← Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Countdown to Trump’s 48-Hour Ultimatum — with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal
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- [00:02]
Dan Senor
I want to highlight an extraordinary example
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Host (Dan Senor)
of Israeli resilience at Hadassah hospitals in Jerusalem.
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Dan Senor
There are fully operational facilities built deep underground, designed so even during war. Life saving medical care never stops. Entire departments have moved below ground. Operating rooms, intensive care units, maternity wards. Doctors and nurses are urgently treating patients, even while rockets are flying and sirens are blaring. Hadassah, the women Zionist Organization of America, built these hospitals and is now working to rapidly expand these underground areas. There's a critical need to equip a new underground emergency zone with 40 additional beds, as well as to build and outfit six advanced operating rooms ensuring surgical care under extreme threats. Please go to hadassah.org to make a gift that helps Hadassah continue its long standing, life changing support for the people of Israel. Visit H A D A S S
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Host (Dan Senor)
A h dot org. You are listening to an art media podcast.
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Amit Segal
We keep thinking about either toppling the regime instantly or ending it with an agreement. And I would like to offer there is a third way to go directly after each and every tool that facilitates the existence of this regime, thus shrinking its powers and ending the war in the moment which is suitable for Israel and the United States.
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Nadav Eyal
I agree it's a scenario, Amit, but it's not a good scenario because this is not a small dictatorship. This is a totalitarian dictatorship with about 100 million people and it's going to have resources. But if you don't reach some sort of an agreement there or you don't reach a regime change, they will rebuild. And that's a huge problem. Because of that, the Israeli political class and parts of the IGF are trying to play this as though, yeah, you know, we degraded their abilities. No agreement as to enrich uranium. No agreement as to limiting their ballistic missiles. We see that they have about half of their launchers still functioning and they're holding Hormuz. What do you guys think is going to happen next?
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Host (Dan Senor)
It is 4pm on Saturday, April 4th in New York City. It is 11:30pm on Saturday, april 4th in tan. And it is 11:00pm on Saturday, Apr 4th in Israel as Israelis, Iranians and Americans are counting down the time from President Trump's ultimatum to the Iranian regime, which ends at 8pm Eastern Time on Monday, April 6, 2026. Will this ultimatum end with an expanded military operation in which, quote, all hell will rain down on them, per Trump's social media post? And how are the different players in the region, the Gulf states, Israel, the US and of course Iran and its proxies, preparing for this moment with me to unpack the possible outcomes are ARC media contributors Nadavael, senior analyst for Yidiot Ahrenot and Amit Segal, senior analyst for Channel 12 and columnist for Israel Hayom Nadav. Amit Hag Pesach Sameach.
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Amit Segal
Happy Passover.
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Nadav Eyal
Thanks for having us.
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Host (Dan Senor)
Amit, I will start with you. Set the table for us. What exactly do you understand President Trump's ultimatum to be, and what should we expect to happen if the ultimatum expires?
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Nadav Eyal
I think we should go back to
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Amit Segal
the drawing board, rethinking the analysis and interpretation of President Trump, because according to various reports, it's always hanging by a thread. Everything is subject to an imminent change and everything is unstable. And I think that this war is boringly persistent. Now, take a look at what President Trump is doing and not what he's saying. When this war began, he talked about four to six weeks, and somewhere in the middle, he talked about a few more weeks. By the way, had you talked to Israeli military experts, they would have told you at the beginning of the war that the deadline is April 23, something between Israeli Independence Day and Memorial Day. And that's exactly what is going on now. The ultimatum is about bombing the energy facilities, which were not part of the original plans. I'm looking about it from a different perspective. While giving this ultimatum and prolonging it In, I think, 10 extra days, President Trump actually greenlighted the continuation of the original plans of the war. So as far as I understand the situation, it is as follows. Israel and the United States are continuing to bomb each and every military facility, every ballistic missile site, every nuclear site in Iran. Their estimation is that it's going to end around April 22, April 23, and then either it is going to include, you know, this crescendo of attacking all the energy facilities, thus destroying the Iranian economy, or to reach a bilateral ceasefire. That's the plan. And that has been the plan, as far as I understand, from day one and from day zero.
