Did the Iran War Succeed? - with Tamir Hayman and Mark Dubowitz

Summary

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Podcast Summary: Call Me Back – with Dan Senor

Episode: "Did the Iran War Succeed?"

Guests: Tamir Hayman (Retired General, ex-Head of Israeli Military Intelligence; Director, INSS)
Mark Dubowitz (CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies)
Release Date: June 8, 2026

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Overview: Main Theme and Purpose

This episode explores the aftermath of the 40-day Iran war—one of the most consequential Middle East conflicts in decades. The discussion centers on whether the objectives of Israel and the US were achieved, particularly regarding the Iranian nuclear threat, and analyzes the dilemmas, setbacks, and future implications for Israel, the region, and the global order. Host Dan Senor mediates a debate between two eminent Iran analysts: Mark Dubowitz, who offers a more optimistic take on the outcomes, and Tamir Hayman, who is deeply skeptical.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Setting the Stage: Where Things Stand

• Current Situation (as of June 7, 2026):
  • US-Iran negotiations remain stalled, focusing on a narrow interim "Hormuz for Hormuz" deal.
  • The war obliterated Iran's air defenses, navy, and ICBM program but left the regime (under new Supreme Leader Mujtaba Khamenei) intact.
  • No comprehensive nuclear deal is on the horizon; both sides wish to avoid broader conflict.
• The Big Question: Did the war achieve what was needed? Did it “succeed”? The guests are both committed to eliminating Iran’s nuclear program but differ on their assessment of the war’s efficacy.
  • [01:55] Dan Senor: "The question now dividing serious people... is given where we are, how do we assess what the war achieved and what it did not achieve?"

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2. Opening Positions: Worth the Cost?

• Tamir Hayman (Skeptical)

  • Thesis: War wasn’t worth it—all while the nuclear threat remains unaddressed and the regime still stands.
    • [00:51, 10:13] Tamir: “Considering the situation now where nuclear threat was not handled thoroughly and the regime seems to be intact... the quick answer is no, it wasn't worth it."
  • Costs:
    • Perception in Europe/US that Israel dragged US into a war.
    • Unlikely to get a second chance for such a large operation.
    • Iran has proven regime resilience, learning to stabilize and conduct transitions even while under attack.
    • Asymmetric cost: Israel and the US paid diplomatically and domestically while Iran's regime survived.
      • [10:52] Tamir: "One of the major costs is the false narrative that circles in Europe and United States that Israel drag United States to a war in the Middle East against US interests."

• Mark Dubowitz (Optimistic)

  • Thesis: The war was a significant achievement, setting back both Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
    • [12:57] Mark: "If you're in a way the benefits and costs of this war... it was a significant accomplishment by the United States and Israel."
  • Specific Successes:
    • Missile production degraded by 85%.
    • Nuclear enrichment capability destroyed; Iran pushed back two and a half years from a “breakout” capability.
    • Noted that regime change was never the stated US objective.
      • [12:57] Mark: "For the first time in 20 years, Iran has no enrichment capability as a result of US and Israeli strikes."

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3. Points of Agreement and Contention

Agreed Principles

• Military execution was impressive and tactical achievements real.
• Only elimination of the nuclear program counts as true success.
• Iranian negotiators are sophisticated; any deal allowing enrichment is unacceptable.
• Survival of the regime—especially postwar, under a more radical leader—is a deep strategic concern for Israel, the US, and Gulf states.

Disagreements

• Dubowitz disagrees with Tamir on how “hawkish” the new regime is, arguing the previous regime was already fully committed to nuclear weapons.

• Ceasefire Benefit: Is Iran, which gets time and potential economic relief, or the US/Israel—which gained military objectives—better off?

  • [09:27] Mark: "It's debatable that the current ceasefire is benefiting Iran more than the United States..."

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4. Missile and Nuclear Program: Achievements and Limitations

Missile Program

• Both acknowledge severe damage inflicted: CENTCOM claims 85% capacity reduction.
  • [15:51] Tamir: "85% out of the military industrial base of missiles were destroyed. And it is a great accomplishment..."
• Tamir warns Iran has a history of quick recovery—unless constant pressure is applied or the regime is toppled, the problem will recur.

Nuclear Program

• Iran’s enrichment capability was destroyed in the earlier “12 Days War” but rebuilt rapidly; new sites like Pickaxe Mountain (a possible underground enrichment facility) pose formidable new challenges.
  • [17:55] Mark: “Pickaxe Mountain is not yet an enrichment facility, but the Iranians are going deeper and deeper… I worry we may not be able to do that militarily.”
• Both agree: Without ongoing action, Iran can ultimately restore both nuclear and missile programs.
• Tamir: Recommends fully destroying the nuclear program—claims there's a plan to make Iran’s nuclear enrichment undevelopable for “about a century.”
  • [19:59] Tamir: "Remove the nuclear out of the bargaining table. Nuclear project over Iran can be destroyed, obliterated..."

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5. Negotiating with Iran: Challenges and Dilemmas

Iranian Strategy

• Iran seeking immediate cash, public acknowledgment of its sovereignty over Hormuz, and guarantees of regime stability.
  • [04:59] Tamir: “They want money right now… Some acknowledgment of their sovereignty over the Straits of Hormuz... [and] a total elimination of the constant threat on the regime stability."
• US has not yet yielded to those demands, maintaining blockades and sanctions.

