. If at least.

Bill Kristol (31:21)

Yeah, that's striking. Did you have that. I mean, did you have that few two weeks ago, or are you just judging?

Bob Kagan (31:27)

No, because like everybody else. Like everybody else, I thought Trump would declare victory and bug out, but now things have gotten to the point where I think. I don't even think he thinks he can do that. You know, he could have bugged out on the Sunday after they killed the entire leadership of the Iranian government. And honestly, that's what I would have expected. So, like a lot of people, I expected the Trump taco, but I think that he's. I'm not sure that that is an available option. Honestly, I'm not sure that is now an available option. Because if this war, if he, if the United States, first of all, the war is not going to stop, but if the United States stops, he's going to have left in power the son of the ayatollah. That's not what I would say would be the ideal outcome. But also more importantly, the fact that the straits now are in a way, much more vulnerable to Iran than they were before. I'm not sure you can accept that that is an acceptable outcome, even for someone who feels no sense of responsibility.

Bill Kristol (32:30)

Yeah, I've assumed that he would. Taco and I wrote this, I guess, 10 days ago. So a week into the war, and I guess I'm still inclined to that. I have been inclined to that view just because it does seem like the one lesson Trump learned from watching American politics, or one of the key lessons over 50 years was do not get involved in a ground war in the Middle East. I mean, you know, it's a. And from act, frankly, just if you're judging politics, it's a good lesson to learn. It tends those tend to be difficult. They've hurt presidents, obviously, George W. Bush, and getting successfully, executing one successfully. George H.W. bush didn't help him either, you know, so you don't, you don't gain from it and you just lose from it. So I've always assumed he would, you know, and he doesn't care about the Pottery Barn stuff. You can still imagine. I guess I could still imagine him. He needs to be given some fig leaf, you know, some kind of ceasefire with the Strait being stabilized. But he stops the military action. He doesn't care about what happens on the ground. He assumes that, hopes that things don't fall apart too dramatically so as to make it hugely embarrassing to the US that we did this. He hopes the Gulf states kind of help clean up some of the mess, some of the Pottery Barn mess, you know, in the region, and people don't pay too close attention. And he could at least claim it's Venezuela, like, and who knows what's going to happen in Venezuela. That could be a total mess, of course, in three months, too, but, you know, and kind of move on. But I think maybe you're right. Just the rhetoric certainly hacks us And Trump goes so back and forth. But I could end it as quickly as I want, but I don't know. It's an interesting question.

Bob Kagan (34:01)

I mean, he has to not only stop himself, but he has to get the Israelis to stop. Yes, because the Iranians will keep firing if the Israelis are still firing. So that means that they'll keep hitting the Gulf, keep closing the Strait, et cetera. So he has to get the Israelis

Bill Kristol (34:15)

to stop, too, which he did in June. And. But that was after, you know, they had. That was a much more limited goals. And Israel and Netanyahu and Trump could both say they'd accomplish the goals of very badly setting back, even though maybe not. What did Trump say? Eliminate or something, eradicate the Iranian nuclear program. But, you know, there was clearly real damage done. I mean, yeah, they had gotten themselves in it. You think the. And when do we think we. I guess he's got some. I don't know, he's tied. He can, of course, keep doing what he's doing for a while, I guess. I mean, but it's. The other difference with June, of course, is they're real because of the Gulf, because of the Strait. There are real world, real time consequences, I guess, that we're not. Right. It's not like a. Well, he's got two weeks, four weeks, six weeks. He can decide because. Which would be true incidentally, in other conflicts, in other circumstances. You and I were great advocates, defenders of the US military effort in the Balkans twice in the late 90s and the second time, we thought they should be ground troops, worried that the bombing wouldn't be enough. I think the threat of ground troops finally brought Milosevic down and took a long time. Right. 75 days, 80 days. I can't remember. It was a long 90. It was a long time. Yeah, but there. There was no. I don't say no, but I mean, in a way, 40 days, 80 days. It wasn't affecting the rest of the world that much. Affecting us at home and here. That's not really the case. Right. So you can't just kind of play out the clock and hope for something lucky to happen. And maybe this. The second this Khamenei son turns up dead, and then you have an excuse to say, see, we really did decimate the regime again. Go ahead.

