America’s War Objectives, and Israel’s - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

Summary

Podcast Summary: Call Me Back - "America’s War Objectives, and Israel’s"

Host: Dan Senor
Guests: Nadav Eyal (ARC Media contributor, Yediot Aharonot), Amit Segal (Channel 12, Yisrael Hayom)
Date: March 16, 2026
Episode Theme:
Exploring the current Iran-Israel war, examining U.S. and Israeli objectives, and analyzing the regional impact amidst military conflict and global energy turmoil.

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Main Theme Overview

The episode dives into the dilemmas and strategic objectives facing Israeli and American policymakers in the ongoing war with Iran. The discussion centers on the divergence and overlap of Washington and Jerusalem’s goals, the pivotal role of energy markets (especially the Strait of Hormuz), and the broader consequences for the Middle East and world economy. The conversation explores whether military success translates into enduring strategic advantage and how both countries define "victory."

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. War Update and Regional Context

[09:13]

• Iran's strategy shifts: While Hamas previously exploited Western sensitivity to civilian casualties and Israeli anxieties about hostages, Iran is now targeting American sensitivity to oil and energy prices.
• Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has become central: Only Iranian and Russian tankers pass, others are blocked, disrupting global oil flows.
• Despite U.S.-led military success degrading Iranian missile capabilities, energy bottlenecks create political and strategic dilemmas for the U.S.

Nadav Eyal:

“20% of the oil in the world flows through Hormuz right now. It's not only that the Strait is closed. It's just open only for Iranian or Russian oil tankers that are approved by Tehran.” [09:32]

2. The Energy Front: Oil, Markets, and U.S. Political Stakes

[13:04–17:41]

• Energy markets highly sensitive; U.S. market messaging influences oil prices.
• Nadav skeptical of a master plan: The U.S. may not have fully anticipated oil shock ramifications, though some (Amit) suspect strategic forethought and even a “trap” set for Iran by President Trump.
• U.S. strikes on Kharg Island are deliberately focused on military targets, avoiding crippling damage to oil infrastructure to prevent further oil price spikes.

Nadav Eyal:

“The meaning of 20% [of oil flow through Hormuz] is like the peak of COVID if it lasts... but now there is no less demand, but there's less supply. And that's the problem.” [14:05]

Amit Segal:

"Iran now aims at the sensitivity of the American society to the energy prices because they know that President Trump got elected first and foremost on the basis of skyrocketing inflation.” [18:57]

3. U.S. vs. Israeli Objectives: Regime Change vs. Containment

[25:16–28:07]

• U.S. Goals: Degrade Iranian ballistic/nuclear/choke-point capabilities; containment and deterrence, not necessarily regime change or uranium removal.
• Israeli Goals: More ambitious—with the preferred endgame being regime change in Tehran. Israelis see toppling the Iranian regime as the only way to achieve lasting security, expecting recurring conflict otherwise.

Nadav Eyal:

"None of these [U.S.] goals is a regime change in Iran... it's about being realistic as to these expectations." [26:33]

Amit Segal:

"Israel is fully invested in toppling this regime. That's the main mission." [28:07]

4. The Strait of Hormuz—A Test of Deterrence and Regional Security

[21:29–23:18]

• U.S. failure to open the strait or force Iranian capitulation could set a dangerous precedent—the region may see Iran as undefeated and embolden similar tactics.
• If Iran's neighbors believe closing the strait is a viable threat, regional deterrence is eroded.

Nadav Eyal:

"If the US doesn't forcefully open the Strait of Hormuz or Iran isn't vanquished to the point that it needs to open... all of Iran's neighbors know from now on that they can do that. I cannot explain how meaningful this is." [21:29]

5. Domestic Support and Political Fallout in Israel

[33:06–34:45]

• Israeli public currently backs the war, but past patterns suggest support wanes without "decisive victory."
• Netanyahu’s standing may improve if perceived as the right leader for security, especially with visible U.S. (Trump) collaboration.

Amit Segal:

"So I think people now are afraid that this operation or this war is not going to end with a decisive victory if it happens before the elections. I think Netanyahu's standing improves dramatically because he's the one that warned against Iran." [34:05]

6. The Nuclear File: The 440kg Question

[35:35–36:22]

• Removing Iran's enriched uranium stockpile still considered a must, but the path is unclear—either by agreement (seen as unlikely) or military seizure.
• War conditions, ironically, make certain operations technically easier.

Amit Segal:

"This enriched uranium must leave Iran, be it in an agreement which no one can actually see coming as we speak, or in a military operation." [35:39]

7. How Will Success Be Judged? Israel and the U.S.

[39:59–42:14]

• If war ends with Iran’s regime weakened but not toppled, and no uranium removal, is it a success?
• For Israel, it may be “another brick in the wall” (Amit), part of a longer decline of Iranian influence rather than a definitive victory.
• Nadav stresses the value of translating military gains into lasting diplomatic or regional advantage, referencing Kissinger/Nixon’s Cold War diplomacy.