Dubowitz: Dangers of a “Hormuz for Hormuz” deal

• Warns against any deal that allows Iran to extort concessions by threatening Hormuz, replacing “nuclear extortion with Hormuz extortion.”
  • [31:30] Mark: “He has to return to Operation Project Freedom… We have to go back and win militarily the battle for Hormuz or Iran will emerge ... with a permanent threat and stranglehold over Hormuz.”

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6. The Regime Change Debate: Hope vs. Realism

• Tamir’s critique: Overoptimism about regime collapse (through arming the Kurds or leveraging internal dissent) undermined the focus on military degradation. American and Israeli war planners assumed extraordinary circumstances, but “hope covered rational thinking.”
  • [24:42] Dan (quoting Tamir): “Hope covered rational thinking, or hope overrode rational thinking, referring to war planners being overly optimistic...”
  • [29:12] Tamir: “The hope of a regime change was counterproductive to the ability to achieve the military degradation campaign.”
• Dubowitz’s view: Regime change will require time and persistent support for Iranian protesters, not quick fixes—“regime change is about millions of Iranians coming back to the streets.”
  • [27:53] Mark: “Regime change against Iran is about millions of Iranians coming back to the streets…”

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7. Key Personalities: New Supreme Leader and Internal Dynamics

Mojtaba Khamenei: Is Iran More Radical?

• Both agree the new Leader is radical, vengeful, and motivated to pursue a nuclear deterrent.
  • [35:59] Mark: "He is absolutely a true believer, an extremist or radical. He's committed to Iran developing nuclear weapons..."
• Tamir emphasizes Mujtaba owes his power to the IRGC; his freedom of action is narrowed by the trauma of losing his family and the need to avoid any appearance of weakness.
  • [36:46] Tamir: "He owes his nomination to the IRGC that promote him against the will of his father..."
• Mark argues the regime is less dangerous without Ali Khamenei’s patience and strategic acumen, though Mujtaba’s inexperience could make him prone to dangerous mistakes.

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8. Bottom Line: Is Iran More Dangerous Now?

• Tamir: "Basically the regime is more dangerous. The capabilities are less dangerous. ...if stable for the next two years, it will end up more radical and more dangerous than the previous one." ([42:04])
• Mark: "No. The regime is much less dangerous, both in terms of capabilities..." ([42:32]) while warning the regime’s ideological danger remains unchanged.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Tamir Hayman—On the costs:

  • [10:52] “One of the major costs is the false narrative that circles in Europe and United States that Israel drag United States to a war in the Middle East against US interests…”

• Mark Dubowitz—On achievements:

  • [12:57] “For the first time in 20 years, Iran has no enrichment capability as a result of US and Israeli strikes.”

• Tamir Hayman—On regime resilience:

  • [11:44] “It is a learning experience that Iranians exiting it in a self-confidence resilience manner.”

• Mark Dubowitz—On regime change:

  • [27:53] “Regime change against Iran is about millions of Iranians coming back to the streets the way they were in January…”

• Tamir Hayman—On strategic opportunity lost:

  • [29:12] “The hope of a regime change was counterproductive to the ability to achieve the military degradation campaign.”

• Mark Dubowitz—On future risks:

  • [32:06] “If we are going into another endless round of negotiations… then the Iranians will do what they have always done… win at the negotiating table what they lost on the battlefield.”

• Mojtaba Khamenei's motivation:

  • [36:46] Tamir: “He is entering a position of 50 years, not two years… because in Iran, any sign of weakness ends up with protest in the street.”

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• [00:51] Tamir Hayman’s opening verdict (“not worth it”)
• [04:59] Tamir on Iran’s negotiation strategy (money, Hormuz, regime security)
• [09:27] Mark begins to dissect ceasefire’s pros/cons
• [10:52] Tamir discusses the “costs”—false narratives and strategic risks
• [12:57] Mark outlines why war was a major accomplishment
• [15:51] Tamir and Mark debate missile program achievements/limitations
• [17:52] Debating Pickaxe Mountain and nuclear threat persistence
• [19:59] Tamir claims a plan exists to permanently destroy Iran's nuclear program
• [24:42] Dan raises the “hope over rationality” problem in war planning
• [29:12] Tamir: Regime change hopes undermined the actual military campaign
• [31:30] Mark critiques substituting “nuclear extortion” for “Hormuz extortion”
• [35:59] Assessing new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei
• [41:45] Final question: Is Iran more dangerous now?

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Concluding Takeaways

• The Iran War set back military and nuclear capabilities—but left the regime standing, and possibly more radical.
• Whether this is a success or failure is debated: One view is that it was a missed opportunity and possibly a strategic mistake; the other sees it as a necessary, significant degradation of Iran’s most threatening programs.
• Both agree: Any solution must ultimately remove the nuclear threat and deal with a resilient, sophisticated regime that learns and adapts.
• Urgency looms: Two to three years before Iran can possibly rebuild its capabilities; will the US and Israel act further, or fall into a drawn-out, incremental negotiation process again?

