Trump Doesn't Understand the War He Just Lost (w/ Tom Nichols) | Command Post

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Trump Doesn't Understand the War He Just Lost" (Bulwark Takes w/ Tom Nichols)

Podcast: Bulwark Takes
Episode Date: June 17, 2026
Host(s): Ben Parker, Mark Hertling
Guest: Tom Nichols

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Overview of the Episode

This episode of Bulwark Takes, recorded as part of the Command Post series, features a deep-dive discussion with Tom Nichols (noted academic and author, "The Death of Expertise"), host Ben Parker, and retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling. The conversation pivots on the aftermath of the recent Iran war, the Trump administration’s approach to war and foreign policy, the significance of the so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran, and the implications for U.S. national security and global standing.

The hosts analyze President Trump's handling of the conflict, highlight the lack of strategic purpose, and discuss real-time global perceptions—including reactions from allies, adversaries, and leaders worldwide.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Iran Memorandum of Understanding—What Is It and Why Does It Matter?

• Nature of the MoU

  • “It’s a page of paper that says at some point we’ll talk about other stuff. … It’s a get out of the war free card for Donald Trump.” (Tom Nichols, 04:11)
  • The agreement lacks any binding commitments and mainly serves as justification for Trump to exit a faltering conflict.
  • Military and diplomatic MoUs are compared to a corporate meeting agenda; they lay out talking points, not binding resolutions (Mark Hertling, 05:11).

• Substance and Perception

  • Despite leaks, the administration claims the MoU is strong, yet withholds its actual contents.
  • The panel agrees this is not a real deal, but a performative step marking the lack of a coherent strategy.

2. Absence of Strategy and National Interest

• No Strategic Foundation

  • “I don’t see any strategy here at all…” (Tom Nichols, 07:52)
  • The U.S. entered the war without clear goals or desired outcomes—no understanding of ways, means, or ends.
  • Tactical victories (bombings, strikes) do not translate to strategic gains or clear end-states (11:02–12:07).

• Trump’s Personal Agenda

  • The war served Trump's image interests rather than U.S. national interests:
    • “Donald Trump went into this thinking… ‘Wouldn’t it be great if I were the guy that solved Iran? And I can do that with enough TNT.’” (Ben Parker, 15:07)
  • U.S. objectives such as restraining Iranian nuclear ambitions, maintaining Middle East stability, and free oil trade were secondary to Trump's self-promotion.

3. The Influence of Personalities and Advisors

• Personality-Driven Decision-Making

  • “Personalities matter… When you have someone like a President Trump who likes to be considered part of the tough guy club…” (Mark Hertling, 16:23)
  • Discusses the hazardous impact of Trump seeking validation from authoritarian leaders (Putin, Netanyahu, Sisi, Kim Jong Un), and acting without listening to experienced advisors.

• Diminished Global Standing

  • Trump perceived as "visibly declining"—world leaders reportedly avoid engaging meaningfully with him now (Tom Nichols, 18:00).
  • “They’ve had it with this tyrannol man who speaks gibberish, who makes no sense, who swans in…” (Tom Nichols, 18:00)
  • The administration's credibility and respect (wasta) in the Middle East and globally have collapsed.

4. Global Reactions—Allies, Partners, and Adversaries

• Israel and the Gulf States

  • Israel likely feels betrayed; Trump’s shifting messages have left the Israeli government exposed and uncertain (22:15–25:02).
  • The Gulf allies have learned that the U.S. will not reliably secure them—“The new order in the Persian Gulf is that Iran controls the straits… The Americans pretend, but… when we want to get anything done… we have to call Tehran.” (Tom Nichols, 28:22)

• Ukraine and European Allies

  • For Ukraine’s Zelensky and Europeans, it’s clear that U.S. guarantees are unreliable, leading to greater defense independence and the possibility of nuclear proliferation among countries seeking self-protection (32:12).

5. Institutional Breakdown—Who Is in Charge?

• National Security Council and Key Roles

  • The Trump administration has gutted interagency process:
    • “Trump views things like the National Security Council as his enemy because they were the ones that ratted him out on his attempt to blackmail Ukraine.” (Tom Nichols, 37:40)
    • Dual-hatting Rubio as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State left both roles weak; real power and process are absent.

• Comparisons to the Past

  • Recalling Cold War and Gulf War leadership, the hosts lament the decline from principled, strategic, and values-driven foreign policy to today’s ad hoc, personality-driven chaos.

6. Miscellaneous—Naming the Pacific Command

• Change Back to “Pacific Command”
  • Critique of the recent renaming from "Indo-Pacific Command" to "Pacific Command" as symbolic busywork with no positive strategic intent.
  • “Idle hands are the devil’s play thing… The Pentagon? Isn’t there a war on? Aren’t there all kinds of things going on?” (Tom Nichols, 46:34)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the pointlessness of the MoU:
  • “This is a way for Donald Trump to—he wanted this done on his birthday, and it didn’t happen.” (Tom Nichols, 06:48)
• On strategic failure:
  • “A string of operational victories do not produce a strategic effect.” (Tom Nichols, 11:02)
• On loss of American influence:
  • “I think President Trump has lost all American wasta in the Middle East.” (Mark Hertling, 31:06)
• On world leaders’ reaction to Trump:
  • “I think there are people realizing that … there's no point in a conversation with Donald Trump … there's no there there anymore.” (Tom Nichols, 22:09)
• On allies’ future faith in America:
  • “We know your bosses—we know the American people are half nuts now, and we know you can do this again in a moment.” (Ben Parker, 36:18)
• On the hollowed-out process:
  • “You can't run the foreign policy of a superpower that way.” (Tom Nichols, 39:07)
• On the consequence of America’s lost standing:
  • “If I were a foreign adversary, I would look at this White House and say, … the candy store is open.” (Tom Nichols, 50:51)
• On the moral high ground lost since the Cold War:
  • “We won that competition by being who we are… now we are determined to say to the rest of the world, we're no better than any other second-rate authoritarian backwater.” (Tom Nichols, 51:23)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• MoU and "Art of the Deal" Parody: 03:38–06:11
• Absence of Coherent Strategy: 07:16–10:53
• Comparison to War College Strategy: 11:02–12:10
• Trump’s Personal Motives & Israel/Netanyahu Dynamic: 12:31–16:23, 22:15–25:02
• Global Decline in American Reputation: 18:00–19:55
• Allies and Partners’ Reactions, Gulf States: 19:55–30:31
• Loss of Wasta, Potential Nuclear Proliferation: 31:06–32:12
• Process Breakdown, NSC, Rubio’s Weak Role: 37:40–40:25
• Pacific Command Name Change: 44:35–49:30
• Post-Cold War Reflection, Loss of Standing: 51:01–52:16