Amit Segal:

"At the end of the day, what we are seeing now is the decline of the Iranian terror empire and I would say the rise of Israel's raw military force. That's what history would remember from 2025, 2026." [41:05]

Nadav Eyal:

"Israel is very good at hard power... But then it takes a Henry Kissinger or it takes a Richard Nixon or it takes a Donald Trump to get a hostage deal out of this and to get an Abraham Accord." [41:49]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Iran now aims at the sensitivity of the American society to the energy prices... that's what they got.” —Amit Segal [01:30, 18:57]
• “If the US doesn't forcefully open the Strait of Hormuz... all of Iran's neighbors know from now on that they can do that. I cannot explain how meaningful this is.” —Nadav Eyal [21:29]
• “Israel is fully invested in toppling this regime. That's the main mission.” —Amit Segal [28:07]
• “It's not President Trump that wants Netanyahu some days to stop. I think it goes exactly the other way around... For Israelis, the oil prices are like the weather forecast. We have nothing to do about it. We are not an empire.” —Amit Segal [23:19]
• “At the end of the day, what we are seeing now is the decline of the Iranian terror empire and the rise of Israel's raw military force.” —Amit Segal [41:05]
• “It's too early to tell, even when this specific struggle ends.” —Nadav Eyal [42:14]

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Timestamps of Important Segments

• 01:30 – Iran’s war strategy and aims (Amit Segal)
• 09:13 – War update and transformation into an energy conflict (Nadav Eyal)
• 13:04 – Deep dive on the energy dimension and oil market impact
• 18:57 – Iran’s asymmetrical tactics; targeting U.S. energy sensitivity (Amit Segal)
• 21:29 – Dilemmas posed by the Strait of Hormuz for deterrence (Nadav Eyal)
• 25:16 – Defining U.S. war objectives (Nadav Eyal)
• 28:07 – Defining Israeli war objectives—regime change (Amit Segal)
• 33:06 – Israeli public and political dynamics during war
• 35:35 – Nuclear issue: the 440kg of enriched uranium (Amit Segal)
• 39:59 – “Would Israel see the war as a success?” discussion
• 41:05 – Historical significance of the conflict (Amit Segal)
• 41:49 – Hard power vs. strategic gains; lessons from history (Nadav Eyal)
• 42:14 – "Too early to tell" — the French Revolution analogy

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Tone and Language

The conversation is informed, direct, and often somber, interwoven with occasional dry humor—especially regarding the personal impact of war on Israeli daily life. The analysts approach topics with nuance, accepting ambiguity and emphasizing the complexity of defining "victory" in today’s regional context.

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Summary Takeaway

The U.S. and Israel share immediate military aims against Iran but diverge on long-term strategic endgames—containment versus regime change. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and sensitivity of global oil markets put intense pressure on Washington and threaten to shift the war’s outcome from battlefield gains to enduring regional power dynamics. Despite broad military successes, the ultimate judgment of the war's success—especially from the Israeli perspective—will depend on whether these achievements translate into profound and lasting strategic advantage, a question that, as the guests note, remains “too early to tell.”

Transcript

[Dan Senor]

War has returned to Israel. Israelis have spent the last days in their safe rooms and in public bomb shelters. Buildings have been hit and tragically, civilians have been killed. As Israel and the United States continue their military offensive, Israelis brace for sustained rocket fire. And at the scene of these attacks, United Hatzala volunteers, EMTs, medics, paramedics and doctors are working to save lives, often showing up in the first minutes to evacuate people stuck in buildings, supply medical care to the wounded, and provide first aid to many others impacted. Their volunteers are often in the critical first minutes after rocket impact. Their services, which are always free, are a vital lifeline to the people of Israel. You can make sure that they have the life saving equipment and supplies they need right now. Bulletproof vests and helmets, tactical stretchers for evacuations, oxygen kits and whatever else they need to meet this moment in Israel. Visit IsraelRescue.org CallMeBack that's IsraelRescue.org CallmeBack or go to the link in my show Notes to learn more and support United Hatzala's critical efforts.

[Nadav Eyal]

You are listening to an art media podcast.

[Amit Segal]

Iran, unlike what it has said for the last two generations, cannot win a war now. Whereas Hamas based its war on the sensitivity of the Western society to civilian casualties in Gaza and this sensitivity of the Israeli society to hostages, Iran now aims at the sensitivity of the American society to the energy prices. So this is it. That's what they got.

[Nadav Eyal]

The question is more, I would say, diplomatic and regional than it is military. Will the region see Iran as isolated, or did Iran manage to deter the region through the Strait of Hormuz and the attacks on its neighbors, the UAE cannot relocate. What would the UAE tell itself at the end of this war? I think that without an agreement of some sort of a capitulation with the Iranians, at least handing over their enriched material. Be very hard for the region to see this as an Iranian defeat. And if they do not see this as a defeat, it's a problem.

