Defining Victory - with Micah Goodman

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Defining Victory - with Micah Goodman"
Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Release Date: August 11, 2025
Host/Author: Ark Media

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Introduction and Context

In this episode of Call Me Back, host Dan Senor engages in a profound conversation with Micah Goodman, a research fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute and co-host of the Israeli podcast MIF Leget Hamach Shavot. The discussion centers on Israel's ongoing conflict in Gaza and its broader implications for regional geopolitics, particularly in relation to Iran.

Goodman opens the dialogue by highlighting the internal divisions within Israeli politics and the challenges of defining victory in the context of both the Gaza war and the looming threat from Iran. He asserts, “[...] the only way to create a new architecture for the region is to create a new architecture for Israeli politics” ([00:44]).

Netanyahu's Strategy and Israeli Political Landscape

The episode delves into recent developments, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's press conferences where he outlined Israel's five principles for concluding the Gaza war:

1. Disarm Hamas
2. Release all hostages
3. Demilitarize Gaza
4. Establish overriding security control of the Gaza Strip
5. Govern Gaza with a non-Israeli peaceful administration

Goodman explains Netanyahu's stance that the IDF's takeover of Gaza City is a tactical move aimed at ending the war swiftly, countering international accusations by placing responsibility on Hamas for Gaza's humanitarian situation.

Impact on Israeli Society and the Military

Protests erupted across Israel advocating for a hostage deal and a ceasefire, reflecting a significant shift in public opinion. Goodman notes, “[...] the army is very, very tired,” ([28:38]) underscoring concerns about the strain on IDF reservists who have been engaged intermittently for nearly two years.

Defining Victory: Gaza vs. Regional Stability

A central theme of the conversation is whether Israel can modify its definition of victory in Gaza to achieve broader regional stability. Goodman emphasizes that the conflict with Iran remains unresolved, stating, “[...] we're in the middle of something very big in Iran” ([06:07]). He posits that while Israel has weakened Iran's capabilities, Iran's determination to harm Israel has only intensified.

Goodman introduces a dichotomy in Israeli reputations: deterring threats in the Middle East through fear while seeking love and legitimacy in the West. He explains, “There is a zero sum game between fear and love” ([07:19]). This duality has led to a fragile moment where Israel's actions in Gaza have damaged its standing in Western countries even as it maintains strength in deterring Middle Eastern adversaries.

American-Israeli Political Dynamics

The discussion shifts to the relationship between Israeli and American politics, particularly within the American right. Dan Senor challenges Goodman's initial assertion about a divide within the American right regarding support for military action against Iran. Senor argues that the mainstream American Republican stance is overwhelmingly supportive, countering voices like Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon as merely "noise" ([10:41]).

Goodman responds by explaining that any potential normalization with Saudi Arabia would not only affect international relations but also cause internal political realignments within Israel. He suggests that Netanyahu's leadership is pivotal in navigating these complex dynamics, stating, “[...] only Bibi could lead to normalization because only he could split the right and reorganize Israeli architecture” ([22:59]).

Normalization and Its Political Ramifications

Normalization with Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, is portrayed as a strategic victory that could reshape Middle Eastern geopolitics by isolating Iran. Goodman argues, “Normalization is the return of legitimacy” ([24:47]). However, he warns that this process could divide the Israeli right into pragmatic and ideological factions, potentially leading to a significant political realignment.

He elaborates on the internal split within the Israeli right: the ideological right focuses on biblical and messianic narratives, opposing any concessions to Palestinians, while the pragmatic right is more open to strategic normalization if it serves broader security interests.

Goodman envisions that Netanyahu’s leadership could potentially bridge these divides by fostering new coalitions that support normalization, thereby creating a unified front necessary for regional stability.