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Host (Dan Senor)
Nadav, if the ultimatum expires without an agreement, what do you expect to unfold militarily by the US By Israel, and also Iran gets a vote here. So the saying goes. So how would you expect Iran to retaliate to whatever scenario you expect?
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Nadav Eyal
So there are two main scenarios. The first scenario is that the president decides to extend the ultimatum one more time. We shouldn't rule it out. There are suddenly negotiations. The Pakistani track, the Islamabad track, has failed. It's Iranians that aren't coming right now to the table. The US is ready to negotiate based on the 15 point plan suggested by the President. And if the President feels that there's a chance for negotiations he might extend. He has done this before and we should at least mention that possibility. And the other possibility is that the ultimatum ends and then the US by virtue of making that threat, needs to act or start acting. Now. There are two basic operational plans that are possible there, say Israeli security forces. Then the first one is starting to take out energy installations one by one, basically signaling to Tehran. If you continue to, with this kind of refusal to negotiate will take everything out. This is one possibility, increasing the pressure on Tehran until they start really negotiating. The other possibility, which I have to say is pitched by the IDF to the Israeli decision makers and by extension also to the US says let's end this. And by let's end this. What they're saying is take everything out, don't do this gradually, but give me
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Host (Dan Senor)
examples of what everything encompasses, every oil
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Nadav Eyal
installation that is significant out there. Look, I was surprised myself when the senior Israeli security source spoke to me about that. He said that it is their determination that Iran, in order to actually agree to something, you need to take away their oxygen and their oxygen is oil and fuel. And I said, yeah, but then what happens? And I'm moving to the other part of your question, Dan, which is retaliation. What happens if you do that and you attack so much of their energy sector? They're going to attack across the region and who knows what's going to happen to oil. Now the security source I spoke with after asking that, he said, look, this is what the Iranians have been doing. The Iranians have been taking one energy installation after the other. And if you don't start doing that right away, you won't force them to the table. This is the assessment of most of the Israeli Defense Forces. Now after saying that that doesn't mean that it's the right way to go or that the US can just accept the Israeli recommendations. Israel and the US have shared goals in this war, but also divergent paths. You can see this very clearly from the statements made in Jerusalem and in Washington. I don't think there is daylight between the sides. I think both sides agree that there is a difference in terms of some of the goals there. And because of that, the fact that the Israeli security forces are recommending to do that doesn't mean that the Israeli decision makers are going to pressure the United States to do that or that the United States is going to attempt and take that decision.
- [09:11]
Amit Segal
The most dramatic moment, the only moment in which there was daylight between, I would say natural gaslight between Israel and the United States was when President Trump greenlighted Israel attacking 40% of the energy facility, the natural gas facility facility in Iran. Now, the idea was that Israel is going to attack. President Trump was going to say, listen, they are like Iran has talked about its proxies for the last 47 years. Ah, those lunatics. Yes, I can calm them down. It's not me. Let's talk now. Israelis in a retrospect after the fact, say that Israel should either attack and destroy the entire facility or not do it at all. Because the outcome was that Qatar talked Trump out of attacking the rest of the energy facility, thus signaling for the first time to Iran that President Trump has soft points, that he's vulnerable for energy prices, for the energy crisis now, while Iran is way more vulnerable. Yet it signaled weakness when this ultimatum was translated from American English to Persian. So that was a very, very significant moment, that the remedy came in the Israeli attack against the steel factory in Iran. Why? Because Iranians has become since then very, very anxious. It destroyed 3% of their GDP in a moment. What I'm trying to say, it's a combination of military goal and something that is devastating for their economy. So it's very, very important for Israel and the US to keep attacking those economy targets because it's the only way that might bring Iranians to the table.
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Host (Dan Senor)
But in either of these, I guess, according to either of your analyses here, are ground forces part of the picture? I'll start with you, Nadav.