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Final Thoughts

The episode paints a picture of a U.S. foreign policy adrift: lacking strategy, defined by the whims of a single, embattled leader, increasingly irrelevant to its allies, and unable to provide credible deterrence to adversaries. The symbolic “deal” with Iran is less a solution than an exit strategy that leaves key questions unanswered and American interests further undermined. The panel ends with a call for humility, seriousness, and restoration of process and expertise—worried, above all, about what doors have now been opened by this period of American decline.

Transcript

[Tom Nichols]

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[Ben Parker]

Hi, I'm Ben Parker from the Bulwark.

[Mark Hertling]

And hi, I'm Mark Hertling from the Bull Work. And before we get started, Ben, I have to tell our listeners who are our watchers actually, that I have an eye problem because I had surgery on Monday. I was not in a cage match with Tom Nichols, although his eyes look bad because he's been writing so much. Mine look bad. My left eye looks bad because of a little. A small minor surgery. But I'm okay. But thanks for everybody who wrote me yesterday asking me what the hell was wrong with me. But it's great to be with the great Tom Nichols again, Tom, a dear friend and, and a just unbelievable oracle of, of common sense and the current events that we're in.

[Tom Nichols]

Well, thank you. Thanks for having me, guys. And yes, Mark, now you've got a.

[Ben Parker]

That.

[Tom Nichols]

See those of us with a. With lazy eye. Now you get to join the big fraternity of those of us that always look like. Like Colombo, you know. Yeah, Sarah, it's just one more thing that's bothering me here.

[Mark Hertling]

We have a lot of things bothering us.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, I was gonna say, speaking of

[Tom Nichols]

things that are bothering us, one more thing, Mr. President.

[Ben Parker]

We're going to be talking all about this Iran member memorandum, understanding what it all means and how awful it is this morning.

[Tom Nichols]

But let's start seeing it.

[Mark Hertling]

Well, right.

[Ben Parker]

We've only seen reports of what's in it and not that it's even necessarily finalized yet. We'll start with what the President said just this morning is the facts to

[Mark Hertling]

the Agreement now final or are you still.

[Tom Nichols]

No, it's not final. It's a memorandum of understanding.

[Mark Hertling]

And if I don't like it, we'll

[Tom Nichols]

go back to shooting at them, dropping

[Mark Hertling]

bombs on their head if I don't like it, if they don't behave, we'll go right back to dropping bombs right

[Tom Nichols]

smack in the middle of their head.

[Mark Hertling]

Okay. Because they've misbehaved for 47 years.

[Ben Parker]

So I just want to point out two things before we get to the actual substance of what Trump said. The first is he is speaking with the Egyptian dictator Sisi, who Trump once called his favorite dictator. I know a lot of people think that's Putin, but the actual answer is it's Sisi of Egypt because Trump straight up said he is my favorite dictator, which is a wild thing to remember. Uh, and also, did you notice what Sisi was wearing? Do you think he usually wears cobalt blue suits with a bright red tie? Or do you think he dressed up special for Donald Trump just like every other 20something white dude in Washington? It is so annoying.

[Mark Hertling]

Uh, anyway, Ben, if I can inject something here, though, I, I hope that you were listening very closely because, you know, the President has written the book Art of a Deal, but you being a new parent of a recently born child, I hope you took some great parenting advice for what happens when your children misbehave from that statement.

[Ben Parker]

Just go right back to bombing them because they've been misbehaving for a long time. Tom, start with this. What the hell is a memorandum of understanding?

[Tom Nichols]

It's a page of paper that says at some point we'll talk about other stuff. And so that's not even fine in this case. It's a get out of the war free card for Donald Trump. That that's what he really wants. Just give him anything, any reason to get out of this. You know, it's not a deal. It's a deal to make a deal. It's an understanding to make a deal. But again, there's only so much I can say because all we've seen are leaks of it rather than the actual text. And if it's such a great deal, if it's so strong, you know, the accordion hands are always the tell. If it's so strong, then why not just show it to everybody? And by the way, I'm with the President on one thing, one thing only. I don't think Congress actually needs to bless this. It's not a treaty, it's an executive agreement at this point. Don't you Know, just show it to everybody. That's all.

[Mark Hertling]

Anybody, you know what, what I'd say, Tom, I'd kind of go one step further and say that, you know, my understanding of memorandums of understanding, which I've participated in multiple times through my career, is it's. It's the military or diplomatic equivalent of what you get within a corporation, which is called a meeting agenda. It's just the things you want to talk about. And we all know from the business arena that agendas are always, you know, the start point, but you never get to all of them unless you've got a really good organization. And it is an opportunity for people around the table to say, okay, I got your talking point or your agenda item, but I'm going to go sideways on it. So, again, everyone who's been saying this is a deal, and the President has been one of those, it is nowhere close to being a deal. It is an agenda.

[Tom Nichols]

If, if it's what we're seeing leaked now, you know, every time the leaks come out, the President says, that's not what it is. Nobody knows what's in it. And then Vance basically says, well, that's kind of what's in it, if that's what it is. It's basically an agreement to stop fighting, to set up the talks, to give the Iranians all the things they want and to get. And to get nuclear talks down the line. And the only difference between the MoU and a deal is that nothing in it right now is binding, but it's all setting the road.

[Mark Hertling]

The.