Future Prospects and Strategic Flips

Addressing the future, Goodman outlines a vision where normalization serves as a strategic flip against Iran, mirroring Iran’s original strategy to encircle and weaken Israel. He states, “Normalization will do to Iran what Iran did to us” ([24:47]). This strategic reorientation aims to dismantle the network of proxies surrounding Israel and establish a new geopolitical order favorable to Israeli security.

Challenges and the Path Forward

Goodman acknowledges the immense challenges Israel faces: balancing military objectives with international legitimacy, managing internal political divisions, and addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. He underscores the complexity of achieving a “victory” that encompasses both immediate security needs and long-term regional stability.

He concludes with a philosophical reflection inspired by Talmudic thought: “The future defines the past” ([29:08]). Goodman suggests that the true measure of victory will be determined by the outcomes post-conflict, particularly through normalization and the eventual dismantling of Hamas.

Hostile Hostage Situations and Moral Responsibilities

The issue of hostages remains a contentious point. Goodman conveys the moral imperative to recover hostages but recognizes the limited incentives for Hamas to comply fully. He states, “Hamas probably won't give us all the hostages back” ([31:25]), highlighting the precarious balance Israel must maintain in seeking to end the war without appearing to capitulate to Hamas.

Conclusion: Navigating a Tragic Dilemma

In wrapping up, Goodman encapsulates the Israeli predicament as a tragic situation with no good options—only choosing the lesser of two evils. He emphasizes the necessity of integrating short-term losses into a broader narrative of long-term victory over larger threats like Iran, asserting, “We have bad options. But our best way is to locate the loss inside a larger narrative of victory” ([37:05]).

Dan Senor closes the conversation by acknowledging the depth of the issues discussed and the ongoing complexities faced by Israel.

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Notable Quotes with Attribution and Timestamps

• Micah Goodman [00:44]: “The only way to create a new architecture for the region is to create a new architecture for Israeli politics.”
• Micah Goodman [07:19]: “There is a zero sum game between fear and love.”
• Dan Senor [10:41]: “It's like separating the signal from the noise.”
• Micah Goodman [22:59]: “Only Bibi could lead to normalization because only he could split the right and reorganize Israeli architecture.”
• Micah Goodman [24:47]: “Normalization is the return of legitimacy.”
• Micah Goodman [29:08]: “The future defines the past.”
• Micah Goodman [31:25]: “Hamas probably won't give us all the hostages back.”
• Micah Goodman [37:05]: “We have bad options. But our best way is to locate the loss inside a larger narrative of victory.”

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Conclusion

This episode of Call Me Back offers a nuanced exploration of Israel's strategic challenges amid ongoing conflicts and the pursuit of regional normalization. Through insightful dialogue, Micah Goodman and Dan Senor dissect the interplay between military objectives, political realignments, and international legitimacy, providing listeners with a comprehensive understanding of the intricate dynamics shaping Israel's present and future.

Transcript

[Micah Goodman]

Foreign.

[Dan Senor]

You are listening to an art media podcast.

[Micah Goodman]

If BB leads normalization, it splits the right. The pragmatic right joins with the center, the center left, and we have a new coalition for normalization. What this means is that the only way to create a new architecture for the region is to create a new architecture for Israeli politics. This has to come together. Right now it's divided right versus left, not the mainstream versus fringes.

[Nadavayal]