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Nadav Eyal
Yeah, very possibly. As you know, Dan, there are creative approaches that are now being considered in the US And Israel as to how to use leverage. And there are specific problems there. One of them is how do you open Hormuz? Or how do you create leverage to open Hormuz? Another one is those hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium. How do you take it if you can take it out of Iran? Or do you bury it deeper through bombardment, or what do you do with that? And one of the key elements there is could you use ground forces? Now, if you're using ground forces, you need to take into account the risks involved. It's not only about the casualties, which is the most significant risk. It's also about the Iranians managing maybe to take hostages. And of course, every time you invade a sovereign country, you need to take into account the possibility that the other side might be prepared in ways that you didn't prepare to yourself. So it's a decision to be made by the president. We are all hearing right now as to the search and rescue operation to the American navigator, which, as far as we know at this point when we're recording this, has not been retrieved from Iran. And that's just an example of how this can go wrong. What Israeli sources are saying is, look, if Iran is going to respond anyhow against energy installations, if you do any ground operation, if they're going to go completely nuts and go crazy and attack everything, why should you even risk your soldiers going in? You can begin by attacking from the air their energy installations. This is what I'm hearing. Maybe Amit is hearing other stuff, but that's what I'm hearing from Israel's defense establishment. They don't understand, for instance, taking Hag to use as leverage as to Hormuz, when everybody knows that, then they're gonna attack the energy of the UAE also. It gives them pretense, Dan, and this should be considered to try maybe to move against Bahrain or the UAE with ground forces.
- [13:22]
Host (Dan Senor)
Obviously, we are thinking about this missing member of the crew that was in the aircraft that was shot down while we're recording this. Nadav, to your point, we don't know his status. We're in the fog of war. But I'm hearing that the US does have a sense, perhaps a good sense of where he is, but they have not been able to retrieve him or haven't gone in yet to retrieve him for any number of reasons. But obviously we're monitoring that closely. And when we're recording this, as I said earlier, it's still unknown in terms of what's out there in the public domain. Amit, what would be from Israel's perspective? What would be red lines in any kind of agreement? I continue to be highly skeptical that there's an agreement to be done with Iran. But if there were to be an agreement, imagine Prime Minister Netanyahu saying, president Trump, look, negotiate your heart out with Iran. But we just need to be clear. Jerusalem needs to be clear with Washington about what our red lines are. What would they be?
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Amit Segal
I think it's equivalent to those of the American side. By the way, even when Trump initiated his plan for negotiations with the Iranians, Netanyahu was not worried about the red lines. He was just worried about an interim ceasefire. The idea is as follows. Israel is not worried that a fundamentalist fascist regime is going to actually give up its nuclear facilities, its enriched uranium, its ballistic missile program, its proxies. The only thing that they are worried about is the negotiation itself as a tool, as a weapon in this war. They were worried that President Trump would somehow be talked into declaring a ceasefire for, let's say, 60 days, thus actually dragging all the momentum out of the room. That was the main fear, and it didn't happen. That's why I have to say I don't hear lately, over the last 10 days any worries in Jerusalem from such a scenario. I think that the idea of an agreement belongs to the past because we don't see, unlike what President Trump has repeatedly said, we don't see a new administration in Iran. And if there is a new administration in Iran or a new leadership, so how come they keep attacking Israel and 11 other countries, including the United States of America? So let's put it aside. In my opinion, the only way to actually do it is by ending this war in a decisive way, that is to say, attacking the energy facilities and then declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Which is fascinating because there are two options. One is that exactly like in June, Iran would stop firing because they understand the price or the cost of every day of fighting to their economy, army, etc. However, if they are convinced in the idea that this Middle Eastern version of the trenches war from World War I is what would actually make Israel and the US to give up or give in. So there is another option, which is to do what Israel has done in Gaza and Lebanon and in Lebanon over the last few months, enforcing ceasefire, sending drones, sending jet fighters. It's not ideal, but Iran is way weaker than it was. And I keep hearing voices from Jerusalem saying that this might be an option. And they believe that the combination of the US army circling Iran, the Israeli Air Force flying over Iran and the monstrous inflation would actually lead to another round of protests.
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Nadav Eyal
I want to say something about this.
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Host (Dan Senor)
Go ahead, Nadav.