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For listeners new to the Iran file, this episode offers an accessible, detailed exposition on the military, diplomatic, and intelligence stakes—and reveals the intense debate within the Israeli/Western strategic community about what “winning” actually means.

Transcript

[A]

As events accelerate in the Middle east, the team here at ARC Media is increasing our coverage. More conversations, more context, more time spent trying to help make sense of what's happening. And all with an expanding cast of podcast hosts, analysts and journalists. Our Inside CallMeBack subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. If you're not yet an inside Call Me Back subscriber, this is an important time to join us. To subscribe, you can follow the link in our show notes or visit arc media.org and to our insiders. Thank you. You are listening to an ARC Media podcast.

[B]

Considering the situation now where nuclear threat was not handled thoroughly and the regime seems to be intact, considering the price Israel paid, Israel and United States in global arena and of course domestically, the quick answer is no, it wasn't worth it. Hopefully it's not the end of the war. But if you are forcing me to evaluate the situation right now, the quick answer is no.

[C]

We have to go back and win militarily. The battle for Hormuz or Iran will emerge out of this with a true strategic victory and a permanent threat and stranglehold over Hormuz. Now we have a fighting chance, and I hope President Trump fights and doesn't negotiate with a regime that has no desire to give up nuclear concessions that meet the President's minimum demands.

[A]

It's 7:30am on Sunday, June 7th here in New York City. It is 2:30pm on Sunday, June the 7th in Israel as Israelis closely follow the negotiations between the United States and Iran. As of this recording, U.S. iran negotiations appear to be stalled but not dead. The talks are still centered on an interim framework, what we've been calling a Hormuz for Hormuz deal, a 60 day memorandum of understanding, not a peace deal and not a nuclear deal. The Core Exchange Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz and clears mines. The US Lifts its blockade on Iranian ports, allowing Iran to sell oil again and the unfreezing of some billions of dollars in Iranian assets. Outside of this narrow interim deal, a comprehensive nuclear deal looks unlikely in the near term as both sides have reasons to avoid a wider war. So this is a moment that we thought here on Call me back. It would be a good time to take stock. The 40 day war that began on February 28th of this year obliterated Iran's air defenses, sank its navy and destroyed its intercontinental ballistic missile program. It also left the regime intact minus many key figures. With a new supreme leader intact, Mujtabat Khamenei, a man who reportedly believed for years that his father's nuclear restraint was a fatal mistake and it did produce a ceasefire before the nuclear program was addressed. The question now dividing serious people who all wanted Iran's nuclear threat eliminated, is this given where we are, how do we assess what the war achieved and what it did not achieve? To work through that question, I'm joined today by two guests who've each dedicated much of their respective careers to thinking about the Iranian threat. Mark Dubowitz, a frequent guest on this podcast, is the CEO of the foundation for Defensive Democracies and he's one of the most persistent high hawks and astute analysts on the Iranian nuclear threat which earned him the distinguished honor of being sanctioned by both Iran and Russia. Mark also has an excellent podcast that we'll link to in the show Notes on Iran and retired General Tamir Heiment, who was the head of Israeli military intelligence for four years just a few years ago and he currently leads the Israel National Security Studies Institute, a leading national security think tank in Israel. Tamir has been a clear eyed and at times sobering voice on what the war has and hasn't accomplished. Mark is more optimistic about the war's trajectory. Tamir, as you can tell from this introduction, I would say is more skeptical. But both of them are clear that they want Iran's nuclear program gone and they are both focused on that at FDD and inss. Mark Tamir, thanks for being here.

[C]

Thank you, Dan.

[B]

Thank you, Nat.

[A]

Tamir, I want to start with you. Just tell me where you think we stand now with the U. S Iran negotiations and what you would say are the most likely outcomes based on what we know now.

[B]

Basically Iran is conducting the negotiation on its own terms mainly that is to achieve the maximum benefit available for the Hormuz deal and delay the crucial and more painful concessions to a future potential. Step through that in my assessment, according to previous knowledge with Iran and will take forever and will not lead to any kind of a credible Iranian nuclear deal. Basically, they insist on achieving three main goals. One, they want money right now, not in credit, not delayed, not conditioned a flow of money whether it will be starting in 6 billion and ended up in 24 because the economy is in a dire situation. If they will not have some form of relief that they can provide immediately that the mass in Iran will see something they are in a major problem and considering the fact that they know that they will drag the negotiation over the Iran deal indefinitely, that free flow of money will help them in the long term. Secondly, they want some acknowledgment of their sovereignty over the Straits of Hormuz. That is a source of income, but moreover, a sense of accomplishment, a kind of an image of victory that they can declare as an added accumulated strategic benefit. Benefit they've got from the war. They will label it as a kind of a signal of victory. And third is a total elimination of the constant threat on the regime stability by the American president. And that will give the new supreme Leader the stability he needs in order to fortify his authority on Iran.

[A]

Mark, anything to add to that?