Bob Kagan (35:50)

No, I mean, these are other, like, contrasts with the Iraq war. The price of oil both before and after the invasion in 2003 was 20 to 30 dollars a barrel. I mean, there was not an oil spike as a result. So living indefinitely at $100 a barrel oil, and some people say go up to 150 and other people say go up to 200, but let's just say it's at 100. That will obviously have severe economic repercussions at home and also, again, help American adversaries and harm American allies. By the way, we could also be on the cusp of a really sort of, I don't know, virulent European anti American sentiment on the conflict. I mean, obviously during the Iraq war and during the Vietnam war, millions went into the streets of Europe to oppose that action. But the governments kind of held firm because the United States was still guaranteeing their security. It was still a reliable ally. These wars. When the United States fought the Iraq war in 2003, Russia was not a threat at that time. Putin was still sort of trying to make nice with everybody. The Chinese were in their Hu Jintao, Wenzhou Bao, moderate sort of accommodating phase. There was no impact on the global balance of power as a result of this war. But in this case, we're in a very different strategic situation. Russia has already committed an act of aggression in Europe as an ongoing war in Europe. China is clearly in a more aggressive and more powerful mode than it was in 23 years ago. So that now an action like this really can and is having implications for the strategic balance, including in an actual war that's occurring in Europe. So the downside consequences of this conflict are much greater than the downside consequences of a failed war in Iraq. Was.

Bill Kristol (38:03)

That's such an interesting point and a good point, I guess an important point, really worth thinking about even more, I guess from Trump's point of view, from whatever his America, his version of America. First, America alone, America the bully. I don't know. However you want to define it, maybe that doesn't matter because he doesn't take the alliances seriously, but even so, just from a practical, as you say, economic well being of America and Americans involved in a difficult conflict, you think, yeah, he's got to be.

Bob Kagan (38:31)

Well, I'm sorry, I mean, let me, let me complete the thought about European Americanism. We've already had a case in this situation where Spain didn't want to let the United States use its base. You know, the United States, despite what Trump may or may not realize, is heavily reliant on bases in Europe. Not for the defense of Europe, but for, you know, being able to use it in Central Asia, being able to use it in the Middle east, etc. Who's to say that we will always have access to these bases if we have driven such a wedge between ourselves and our allies? And by the way, when it comes to our allies, I did leave out one other point. When, when Bush invaded Iraq in 2003, the allies did not have to wonder whether this use of force and this sort of American boldness might not be used against them. But now the allies do have to worry about that, because a Trump that is bold enough to do Venezuela, that is twice as bold enough to do Iran, is it inconceivable that he's bold enough to take Greenland when he decides to do it? The costs and risks, risks of taking Greenland are infinitesimal compared to the cost and risks of going to war with Iran. And he's already challenged the Europeans on that issue. So if you're Denmark today, is the war in Iran making you feel more or less secure against an American move against Greenland? And I would say the answer is likely to be less so. Now we have a situation where the war may actually be frightening to some of our allies. And again, this gets back to context. And what is the purpose here? No one had the doubt when Bush went to war in Iraq, the first Bush in the first Gulf War, the second Bush, that they were still heavily committed to defense of their allies, heavily committed to supporting this liberal world order. I think we have reason to believe now that Trump is not committed to any of that. Therefore, this Iran operation is occurring in a situation that is not about defending the liberal world order, is not about defending allies which is why I think from an allied point of view, this is not an encouraging action by the United States.

Bill Kristol (40:54)

The allies looking in 91 or 2003 would also see that Congress had approved these wars. The Democrats had voted for in considerable numbers to do that. And therefore, even if you didn't participate or agree with the judgment, and as Schroeder didn't and Chirac didn't, you sort of said, okay, but look, that's what America has decided and we'll have to just, you know, we'll live with it. We won't be part of it. We won't either. As you say, they quietly didn't encourage, I wouldn't say, demonstrations in the streets and so forth. They didn't blackball those allies and Tony Blair and Spain and other countries that were much more with us in that effort. Right. They didn't sort of have repercussions within the EU or NATO and so forth. You're looking at America now, and he's taken American war. The Democrats are going to be against the war and certainly, again, are against the war and are going to be really against it. I think they should be, too, in terms of ground troops and so forth. You look at this country, you think, is this, even if Trump somehow disappears from the scene or is succeeded by, I mean, what are we looking at? A country that's at all, you know, they can't count on anyone, honestly. I mean, if I were, you know, I'd be, I mean, not that I think the Democrats have behaved responsibly so far. They, you know, I'm not criticizing them. I just think analytically, a country like that's got a president who's acting entirely on his own and then forcing, in a way, an opposition party to be in total opposition to this war without getting any buy in. How reliable. Yes, you say, when you know, how reliable is this going forward and without any clarity about whether he's, as you say, you and I are sitting here, we follow this pretty closely. Two weeks in, we don't know, he could pull the plug tomorrow or he could double down. Right, right.