It's 6:30pm on Sunday, August 10th here in New York City. It is 1:30am on Monday, August 11th in Israel, as Israelis turn to a new day. On Sunday evening, Prime Minister Netanyahu held a press conference in Jerusalem, actually two press conferences, one in English and one in Hebrew, where he outlined the government's plans to move forward with the Gaza war. This of course, follows last week's cabinet approval of a plan for the IDF to take over Gaza City, where roughly 1 million Palestinians, half the entire Gazan population, reside. The plan would be to move the civilian population from Gaza City to Al Mawasi in southern Gaza, which is next to Rafah, so the IDF can fight Hamas and hopefully remove Hamas from Gaza City. During Netanyahu's press conference, he laid out five principles for concluding the war. One, that Hamas be disarmed, two that all hostages be released, three that Gaza be demilitarized, four that Israel will have overriding security control of the Gaza Strip and five that that Gaza will be ruled by a non Israeli peaceful administration. On this last point, Netanyahu announced that Israel has identified several candidates for a transitional authority that could govern the Gaza Strip once the war concludes. Netanyahu told reporters that the conquest of Gaza City is not an indication of plans for a permanent occupation of the Gaza Strip, but rather the best and fastest way to to end the war. He also took apart widespread accusations that Israel is responsible for starvation in Gaza, accusing Hamas of responsibility for any hunger among Gazan civilians and condemning international media for buying and parroting Hamas's propaganda. With all this news unfolding, Saturday night saw more large protests in cities across Israel calling for a hostage deal and ceasefire agreement. Obviously, governments from Jerusalem to Washington to Doha lay the blame at Hamas for the collapse of negotiations on July 24. But protesters argue whatever possibility there is going forward for a deal, however challenging will be even harder with an expansion of the war in Gaza. And they also argue the expanded war could have fatal implications for the remaining hostages. There is also concern over the toll the Gaza City operation will take on reservists. IDF reservists, many of whom have been serving in the war on and off for almost two years. IDF officials are not yet clear on how many troops will be needed for the Gaza City operation, but there will certainly be many reservists called up as the plan proceeds in its implementation. We will of course, follow any developments on this topic closely and be sure to keep you up to speed on what unfolds. Today's episode is a conversation we taped Last Week with Dr. Mika Goodman where we discuss the difference, as Mika sees it, between winning the war in Gaza and winning the regional war. Is it possible that Israel will need to modify its definition of victory in Gaza in order to emerge victorious in the larger reshaping of the geopolitics of the Middle East? This question is especially timely given the international backlash Israel has received, only heightened now by the government's decision to have the IDF take over Gaza City. Mika is a research fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute and co host of.

[Dan Senor]

The popular Israeli podcast MIF Leget Hamach.

[Nadavayal]

Shavot, produced by Beit Avichai. Oh, in one housekeeping note before we start the conversation, ARC Media is looking to hire an experienced media production manager to join our growing team. Please please follow the link in the show notes to learn more about the requirements for this role in the event that you or anyone you know would be interested and would be a good fit. And now Micah Goodman on Defining Victory. This is Call me back.

[Dan Senor]

And I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast Micah Goodman, who joins us from Israel. Micah, good to see you.

[Micah Goodman]

Hi Dan. How's it going?

[Dan Senor]

You know, it's not easy.

[Micah Goodman]

Yes, complicated.

[Dan Senor]

Yeah, that's a good way. That's the simplest and most diplomatic way to put it. What I wanted to talk to you about was a topic that hasn't gotten much attention. It's like you have these very intense periods, like the 12 Day War against Iran I think was one of the most important developments. Leave Israel aside. It was one of the most important developments in global geopolitics since World War II, and I know it was very important inside Israel. And yet since then we haven't been hearing that much.

[Micah Goodman]

Much.

[Dan Senor]

You know, there was some news like right after big debates. Was Fordo taken out? Was it not taken out? Is the nuclear program still alive? And then everything just seemed to wither. And I think the jury is still out on the degree to which it will reshape the geopolitics of the region. There's no question it will reshape, but the question is to what degree? But militarily, the Power structure has definitely shifted. So how do you assess the moment we're in as it relates to the outcome of the war against Iran?