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Nadav Eyal
When we are saying there is no agreement, even if their entire energy sector is gone, they will have enough resources to continue on shooting against targets in the region. They might not have an economy, people will be impoverished, the country will be even more miserable than it is today, but they can continue on shooting. This is the narrative of this regime. This is the eight year war with Iran, Iraq. This is the decision by the Imam Khomeini, the leader, the founder of the Islamic Republic, when he decided to go for a ceasefire, he described it as drinking the poison chalice. And because of that, the idea that they will stop because they understand that they have taken so much damages. It's possible, but we need to take into account the possibility that they'll just continue on shooting now you have no leverage. The thing about Threats is that you need to keep them at bay. And once you use the threat, once
- [18:01]
Host (Dan Senor)
you make the threat, you mean.
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Nadav Eyal
The Strait of Hormuz is a great example for Iran. This was their nuclear option. We'll close down the Strait of Hormuz. And they succeeded in doing that on face value. It's a huge success for them. Not only is the strait closed, they are still producing oil. So it's not even closed. It's just closed to whoever Iran wants it to close to. Right. On the other hand, they already used that. They used that nuclear option. And now everyone around them, the Gulf countries, Israel, the United States are thinking, how are we going to deal with that? In a way which will not allow them to be in this position ever again. They can't use it a second time. This is what I'm saying. Now, if you take away their energy sector, what else can you take away from them that isn't a full blown invasion? That isn't going to happen. Nobody is going to send boots on the ground to occupy Tehran. And because of that, this calls into some sort of both diplomacy and leverage. And I want to point out to an article written by Javad Zarif, the
- [19:03]
Host (Dan Senor)
former Iranian foreign minister who was a key player in the negotiation over the JCPOA in 2015.
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Nadav Eyal
So he wrote an article full of, of course, the classic Iranian rhetoric as to how Israel led the United States to this war and how they're winning the war. But, and it's very interesting in that article, what he says then is now we need to cash in on our victory. So there is an agreement in Iran that they are right now winning the war. But there are two sides. One side is saying we can cash in later because we're so much winning, say the irgc. But the other side, which is Zarif and the current president of Iran, they're saying, no, no, let's reach an agreement now and use us winning this to reach a peace treaty with the United States. Not a ceasefire, but a peace treaty. Now, the conditions set by Zarif in that article, it's impossible. Right?
- [20:03]
Host (Dan Senor)
Right. We'll link to that piece in the show notes because I think it's an important piece. Go ahead, Amit.
- [20:06]
Amit Segal
Israelis have learned over the last two and a half years the limits of the term deterrence. We were assured that Hamas was deterred and we learned in the hard way, the tragic way, the monstrous way, that it wasn't. We thought that Hezbollah was deterred and we learned that Hezbollah was deterred more by Iran. And I Think what we are seeing now from the Iranian side is the mirror is the rear side of deterrence. It's exactly the other term of, you know, a regime that is fully unaware of its situation and it takes pride for losing only, I don't know, 99 to 1 rather than 100 to 0. But the conclusion is the same exactly as in Gaza and in Lebanon. The Israeli army should have focused on abilities rather than, you know, the emotional way of thinking. This should be here. I don't really care personally if they think that they won as long as they do not have means to reach this end. If they do not have the means to destroy Israel or to deter Israel or to destroy the economy of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, I'm not really obsessed with their situation. There are many, many miserable countries on earth in which Derulaire is a dictator who's quite satisfied with himself. We keep thinking about either toppling the regime instantly or ending it with an agreement. And I would like to offer there is a third way to go directly after each and every tool that facilitates the existence of this regime, thus shrinking its powers, cutting the tentacles of this octopus, and ending the war in the moment which is suitable for Israel and the United States.
- [21:56]
Host (Dan Senor)
Okay, but a question for both of you then. Coming off what Amit just said, that as far as you're concerned, Amit would be a worthwhile objective met, and I tend to agree with you, is that how the Gulf states view things? Not how the Gulf states felt before the war began, this war, but how they feel now. And I know you both are, and I am talking to people in the Gulf, and boy, they don't seem like they would be comfortable with stopping right there.
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Amit Segal
Absolutely.
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Nadav Eyal
This is why I think that what Amit is pitching could really happen. I agree it's a scenario, Amit, but it's not a good scenario. And let me explain why.
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Amit Segal
Okay?