[Dan Senor]

It's 11:00am on Sunday, March 15th in New York City. It is 6:30pm on Sunday, March the 15th in Tehran. And it is 5:00pm on Sunday, March 15th in Israel. As Israelis get ready to wind down their day, the Pentagon on Saturday identified the six U.S. service members who died this past week when a refueling aircraft crashed in Iraq. The Service members were Major John A. Kinner, 33 years old, of Auburn, Alabama, Captain Arianna Savino, 31, of Covington, Washington Tech. Sergeant Ashley Pruitt, 34 years old, of Bardston, Kentucky Captain Seth Covel, 38, of Mooresville, Indiana Captain Curtis Angst, 30 years old of Wilmington, Ohio, and Tech. Sergeant Tyler Simmons, 28 years old, of Columbus, Ohio. May their memory be for a blessing. Now here's ARC Media contributor Deborah Pardes with the news update According to a

[Deborah Pardes]

report published on Saturday night by Semaphore, Israel told the United States it's running critically low on ballistic missile interceptors amid daily bombardment by Iran. The report cited unnamed U.S. officials. Asked on Sunday whether the report is true, Israeli Foreign Minister Gidon Zaar said the answer is no, without elaborating. Earlier in the day, Israel's military also rejected the report, saying in a statement, quote, the IDF is prepared and ready to handle any scenario, end quote. Israel and the United States say it is in fact Iran that is running critically low on munitions as the two allies have destroyed the Islamic regime's capacity to fire and produce missiles heading into the third week of the war. The rate of Iranian missile fire at Israel has dropped by almost 95% since the beginning of the war. Still, attacks by Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah wounded dozens of people in Israel over the weekend. On Saturday, a 12 year old boy in the southern resort city of Eilat was hit by shrapnel from an Iranian missile and taken to the hospital in moderate condition. Also on Saturday, Axios reported that Lebanon's government has agreed to negotiations with Israel based on a French peace plan. Lebanon would have to recognize Israel and fulfill past commitments to disarm Hezbollah. Israel and the United States are reviewing the proposal, according to the report. As an alternative to talks, Israel is reportedly planning to massively expand ground operations in southern Lebanon and seize all territory up to the Litany river at Mar a Lago. On Saturday, US President Donald Trump appeared to be in no mood for diplomacy. During a phone interview, Trump told NBC News that Iran wants a deal to end the war, but he does not because, quote from the terms aren't good enough yet. The president questioned whether Iran's supreme leader is even alive, noting that Majdaba Khamenei has not been seen since the war began and issued his first public statement on Thursday. In writing, Iran denied any interest in talks with the United States regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Trump told NBC News that several countries agreed to help the United States secure the key shipping lane, which Iran has largely shut down during the war, driving up global energy prices. Trump declined to name the countries and none have publicly made such a commitment. On Friday, US forces carried out strikes on Kharg Island, Iran's most critical oil terminal. According to Centcom, the US hit more than 90 military sites there while preserving the oil infrastructure. According to news reports on Friday, the United States has deployed about 2,500 Marines and an amphibious assault ship to the Middle East. The move will give Trump the option to launch a ground operation in Iran, or at least to threaten one. I'm Deborah Pardes and this is a

[Dan Senor]

news update before today's conversation. A quick Update because news from the war is moving so quickly, we at ARC Media have decided to start bringing you daily news updates. Every weekday, Ark Media's Deborah Pardes will deliver a concise 10 minute briefing on the most important stories shaping the day. So if you want to stay on top of the latest developments in the Iran war and what they mean for Israel, the Middle east and for Jews around the world, please follow the link in the show notes and subscribe to our new podcast feed Ark News Daily. For the next few days, you'll hear these updates here on the Call Me Back feed, but starting next week they'll move to the Ark News Daily Feedback now onto today's episode. On this podcast, we've described the unprecedented degree to which Washington and Jerusalem are aligned and fully integrated, not only politically but also militarily. While this is true, alliances don't always soften differences in strategy, they manage them. If you look closely, the United States and Israel are pursuing overlapping but not always identical objectives. While both nations have successfully hammered Iran's hard power, the missiles, the drones and the nuclear sites, and even a lot of the military bases and headquarters and infrastructure, the end game is where things potentially diverge for Prime Minister Netanyahu. He has often talked in existential terms for this mission, with the ultimate objective at some point overthrowing the regime entirely, viewing a total collapse as key to securing Israel's future. But yet some argue that for President Trump, the clock may be ticking with soaring oil prices and American public opinion, support for the war at best uneven. Could the US Be eyeing a quicker off ramp focused on containment and deterrence? In practice, this means we could see the US at some point declare victory and pull back while Israel is still pushing for a knockout blow with Washington's blessing. To better understand where U.S. and Israeli interests overlap and diverge and what it all actually means practically, we are joined by ARC Media contributor and senior analyst for Idiot Akronot Nadavael and ARC Media contributor and senior analyst for Channel 12, also a columnist for Yisrael Hayom, Amit Segal Amit Nadav, welcome back.

[Nadav Eyal]

Hi.

[Dan Senor]

Let's just start with an Update on the state of the war. What have been the most important developments since we last spoke a few days ago?