[Tom Nichols]

Setting up the. What am I trying to say? The, the markers, the road sign toward where we're going. You know, we're. We're going to pay them. They're not going to pay us. We're all going to stop fighting. They're going to talk to us about a nuclear deal. Okay, fine. We used to have that. There's, you know, this again. I think this is a way of. For Donald Trump to. And I think, you know, I think one of the things Trump's pissed about, he wanted this done on his birthday, and it didn't happen.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah. Tom, is this. I got to ask this important question, because this is what I've been struggling with. I have never seen so much emphasis put on an mou. So you taught strategy to naval officers and other officers of the military force at the Naval War College. You taught at Harvard. Is this what you see as part of a strategy that includes diplomacy, or is this strategic impatience dressed up as diplomacy?

[Tom Nichols]

Yeah, I don't see Any strategy here at all. I mean, a strategy is, you know, a what we, you know, you know, this market was what we teach at these colleges. Ways, means, ends. Right. You know, how. What are the goals of national policy? How are you going to apply the various instruments of national power to those, to attaining those goals? A strategy is, I used to say, look, a kid who wants to get cookies out of the jar on top of the shelf has a strategy. Should I ask Mom? That's a strategy. Should I put up a ladder? That's a strategy. You know, you have different paths to it. This is, I screwed up. I don't know what I'm doing. Get me out of this. That's, that's. And I mean, I, you can see it. I mean, it's palpable. It radiates off the president. So I don't think there's a strategy here because we're telegraphing to the enemy we want out of this and then saying to the enemy, now tell us what we have to do. You know, it reminds me, I'll just digress for one minute and say that this reminds me of something. One of my army colleagues, you know, one of my friends that I taught with years ago said about the Vietnam peace negotiations that when they start to falter, we started bombing. And he said we were bombing them. We were bombing Vietnam to coerce them to accept our surrender.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

Which I thought, which I always thought was such a fantastic line. We bombed them to coerce them to accept our surrender. And I think that's kind of where we are. There isn't a, there isn't a strategy here. What is the goal that we're trying to. The only goal that you can point out is Donald Trump's personal goal of this went south on me. It's bad. I want it to stop.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Tom Nichols]

So beyond that, I see no national goals in this other than things that people are kind of putting on it, like post its like get a discussion about nuclear weapons, you know, set up a reparations fund, which, you know, kind of mind blowing, but okay. You know, beyond that, no one can. We don't have any POWs to exchange. We don't have any territory that we have to exchange or go back or back and forth on. This is we want out. Tell us what we have to do to get that.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, I would say that's because we entered the war without any clear goals.

[Tom Nichols]

Sometimes it was the outset of the, I mean, the first thing I wrote about this conflict was if you have no, you know, if you don't know where you're going. Any road will get you there. There is no strategy here. This is all the celebration, and we saw it with, you know, Pete Hegseth and Donald Trump ooking about, you know, about videos of explosions. Okay, those are operational successes.

[Ben Parker]

Maybe.

[Tom Nichols]

Well, maybe the operation at that level of fly to this area, destroy these targets were successful.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

It's not like the pilots came back and said, we couldn't find them or we got shot down, or as an operation, each of those discrete operations succeeded in the assignment they. That they were given. But, you know, I think this is if there are still war colleges after Hegseth gets through. But I, I kind of hope there. I think there still will be. But certainly in any program where they discuss war and strategic studies, this war is going to replace the first few years of World War II in the Pacific as the example of how a string of operational victories do not produce a strategic effect.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah. You know, it's interesting, Ben, Both Tom and I have been beaten. This drama and, you know, this, the, the very simple model of ends, ways and means. I mean, it could not be any easier. And they put it, I think the war colleges put it in those three words, because sometimes military personnel can only take three words at a time and say, okay, I can figure that out. But that operational campaign, they all sit

[Tom Nichols]

on the same flashcard, Mark.

[Mark Hertling]

But that operational campaign of the military strikes is a way of reaching an objective, and there are means attached to it, a carrier strike group, Tomahawk missiles, logistics and all that. But we went into this without a true end state desired. So those things were just spending money,

[Ben Parker]

spending resources, spending American lives, in some cases, American lives.

[Tom Nichols]

I mean, the duck. But the president didn't want to say it out loud because he didn't want to because of the implications that would come with it. But the end state was the regime falls and they build a golden statue of Donald Trump in the middle of Tehran.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah, that was it.

[Tom Nichols]

The rest would all flow from that. Right. That new regime of Iranian democracy would not engage in regional terror, would dismantle what's left of the nuclear program, would turn the Strait of Hormuz into the Riviera, you know, on and on and on. Trump and to their credit, I mean, I, you know, you don't have to hand it to the Trump national security team, but you can say, well, you know, at least one or two cheers for Marco Rubio and John Ratcliffe and a few others who said it's not going to happen. Yeah, that's not gonna happen. So, but then, but then shame on everybody else, they're saying, okay, if that doesn't happen, what do we do next?

[Mark Hertling]

And because this is a military command post that we call it, I'll add one more name to that list. And I don't think you should take the blame, and that's General Dan Kane. I mean, his job is to offer military advice. We don't know, because the military shuts up after they give that advice. They don't give it to anyone but the Secretary of Defense and the President. We don't know what kind of advice he gave. But I can only suggest that if he didn't give the advice of, hey, this is not going to turn out well, this is going to be a lot harder than you think, Mr. President. This is going to take a long time. And just because Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to take you there and thinks he can undercut the Iranian regime and help his existential threat go away, if he didn't say, you're, you're being sucked into a military adventure, which we have been sucked into before because of civilian, basically civilian orders, then he's wrong, too. But we don't know what he said. So he may be in the same level as Radcliffe and Rubio.