[C]

No, I think that's exactly right. The key point here is that that's what Iran's been demanding. And so far, President Trump hasn't provided any of those concessions through the negotiations. Now, Dan, I remain worried that he might, but to be fair, he hasn't provided any upfront cash right now to open up Hormuz. He continues to maintain a blockade on Iranian ports, which has driven Iranian oil sales from 2.1 million barrels before the war to 64,000 barrels per day in May. The Iranians are bleeding cash, as Tamir has suggested. They sustained, according to Iranian numbers, about 280 billion doll dollars worth of damage during the 40 day war. And I would add, too, and I'm sure we'll get to it, that the Iranians have had their missile production capability severely degraded. I think Admiral Bradley Cooper of CENTCOM mentioned that there's been an 85% reduction in that production capability. So the Iranians are bleeding both physically and economically. And I think so far, President Trump has not been willing to concede to the demands, which makes me very skeptical we're going to get any deal, whether it's a phase one Hormuz for Hormuz deal or even the phase two nucle deal that Tamir talked about.

[A]

Okay, so we're going to have some kind of debate here, but I think it's important first for our listeners to understand that you don't only diverge, you also agree on a number of important topics. And I just want to tick those off first before I get to where it's divergent. So, one, the tactical achievements are real and the military execution was impressive. Two, the nuclear program is the metric that matters most, and it wasn't addressed, at least not holistically and totally. Three, the current ceasefire, so far as we understand it, benefits Iran more than it benefits the U.S. four, the Iranian negotiators are pretty sophisticated. Five, a deal that leaves Iran with enrichment capability is not acceptable. And six, the regime surviving is a serious strategic problem for the US and for Israel and I might say the Gulf states and the broader region. So I just want to ask you both, do you basically agree with my quick run through there?

[B]

I will add, it's not just self enrichment that leads to a bad deal. In the current situation of knowledge, experience and the new regime, which is much more hawkish than the previous one regarding nuclear capabilities, we must insist that all underground enrichment facilities will be closed, destroyed, blocked, whatever. And secondly, no advanced centrifuges. Because currently with the current knowledge and advanced centrifuges, the breakout time for enrichment material will be less than year. And that even worse than the Obama deal.

[C]

Yeah, Dan, I think it's debatable that the current ceasefire is benefiting Iran more than the United States. And maybe we can dig into that. I think I take some issue with Tamir's characterization of the current regime in Iran as being, quote, more hawkish than the previous regime. Because I think there's been a misconception that somehow Mostaba Khamenei is more committed to nuclear weapons than his late father Ali Khamenei, and that the Revolutionary Guards has more power today than they had over Iran before the war. So I think worth digging into those issues.

[A]

Okay, so we'll get into that.

[C]

Now.

[A]

Let's dive into where you diverge. And I want to start with you, Tamir, weighing the war's achievements against its costs. Was the war justified from a strategic

[B]

perspective considering the situation now where nuclear threat was not handled thoroughly and the regime seems to be intact, considering the price Israel paid Israel and United States in global arena and of course domestically, the quick answer is no, it wasn't worth it. Hopefully it's not the end of the war. So we are now summarizing right now just a temporary secession of activity. But if you are forcing me to evaluate the situation right now, the quick answer is no.

[A]

And can you just double click on the costs?

[B]

First of all, one of the major costs is the false narrative that circles in Europe and United States that Israel drag United States to a war in the Middle east against US interests. We are talking about a long eroded special relationship that may accelerate it because of that war. Secondly, I'm not sure that we will have a second chance on revisiting that scale of an operation. So if things are not changed and Iran will succeed somehow to revive or to reconstitute their lost capability, which we are all agreed two, three years from now, I'm not sure that the next president in the White House, next administration will back Israel into Returning to another cycle of violence or another cycle with Iran and Iran is not Gaza, Iran is not Lebanon is not something that Israel can conduct cycles like we have conducted against Hamas in Gaza. Iran is a totally different element. Third, the fact that the Iranian had faced their worst case scenario in terms of regime change operation facing Israel and United States working together and somehow achieved or maintain its stability conducted a transition of authority through wartime in a very successful according to the Iranian constitution create some sense of resilience, self confidence and lessons learned about Israel, US capabilities and how to learn and to be better for the next. So it is a learning experience that Iranians exiting it in a self confidence resilience manner. I'm not marginalizing the Israeli and the American cast. Israel suffered, life was lost, all of the arenas were open. Hezbollah is ongoing a campaign right now and we are bleeding on a daily basis. That happens in war. That's not matter in the long term strategic national security balance of Israel.

[A]

Mark.

[C]