[Nadav Eyal]

I think, and to some degree, I think, unfortunately, there are substantial developments that are changing the face of this war. This war has begun with being framed around the Iranian regime and the abilities by the Iranian regime and trying to degrade them, taking them out. We're going to discuss this. But right now it has become a war also maybe mainly about energy and the strait of Hormuz. 20% of the oil in the world flows through Hormuz right now. It's not only that the Strait is closed. It's not really closed. It's just open only for Iranian or Russian oil tankers that are approved by Tehran. Tehran right now is producing, according to the Wall Street Journal, more oil per day than it produced before the war, while the countries in the region cannot export oil anymore. And we have just seen India, for instance, turning to Tehran and getting clearance from Tehran to get two tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. This is a substantial issue, Dan, because if you need to continue on degrading the power of the Iranian regime and the Strait of Hormuz remains, again, not closed, but just open to whatever the Iranians want. But at the end of the day, this limits the ability of this war or might limit the ability of this war to continue. There have been substantial developments in this sense. There is the east west pipeline in Saudi Arabia. There are attempts by the United States to either open the strait or to find sort of hacks or ways in which you can pacify the energy market internationally. But we're recording this on Sunday. This evening, the future trade of oil will open again. A week ago, it opened, and oil, in a matter of hours, rose to almost $120 per barrel. And then the administration said a few things and it dropped. It dropped substantially.

[Dan Senor]

Yeah, it went down like $40 barrel.

[Nadav Eyal]

Yeah. Until Monday noon, I think.

[Dan Senor]

Yeah. I'm just saying when the Met. When the administration did that first round of messaging, and then it came back

[Nadav Eyal]

up and the messaging was basically giving an impression to the market, which I don't know if it's true, Dan. The impression that the market got was that this is going to end quite soon. Now, this is the impression of the market. I'm not saying that this is the intention of the president, and I'm not saying that this is the case, but this is what the market was reading into this. So this is becoming a huge political story in the US Even more than on day one because of Energy. And it also has or could have repercussions to the operational side. I'm going to stop with this. We can elaborate if you would want to.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Amit, before I come back to Nadav, because I want to drill down on a couple of points you made anything to add.

[Amit Segal]

So I have hard times believing that the administration hadn't thought it through regarding the Straits of Hormuz and the oil prices. Maybe I'm too much into conspiracy theories, but I think that when President Trump says I need or I want the help of other countries to actually accompany ships into this strait, it's not because the US Lacks the power to do so alone, but because he wants to do something bigger. I believe it was a strategic trap put in front of the Iranians, and if I'm right, so we'll see it in a few days.

[Dan Senor]

What do you mean by a strategic trap?

[Amit Segal]

That this is the excuse for President Trump to do more, to take more dramatic measures.

[Dan Senor]

Okay. So Nadav, we can talk a little bit about where I think American, where the administration's heading with the politics of this and what constraints it puts on what the US does before we do. Can you just drill down a little bit on the specifics of some of these concerns in area of energy that you were citing there and the hits on energy assets?

[Nadav Eyal]

So Iran for many years has warned that if this and that happened, it will close the Strait of Hormuz. This was absolutely the scenario. I don't think, frankly, I do not agree with Amit that this is all part of a master plan. I'm not saying that the US Would not try to open now, the Strait of Hormuz forcefully. We have seen that the U.S. is deploying more than 2,500 Marines to the region. There is definitely discussion that I'm hearing about the possibility of taking some ground assets around the Strait of Hormuz. I'm hearing this from Israeli sources in

[Dan Senor]

order to secure the Strait of Hormuz,

[Nadav Eyal]

in order to secure that. But I don't think everything was pre planned, and here's why. What I'm hearing is that there's a lot of tension in the markets and there's a lot of tension with those politicians that support, that support this war. I'm talking about just reading what Lindsey Graham is saying, and he's probably the biggest supporter right now in the American Republican political sphere. It's obvious that there's something going on in that sense that wasn't completely pre planned. Now, the Iranians have small speedboats. They've Prepared mining, they've shorted tankers, and basically right now it's closed. I just read an energy analyst explaining that the meaning of 20% is like the peak of COVID if it lasts, if it's not a matter for two weeks now, what does it mean, the peak of COVID It means that in Covid, there was less demand, okay? And now there is no less demand. It's the same demand, but there's less supply. And that's the problem. Now, what they can do, for instance, and what's already happening, and it's just mesmerizing to see, Dan, you can see it virtually with satellite, is that oil tankers are turning to the Red Sea because Saudi Arabia was preparing for this moment, strategically speaking, because they knew that at a certain point the Iranians might do that. So they built a huge pipeline crossing the entire Saudi desert from east to west. And now you can see all these oil tankers and they're churning from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea to that point. Now, here's the problem. If you take that and if you take a UAE depot that is beyond the Straits of Hormuz geographically, and you take it together, it still compensates for about 30%. So that's one problem. Now, another problem is that the President has ordered a strike against Hag island. Hag Island is 90% of the Iranian oil flowing from Hag Island.

[Dan Senor]

So just for our listeners, in Hebrew, it's Hag island, as Nadav is pronouncing it in English, it's Kharg Island. What is this island and what is this operation?