[Tom Nichols]

I'd like to make. The answer he was given was shut up in color.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, I think that's right. I'd like to make one point here about, about something I think Trump and Netanyahu have in common. And Tom, you got at this a little bit. I don't think Trump identified American interests vis a vis Iran. I don't think he went in and said the Iranian regime sponsors a lot of terror that is bad for America's interests. It, you know, they attack American targets around the world. They make it much harder for us to secure our friends. They, you know, sponsor international terrorism all over. It's very expensive and dangerous for us. It's our, in our interest that there's free trade in oil around the world because it's to going good for our economy, good for the global economy, when there's not, it causes upheaval and violence. We generally want the Middle east to be stable and we'd like Iran to be a sort of free, democratic country that, you know, isn't a huge slot on our side. Those are American interests. I think you're right that Donald Trump went into this thinking of Donald Trump's interests, which is, wouldn't it be great if I were the guy that solved Iran? And I can do that with Enough, you know, tonnage of tnt, basically. I also think, real quick, I just, I also think he got snookered basically by Bibi Netanyahu, because that's kind of the way Bibi Netanyahu thinks about strategy, too. Netanyahu doesn't really have an end game for what's going on in Lebanon or in Syria or in Gaza or with Iran. He just thought, well, wouldn't it be great if instead of being the guy who was responsible for October 7, or instead of being the guy who has basically ruined the Israeli American relationship over the past decade and a half, I were the guy who solved Iran. And so these two guys went and tried to solve Iran, and look what happened.

[Mark Hertling]

Well, let me, let me posit this to you based on what Ben just said, and this is a kind of a thought that I've been having recently as I've watched over the last year. Plus, Ben's point, I think, is a good one, but it only addresses one leader, and that's Netanyahu. What? You know, one of the things they teach in the reduced. In the succinct course of the word war college are the four main things we need to remember. And one of those things is personalities matter. When you have someone like a President Trump who likes to be considered part of the tough guy club, when you have Netanyahu whispering in his ear saying, hey, we can take this guy out and it'll solve my problems and your problems, that sounds an awful lot like the kind of advice that Trump may be getting from Putin saying, we just need to disband NATO and take over Ukraine or Kim Jong Un, hey, you're my best friend. Now I'm a dictator. You're my best friend. Although nothing happens in terms of the nuclear elements of this, or Sisi this morning, he's being a tough guy again. After we all watched yesterday, he was basically shunned by all the leaders of the G7. When they were doing their, their, their photo for the G7 conference. You could tell by body language no one wanted to associate with him as they were lining up for that photo. Is this a personality issue that's creating the kinds of dynamics that we're now seeing across the board?

[Tom Nichols]

Yeah, and I think there's an additional problem with the. Well, as you said, he like, be perceived as tough. So I'm sure he thought he would come out of this war and he'd call all these guys and say, you know, I'm the guy. You know, I'm the guy that scragged the Ayatollahs instead of what's happened. But I think there's an added dimension to this, which is that Trump is visibly declining and that people are noticing it and they're not paying attention to him. I mean, I don't know. I really want to know what George Maloney said to him yesterday. I don't know if you guys saw that little, you know, when the, with she got right and wow. And I was like, I, I said, you know, I, I'm not, I haven't been a fan of Maloney on some things. Certainly on Ukraine, she's been great. But I, I am. I wouldn't want to get reamed up by some, you know, angry, small Italian woman like that, the way he just did. And I think that's a sign that these people are just like, they've had it with this tyrannol man who speaks gibberish, who makes no sense, who swans in, like this morning, he swans in, I'm the boss. I'm here because I'm late, but I'm the boss. And I'm sure me around the table went, yeah, anyway, as you know, and then back up, back to work because you can't talk to him. And I think they've come to realize that even the Trump from seven or eight years ago, where they could talk to him, you remember that picture with Merkel and the rest of them kind of crowded around him. You're not seeing that picture now. Now they're like, he's, he can't, you know, he's beyond talking to. There's something wrong with him. He's not processing this information. Just, you know, give him presence and smile while he says stupid things during these pressers. So I think, you know, this is a metaphor maybe of, you know, our general decline, but the president is in decline, and I think other people are noticing it.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah. Tom, a question for you. Let's talk about alliances, allies and partners. Let's talk specifically Israel and the Gulf leaders. If you're an Israeli, are you reassured or furious about what is happening right now? If you're a Gulf leader, if you're one of the. The Gulf states, are you buying that this is going to provide stability, or are you questioning the thing that popped up as part of the leaked memorandum that Gulf nations would contribute to the $300 billion proposed reconstruction gift? And then finally, the last one, a partner of ours, not an ally of Trump, that's for sure. What is Zelensky thinking when he hears Trump praise this kind of operation and a fast, negotiated Settlement with Iran that's not really in existence, which Trump has been pushing between Zelensky and Russia. That's a long question, but it talks about world dynamics that we haven't considered, as it's us against Iran.

[Tom Nichols]

You know, let's start with the last part first, which is Zielinski. I mean, Zelensky's got to be. There's got to be a part of Zelensky saying, yeah, huh? Just roll over and do regime change. Not as easy as, when will you guys learn? You know, because this is. I mean, when people get. Get mad at me. When Trump's people online get mad at me and say, we didn't lose where we kicked their ass, I'm like, well, we're losing the same way the Russians are losing in Ukraine. Every day that Ukraine exists as an independent state, Zelensky wins, and God bless him for it, you know, but the Iranians took the same approach. As long as we come out of this still in charge of Iran, we won because that.

[Mark Hertling]

What.

[Tom Nichols]

I mean, this is the, this is the most disingenuous, I mean, of all the lies Trump is telling about this. But when Trump says, I was never. I was never interested in regime change. Yes, you were. That.

[Ben Parker]

We know, because you said it.

[Tom Nichols]

You went. You said it. You know, this is why I said in the piece, this is a classic Trumpian move to dare us to forget today what we knew yesterday. So there's that. And I think Zelensky, you know, like, again, like the Europeans at the G7, you know, Zelinsky is saying, you can't. You can't talk to the guy. I mean, there's just nothing. There's no there there anymore. I mean, I really, I don't want to overplay that, but I really do think that there are people realizing that he. You can't, you know, there's no point in a conversation with Donald Trump, in part, because he'll only remember whatever the last thing was, you know, when. And this. Now I'm going to jump over the Gulf allies for a minute to the Israelis, which is why, if you, if, if I were an Israeli, I'd be freaked. You know, Trump's going on about the, all the deaths in Lebanon. Who was the last person he talked to? Who, who plugged that talking point into his head. I mean, Donald Trump is basically saying, I am siding with the Iranians to restrain the Israelis against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

[Ben Parker]

Do we.

