Podcast Summary: "Yes, Democrats Could Win the Senate in 2026"

Podcast: Bulwark Takes
Host: Bill Kristol
Guest: Ron Brownstein
Date: February 8, 2026

Overview

This episode dives deep into the 2026 midterm elections, focusing on the prospects for Democrats to win the Senate despite challenging odds. Veteran political commentator Ron Brownstein joins Bill Kristol to unpack electoral dynamics, historical precedents, demographic shifts, and current polling that shape the 2026 landscape. Together, they analyze the “laws of political gravity” in an era of quasi-parliamentary politics – highlighting the centrality of presidential approval, Senate and House maps, the role of non-college whites, and the particular hurdles and opportunities Democrats face.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Laws of Political Gravity Still Apply

[04:40–07:42]

• Brownstein opens with a pop culture nod (“the fundamental things apply, as Bogart says in Casablanca”), emphasizing that Trump and his party are not immune to traditional political trends.
• The most critical driver in modern midterm elections is the approval rating of the incumbent president.
  • “We have moved into a quasi-parliamentary system where voters are making their choices less on how they feel about the two individuals on the ballot and more about which party they want... overwhelmingly based on their assessment of the performance of the incumbent president.” – Ron Brownstein [04:53]
• Data cited: In 2018, 90% of voters who disapproved of Trump voted Democratic for the House; this increased to 93% in 2020 and held in special elections in 2025.

2. The “Unified Control” Midterm Curse

[07:21–09:22]

• No president since Carter in 1978 has entered a midterm with unified control of Congress and maintained it.
• Recent presidents (Biden in 2022, Trump in 2018, Obama in 2010, Bush in 2006, Clinton in 1994) all lost unified control in their first midterms.
  • “That has never happened in American history… five times in a row where a president has gone into a midterm with unified control and voters took it away.” – Ron Brownstein [08:07]

3. Current Presidential Approval and Its Implications

[09:36–12:34]

• Trump’s approval at the time of the episode: estimated 41–43%, disapproval 57–58%.
  • This is potentially lower than his standing in 2018. (“If it is that low on Election Day, Republicans are going to have a catastrophic night.” – Brownstein [10:41])
• The relationship is direct and near-mathematical: each additional point in Trump’s disapproval is likely to translate “point for point” to the Democratic congressional margin.

4. Senate Map Realities – Parliamentary Alignment

[13:29–17:34]

• The Senate increasingly reflects presidential voting patterns: states that vote for a party's president consistently are now nearly exclusive to that party in the Senate.
  • In the 25 states Trump carried three times, Dems now have zero Senate seats; Republicans have all 50 seats.
  • Democrats have 37 of 38 possible seats in the 19 states that voted against Trump three times, with a shot at the last one (Susan Collins, ME).
    • “There are now 25 states that have voted three times for Trump… Democrats have 0% of the Senate seats in those 25.” – Ron Brownstein [15:04]
• Democrats’ current Senate advantage comes from swing states (MI, PA, WI, NV, GA, AZ) where they hold 10 of 12 seats, an “unsustainable” margin over the long term.

5. The 2026 Senate Battlegrounds

[17:39–21:38]

• Job one for Democrats: Flip Susan Collins (ME) and defend Michigan and Georgia, both winnable in a low-Trump approval climate.

• To add to their majority, Dems must win in states where Republicans have been dominant since the Trump era: Ohio (Sherrod Brown), Alaska, Iowa, Texas, Kansas.

• Brownstein underscores that winning in states where Trump is over 50% approval is historically almost impossible for Democrats.

  • “In 2018, Tester, Manchin, and Sherrod Brown were able to win in states where Trump was over 50... more often than not, if he is over 50, it's really hard.” – Ron Brownstein [21:19]

6. Demographics: The Role of Non-College Whites

[24:03–29:26]

• Non-college educated white voters remain the GOP’s backbone—especially in key Senate battlegrounds where this group is overrepresented.
• However, recent polling suggests Trump’s approval among working-class whites is down—sometimes majority disapproval outside the South.
  • “If we had to divine out of all of this conversation...one thing that will decide how far Democrats go in 2026, it'll be Trump's approval/disapproval among non-college whites and how much weaker it is than 2018.” – Brownstein [45:20]
• In the South, evangelical non-college whites are disproportionately supportive of Trump, complicating prospects in states like North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas.