[Nadav Eyal]

So 90% of the oil installations of Iran, refineries, everything is flowing through Haag Island. Now, here's the thing. Even now, after the strikes ordered by the President, the White House has made sure that everybody understands that this is not against any of the oil installations on this island. Now, it's very difficult. It's a very small island. It's a tiny island to hit the military targets there without hitting the installations of Haag island for oil. But the US did that, and it also signaled that it doing that. And I just saw a satellite from this morning. There are three tankers there uploading oil right now as we speak. For Iran, in terms of its lifeline, which is energy, it's not only business as usual because oil has risen any way you want to cut it, Dan, it's risen substantially. Even with its new rates, it's still risen substantially. So they are actually getting more money right now. And this is the lifeline right Meaning

[Dan Senor]

because the price of oil is up now.

[Nadav Eyal]

Why, why wouldn't. So the Israelis always go, you know, when I talk with the defense establishment in Israel, some go, we should bomb the oil refineries. Just bomb the entire thing. I read a tweet by Lindsey Graham was saying to the Israelis, and I'm paraphrasing, you can't bomb the oil installations of Iran because it's the future of Iran. And I will add to that, because if you do that and oil rises substantially all around the world, then the war might need to be stopped anyway. So there is a question here. What's the problem with what Amit just said? Amit made a pitch that maybe you can just open the Straits Dam. You probably remember the tanker war in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan.

[Dan Senor]

Yep.

[Nadav Eyal]

This thing might take time. That's the only point there. It could be brilliant. I do hope the President, the administration are preparing something. It can take time to open it because Iran was preparing for this. So there's really a dilemma here. One could hope that it will be solved in an optimal way, but it's definitely the main limitation on the war.

[Amit Segal]

I think that as time passes, Iran becomes more and more similar to its proxies. It's very interesting because Iran in the eyes of its leaders and its citizens and its people is a well respected country. But it's amazing to see how they act like Hamas and Hezbollah. One example, for instance, is the fact that the leaders of this regime, save of course the new Ayatollah Khamenei, were seen in public on Friday in this Al Quds Day, Jerusalem day, surrounded by citizens, knowing that Israel will not kill them because of the rate of collateral damage. And the second thing is exactly what Nedafit just described. Because Iran, unlike what it has said for the last two generations, cannot win a war. Now, two months ago, a year ago, two years ago, we were all under the impression that the war between Israel and Iran is going to be a war between equivalent forces. Now we see it's not the case, not only because the US army joined the battle, the same applied for the Rising line operation in June 2025. So they actually resort to this asymmetrical conflict. So whereas Hamas based its war on the sensitivity of the Western society to civilian casualties in Gaza and this sensitivity of the Israeli society to hostages, Iran now aims at the sensitivity of the American society to the energy prices because they know that President Trump got elected first and foremost on the basis of skyrocketing inflation. So this is it. That's what they got. Now, I'm not saying it's not a crucial problem that should be solved. Then again, I believe that they thought about it because it doesn't make any sense that they went on war without taking into consideration the number one strategic weapon of the Iranians, AKA the oil prices. I do hope they took it into account, but I'm trying to say that's all they got and we should take it into account when we look at the broader picture.

[Dan Senor]

My sense in terms as far as the US Is concerned, just based on folks I'm talking to inside the administration in Congress who are dealing with him directly dealing with the administration on this, my sense is he's not panicked at all. He recognizes that this cannot go on indefinitely, but he still believes he's got time. He still believes he has cushion and he genuinely believes that the US And Israel together are making extraordinary progress just on the military front, that the payoff, the long term payoff of the degradation that they are subjecting Iran's military offensive and defensive military infrastructure to will have a very long term payoff. And so he's so far pretty committed to grinding it out now, obviously not indefinitely. So there's two I think data sets to look at. One data set is just general public opinion polling. And, and as I said at the beginning, public opinion for this support for this war is, is uneven at best. And I think there's some real concerns, but not among Republican voters so far and not among self described MAGA voters, MAGA Republican voters. Now the question is if the oil markets are volatile and gas prices are way up on a consistent basis and it contributes to the sense that cost of living is not being addressed, which you will recall was one of the primary issues that President Trump ran on. It's not great to have a surge in gas prices heading into the midterm elections, but here we are in the middle of March, the midterm elections are not until November. Can the president risk and the Republicans risk sky high if it gets to that or very high gas prices, you know, into the summer, early fall, political strategists would probably say no.

[Nadav Eyal]

I want to say before you pivot there, Dan, if the US doesn't forcefully open the Strait of Hormuz or Iran isn't vanquished to the point that it needs to open the Strait of Hormuz, all of Iran's neighbors know from now on that they can do that. I cannot explain how meaningful this is. And this is what I meant by saying this is no longer the war about the nuclear issue. It's no longer only about the ballistic issue. It's about Iran testing its core national security principles. And that is in Judgment Day, we close the Straits of Hormuz and we let the global economy suffer and die and everybody go to us. And the Prime Minister of India just went to them and asked them to let his own tankers go through the Strait of Hormuz. Even if, for instance, it lasts for another three weeks. I don't think it's going to be 60 days, but I don't know. And it ends. And then the US Says, look, we have degraded their ballistic abilities, we have degraded their nuclear abilities, and we are stopping. And best case scenario, the Iranians say, yeah, we stop too. They have just made such a mark on global economy. And what will the UAE do with this? What would Iraq do with this, by the way? It's not only the UAE and Qatar and the rest, it's also Iraq, for those who don't know. Also, some of them have stopped production. When you stop production because there is no way that you can produce and then just hold so much oil that you don't actually export to tankers, it takes time.