So I think if you're in a way the benefits and costs of this war in strategic terms, I think it was a significant accomplishment by the United States and Israel because fundamentally the 12 day war last year and the 40 day war this year have massively set back Iran's nuclear ambitions. And to understand that you have to look at the fact that nukes and missiles are inextricably linked. Because Iran's supreme Leader Ali Khamenei understood that if he were to actually succeed in building a nuclear weapons program, he first had to build a massive missile arsenal that would make it extremely painful for the United States and Israel to launch military action against that nuclear program. And he was on that trajectory. I mean, According to the IDF's own statistics, Iran had about 2,500 ballistic missiles before the current war began. They were on a trajectory to have about 11,000 ballistic missiles within about two, two and a half years. At 11,000 ballistic missiles, Israel does not have the air defense capabilities to defend itself from a massive arsenal of missiles. Hundreds of ballistic missiles coming in Daily Weekly. 85% of that missile production capability has been destroyed. I think Tamir would acknowledge, and I think certainly the IDF is quite proud of this, that the current war was decisive in severely degrading that missile capability. Now because it was so decisive, we were able to do severe damage to Iran's nuclear program for the first time in 20 years. Iran has no enrichment capability as a result of US and Israeli strikes. And I agree with Tamir. It is absolutely essential that we keep it that way. And we either do that through kinetic operations or through some kind of negotiated deal. But taking the two wars together, we have decisively set back their nuclear program. They were at breakout of a few days. Now the assessment is they are two and a half years away from having that nuclear weapons capability. We've decisively set back their missile capability. And on the leadership question, I completely agree with Tamir. But let's be candid. That was not the objective of this war or the last war. Regime change was not set as President Trump's strategic objective. That may have been Prime Minister Netanyahu's, but the United States did not make that a strategic objective. However, this regime has been severely weakened and even though the leadership remains intact, I would certainly challenge the notion that this is a stable Islamic republic. And I think the idea now is to take a weakened Islamic Republic suffering a crisis of legitimacy and massive economic crisis and having been significantly set back in its war making capabilities is now to push forward with what Dan, I've been long calling for on your show, which is a maximum support campaign for the millions of Iranians who want to bring down this regime and by the way, who are already back on the streets in protest as we speak looking to bring down the Islamic Republic.

[B]

Just quick comments one regarding the missiles, I agree and I take the numbers that were published by the centcom is credible. 85% out of the military industrial base of missiles were destroyed. And it is a great accomplishment but it is the third cycle that we are destroying assembly line of missiles. We have done it twice before and we need to acknowledge the fact that Iranians are able to recover quickly and much faster than we anticipate that. And just one number to clarify things we have started the war. Three years ago the Iranian had only 1000 ballistics missiles that were able to reach Israel. Although two circus when we have destroyed the industrial mixers, 12 industrial mixers in the first round and in the 12 days war destroy all the assembly lines. They are now in a possession of about 1700 after beginning as said 2500. The bottom line, they will recover. It will take them time. If there is no constant erodence of these capabilities or there is no alternative regime regime in Iran, they will recover. As for the nuclear, I totally agree with the assessment of Mark. But all of those accomplishments was the accomplishment of the 12 days war. The 12 days war was a historical success. But between the 12 days war and the beginning of this current operation, Iran has recovered. It's not fully recovered, it's not started reaching uranium again but it made some tremendous recovery effort, building a totally new enrichment site in Pickaxe Mountain and rebuilding some of its lost capabilities in a pace that is alarming and that was not handled in this current war.

[C]

So, Dan, I've been on your show talking about Pickaxe Mountain exhaustively.

[A]

Yeah, I think our listeners first heard the term from you, Mark, many months ago. So. Yes.

[C]

So I agree 100% with Tamir. Pickaxe Mountain is an issue. By the way, Pickaxe Mountain is not yet an enrichment facility, but the Iranians are going deeper and deeper with, I think, the objective of building an enrichment facility. And Tamir is right that it wasn't dealt with in the last war. It wasn't dealt with in this war. I worry that the problem is, of course, that Pickaxe Mountain is so deep that it is immunized against our largest bombs, our massive ordnance penetrators that the United States used last year to severely degrade $4, the previously deeply buried enrichment facility. So I agree that that is something that needs to be addressed. I worry that we may not be able to do that militarily. We may have to do that only diplomatically. And I would be shocked if the Iranians gave it up. But I think what's really worth underscoring is if you have ballistic missiles, those ballistic missiles can carry nuclear warheads. If you have an icbm, that ICBM can carry a nuclear warhead and strike the American homeland. And again, I agree with Tamir. Iran is trying to reconstitute that missile program, but they were on a trajectory to 11,000 ballistic missiles, which would be a devastating threat to Israel and would be a significant threat to the United States, to our bases, to our embassies, to our allies. That trajectory has been sharply reversed. So what we need to do now is double down on how to ensure that we continue to degrade Iran's nuclear program and missile program. But I think it's wrong to say that this war did not have a significant strategic impact on one of Iran's most deadly capabilities that is inextricably linked to its nuclear capabilities. That is the ballistic missile program that has suffered severe damage during the 40 day war.

[A]

So, Tamir, in terms of what you see as the major problems, in your opinion, is there something, anything, that President Trump and his team could do now to realistically fix or meaningfully address what you consider the failings, follow as planned

[B]

and remove the nuclear out of the bargaining table. Nuclear project over Iran can be destroyed, obliterated in a manner that they will not be able to reconstitute it for a period of about a century. Okay, there's a plan. I cannot get into the details. It was already on the schedule. And imagine life right now after Iran has no theoretically potential nuclear project. Imagine how that looks. What are the negotiations are going to be about? It will be on missiles, on proxies, on human rights in Iran, on the real issues that is left. And if they don't want to negotiate over that, we will keep on the sanctions and it's better off for all of us not giving them any lifeline and just drop the keys and go. That would be my number 1, 2, 3 recommendation on doing that.