[Micah Goodman]

So I don't think it's over. I don't know if it's in the beginning or the middle of the beginning of the end, but this is not over. We're all focused on Gaza and we forget that we're in the middle of something very big in Iran. And because I think the best way to think about Iran now, as a result of the very successful 12 day campaign, their capabilities went down, but their will to injure Israel went up. Now, when the Persian Empire has so much will and this burning level of motivation to attack Israel, their capabilities went down, but the will is up. So that's why we're in a very fragile moment, because we attacked them, but it's the same regime. And while the Iran issue is far from being over, we are now have our reputation being destroyed in Gaza. So while the Iran thing is not finished yet, our reputation seems like it is. When you speak to Israelis, throughout the past year and 10 months, Israelis didn't care much about our reputation in the West. It didn't care too much. And this week you see Israelis saying to themselves, oh my God, this matters. This crisis of our reput is serious.

[Dan Senor]

And you're seeing that beyond just the political class and the media, you're seeing this is the conversation happening among regular Israelis.

[Micah Goodman]

Yeah, now there's something about Israelis that we don't care about what people think about us. And what I just said is wrong. I want to correct that. Israelis do care about the reputation. But you see, Israelis have two reputations to protect. We have a reputation in the Middle east, we have a reputation in the west and in the Middle east, we want the jihadi forces of the Middle east to fear us. That's the idea of deterrence in the west. We want to be liked. We want to be loved. Now, Dan, which is a more important emotion? Fear or love? If you are an Israeli? So which emotion will enable you to sleep better at night knowing that you're feared in the Middle east or knowing that you're liked or loved in the West? Israelis chose fear over love. It shows in the past year and 10 months to build its reputation in the Middle east as a country that's forceful, maybe brutal, a little bit crazy, unpredictable. That's how you scare the jihadi forces in the Middle east from attacking you. But while you are building your reputation in the Middle east, you're destroying your reputation in the West. Because there is a zero sum game between fear and love. Remind you, Dan, in October 8th, the Middle east didn't fear us. We lost all our deterrence and everything we needed to do to restore the fear of the Middle east eroded the love of the west. And everything we wouldn't have done in order to protect the love of the west would have kept the fear of the Middle east low. We have two reputations to take care of, not one. And they contradict each other. And now the fact that we neglected our reputation in the west came back to bite us.

[Dan Senor]

The war against Iran was fought not only by Israel, but also by the US in terms of the impact of the victory on Israeli politics, the fact that Israel partnered with the US and advanced a major setback for Iran, what's been the impact domestically in Israel, politically?

[Micah Goodman]

Obviously, the campaign in Iran was backed by all Israelis. There was no polarization regarding the campaign in Iran as opposed to the United States, where in the United States, America joined the war, took the American right and divided into two camps. Between the isolationist camps, you know, the Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannons of the world and Donald Trump, which I wouldn't say he's a neocon, and he's not. It wasn't like the evangelical Christian trying to promote some big messianic vision or the neocon thinking that America has to lead the world and show the way for other nations. The way I understand Trump's involvement in this war, the strike of America, was he is an isolationist, but he's also a businessman. And the ethos of a business person is that you try to detect opportunities. And the person that could detect opportunities, that other people can profit from it. He thought Israel presented Trump with a great opportunity. So I would say he joined the war in order to end the war, which is classical, which is the difference between a pragmatist and the person that's very ideological. I think that's where the divide in the American right was between Trump and the isolationists. It's about pragmatism, like a pragmatic approach to isolationism and a very purist, idealistic approach to isolationism. It's very possible. And I'm wondering if you agree with this analysis. When Americans joined the war to finish off Fordu and the other two sides, it's very possible there was a deal or an understanding between Trump and Bibi and America and Israel, and that is, we join this war, we do Fordu, but then Israel has to finish the war with Gaza and move towards normalization. You think this is probable there is an understanding between Bibi and Trump.