[Dan Senor]

What do you mean it takes time?

[Amit Segal]

What Nadav means is that it doesn't necessarily take 60 days of military attacks by Israel and the United States. The conflict can go on longer, and the implication ramifications can stay here for months, till the midterms.

[Nadav Eyal]

Right.

[Amit Segal]

And that's why back to square one. I can't believe that this president and this administration were so sensitive specifically to the prices of the oil actually began or initiated the war without taking this scenario into consideration. I not only can digest this, I have contradicting pieces of information, and I would suggest the entire international media to go to rehab. From using the term Trump is unexpected. Trump can stop the war every day. I think it's exactly the other way around because exactly as Nadav explained that the ramifications for the United States and the entire energy market are way more significant than the ramifications to the Israeli society and the Israeli country that I would like to rethink the entire perception of the world. It's not President Trump that wants Netanyahu some phase to stop. I think it goes exactly the other way around that there is going to be a point in which Israel behind closed doors will say, we are quite okay with what we have achieved, but the United States will need much more because Israel cannot affect the entire energy market, whereas the United States can. For Israelis, the oil prices are like the weather forecast. We have nothing to do about it. We are not an empire. That's why the perception of Israeli prime ministers and US Presidents have been so different throughout the years when it came to the Iranian question. And that's why at this very specific point, President Trump has more considerations when it comes to the war. One is the energy market. The second is, as Nadav mentioned, the uae. Listen, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not going to end this war when they are the new Israel. A country or a city or a capital city suffering ballistic missile once a week. Like the old saying, a missile a day keeps the tourists away. They cannot live with it.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, so this brings me to the focus of the conversation. The US And Israeli objectives in the war as we understand them now. So let me start with you, Nadav. Based on the Israeli assessment, how do the Israeli sources you're talking to assessment the US Objectives in this war?

[Nadav Eyal]

So they don't need to interpret the president or try to interpret the president or the White House as to what are the goals of the war. They need to listen to what they said. Destroying the Iranian offensive missiles, ballistic missiles, destroying the Iranian missile production, meaning military industry. Destroying Iran's navy and other security infrastructure and preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, not decimating every single century fuel there. I don't think that anyone in the US Said a goal of this war is to take out the enriched uranium from Iran, for instance. None of these goals is a regime change in Iran. Now, it's true that the president has remarked many times since the beginning of the war as to the possibility of a change in Iran, but this was not set as a goal. And I think it wasn't set as a goal because most probably analysts both in Israel and across the west have said that it's not necessarily achievable or achievable through this campaign alone immediately. So it's not about lowering expectations. It's about being realistic as to these expectations. Now, the main question, and I think this is something overreaching, that we should say the goal is, after all, if you see these tactical goals, is that Iran will come out of this war weaker than it was before the war. And that's the question. I think this is the question at hand. Now, one could argue that even today, now, if you stop the war immediately, if in six hours, the president says we achieved everything, which by the way, from time to time he says we already did so much, or there's no targets left, or, you know, I'm paraphrasing, but the president Gives an impression that a lot has been done in Iran. So even if he stops today, what could argue the Supreme Leader is dead, the commander of the IRGC is dead, the Defense Minister of Iran is dead. Their navy is basically gone. I can go on. Okay, so one could argue they're weaker and they're more isolated because they made mistakes. They attacked their neighbors. Their neighbors don't want to hear about them. That's very meaningful. So one could argue that, of course, the Iranians would say, and we said that on day one, Dan, we survived the regime for now, survived. They will make that argument. But these were the goals. This is how the Israelis understand that. Israelis were more ambitious. Prime Minister was more ambitious.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, so I want to ask Amit about that. Amit, Nadav says Israel's objectives are more ambitious than what he just laid out as the US Objectives. What do you see as Israeli objectives? Now?

[Amit Segal]

Israel is fully invested in toppling this regime. That's the main mission. Because we know for sure that as long as this regime exists, every once in a while, be it eight months like now or two years or five years, Israeli jet fighters will have to attack the Iranian army and the irgc. Again, it's not a question of if, it's a question of when. So the number one solution, the one stop shop for the entire conflict in the Middle East, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and of course Iran, is toppling this regime. Because once this regime collapses, it's like this scene from Game of Thrones when, you know, you kill the king of the winter, and all of a sudden every single soldier of this king is shattered and dead on the ground. This is the case with the Iranian regime. It's dramatic. I'll give you one example. There was a special committee who wrote a report about the desired defense budget. And they said, of course, that the security budget, the defense budget, should be this and this. They gave three scenarios, and then they gave the force. They said, and if Iran collapses, if the Iranian regime collapses, you can actually cut the defense budget by half because the entire strategic framework of the Middle east changes. So I understand why Netanyahu and Trump do not mention toppling this regime as a goal. But of course, this is the only thing that. That's the only reason why they initiated this war. Now, it might take a few months. It took six months and a half from the end of Rising Line operation and the beginning of the protests in the streets of Tehran. I guess now it's going to take less. But of course, this is their number one priority.