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Nadav Eyal
Because this is not a small dictatorship. This is a totalitarian dictatorship with about 100 million people. And it's going to have resources and it's going to be a bad player across the region. And I agree as to the limitations of the notion of deterrence. Everything you said is absolutely true. But if you don't reach some sort of an agreement there or you don't reach a regime change, and you don't have any limitations. For instance, they will rebuild their ballistic missile program so the IDF can say whatever they want about bombing the steel factories in Iran. And at the end of the day, if they have petrodollars, they'll buy other steel, and they buy ballistic missiles. So people say, no, if we destroy the energy sector, they'll have nothing. No destruction is total. They'll have something and they'll just prioritize hitting the uae, hitting Bahrain, trying to extort them, closing the Strait of Hormuz, which is right now held by them. It's holding about 20% of the global fossil fuel energy market, and that's a huge problem. Because of that, the Israeli political class and parts of the IGF are trying to play this as though, yeah, you know, we degraded their abilities. No agreement as to enrich uranium, no agreement as to limiting their ballistic missiles. We see that they have about half of their launchers still functioning, and they're holding Hormuz, but they're so degraded, they're so destroyed. So the only way this can happen is if the Iranians say, you know what? We agree to a ceasefire right now and we're releasing Hormuz with no conditions. If they release Hormuz, I think that's the cleverest move they can make, Dan, And I'm wondering what you think about this. I think that if Iran would say to Washington D.C. right now, hey, we have no claim to Hormuz, the passageway is clear and free, and we want a ceasefire right now. What do you guys think is going to happen next?
- [24:30]
Host (Dan Senor)
There's a possibility that President Trump want to get very engaged in that negotiation. You really think the regime would give that up?
- [24:35]
Nadav Eyal
No, No, I don't. What I'm saying is that it's the wisest move for them to make at
- [24:40]
Host (Dan Senor)
this point, but it's their only real leverage ultimately.
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Nadav Eyal
But the war wasn't fought over or moves.
- [24:45]
Host (Dan Senor)
I take your point. That's not what the war was fought over. But at the end of the day, I mean, there's that famous article by Andrew mack back from 1975, published in 1975, called why Big Nations Lose Small. And it's like the regime is reading the Persian version of why Big Nations Lose Small wars. By the way, I'm not of the view that the US Is losing this war right now, but that said, if you look at from the regime's perspective,
- [25:08]
Dan Senor
they've stumbled upon leverage.
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Nadav Eyal
But then you should say something about that article. Why do they lose small wars?
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Host (Dan Senor)
Well, it's asymmetrical warfare, asymmetrical advantages.
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Amit Segal
I want to remind everyone it wasn't supposed to be an asymmetrical war, if any. It was supposed to be an asymmetrical war the other way around, because Iran was a 100 million strong country with almost nuclear capabilities. Seven armies of proxies against the state of Israel. Now it's asymmetrical because of brilliant moves made by Israel and by the United States. So now they function as a terrorist organization that lives up to Mukawama resistance. Living up to the moment. But the fact that the first F15 was intercepted 32 days after this war had begun, while I think in the Iraq war it was, I don't remember exactly, dozens of jet fighters.
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Nadav Eyal
Bret Stephens had a wonderful article.
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Amit Segal
Yeah, Brett wrote about it in the New York Times. What I'm trying to say is, I mean, the fact that this war is asymmetrical is already a huge achievement. The fact that they have only enriched uranium buried under, you know, hundreds of tons of ground in Fordo and Isfahan is a huge achievement. I agree it's not 100%, but let's not forget something else. We still have 85% of this population against the regime. And the inflation has not decreased since the beginning of the war. So at the end of the day, when they end this round of war, one way or the other, they are to face the real threat to the regime, which is the population itself. That's why I'm way more optimistic than many, many others.