[Dan Senor]

Well, let me rewind the tape a little bit because I disagreed with a couple of things you said. I think that the fixation of some in the American press and the Israeli press, that there was this divide within the American right was completely off. There were some loud voices on the American right that were oppositional to the US Getting involved in the war against Iran, but they were not reflective at all of where the actual American right is. It's like separating the signal from the noise. The noise was Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon and Marjorie Taylor Greene and Tom Massey. That's high volume noise. But the signal, the facts are grounded in the following one, politicians that are actually elected by Republican voters, other than Tom Massie in the House and Rand Paul in the Senate, and I guess Marjorie Taylor Greene in the House, you'd be hard pressed to find a single House or Senate Republican that was not only not opposed to the US Getting involved, but was encouraging the Trump administration to get involved. And the second thing is, if you look at the polling data, Republicans were polled before the war against Iran, during the war against Iran and after the war. And Republican voters, the people who actually voted in primaries, turnout in elections, were overwhelmingly supportive of military action against Iran. So, I mean, this is just the world we live in now where if you have a few outside voices, you tend to think that represents the consensus in a particular political environment. It almost reminds me of the conversations I'm having over here with friends of mine who don't really understand Israeli politics. So you would think that every Israeli is represented by Ben GVIR and Smoltrich, if you follow the American press. It's not to say these people don't have influence over the broad direction, but there's a sense that these very fringy politicians represent the Israeli mainstream. Before the war, when Trump was still negotiating, within that 60 day period when Trump was still negotiating with Iran, 52 Republican senators sent a letter and then that was followed up by a letter from the House where I think almost all House Republicans signed a letter. But the 52 Republican senators signed a letter to President Trump telling him directionally where he was going was wrong and that negotiating with her and that there should be zero enrichment. I can't tell you the last time or I can't tell you at all since Trump was elected, when 52 Republican senators came together to fire a very public warning shot against Trump, there are 53 Republican senators, which means every Republican senator except one was willing for the first time to Publicly tell President Trump you're headed in the wrong direction.

[Nadavayal]

That's not a divide.

[Micah Goodman]

Okay? You're criticizing something that me and my partner, Frat Shapiro Rosenberg said in our podcast in Israel. We said, if there is a deal between Bibi and Trump, saying, Trump, America joins war with Iran and then Bibi goes with Trump to end the war with Gaza and normalization. So the first part divided the American right, and you're saying that's just a narrative. The second part, ending the war in Gaza and normalization will divide the Israeli right. And here I'm arguing this is not a narrative. Normalization will split the Israeli right. And this is where things get interesting, because usually peace initiatives create a schism between right and left. Right, like think about the Clinton accords or the whole Camp David process.

[Dan Senor]

So the two state solution in the.

[Micah Goodman]

90S, the two state solution in the 90 s, there was two camps, the pro peace camp, the Agats withdrawal camp. And they were high levels of ideological polarization. And that was the last time right and left had an ideological debate. There are no more real ideological debates among between right and left. It's about the personality of Netanyahu, not about the two state solution. We move from the politics of ideology to the politics of identity. But the process of normalization in Saudi Arabia is a peace process, does not divide right and left. It divides right and right. And if the train is going that direction, that's what we're going to be seeing.

[Dan Senor]

So how do you think Netanyahu and Trump will leverage their political wins from this war?

[Nadavayal]

No.

[Micah Goodman]