[Dan Senor]

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[Amit Segal]

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[Dan Senor]

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[Nadav Eyal]

Yeah, the covert operations against Iran are going to continue as long as this regime continues to control Iran. And right now, in terms of command and control, it seems that there are cracks in the regime. There are soldiers running away from their posts. There are some quiet defections. This is happening, but still very small scale. Israeli intelligence is not saying that the regime is crumbling as of yet. Right. The IDF is attacking Basij outposts across Tehran. I should mention this, there are many, many attempts that are made behind the scenes. These covert operations, to your question, Dan, are going to continue as long as the regime is there. But as to conventional warfare, the answer, I think is no. The answer is that when the US ends this, the US would not authorize Israel to continue, would not green light that. And by the way, I don't think Israel would want to continue in that case. Because look, right now in Israel, I don't want to say that life has stopped. Life never stops in Israel. Right. But kids don't go to school. We're entering this period towards Pesach, but

[Amit Segal]

it feels like five years.

[Nadav Eyal]

Yeah, but.

[Amit Segal]

And also, I think the main problem with World War II was that there were no schools. I mean, now when I see it, it was not the bombardment or the evilness of Nazi Germany. It was the lack of functioning education system. That's my perception after 15 days at home. But who counts?

[Nadav Eyal]

I have a feeling we're going to cut this out.

[Dan Senor]

But, Nadav, I understand that life in Israel has grown to a halt to some degree for all the reasons you said most, because kids aren't in school and people are constantly running in and out of their shelters. So I get all that. And now we're heading into Pesach, which is basically a two week vacation soon. So it'll be like a month of Israel being shut down. And yet Israelis seem to be totally behind the war.

[Nadav Eyal]

First of all, right now, according to polls, it's the case, I think, for Prime Minister Netanyahu. I'll be happy to hear what Amit has to say about this. If there is no substantial strategic change beyond the substantial degradation of the Iranian military capabilities and the regime stays in power and the war stops in a week or in a week and a half, what does it mean for Netanyahu's status towards the election? I don't know yet. Right now, the polls, his numbers, the block numbers are not changing. But we're in the middle of the war. Usually takes time for people to draw conclusions.

[Amit Segal]

Before October 7, there was a pattern for every Israeli military operation. It began with a huge support for the government and the army, and then there was a sentiment of bitterness. Why? Because there hasn't been a single military operation since the Yom Kippur war that ended with a decisive victory. So I think people now are afraid that this operation or this war is not going to end with a decisive victory if it happens before the elections. I think Netanyahu's standing improves dramatically because he's the one that warned against Iran. Both the diagnosis and the prognosis wrapped in the figure of one leader of one party. However, there is a situation where we are going to the polls when the Iranian regime is, I don't want to say intact, injured, yet functioning. Nonetheless, I would say as a general rule that this war will improve Netanyahu's standing for two reasons. One, the cooperation with President Trump. This is his new raison d'.

[Nadav Eyal]

Etre.

[Amit Segal]

Politically, he was Mr. Security. Now he's Mr. Diplomacy and Cooperation with Trump. You can say no one could have actually talked Trump into this war. And the second thing, Madhav, you have a guest. Is the fact that it shrinks the proportions of October 7th within the package of voters. Had we went to the polls on October 8th, October 7th would be 100%, right? The failure, now it's 50 if the war is prolonged. So it's, I don't know, 40, 30%.

[Nadav Eyal]

Who knows?

[Dan Senor]

Okay, but Amit, you. On a recent episode with you. You Talked about the 440kg of enriched uranium, and you sketched an image for us of Trump and Netanyahu standing behind Iran's uranium canisters at a press conference. And you suggested that retrieving that stockpile could be the strategic surprise and the big inflection point.

[Nadav Eyal]

Right. Do you think that's still on the table?

[Dan Senor]

Can you imagine that still happening? Are we beyond that?

[Amit Segal]

It can still happen for two reasons. One, because it must happen. I mean, this enriched uranium must leave Iran, be it in an agreement which no one can actually see coming as we speak, or in a military operation. Now, from a perspective of commando operations, in an absurd way, the war has made it way simpler. You don't have to hide. You don't have to act in the middle of the night. You can actually just take over the region. Take it and leave now. No, I know I'm describing it as just taking something from the postal office. A package from the postal office. No, it's very complicated, but it's slightly less complicated than in ordinary days.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Nadav, if the war ends with the regime still in power and the uranium stockpile still out of reach, strategically, what does that mean for Israel? Was this war considered still, by my lights, it's still strategically a massive advance for Israel and the US in terms of just leaving the regime isolated, probably impoverished, and with a very weak leadership. And that'll be the perception of the regime in the region, and there'll be the perception of the regime internally.