[C]

So Dan, I have a question for Tamir because this is the first that I've heard that there is a plan that could obliterate Iran's nuclear program. And I have to say if that's true, I'm puzzled why in 52 days of war, 12 day war last year, 40 day war this year, the Israeli air force did not execute on that plan. I mean if there is a plan to obliterate Pickaxe Mountain, meaning that you can actually destroy this deeply buried, soon to be Iranian nuclear enrichment facility and you can either do it from the air or from the ground. If there is an opportunity to destroy every advanced centrifuge inside Iran, if there is an opportunity to take out the thousands of pounds of enriched uranium at all purity levels. Puzzled why this plan was not implemented.

[B]

President Trump answers your question. Lately President Trump said that there was a plan to take off all of Iran's nuclear ascent through ground operation that involves two weeks excavating the enriched uranium. He I'm just relying on what he said openly. Based on that, based on what Trump said, you understand that that scale of an operation cannot be executed in day one, day two or day three. That scale of an operation should be prepared and it takes weeks to create the a military environment that ensures success of that very complicated plan. As to your question, I will redirect this question to the White House. Ask him why did he stop it and why didn't he execute it. He said it's a huge logistics nightmare. I agree. But as for your question, President Trump answered, why was not that conducted sooner? Because that scale of operation takes time to prepare.

[C]

I think that if President Trump decided now that was it. He's not returning back to major military operations. He's not ordering special forces to go and retrieve the enriched material. He is not going to destroy and actually really obliterate fordhamount if he's not going to do something about Pickaxe Mountain. And he's just going to go try to negotiate for the next two and a half years with the Iranian regime as they reconstitute their missile program, as they reconstitute their nuclear program, and as they control the Strait of Hormuz. Then I think we will look in two and a half years and say that the second war wasn't worth it. The real question is, did President Trump decide to do a ceasefire in order to buy himself time to return back to major military operations? And on the question of regime change, is he prepared, and I'm not sure he is, but is he prepared to commit the United States to an Israeli operation to provide maximum support to the Iranian people and maximum fracturing of this regime so that in two and a half years we have crippled this regime and we've laid the groundwork for its demise? I think the jury is still out on those questions.

[A]

Stay with us. We'll be right back.

[D]

I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of ARC News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. That's why we started ArkNews Daily. Every weekday morning, I walk you through the most important news, give you the context you need, and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything and I don't waste your time. On most days, I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully a little bit smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show notes. I hope to see you tomorrow.

[A]

I want to come back to something Tamir has said in other conversations, which is that hope I'm quoting you here, Tamir, hope covered rational thinking, or hope overrode rational thinking, referring to war planners being overly optimistic, especially as it relates to the possibility of regime change. But some of those planners in Israel's intelligence, based on what we understand from public reports and various reporting and analysis that we've had on this podcast, would say that the plan wasn't executed upon referring to the arming of the Kurds, the plan to arm the Kurds, that that was something, as you've talked about, the Israelis were for and were ready to execute. And then the Pentagon kind of put a hold on it in response to pressure from Erdogan. If you were presented with that plan, assuming the Americans were 100% aligned, would you have recommended Relying on the Kurds to help achieve the collapse of the regime.

[B]

I would not have recommended them as the capstone of all the arches of the special operation as one component that there's the doubt whether it will be successful, but not connect all of the sequence of special operation into that component. Because we all know how the Kurdish issue is sensitive in the Middle East. Not just the Turkey which was was dominant in influencing President Trump. But moreover, it is very crucial to Syria and to Iraq and to Iran. The possibility of a Kurdish state on the expense of the stability of Iran and other countries in the region is something most analysts will predict before even executing it. So I'm not saying that I will not support it because knowing the details of that potential operation, it was really amazing. So it had the potential of creating a momentum, internal momentum that might lead to a chain of event that eventually may promote the probability of a regime destabilization. Okay, I can't really rule that out because now I know better. And secondly, just for the sake of hope and rationality, all of this war is a balance between two complementary efforts, the regime and degradation. Apparently someone in the room said that we are in historical event. There's no real chance in the near future or long future that we will have such favorable context than now. President in the White House to support us in dire economic situation of Iran Protest in the streets. They are still weak from the 12 days war and haven't really recovered the aerial defense system. It is an historical event to conduct it. We don't know how much it will be successful, but let's try to do it if that context enable us and if not, if regimes still not collapse. The degradation of military capabilities is essential in any cases. So either way, we should deal with that aspect. The sooner the better. So those two elements when presented like that, that you can understand why it was approved.

[C]

I don't know what the comprehensive plan that Mossad had for regime change, I know some elements of it were not approved by the President. But I do think that regime change against Iran is going to take time. It wasn't going to happen while the bombs are dropping. Because regime change against Iran is about millions of Iranians coming back to the streets the way they were in January, the way they've been since 1999, repeatedly. And those Iranians taking back the country. And we have to be prepared to help them. That is what regime change will be about. And I fear that in two and a half years time we have a new president who is not committed to crippling the regime in Iran. So I agree with Tamir. We have a short period of time. It's two and a half years. And what we should be pushing for is for President Trump not to throw the Iranian people under the bus by doing a deeply flawed deal on the nuclear program, but by actually returning to using all instruments of American power, kinetic and other, in order to support Iranians when they come back to the streets. And again, I'll underscore this as we are recording this podcast and the Internet blackout has been lifted, we are now seeing videos of Iranians back on the streets. They're not back on the streets in the numbers they were in January. They're back on the streets because they cannot live under these conditions and they refuse to live under these conditions. And they have been on the streets and will come back to the streets again.