Bob Kagan (42:39)

No, it's just the whole thing is being carried out in a way that evinces no sense of broader responsibility, I guess that to allies, to anybody. So I think that's unnerving. By the way, there's one thing we haven't mentioned and it is, I don't know, a little bit concerning, which is what is the domestic ramifications.

Bill Kristol (43:01)

Yeah. Say a word about that.

Bob Kagan (43:03)

And one of the reasons I, a little bit worry that Trump is willing to have the war go on now for months, including into the election, is that it is a potential weapon in his holster against domestic opposition. Now for, and to make the most obvious point, Brendan Carr just warned, threatened, I think it was today or yesterday that he's going to start looking into the licenses of the news organizations that are running news reports that the Trump administration is not happy with. I mean, Hegseth is up there complaining about news criticism that is like so like even mentioning that something got American, some American thing got blown up, is somehow you know, unpatriotic and making the completely obvious point that we weren't really ready for. Iran's response is now regarded as fake news and an effort to undermine the president. And so, you know, I think that they could use this as a way to try to silence the media more than they've already done, which is plenty, or that they could convince the corporate chiefs to make to rein in their news gathering organization so they don't report news that's unhelpful to the Trump administration. And that doesn't even get into the question of national security sort of dispensations to the federal government, whether it's, you know, during elections or some other time. Because we're at war and we're facing a risk. And you know, now we're down to now we have to find out whether can we trust the FBI when it tells us that there's a threat here or a threat there. They're credibility is not particularly high right now under Cash Patel. So. But it wouldn't take much for the FBI to say, hey, we were facing a lot of threats out there. We're gonna have to crack down on X, Y and Z. What if we start having anti war protests? Do they become domestic terrorists because they're protesting against this great patriotic war that we're fighting? So I do worry that, I've always worried that Stephen Miller was particularly pro the Venezuela action, not because he cared about who was ruling in Venezuela, but because of the opportunities it might give him to wield particular kinds of authorities in the United States. And I, and I worry that the Iran war as it continues could open that opportunity as well.

Bill Kristol (45:33)

Yikes. No, but I think that's right. I think just in terms of the choice, it's something to at least think about. But it's probably in Trump's mind, but also in others who are very close to Trump's, in the minds of others who are very close to Trump, including Stephen Miller, but not only Miller, that There's usually you would say being involved in an ongoing war that's hiking oil prices and causing turmoil and mayhem and not going so great is not a good thing for a US President, which therefore gives him a political incentive to cut it, cut his losses or pull back or try to stop it. But if, on the other hand, you wanted excuses to do a whole lot of things at home in terms of the 2026 elections and beyond, that maybe changes that calculus.

Bob Kagan (46:12)

Yeah. I mean, Trump would not be the first leader in history to feel that a foreign war was useful for domestic purposes. The domestic consolidation.

Bill Kristol (46:23)

Yikes. But this has been a good, this is a very helpful discussion on the geopolitical side and ending a little on the US Side. But that's appropriate. That's part of the. They're connected. Bob, thanks for joining me today. People should keep reading Bob Kagan as he writes about this war and listening to you, and maybe we'll get back together in two, three, four weeks and see where we think things stand. If Trump has really picked one of the, picked, picked one of the forks in the, one of the forks in the road. Picked the road from which came to

Bob Kagan (46:54)

the fork and he took it. I think is.

Bill Kristol (46:56)

I know. What is that joke. Yeah. Yogi Verras. Yeah. Anyway, thanks, Bob, for joining me today. And thank you all for joining us on Bull Work on Sunday.