[Tom Nichols]

I mean, what. So, you know, again. And that could change tomorrow because Trump doesn't think in term, in linear terms or in, you know, causal relationships. But also, this is clearly, I mean, that whole section yesterday, and I wrote about this in the piece, that whole thing he went through yesterday in his interviews at the G7 where he basically like, oh, come on, you know, Hezbollah, that's a little pin prick. And he's basically, the Israelis need to stop being hysterical and calm down because I have more important things to do here. And I think he basically just sold the Israelis out and said, but as I also say in the piece, you can't cry for Netanyahu. He brought this on himself and he brought this on his country because he thought he was going to be the one that was going to be clever and persuasive enough to keep Trump pointed in the direction he wanted Trump to go. And that wasn't going to happen. I think the Israelis, I, I'm going to disagree with the idea that, you know, Netanyahu didn't really have a strategy. I think since the, since, for years, decades, Netanyahu strategy has been, is Iran like Carthage?

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

You know, you know, Iran, Delinda est. You know, it has to be destroyed. This regime has to be destroyed. And I think he took his shot a year ago saying, we're going to go after the, you know, know, this is purely a nuclear run, but if the Americans jumped in and turned it into a regime change war, that'd be okay, too.

[Mark Hertling]

Yep. That's exactly what happened.

[Tom Nichols]

That's exactly what he did a year ago.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

And that, that became a night hammer. And then Trump said, okay, we did it one night. And I think the Israelis, you know, crap, that was it. This was supposed to go on. This is supposed to go on a little longer. So I think Netanyahu took another bite at that apple. But we can't reduce this to, well, you know, the sneaky Israelis talked him into it. Trump wanted to do this. Trump's had a pebble in his shoe about Iran and being the liberator of Tehran for a long time, going all the way back to his first. One of the last things I wrote about Trump before he left office in 2021 was beware that he does not start a war with Iran as his parting gift on the way out the door. He's been wanting to do this for a long time. And the first time around, he had real people in the room with him saying, this isn't, this is a stupid idea. There's a reason other he's, no president's ever done it. Yeah, no president's ever, you know, stuck their hand In a blender either. You know, there's a reason for that, Mr. President, and you just learned what it is. So, you know, the, the idea that somehow the Israelis finally talked him into it. This was finally just Trump unleashed unplugged with a bunch of people that were willing to do it.

[Ben Parker]

The Gulf of the Gulf states in a sec, real quick. But thank you for making that point about the Israelis, because I do think there is a little bit of a double stated where we hold Trump responsible for every one of his bad decisions and all of his bad advisors, except for this one. And it should be the same. I mean, there were people around Trump saying, you shouldn't listen to Bibi Netanyahu. He says this every year. He's way too optimistic. And Trump said, no, I'm going to believe him. And it's Trump's son. I also, I do think we back

[Mark Hertling]

to the tough guy image, too.

[Tom Nichols]

I'm sorry I said I don't like the undertone of anti Semitism that comes. Comes with it as well, that, you know, these American patriots wouldn't have done something so stupid if they hadn't been dragged into it by the Jews.

[Mark Hertling]

Sorry.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, totally, you know, sorry.

[Tom Nichols]

Trump wanted to do this. Netanyahu was one more finger on the scale. A weak cabinet that didn't, you know, a good secretary. Not even a good Secretary of Defense. A real Secretary of Defense. An actual Secretary of defense. Instead of this, you know, this play acting kid, you know, that's. That's playing dress up as Secretary of Defense. Would have thrown himself in front of the door and said, Mr. President, I'm. I'm your guy. I, I want to do whatever it is you want to do, but I'm telling you, this is a bad idea. And I'm standing here, you know, in the doorway, just a Secretary of Defense with tears in his eyes, begging you not to do this. And if you do, I'm gonna have to resign because this is gonna go bad. So please don't do it. He could. This could have gone a different way, but everybody thought, great. Glory, honor. I get to do briefings every day. I get to show show blowing up,

[Mark Hertling]

you know, helicopters, but like a, you know, a special operator guy, which I real, you know.

[Tom Nichols]

Yeah. I'm eating dirt with the real men, you know. No, you're 46 years old. You should be in your office keeping tabs on a war that is going south at an alarming rate instead of out playing paintball with the guys.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Tom Nichols]

As for the Gulf allies, I think what they've realized is, okay, it's a new world. And you know, it's, it's a, it's pretty much an Iranian world. We're living in it. If the Iranians want to bomb our airports or our fields, you know, our oil fields, well, there's a way out of that. We have to call Tehran and we have to make arrangements. The Americans are not going to help us here. This, at least these Americans are not going to help us here. And the new order in the Persian Gulf is that Iran controls the straits. The Americans pretend that to, you know, they put, they put their hands on their hips and swan around, but that when we want to get anything done, like not get our LNG plants blown up, you know, or not our LNG plants. What am I trying to think of when they, there was a thing the other day about, about a gas field anyway, you know, call them up, call

[Ben Parker]

their energy infrastructure, basically.

[Tom Nichols]

Yeah, yeah, right. Gas infrastructure, oil infrastructure, water. You know, the, the Iranians still have the capability. And now, now that the war has. Is over, we'll redevelop even more capability so that if we piss them off, they might, I think the Iranians about when, when I used to work on nuclear weapons stuff, you know, kind of on a, on the daily. But my, my sense of people trying to divine why the Iranians would even think about getting a bomb when it would be so dangerous to them. Right, because the Israeli, that's at one point where the Israelis said, well, it's just not going to happen. And you know, we can, we can make sure that's not going to happen. But it was perhaps to say, fine, we have a bomb. If we go down, we take as many of you with us as we can. The Europeans, we can't reach the United States, but Europeans, Israelis, whoever, if we go down, you go with us. And now the Iranians who be saying that with conventional weapons. Well, if we're going to go down, fine, your oil fields, your airports, your infrastructure, you're going with us.

[Mark Hertling]

Your economy.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah, your global economy.