- [26:52]
Nadav Eyal
This needs to end in a resounding way. And if it doesn't end in a resounding way, and we knew this from day one, that they will say that if they survive this day one, it's fine as long as they do not possess the abilities that they had before and there is either a regime change or a different regime. As to their ballistic missile or nuclear abilities, and now as to their control of Hormuz, what I'm saying is that it's really complicated and the truth is that it's nuanced. So, for instance, if you take Hormuz by force, you'll probably need to maintain it. And by maintaining it, that means that the Iranians will continue attacking you, and that means that you'll need to have a force there. And because the United States is not going to fight a forever war, this is the commitment of the US President, and I believe the US President. A lot of things are going on that were not the original plan in some sense, as is the case with most wars. Yes, yes, absolutely. And in that regard, I'm still optimistic that this will end with a less powerful Iran. And here's the reason, which is mostly overlooked, I think, in the discourse. It's not about them having less or more petrochemical factories or steel factories. It's not about killing another Basij soldier. It's about the very fact that all of Iran's neighbors, all of them see Iran now as an existential threat. And before the war, it was just Israel. And this is not going to change. And this is why I think that the region has already changed in the first week of the war. I'm not sure that it continues on to be changed to the better. But I think that the fact that the UAE stands where it stands, that Saudi Arabia stands wherever it stands, that's the most meaningful changes in the region. And I'm telling you that there are surprises installed as to Israel's relations with other countries around the region as a result of this war. And Prime Minister Netanyahu has been hinting to that in the recent two weeks from conversations I'm having. There are very specific reasons to be optimistic as to that. So the Abraham Accords might be expanding as a result of this war.
- [29:06]
Host (Dan Senor)
So we referenced this Bret Stephens piece. I'm not gonna go through all of it. We can link to it in the show notes. But to the point that Amit raised in the Desert Storm war against Iraq in 1991, Operation Desert Storm, I just wanna get the specific statistic which Brett says, that war widely considered, I'm quoting here, a brilliant military success.
- [29:23]
Dan Senor
The U.
- [29:23]
Host (Dan Senor)
S led coalition lost 75 aircraft, 42 of them in combat, which is pretty extraordinary. Amit, I wanna ask you, you talked about Lebanon a little while ago. All eyes are on Tehran. The idf, meanwhile, is steadily entrenching itself in southern Lebanon. It's even, from what I understand, building outposts there. Are we seeing the early stages of a return to the old security zone model that existed in southern Lebanon where the IDF was in southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000?
- [29:54]
Amit Segal
I hope not. Not because I think it was the gravest mistake. I believe that the unilateral withdrawal in the year 2000 led to the belief in hezboll, the entire fundamentalist Muslim world, that Israel is on its way down. But at the very same time, I don't think that it's the recipe for ensuring peace. I do hope, however, that exactly as Nadav described the situation in the Gulf where the uae, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, et cetera, can no longer live side by side with Iran because they are fully aware of the fact that the attempt to buy Iran or to hire Iran with a few billion dollars failed to. The same thing applies for Lebanon. For the first time, we have a proof that Hezbollah cares only about Iran. Now, I know we all know it, but Lebanese didn't have the proof, didn't have the paper. Here is the paper. Hezbollah suffered 16 consecutive months of Israeli ongoing attacks without responding because he feared the cost that would be put on Lebanon. However, when they got the order from Tehran following the killing of Khamenei and the beginning of this epic fury operation, they began firing at Israel without further ado, which means that they work for Iran. And that's why I think this is the opportunity, and I really, really hope that we are not here at the beginning of yet another 18 futile years of ongoing fighting inside Lebanon without having strategic achievements. I do hope, however, that the main effort in Iran would actually cause Hezbollah to collapse. If you want to destroy Hezbollah, attack Iran stronger. Because once Iran falls, they lose 90% of their budget. So I know it's tempting. I know it's frustrating to see Hezbollah attacking the north. It's terrible to hear the names of the young soldiers who fell in Lebanon fighting for their country. However, the best way to ensure Hezbollah is no longer a threat to Israel is not necessarily an Israeli presence by the Litany River. It's an Israeli presence over the skies of Tehran. For do and come.
- [32:11]
Host (Dan Senor)
Nadav, is there a consensus among Israel's security officials as it relates to the strategy in Lebanon or possible strategy, as Amit just laid out?