So the question is, will they leverage it in order to end the war with Gaza and to go to normalization with Saudi Arabia? For Israelis, this is turning the war into a massive victory for two reasons. One, what is really normalization about? It's about building a regional architecture, pro western with Israel and Saudi Arabia in the heart of it. And this is an anti Iranian architecture. What we did to Iran was only phase one. This is phase one and that is victory. The whole plan of Iran led by Qasem Soleimani was to build the rings of fire around Israel to surround Israel with armies of terrorists. And when Israel is isolated, weakened, eventually to press the button and then have them all attack Israel simultaneously and destroy Israel. And it was a very effective plan. In the weeks after October 7th, when we woke up, we realized, oh my God, that could have worked. Now what Israel did in the past year and 10 months, it took that axis and one by one dismantled, dismantled it. And now Israel is not surrounded with an axis of proxies that could isolate it, weaken it, and destroy it. But stage two is to build a regional architecture that will isolate Iran, that will weaken Iran. And therefore what normalization really is, is to do to Iran what Iran did to Israel. It's a complete. What Israelis call the, you know, the Purim story, where everything became upside down, is for us to do to Iran exactly what Iran did to us. That's a strategic flip. And the second strategic flip is that I think I shared this with you one time, this metaphor that if the war is a car and victory is a destination, your oil tank is international legitimacy. And the big question is, will you run out of legitimacy before you make it to the destination? I think, by the way, the fact this international crisis happens now, we're lucky it didn't happen six months ago, a year ago, before Rafah, before Lebanon, before the pagers, before Nasrallah, before Iran. Seems like when we almost made it to the area of the destination, the problem is we ran out of legitim. Now, what is normalization? It's the return of legitimacy. Because if we normalize with Saudi Arabia and possibly with Muslim countries like maybe hopefully Indonesia. So try to think about the world that that creates. I grew up in a world where Israel was legitimate in the west and not legitimate in the Middle East. Are we now creating a new world where Israel is legitimate in the Middle east and not legitimate in the West? Probably what would happen is the process of hyper legitimization in the Muslim world will soften the process of delegitimization in the Western world. So we need normalization like oxygen. This is what completes the victory over Iran and it shrinks the price that we paid for the victory over Iran, the price in legitimacy. Now there isn't one Israeli that won't see the power of normalization, how this is the victory and how this leads to victory over Iran and to shrink the price we paid for that victory in our eroding legitimacy. That's it. That's how it looks like. So why could this divide the right. It's all good. Well, it could divide the Israeli right, not because of the rewards of normalization, but because of the price of normalization. Now, we don't know what the price of normalization is going to be, but we could guess, right? The currency is. We'll have to pay for normalization will be Palestinian currency. Now, there will be a rhetorical element to it. Somebody will have to say the P word Palestinian state. Now, just saying that word is a big deal. In the Israeli right, just saying that word, you say a credible pathway to statehood, and even if everybody knows that it's not going to happen now and the conditions are impossible, you said the word. The ideological part of the Israeli right will cancel you. But there is a pragmatic arm to the Israeli right, and it's going to ask different questions. It won't be only sensitive to what kind of word you said. It will ask two questions. One, does normalization mean a military withdrawal from the west bank of Judea and Samaria? And I think the answer is no, definitely not. In the foreseeable future, a military withdrawal, does it mean a massive evacuation of settlements, which could be a real blow to Israeli coherence and solidarity? The answer is no. Which means if the price for normalization is saying a word and making real actions on the ground to show that you're serious, but actions on the ground that do not contain evacuation of settlements and do not contain any security risks are the kind of concessions that the pragmatic part of the right could accept, the ideological can't. The pragmatic part asks the question is, okay, is the reward larger than the price? That's the pragmatic question. The ideological branch doesn't ask, is the reward larger than the price? There's a taboo. You don't say the word, you don't talk about it. You avoid it. And this goes deeper into the structure of the Israeli right. There's two types of camps in the Israeli right. There's ideology and there's identity. Now, many people on the right believe, by the way, that by building communities where the ancient biblical events took place, like in Judea and Samaria, so you're connecting our present to our past, our life to the Bible. And by doing that, you're activating the ancient biblical prophecies, the messianic prophecies. So that's one branch, and that's the branch that's going to say no to any Palestinian currency. You're paying for normalization. But there's another branch on the Israeli right, and it's there not because of ideology, but because of identity. Now, this branch thinks about life, and this might sound familiar, that there's. The Israeli elites have been discriminating against us. Us. And they've been mocking us and they've been disempowering us for years. Now, those elites control what's called the deep state. And by attacking the deep state, we are liberating ourselves from the control of those elites. This is a different narrative. It's not the Messianic narrative. It's an identity narrative. And Bibi Netanyahu is the symbol of the people being attacked by the elites, those people that they're on the right because they support Bibi. It's an identity thing. It's not a messianic ideology thing. When it comes to national security, they have a tendency to be more pragmatic, not ideological. Which means if Bibi decides on normalization, the identity part of the right will go with Bibi. The ideological right, the messianic right will go against Bibi. And that is why normalization will split the Israeli right.