[Tom Nichols]

The global economy. And in a way, the Iranian ability to affect the global economy is even more powerful now. Without a nuclear weapon.

[Mark Hertling]

Absolutely. And with a nuclear weapon, it is an economic nuke. You know, one, one of the things. Ben, I'll turn it over to you, but I just want to make this comment again. Going back to personalities, one of the things I learned spending a couple years in the Middle east is in, in the Arab world and in the Persian world, I don't know what the Farsi word for it, but in Arabic, it's wasta. They put a lot. And it's. It's the. The connotation for respect for someone else who they know is powerful. When you have wasta, it's because you're. You control tribes, you control areas, whatever. I think President Trump has lost all American wasta in the Middle East. That's my conclusion of what is happening right now. And as Tom just said, I think every single Middle Eastern country is now going to go their own way, and there are going to be others that may start developing nuclear weapons. That concerns me because instead of limiting that, we were going to have explosives on that. Not to be given a pun, but it's not going to be limited to the Middle east either. It's going to be potentially European countries who are going to say, we need a nuclear weapon now, and it's going to be some Asian countries that don't have it right now that are going to want to make them. That is concerning to me. This is. This has been something that has turned the world upside down.

[Tom Nichols]

I think he's lost that respect everywhere. Now the question is, can it ever be regained? I mean, I think Biden made a good stab at it, especially with at least his early response to Ukraine, where he, you know, I have. I was part of the be cautious chorus. So I'm not going to criticize him for how. How he ran the war in that first six months to a year. I think he could have been. I think he stayed too cautious too long. But he also put NATO back together as a functioning alliance that was capable of. I mean, the reason the Russians are still fighting and losing people four years later is because of Zelensky and Biden and now because of the Europeans, Donald Trump is not relevant to that equation anymore. When Trump says, well, cut off aid, it's really like God cut up, do whatever you want, you know, Line. I was re watching a military movie, Mark. Mash the original. Yeah, I'll resign my commission. Well, God damn it, hot Lips, resign your goddamn commission. You know, well, we'll pull out. Well, God damn it, Dom, pull out.

[Mark Hertling]

Who cares?

[Tom Nichols]

You know, I mean, he's reached that. He's reached that position where people go, whatever, you know, you're not reliable. We don't count on you. We're developing alternative sources of weapons and methods of dealing with some of these problems. Now, could, you know another. I mean, if the next president is, I don't know, the Republicans win and it's Marco Rubio,

[Ben Parker]

maybe.

[Tom Nichols]

I don't Know, it's going to have to be somebody, though. And if it's a Democrat, it's going to have to be somebody. They send with the personal imprimatur of the president saying, this has been a bad 10 years and we know it and we're sorry and we fucked up on this one.

[Mark Hertling]

It's going to take two. It isn't going to be a return to what we were. In my view. It's going to have to be something completely different. And part of the value system I think we've got to exercise is a lot more humility and a whole lot less swagger. What you just said, though, a minute ago, Tom, I think it.

[Tom Nichols]

Can I just make one point, though, about comparing, because I'm guessing, Mark, when did you join the Army?

[Mark Hertling]

When did you go in 1971.

[Ben Parker]

Okay.

[Tom Nichols]

Think about the army and NATO as we knew it, circa 1975.

[Mark Hertling]

Right, right.

[Tom Nichols]

I mean, yeah, just Joe Cop, my friend, you know, Joe Collins. You know, Joe used to say, you know, Joe's an old friend of mine. Joe said when he was a company commander in BERLIN in the 70s, he didn't walk into his own barracks without a sidearm.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah.

[Tom Nichols]

And. And an NCO with him, like, go to go into the barracks of his own men.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

If you said in 1974. 75. Listen, by 1985, NATO's going to be the most cohesive and powerful alliance in the world, and the Soviet Union's going to be on the ropes, and within five years, they're going to. Of that, they're going to collapse. They would have said, you're completely high.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Tom Nichols]

So.

[Mark Hertling]

And it took a bunch of great thinkers in not just the army, but in all the services. And your. Your comment, your stories about Joe Collins is exactly right. My first assignment as a second lieutenant in 1975 was Germany, and we did wear sidearms, and there were racial issues and there were huge drug problems and there were all sorts of things. And 10 years later, as a captain in 1984 or, you know, 85, all of that was transforming because of some really smart people that were dedicated to turning things around. Which brings me back to the point I was.

[Ben Parker]

Sorry, I know you want to add this point, but I just want to get one more thing in there, which is, I do think our allies heard a lot of this, though, from the Biden administration. Hey, that was a bad time. Sorry about that. I was so weird. Don't worry about it. We're back. We're normal. And now.

[Tom Nichols]

Never do anything that crazy again.

[Ben Parker]

Right. So now they've seen, like, they're going to hear all these reassurances and they're going to say, well, that's great, thank you, you know, Senator, you know, or sorry, President Rubio or President Josh Shapiro or whatever for saying that. We so appreciate it, but we know your bosses, like, we, it's not just like, oh, this, this administration, this Congress that we've lost faith in. It's like, no, we know the American people are half nuts now and we know you can do this again in a moment.

[Tom Nichols]

That's the hard part.

[Mark Hertling]

That's exactly right.

[Ben Parker]

Go ahead. Next point.

[Mark Hertling]

I was just going to say, to reinforce what Tom said about Ukraine and other places. As much as some people want to knock Biden because of his age or whatever, he had a bunch of really strong, I think he had a bunch of really strong cabinet members. You know, Lloyd Austin was right smack in the middle of Ukraine. Burns was right smack in the middle of Ukraine and other places as the CIA director, the Secretary of State was

[Ben Parker]

all over the world, Great secretary, a

[Mark Hertling]

pickup team right now. And no National Security Council who are putting the things together. I mean, that is the, you know, I don't want to get stuck in process, but boy, you kind of have to have a process and a system to address the complexities of the world as opposed to having ad hoc ism from the mind of one individual.