- [32:20]
Nadav Eyal
I have nothing good to say. As to the Israeli approach. Right now, I'm talking with people within the system. As to Lebanon, there is a very public row in the last 24 hours between the IDF and between Israel's Defense minister as to what are the goals the IEF is briefing that they cannot disarm Hezbollah. They cannot disarm. By the way, this is an example of the difference between a political class that is so addicted to populism and between the truth of the matter. Of course, in order to disarm Hezbol, you need to do one of two things. Occupy the entire state of Lebanon, including Beirut. And Israel is not going to do that because they're just going to run away to the north, right, and they're going to take their weapons to the north and everything, or to Beirut, to the capital of Lebanon. That's the first way to disarm Hezbollah. Second way to disarm Hezbollah is that the Lebanese society, which has proven weak, with no real resilience to fight Hezbollah, will disarm Hezbollah itself. Both options don't seem so likely right now. I, of course, am rooting for the only realist option, and that is that the Lebanese government That is saying that they want to disarm Hezbollah will actually do that and save us all a long war and possibly, as Amit said, an occupation of parts of southern Lebanon. But they're not doing it right now. So the IEF was saying it was briefing the obvious. And by briefing, I'm saying this is an off the record, but very formal briefing. Dan, they were saying we can't disarm Hezbollah and we need some sort of an agreement there that will lead to their disarmament. And the Israeli defense minister was saying, oh, no, the goal is to really disarm them. How? How are you going to do that? And this friction is there. I think there's a lot of frustration. And there's another something that I need to say in that regard. The IDF isn't built right now to fight two fronts. That's the truth. And because of this truth, and I'm hearing this from soldiers and officers in the north, in combat, they are not getting the same resources that they would have gotten if we didn't have a war in Iran. And it's natural. It's not such a big army. It's not the United States army or Navy can't do everything. It can fight. People are sacrificing their lives fighting against Hezbollah as we are speaking. They're willing to sacrifice their lives, but they can't get the same resources. And because of that, I very much resonate what Amit said. Hezbollah and also Hamas, by the way, that is negotiating its place in Gaza in the last few weeks. They're looking at Tehran, and they're looking at how that fight with Tehran is going to end. So the price of not winning that war could be substantial for the entire region, and it could be substantial for Palestinians, for Lebanese, and for Israelis.
- [35:17]
Host (Dan Senor)
Okay, Amit, I know you have to run, so I just want to ask you one question and then you can drop and I'll keep talking with the nada for a couple more minutes. I mean, in a sense, ultimately, we go back to the question which dominated so much of the conversation at the beginning of this war, which is whether or not or whether everything kind of boils down to the local populations rising up against these regimes, the Iranian regime, the Hezbollah regime, can they be toppled? Is there any sense within the Israeli leadership class that that is still a realistic option, that that is a potential wild card that is achievable?
- [35:52]
Amit Segal
It is a realistic option, not necessarily within the framework of the war. By the way, there is a contradiction, or there has been a contradiction, because if you Remember, both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have repeatedly said to the protesters, don't go to the streets yet to protest as long as bombardment keeps on. However, I think that we have two dates we have to bear in mind. One is October 27th, the election in Israel, and one is in November 5th,
- [36:23]
Host (Dan Senor)
I think the midterm elections in the United States.
- [36:25]
Amit Segal
So I think it's quite crucial for Netanyahu to actually go to the ballots with the regime change in Iran. I know. No one counts. I mean, no one takes politics into their calculations, especially not Trump and Netanyahu.
- [36:39]
Nadav Eyal
I'm not sure Dan understands that you're being ironic about that.
- [36:42]
Host (Dan Senor)
I understand. I know.
- [36:43]
Amit Segal
Okay. No, no. So it's going to be quite effective for Netanyahu's chances of getting reelected if this regime no longer exists. Why? Because there is a gap between the way or between the achievements of this war and the perception, and it especially touches the aspect of the war in the north.
- [37:04]
Nadav Eyal
Why?
- [37:05]
Amit Segal
Because this is really painful for Israelis. An enemy that was perceived as dead, and all of a sudden, it keeps firing 100 missiles a day. So it would be very helpful for Netanyahu if can show that this war that began on October 7, 2023, with a devastating failure ended up with a new regime in Iran. So I would say it's necessary for Netanyahu to have this regime change within six to seven months. Other Israelis would be quite happy if it happens by the end of the year.
- [37:36]
Host (Dan Senor)
Okay, we're going to. By the way, just a slight correction. November 3, 2026, is the midterm elections in the U.S. nadav, I'll give you the final word here.