[B]

If I may, I want to clarify one thing. The hope of a regime change was counterproductive to the ability to achieve the military degradation campaign. Imagine that we have re entered the war without all of the regime element of the war just degradation campaign. Imagine that we have approached the President of the United States or Prime Minister Netanyahu said, we need military degradation that has four columns. One, IRGC Air Force, second IRGC Navy, third Military Industrial base, and fourth, the nuclear project of Iran. The only reason that we have left in this campaign without this nuclear is because this regime change hope that was diminished after the first two or three days hovered above all of the campaign and lost interest, lost momentum, lost the necessary stubbornness to achieve all of the goals of the degradation.

[C]

I actually agree with that. But I actually don't think President Trump was prepared to order a special forces operation with the United States Joint Special Operations Command leading the charge of American boots on the ground to go and retrieve thousands of pounds of enriched uranium to go in and on the ground, blow up Pickaxe Mountain or make it inaccessible to human beings for the next hundred years by introducing certain substances into the corridors of Pickaxe Mountain. I don't believe President Trump was prepared for that. Now, he may have dismissed that as an option because, as Tamir said, hovering over this was the possibility of regime change. And I think that if that was the case, then President Trump was sold a vision that was not realistic. And he certainly made it even less realistic by dismissing the Kurdish option and some other operations that the Israelis came to him with. I think President Trump, at the end of the day, wanted a significant victory without risking American lives. And that's why we are where we are today. And he was not prepared for that special operation. The question is, where do we go from here? If we are going into another endless round of negotiations with sophisticated Iranians negotiators who are going to stretch this out for two and a half years and either there's no deal or there's a bad deal, then the Iranians will do what they have always done against American presence. They will win at the negotiating table what they lost on the battlefield. It's an assessment. I don't know what President Trump's going to do. I do think that Hormuz was a real issue for him. He had to deal with it. I think that negotiating his way out of Hormuz is the wrong thing to do because he's going to replace nuclear extortion with Hormuz extortion. He has to return to Operation Project Freedom, which was that shortly lived US Naval operation to escort tankers through the Gulf, which the Saudis blocked by denying us overflight rights. We have to go back and win militarily the battle for Hormuz or Iran will emerge out of this with a true strategic victory and a permanent threat and stranglehold over Hormuz. Now we have a fighting chance, and I hope President Trump fights and doesn't negotiate with, with a regime that has no desire to give up nuclear concessions that meet the President's minimum demands.

[A]

Tamir, we've discussed on this podcast we had Ronen Bergman on a couple weeks ago about the whole potential role for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former president of Iran, to play a role in some kind of regime change, regime collapse. And I remain skeptical that that there was ever a plan for Ahmadinejad by the US Or Israel or anyone to run Iran following the current regime leadership. But there may have been planning about him playing some kind of role. It's not entirely clear and obviously the model people look at, analysts look at, is the Venezuela model and whether or not Ahmadinejad could play some kind of role in Iran's future the way actually that Delsey Rodriguez is. I know it's not a perfect comparison the way Delsey Rodriguez is playing in Venezuela. What's your reaction to that, to kind of comparing the Venezuela experience to the Iran experience?

[B]

First of all, I think the Venezuela inspired the motivation to follow the hopes that the regime change can be achieved quickly, successfully, as it done in Venezuela. But the situation In Iran is 10 times more complicated than the situation in Venezuela. So Ahmadinejad was not a Delsi Rodriguez type. It was a part of sequence of operation that each one of Them carried this kind of internal part in the sequence of event. And yes, according to what was published in the Times, Ahmadinejad held some position. It's not the final position as the head of the state, probably his. His role was to create some additional development that may end up in a regime change. So I would not really copy and duplicate the model of Ezrada. It's not that type. And we all know that although Mahmoudinejad is highly criticizing of the regime of the mullahs, the regime of Ali Khamenei, he is not the poster boy of what is hoped from a future more liberal or more moderated ir. He's, on the contrary, hawkish radical, a Holocaust denial that thinks badly of Israel and the West.

[C]

Mark, I do think Ahmadinejad wanted to be the next leader of Iran. I mean, following his career closely. There's no way that he just wanted to be weaponized by Mossad and CIA to bring down the regime, and then he'd go off and retire in the Persian countryside. So no doubt that he wanted to be the leader. But I think his role in that strategy was very much what his historical role has been, which is a gadfly inside the Iranian system. He's been extremely critical of the clerical establishment. He was the only president who was willing to confront Ali Khamenei directly and the IRGC and the security apparatus. So, you know, if you were designing a plan, you could see why you'd want to leverage Ahmadinejad's insider and outsider status in order to cause disruption and some chaos. But I don't think anybody was under the illusion, except for maybe Ahmadinejad himself, that he would emerge as the next leader of Iran.

[A]

Okay, let's talk about Mujtabak Khamenei, the new supreme leader, who you both agree is a dangerous figure, radical, but you come at it from different angles. Mark, what is the key point through which we should assess how dangerous the new Khamenei supreme Leader is?