[Tom Nichols]

Especially when the President is clearly not, you know, has, clearly he's not on his game. There's the National Security Council. See, the problem is, after his first, his first term, Trump views things like the National Security Council as his enemy because they were the ones that ratted him out on his attempt to blackmail Ukraine.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

He didn't think of the National Security Council as the President's personal think tank. He wanted it destroyed. I, I, I wrote an, you know, because I know we're all Goodfellas fans, but I wrote an article a few weeks back where I said, when it comes to these things now, Trump is like Big Paulie or he. Remember, Paulie hated telephones. Trump hates meetings. He doesn't want anybody to hear what he's saying to anybody. And he doesn't want anybody else to hear what's being said to him. Well, that's great if you're a Mafia boss and you're trying to keep everything plugged into your desk. But the reason the National Security Council exists is because the President just can't keep track of that many things. He needs a National Security Council and having Rubio dual hatted in this simply means I, when Kissinger was dual headed as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, that was his way of getting control of both institutions and making them do what he wanted. Now that I think that didn't work out so well, but it was, it was his way of saying both of these institutions work together and they work for me.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

What happened with Rubio is one of these institutions doesn't function very well now and the other one doesn't function at all. And that's great, just that, that you can't run, you can't run the foreign policy of a superpower that way. And when, when I would say this and when other critics would say this early on and say, oh well, what's, what do you think is going to happen? Look, we're kicking ass in Venezuela. Well, you know, we could end up losing war maybe.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah, yeah.

[Ben Parker]

The other thing is that, you know, it was a, when Kissinger had both these jobs, it was Nixon's clear signal. Kissinger is in charge of foreign policy. It's not the Secretary of Defense, he's in charge of running the military's institution, but Kissinger is making foreign policy. And I'm sort of keeping my eye on it in this case with Rubio. Rubio is just, I mean he is not as strong a position, he's not as strong a person or personality or an intellect as Kissinger. I mean, say what you want of Kissinger, he was a strong personality and intellect. And so what it means is that no one is in charge of foreign policy. There is no one who's in charge. You have a weak leader in both of the key institutions. And I mean over at the Defense Department you have like an absolute joker. So what it means is that like there's really no one thinking about this. And obviously we see now and it's sort of global, like where are we trying to go and what do all the, how do all the pieces fit together kind of way on purpose?

[Tom Nichols]

It was so bad, I shouldn't say bad. It was so complete. Kissinger's control was so complete that Secretary of Defense Mel Laird used to have to spy on Kissinger and steal, have guys steal things off his desk to find out what Kissinger was doing.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Tom Nichols]

You know, which is if we have time for a joke later, I, I have a great Mel Laird joke that, that I was told years ago. This was actually a Robert Gates joke to a bunch of Sovietologists at a conference. But no, go ahead

[Ben Parker]

to our last baby topic.

[Tom Nichols]

Kissinger was going, was leading American Delegation was going to meet the Pope. And during Vietnam, they didn't think it was appropriate to have Mel Laird, the SEC def. You know, the guy in charge of actually dropping all the bombs, although Kissinger was the real guy. So they tried to cut him out of it. And Laird gets went. Now, again, this is a Robert Gates story. Take it as apocryphal or real. You know, take it up with Bob Gates. So Laird gets wind of it and crashes the meeting in Rome with the Pope. Shows up, you know, with a big heater, smoking a big cigar. And. And they said, I'm fine. You're here, but at least put out the damn cigar. And so, you know, Laird kind of stubs it out and he drops it into his suit pocket. So they're sitting there meeting, meeting the. The Pope, and now there's a little smoke coming out of Laird's pocket. He starts, you know, he's kind of padding his pocket, and they're. The delegation's trying to ignore him. And now, you know, Laird's got a problem. His suit's catching on fire, and he's, you know, he's padding. And the rest of the American delegation apparently takes this as a cue to begin clapping because they're hearing Blair do this, to which Kissinger's comment later. And again, this is Gates imitating Kissinger, me imitating Gates. Image even take is there. God only knows what the Holy Father thought to see is the American Secretary of Defense immolating himself to the applause of his delegation. But there was a truth under it all, which is that Laird was constantly cut out of these things. But Laird was a serious guy. It was just a classic internal Washington, you know, bureaucracy fight. Rubio doesn't have the authority or the confidence or the power that would come from being a Kissinger. And Hegseth is just as, you know, like you say, he's just a joker. He's not. He's not a serious guy.

[Mark Hertling]

There is no wasta from the Americans on the world stage.

[Ben Parker]

That's true. Any other last points you want to make on Iran before we move on to our final baby topic? No? Okay. In that case, I'm going to say real quick, Father's Day is coming up, and I am not getting General Hurtling's book for my father because he already bought it. But that's the only reason it's a great. It is a book that is really more than about war, is about fatherhood and trying to live a good life and have a good career and be a good father. All at the same time. It is sort of an ideal Father's Day gift. And you can still buy it. They had to do an emergency paperback run, but if I don't return, a Father's Wartime Journal still available. Yeah.

[Mark Hertling]

We ought to combine if I don't return with the death of expertise.

[Ben Parker]

Yes, we ought to.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Tom Nichols]

I don't return because of the death of expertise.

[Ben Parker]

Oh, that's dark. Too true.

[Tom Nichols]

No, that's. I think that sounds like a wonderful Father's Day gift. And I always said that my book makes a great gift if you want to annoy somebody.

[Ben Parker]

So for Father's Day, it might be

[Tom Nichols]

perfect if you love your dad or your grandfather, get a Mark's book. If you're on the outs with your dad and you want to piss him off, get him my book, the Death

[Mark Hertling]

of Expertise, which is, by the way, also a great book. But thank you, Ben, for that. I was not expecting that.

[Ben Parker]

You know.

[Mark Hertling]

What's the last question then? I want to.

[Ben Parker]

The last thing we have to talk about, just to wrap up here. Did you guys see that they changed the name of Indo Pacific Command?

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah. So I think, producer Matt, we can throw that up on the screen. They've officially changed it back to U.S. pacific Command. I don't know why the eagle is being impaled. I don't know how they decided that. They probably just put it into AI and the AI decided that the America, the symbol of America, should be impaled there. What's the point of changing the name of Indo Pacific Command back to Pacific Command? What does this accomplish? Why are we spending time on this?