7. House Prospects and Structural Hurdles

[31:32–34:29]

• The House map is less fluid than in past cycles—far fewer “low-hanging fruit.”

• Only eight Republicans sit in districts that voted for Harris in 2024 (vs. 25 in Clinton districts in 2018); just 17 in seats Trump won by less than five points.

• Dems have to go deeper into Trump country, triggering the same non-college white dynamics present in the Senate fights.

  • “If you look back at 2018 and 2020, non-college whites who disapproved of Trump also voted 90% Democratic.” – Brownstein [34:30]

8. Can 2026 Be a Real “Wave” Year?

[37:28–42:05]

• Younger analysts lack personal experience with a true wave midterm (e.g., 1994, 2006).

• Real waves can introduce unexpected races to contention, with weak incumbents toppled by accelerated public mood shifts.

• Brownstein leans toward 2026 matching or exceeding the anti-Trump energy of 2018, potentially bringing Dems to 230–235 House seats if the trend holds.

  • “The special election signals are even better for Democrats than they were in 2018, 2017... I would not be surprised if Democrats get back somewhere to where they were after 2018, somewhere in the neighborhood of 230 to 235 House seats.” – Brownstein [41:30]

9. Wildcards and Timing

[42:05–47:25]

• Historically, an incumbent president’s approval typically does not improve during a midterm year—especially in a second term.

  • Notable exception: Clinton in 1998.

• Brownstein expects the environment to remain unfavorable to Trump and the GOP, if not worsen, as 2026 approaches.

  • “Generally speaking, a president doesn't strengthen in the midterm year... Other than Clinton in 98, second term midterms have been especially miserable.” – Brownstein [46:08]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

“It often seems as if Trump has repealed all the laws of political gravity. But what we have seen... is that he is not immune and his party is not immune to the laws of political gravity.”
– Ron Brownstein [04:43]

“The most important of those laws in modern American politics... is the approval rating of that president.”
– Ron Brownstein [05:12]

“No president... has gone into a midterm election with unified control of government and held it through that midterm election since Jimmy Carter in 1978.”
– Ron Brownstein [07:44]

“If you look back at 2018 and 2020, non college whites who disapproved of Trump also voted 90% Democratic... There isn't this extra layer of defense… If they disapprove of Trump, history says most of them... are going to vote Democrat.”
– Ron Brownstein [34:32]

“If we had to divine out of all this conversation one thing that will decide how far Democrats go in 2026, it'll be Trump's approval/disapproval among non-college whites and how much weaker it is than 2018.”
– Ron Brownstein [45:20]

“The special election signals are even better for Democrats than they were in 2018, 2017... I would not be surprised if Democrats get back somewhere to where they were after 2018, somewhere in the neighborhood of 230 to 235 House seats.”
– Ron Brownstein [41:30]

Timestamps for Major Segments

• [04:40] — The laws of political gravity and the driver of midterms
• [07:42] — History of unified control in midterms
• [09:54] — Trump's current approval/disapproval and historical comparison
• [13:29] — How Senate maps have realigned to presidential voting
• [17:39] — The narrow Senate battleground: what must Democrats do?
• [24:03] — The primacy of non-college whites in Senate/House battlegrounds
• [31:32] — The challenge of House gains for Democrats post-redistricting
• [37:28] — Could 2026 be a true “wave” year?
• [42:05] — Historical precedent: Presidential approval through midterm years
• [45:20] — Brownstein’s “one thing” to watch for Democratic success

Conclusion

Brownstein and Kristol lay out a clear, data-driven case: Democrats are favored to make gains in 2026—possibly recapturing the House and narrowly flipping the Senate—if Trump’s disapproval remains high, particularly among non-college whites. The Senate map remains structurally tough, but cracks in Trump’s coalition, notable in special elections and polling, signal a real possibility for Democrats to break through. Ultimately, the key variable to watch is Trump’s standing with working class whites, a demographic whose shifting discontent could reshape the midterms.