[Dan Senor]

So that really is a new politics in Israel for many on the right, probably a majority on the right, Bibi is the only person they would trust. Taking them into normalization and all the consequences from the right's perspective of normalization, Bibi's the only one they would trust. And then there's this ideological segment of the right that it doesn't matter whether it's Bibi or Kahana or whomever that's right.

[Micah Goodman]

Now, Pragmatic Right will ask strategically, is there a security risk? If there's not, we're open to think about this. Is the reward of normalization bigger than the ideological? But the ideologues, there's no price and reward. There is a taboo, and it's out. And here's an interesting fact. If Bibi leads normalization, it splits the right, the pragmatic right, the identity right joins with the center, the center left, and we have a new coalition for normalization. What this means is that the only way to create a new architecture for the region is to create a new architecture for Israeli politics. This has to come together. There is no new architecture for the Middle east without a new architecture for Israeli politics. Right now it's divided right versus Left, not the mainstream versus fringes. We have to reorganize Israeli architecture. And here's a fact. I don't know if Bibi wants to do this, but if he does this, he's the only person that can do this. It's very possible he's the only person. I'll tell you why. Because if a prime minister from the non BB camp tries to lead normalization, he unites the right against normalization.

[Nadavayal]

Meaning?

[Dan Senor]

So not just a non BB figure, but a figure not from the right.

[Micah Goodman]

We're trying to do not for anyone. You know that's not Likud, right?

[Dan Senor]

Right.

[Micah Goodman]

I don't know if it's Lieberman, Bennett, Gantz, Lapid. I don't know who it is.

[Dan Senor]

They unite the right against it.

[Micah Goodman]

If they lead normalization, it unites the right. But if Bibi leads to normalization, it splits the right. That's the difference. These are two facts which are impossible to argue with. But the question is, what do we do with them? Hard fact number one, it's very probable that only Bibi could lead to normalization, because only he could split the right and reorganize Israeli architecture. Fact number two, Bibi's government can't do this. So Bibi's government will fight normalization, while Bibi is the only person that could deliver normalization. And what do we do with these two hard facts?

[Nadavayal]

But that sounds contradictory.

[Dan Senor]

I know it's not, but just. I think it's important to explain, because.

[Micah Goodman]

The center left are on board already, right? So when you split the right, you create a massive majority for normalization. Now, how do I know that there is a potential of that division in the right? Because it already happened, Daniel, in 2020, when Donald Trump presented his plan from Peace to Prosperity, or better known, the deal of the century, right, where Jared Kushner, when they put together that plan, that was a plan that, as opposed to Clinton's plans, did not create a schism between right and left, but between messianic right and pragmatic right. We had a glimpse into the dormant schism within the Israeli right, and the Trump plan did that because the Trump plan did not ask evacuation of settlements, and it did not ask that Israel doesn't have military freedom of movement around the West Bank. So the two basic needs of the right were satisfied, but ideologically it wasn't pure because it meant there's places you can't build settlements. The concessions of the deal of the century were not strategic, they were ideological, if that's a good hint to what we're going to be seeing in the future, what you'll be seeing in normalization, if it's led by Netanyahu, the right being split into two, which means that we're not only be building a new regional architecture, there'll be a new, new architecture for Israeli politics.