[Tom Nichols]

You're the ones that changed it in 2018. They're undoing something the Trump administration did.

[Ben Parker]

Maybe they'll just establish space force next.

[Mark Hertling]

Well, you know, I think the whole emphasis again, is the turn to China. You know, they, they. I don't understand why this one was a surprise to me, because it truly is Indo Pacific Command. I mean, when they made that change in the first administration, I thought, okay, it's a lot harder to say, but it's accurate because it does. It's the largest combatant command, mostly oceans. It's not the largest in size, but it is the largest in area.

[Ben Parker]

Yeah.

[Mark Hertling]

So, yeah, I was stumped by this one. I have no explanation for why that may have occurred.

[Ben Parker]

Tom, I'm going to give you the last word. I'm just going to say, you know, there's. It would make sense if it was. We're pivoting to China and we're actually going to do it. There is no pivot to China. This administration has not been aggressive toward China. They have not been tough on China. They have. All they've done is consistently move assets out of the area around China, out of Pacific Command, first to Venezuela, then to Iran, then to Cuba. All they have done is make us weaker in the very place they claim to want to make us stronger. While they're off on all these excursions, this last one of which they lost. So what, they're going to change the name? Pretend like we're stronger now? I mean, what the hell?

[Tom Nichols]

First of all, I have to steal a joke from my friend Dan Dresner, who. Who every time this stuff comes up, he posts on X and says, thank God Bridge Colby wasn't alive to see this. You know, in theory, the number two or three guy at the Pentagon is the guy that should be like, his hair on fire about this, but who knows? I. I don't know why they changed it. I. I certainly don't understand why the eagle's been impaled. But, you know, I can't really talk because when they did a Starship Troopers version of the Department of Defense logo, I didn't recognize it, you know, after years of working for DoD. So I'm not the guy to ask about graphics and visuals. I think this is, this very simple problem is that idle hands are the devil's play thing. That there's a bunch of guys walking around in the Pentagon who don't really know what they're supposed to do all day, and they're all sitting around shooting the breeze and saying, hey, maybe we'll go back to being Paycom. I liked it better when it was Paycom. Okay, fine. You know, normally you would think with a. With something like this, they'd say, we're going back to Paycom. And here is a, you know, here's an explanation. Here's some talking points. Here's why we're doing this. Here's why we're going to change all the letterhead and all the signage and all that crap all over again. And I just think, you know, again, it's a sign that Pete Heg says defense Department. You know, it's a bunch of guys that have been cut loose to go and run around in the playground. I always keep saying that Hegseth is like, take the worst student in your high school, bring them back 20 years later and make them the principal. You know, so where then they. They just get even with all the teachers they didn't like, and they Let everybody smoke. And, you know, they. They replace social studies with three periods of gym. And, you know, who knows? I mean, this is, you know, some. Some cockamamie idea. I was. Mark, you like the idea of changing it in the first place? I kind of. I was still, you know, in the government at the time. I kind of winced and said, I don't know, does anybody really now think differently about the command? But, okay, fine, if you want to send opacom, because, again, the Indian Ocean's a big place. India is a big country. We're trying to do something kind of more holistic here, but, you know, now. Okay, it's paycom again. What are you guys doing? It doesn't Your time worrying about the Department of War. You know, we're gonna spend $125 million, which I assume some next president will immediately countermand. You know, so, you know, don't you guys have jobs? You know, don't you guys. The Pentagon? Isn't there a war on? Aren't there all kinds of things going on? Don't you guys have something to do besides playing with, you know, PowerPoints and graphics all day? And the answer is apparently not.

[Mark Hertling]

Yeah, it is exactly that. As long. Oh, well, you know, it is discouraging for me, having spent a lifetime. And, Tom, I know you. This. You did this, too. Spent a lifetime in national security trying to prepare and influence allies and build strength and portray who we were as a shining city on a hill. And some of these things. And this is not Trump Derangement Syndrome. This is just. It's a lacking of common sense and pragmatics. And I'm very surprised. So far, as tough as the outcome of this conflict against Iran has been, I'm actually very surprised that we haven't had more challenges like this, that there have been more threats so far. And that's what concerns me, because as much as it would have been complex a couple of years ago, I think we would have had the systems and the processes and the leadership to address them. I'm not so sure about right now. It is an interesting gang of people who are controlling our government right now, and that's really concerning.

[Tom Nichols]

If I were a foreign adversary, I would look at this White House and say, this is just as I did during the first Trump administration, to say, the candy store is open.

[Ben Parker]

This is my.

[Tom Nichols]

There's. This is. This is the chance to do a lot of things. And Mark, I want to. I want to add to, you know, this is maybe one old guy to a slightly older guy. But you know, the real pain of this is that we, we lived through the high water mark of American foreign policy with victory in the Cold War. That wasn't just an economic or a military victory, it was a moral victory.

[Mark Hertling]

Right.

[Tom Nichols]

We won that. We won that, that competition by being who we are and being a better model to the rest of the world than the Soviet model. And now we are determined to say to the rest of the world, we're no better than any other second rate authoritarian backwater.

[Mark Hertling]

And I'll add to your Cold War analogy, Tom, that two years after the Cold War, we stood up for a nation that was being bullied by another larger nation. And it took a lot of power to do that when Kuwait was invaded and they were not an ally, they were a partner. But we said this is wrong. And I haven't seen that in as much evidence recently as it was back in that height of our national security policy establishment.

[Ben Parker]

You're right, gentlemen, we could and should continue this later. There's a lot more to discuss in that vein, but we've been going 50 minutes. I think people have probably had enough for this week. We did get a bunch of great questions in. We didn't get to address them now, but maybe we should do a mailbag episode coming up here. That'd be fun. You can send us your questions@command postheboldwork.com and Dr. Tom Nichols, author of the Death of Expertise. Thank you so much for joining us, Tom.

[Mark Hertling]

It's always a pleasure having you. It's a lot of fun talking with you. And we may have the common cultural bias of seeing things the same way, which makes it a whole lot easier.