- [37:44]
Nadav Eyal
If indeed, Prime Minister Netanyahu can achieve a regime change, or a regime change will happen, that would probably be detrimental for his election chances, and it's going to be a dream come true, not only in terms of his chances to win an election, but in terms of the Israeli narrative. At the end of the day, what really counts is not what the Israelis want, but what the president decides. The president has shown incredible resilience challenging Iran in his first term. He's shown that again here. And when everybody is talking about the price of fighting this war, people need to also remember the price of not fighting the war against Iran. And this region has been very much shaped by Iran calling the shots through what it labels the axis of resistance, which is actually an axis of terror. And I think that's incredibly meaningful to remember when we talk about the costs of the war. Iran could always take hold of Hormuz, it just did it now. And if it wouldn't have done it now, it would have done it in two, three, four, five years, maybe with a nuclear weapon or with 5,000 more ballistic missiles. But here's the thing, Dan, and I'll end with this. There is the front in the north with Hezbollah. Israel basically hammered Hezbollah, beat Hezbollah, and now it's fighting Hezbollah again. There is Hamas in Gaza and there's the war against Iran. Politically speaking, in Israel, there is an expectancy from the public to say, hey, we need to cash in on some of these fronts and show our public some sort of a long lasting, I don't know, solution, agreement, ceasefire, something that we can say we close this issue. Maybe not for eternity, but for now. And I think it's extremely meaningful also for Netanyahu to say, look, look what we have done in Gaza. They are disarming. Look at what we've done with Iran. Maybe there is a regime change or the country is so weakened and so isolated, this is what we've done. Maybe Hezbollah is starting to disarm because of pressure from the Lebanese society. Something needs to change materially.
- [39:56]
Host (Dan Senor)
To an earlier point you just made. There's just something that's been circulating. I've been struck that I've received this post from Israelis, have received it from Americans, have even received it from people in the Gulf. It reads, I quote here, iran was trying to use the North Korean model to get a nuclear nuke, create sufficient conventional deterrence so you won't be challenged in acquiring one. It's called the Seoul Hostage Problem, Sole meaning Seoul, the capital of Korea. This has been explained over and over since day one. Everyone claiming it goes on. The reason North Korea was allowed to get nukes is because Seoul, I'm quoting here, because Seoul, seoul and its 10 million inhabitants is within artillery and rocket range of North Korea. During the 1994 nuclear crisis, the Clinton administration seriously considered airstrikes on North Korea's reactor, but backed off precisely because of the artillery threat to Seoul. And I think this is what Israel knew. And I think many of these Gulf states and the US have learned it's
- [40:49]
Nadav Eyal
too early and then it's too late, right? This is what we learned from North Korea. This is what we learn on countries that are on the threshold of nuclear power or of devastating ballistic military power. And I hear the mainstream media talking again about the costs, but they never measured the costs of not doing anything. And by the way, they never measured the costs to the people of the region. Right now, like the hundreds of thousands of Syrians that were massacred under the hospice and support of the IRGC in Syria. That was maintaining Bashar al Assad. Nobody cared about that. But they care about the coast right now. There's a lot of tribal politics going on there. And of course, again, I recognize my bias as an Israeli in that regard,
- [41:36]
Host (Dan Senor)
and I recognize my bias as an American. So we'll leave it there, Nadav.
- [41:40]
Nadav Eyal
It's a very northeastern way to end our conversation then.
- [41:43]
Host (Dan Senor)
Yes, yes, yes. All right. Thanks for doing this and I will be back in touch with both of you soon. Foreign. As events accelerate in the Middle east, the team here at ARC Media is increasing our coverage.
- [42:06]
Dan Senor
More conversations, more context. More time spent trying to help make
- [42:10]
Host (Dan Senor)
sense of what's happening. Our Inside callmeback subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. This week we published the second part of a three part series with Ronen Bergman. It's called Inside Mossad's Shadow War With Iran, which includes some of the most dramatic and dazzling operations in the world of espionage. It's also quite simply a riveting spy story that has largely been kept out of public view. If you're not yet an inside Call Me Back subscriber, this is an important time to join us. To subscribe, you can follow the link in our show notes or visit arkmedia.org and to our insiders, thank you. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Arc Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio Community Management by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.