[C]

So he is absolutely a true believer, an extremist or radical. He's committed to Iran developing nuclear weapons. I think it's absolutely right. I think he thought his father made a mistake in keeping Iran on this patient pathway to nuclear weapons and a massive missile shield and should have actually gone for the bomb. So one would expect that that's exactly what he intends to do and what he's telling his closest advisors to do. He certainly may be more dangerous, but he's not as experienced as his father. His father was the longest serving dictator in the world, served from 1989 to 2026 so 37 years of experience running circles around multiple US presidents that's not Mushta Bah doesn't have his father's experience but because of that and doesn't have his father's patience, he may be even more dangerous than Ali Khamenei himself.

[B]

I agree with Marx I will add two things. He owes his nomination to the IRGC that promote him against the will of his father who wrote specifically letter asking not to nominate his son and for that reason I think he owes a lot to the algaes Second, IRGC took control, guarding him, delivering message back and forth from him. That's one aspect the IRGC role is much more dominant right now but make no mistake, much to Bahaminei runs the show. He is alive, he is in control by the irgc, he's much more influential. Secondly, the personal revenge. He is entering a negotiation after both Israel and United States killed his father, his wife, his daughter, his mother and that humiliation is important in the Middle East. The freedom of action he has the maneuvering degrees of freedom to make some concessions to the American president is very narrow because he is entering a position of 50 years, not two years he is going to serve for the rest of his life he cannot be received by the mass as a weak that humiliated himself in front of the guy that killed his father. So that creates a more hawkish approach towards negotiation and on and forward Apart from those two elements, the revenge and the historical thinking about his leadership because in Iran any sign of weakness ends up with protest in the street. He knows that it's not just the concessions that he might do in front of United States Any form of concession, any form of bowing before the guy who killed your father is a demonstration of weakness that will end up with the stabilities of his regime for the he's much more hawkish and much more resilient in the matter of negotiation. And as for the other issues, the nuclear is my number one worries. Basically he was pro nuclear weapon. Now considering what happened to Iran, I think that the only conclusion he will draw from this event that the only deterrence that is needed is a nuclear deterrence and that's the only guarantee for preventing another attempt on the stability of the regime.

[C]

Dan, I'd only add to that that I think that's right. Where I slightly differ is that while Mostaba is more radical, more vindictive, more committed than his father was to a quick nuclear breakout, I think his father Ali Khamenei was more dangerous because he was More experienced, more strategic and more patient. And this gets me back to my major argument through this debate, which is that Ali Khamenei understood that if you're going to build a nuclear weapon and not get bombed by the United States and Israel, you had build a missile shield. You had to develop thousands of ballistic missiles, ICBMs, hundreds of thousands of drones. You had to create a situation where the United States and Israel would not attack you because you had taken those patient pathways, not just a nuclear weapons threshold capability, but to having these deadly missile capabilities that could wreak havoc and destruction on Israel, on the Gulf and on U.S. interests and bases in the region. And so for that reason, I welcome the fact that Iran today is ruled by Moshtab Al Khamenei and not Ali Khamenei because I think Mostaba is inexperienced, not as patient and strategic, and therefore is going to be prone to be making many more mistakes. I also think he without a missile program, without a defense industrial base, without a navy, without an air force, without air defenses, without enrichment capability, he is going to have a much more difficult time breaking out to nuclear weapons than Ali Khamenei would have under his patient pathway plan. Which is not to say that we must not be absolutely vigilant because that there is a great danger that there could be a covert nuclear breakout and we must absolutely be committed to using all elements of American and Israeli power to stop that and not be deluded into thinking that we could some way somehow negotiate our way out of this with Mojtab Al Khamenei and the irgc.

[B]

I would just comment just one. Mujdaba knows exactly what you've said right now regarding the importance of the military industrial base and missiles project. Secondly, as for his experience, that guy served 15 years in the chamber of the most important office in Iran, in the leadership chamber, and he's well experienced in the internal IRGC politics in front of the President. He's not an outsider, okay? He's from the system and he knows exactly those lessons that are so accurately described. The bide mark.

[A]

Okay, I want to end this conversation with. I know it's never this simple, but I do want to end the conversation with a, with a yes or a no to the following question. Do you believe Iran is more dangerous today than it was on February 27th? I'll start with you, Tamir.

[B]

Basically the regime is more dangerous. The capabilities are less dangerous. And for that reason, if you are just checking, checking net assessment of strategic capabilities before and after the strategic military capability of Iran degraded dramatically. The regime, different story. That regime, if stable for the next two years, it will end up more radical and more dangerous than the previous one.

[C]

So, Dan, my answer is no. The regime is much less dangerous, both in terms of capabilities and this is where Tamir and I agree with on severe degradation of capabilities in terms of the regime itself, it is as dangerous as the regime has been for 47 years. It is the same theocratic, genocidal, jihadist regime that has been ruling ever since Ruhala Khomeini established the Islamic Republic, since Ali Khamenei took it over in 1989. And now Mushtaba Khamenei is ruling it in 2026.

[A]

All right, gentlemen, we will leave it there. Thank you for illuminating and spirited conversation. And I'm sure we'll be having both of you back because this story and this war is, for better or for worse, not going anywhere. Thank you.

[C]

Thank you, Dan.

[B]

Thank you very much, Dan.

[A]

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan. Senor.