[Nadav Eyal]

I think what you just said, Dan, your last sentences are exactly the question we should be asking. How will the region look like if it ends with this scenario in which you have Mujtaba Khamenei or someone who replaces him who's part of the regime, and then you have them still holding to that stockpile? This is what you just defined. That's the scenario. If they don't have the enriched uranium, as Amit said, I think it's a different situation. If they you don't renew enrichment, it's a different situation. If there's an agreement that is much better than the jcpoa, it's different. But at the scenario that you described, the question is more, I would say, diplomatic and regional than it is military. Will the region see Iran as isolated, or did Iran manage to deter the region through the Strait of Hormuz and the attacks on its neighbors? The UAE cannot relocate. the end of the day, what would the UAE tell itself at the end of this war? I'll give you One example, we all saw that the Iranians decided to attack oil depots in the Oman port. These images sort of reverberated through the region because it was burning. Then a day later, I saw that the Omani foreign minister, who was mediating between the Islamic Republic and between the Trump administration, was actually to some extent blaming the west with this war. And I couldn't understand. And then I understood immediately, it's an extortion. And this is exactly what the Iranians were trying to do. So it's really the package deal of how are you going to orchestrate this, politically speaking, so that they will be still under sanctioned regime, that they will be isolated, that there will be a defense architecture across the region, that the Abraham Accords will be expanded, that Saudi Arabia will be pushed to some sort of maybe normalization with Israel. And by the way, if the end of this war, Diane, is that Hezbollah is disarmed, even if we get the same Iran at the end of the day, or very much the same with Iran just slightly degraded, but Hezbollah, its main militia in Lebanon, it's been threatening Israel for so many years, is disarmed by the Lebanese society. I'm buying this as a result of the war. Right now. I'm not seeing those things happening, but it's still not the end of it. And the US can make any number of very dramatic and interesting decisions. And because of that, it's not over yet. So it's very hard to analyze these results just completely theoretically. But I think that without an agreement of some sort of a capitulation or I don't want to say surrender, but with the Iranians at least handing over their enriched material, be very hard for the region to see this as an Iranian defeat. And if they do not see this as a defeat, it's a problem for deterrence across the region if they manage to close the Strait of Hormuz, and it opens only after the war is over, only because of an agreement or because of a cessation of hostilities, it's a problem.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, so then let me just close here for brief responses from both of you, just to bring this conversation to a close. If the US ends the war without the uranium, without the 440kg that we've been discussing on this podcast out of Iran, and with the regime still in place but much weaker, do you think the US And Israel. But really, I'm focused on your perspectives on Israel here. Would they consider this operation a success, or would the story maybe be different in Israel than it is in the U.S. i'll go to you, Amit, first, and then to Nadav.

[Amit Segal]

Another brick in the wall, I would say. I mean, exactly as we see now, the Rising lion operation, it was a very important step, but not the whole way. It took significant abilities of the Iranian regime. I think that history will not actually differentiate between Roaring lion and Rising lion, and maybe Screaming lion, the third one. But at the end of the day, what we are seeing now is the decline of the Iranian terror empire and I would say the rise of Israel's raw military force. That's what history would remember from 2025, 2026.

[Dan Senor]

Nadav, anything to add before we wrap?

[Nadav Eyal]

I think that the most important thing that is missing, I'm saying this as someone who's covering the political class in Israel and the government, the idf, the Mossad, they have proven their worth during this war and during the last three years. The question is now of your ability to manufacture something that is beyond hard power. Now for that, it's always the United States and the world. Israel is very good at hard power in winning wars, in other words. But then it takes a Henry Kissinger or it takes a Richard Nixon or it takes a Donald Trump to get a hostage deal out of this and to get an Abraham Accord. It's not usually an Israeli initiative, or at least in recent years it isn't. And when you manage to take hard power and turn it into real currency that is strategic for the future, that is really the test. And sometimes, like the old joke about China, the Chinese prime minister and I think Richard Nixon.

[Amit Segal]

Too early to tell about the French Revolution.

[Nadav Eyal]

About the French Revolution, yeah.

[Dan Senor]

He asked, what do you think of the French Revolution? And he said it's too early to tell.

[Nadav Eyal]

Yeah. So I think that it's going to be too early to tell even when this specific struggle ends.

[Amit Segal]

Okay.

[Dan Senor]

Amit, Nadav, thank you for this. We covered a lot of territory. We'll be back with you soon. Stay safe.

[Nadav Eyal]

Thank you so much. Thank you.

[Dan Senor]

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where nadavyalla meets Segal and I respond to to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arc media.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar, ARC Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our Community Manager is Ava Weiner. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. If someone just collapsed right in front of you, you'd call an ambulance. In New York City, that ambulance would take 12 plus minutes to arrive. United Hatzala of Israel often gets there before the ambulance, regularly in three minutes or less. How Innovation United Hatzalah's iconic orange ambucycles, ambulance motorcycles weave medics through traffic, GPS systems geo locate the nearest volunteers and their AI driven technology helps predict when and where the next emergency will occur. This all means faster care and more lives saved. I have family and friends in Israel that count on United Hatzalah and you can too. They'll help anyone who needs emergency care every day, fast and for free. So if you live in Israel, just dial 1221 for help. If you're looking for a cause with impact, support United Hatzala of Israel. Donate [e-mail] callmeback and add this number to your phone right now. If you live in Israel. One two two.