[Dan Senor]

Let's play that out a little bit. Israel has to go to elections by October of 2026, which in one sense feels like a long way off, but we're going to blink. You know, it's not that long way off, especially because you got to allow for about three months before the election. So, like, a lot has to happen before then. Do you imagine Netanyahu going to elections and saying, I'm running on normalization with Saudi Arabia, I'm the only one that can deliver normalization. And then he goes for elections. And then he forms, if he's able to form a coalition, he forms a coalition that looks different from the coalition he has today. That represents the kind of partnership between these different factions within Israeli politics that you're prescribing here.

[Micah Goodman]

It's very hard to see how Bibi calculates the large strategic needs of Israel with his own selfish political needs. Every Israeli has a different read of Bibi, but I'm saying it's possible. But in order to pull that off, he has to do a few things. One, he has to end the war with Hamas, to end the war with Hamas in order to make space for normalization, for that to be even possible. Then to start moving to that direction and go to elections. Then say to Israelis, okay, I always told you, vote for me because I'll be able to defeat Iran. Now Bibi's becoming Shimon Peres. Vote for me for a new Middle East. But I think the real argument is this is what it means to defeat Iran. Meaning we're so used to left wing rhetoric saying concessions are worth it because it will lead to peace. I think Bibi's argument will be concessions are worth it because it will lead to victory. It's concessions for victory, not for peace. It's what we'll do with the Palestinians won't lead to peace with the Palestinians, which most Israelis don't think that real peace is possible. These concessions will lead to victory over Iran. It will lead to us building an architecture that will effectively do to Iran what Iran did to us. And by doing that, we will buy back all the legitimacy that we lost while we were dismantling the evil axis that Iran built around us. And what determines what actually happens are very, very small events that become blown out of proportion. But strategically, I think that's where Bibi would like to go.

[Dan Senor]

Okay. It's widely accepted that sinwar launched the October 7 attack to derail normalization with Saudi Arabia in whatever form it was coming. And obviously it was coming in a different form before October 7th, as we understand it, based on public statements from Saudi officials, Israeli officials. If that process renews, would Israelis see that as the ultimate victory then of this war against Hamas? Because how do you say, the war with Hamas is over. You're saying, look, Israel needs to tidy up this war with Hamas. It's not so simple if Hamas, by the way, all the incentives for Hamas right now is to do the opposite, because they're getting rewarded with recognition of a Palestinian state. They're getting rewarded with this delegitimization campaign being thrown into overdrive by the international community, by Hamas not ending the war. So A, how does Israel tidy up the war in this environment? And B, if there is normalization, is that what Israelis can point to is like they tried to stop us from normalization. Hamas, we got normalization because we defeated Hamas.

[Micah Goodman]

Israel is today in a position where we have in Gaza only bad options to continue the war means we're going against the will of the world and the will of most Israelis. And add to that, that, that I don't want to talk about this too much, but our army is very, very tired, by the way. And Israel doesn't know how to win wars that the nation is not united behind. We don't know how to do that. Look at Lebanon, 1 in 82, that was a war that the nation was divided. We were divided regarding that war and it was very not successful. When we destroyed the second antifa, the Iron Wall, that was the two icons of Israel, the two titans, Shimon Peres and Al Sharon got the icon of the right, Al Sharon and the icon on the left, where you got together and we defeated the second intifada. The six Day War, by the way, was won by a national unity government, Right?

[Dan Senor]

Right. Levi Eshkolem and Akambagan, right?

[Micah Goodman]

That's right. So we know when broad coalitions, when the people are united behind wars, we do well. And when we're not united, we don't do that well. Right now the war has enjoyed massive consensus until this point. If this war continues, we're going against the will of the world and we're divided and the army is very, very tight. This is not a good idea. On the other hand, to end the war without a deal is also a catastrop. So we have bad options. So there is the Eyal Zamir option.

[Dan Senor]

Who'S the IDF chief of staff.

[Micah Goodman]

Our chief of staff. And if I understand him correctly, if I do so, it's saying, okay, we end the war without Hamas handing over their weapons. Hamas doesn't govern Gaza, but it's still there with its weapons. What can we do? We bring our brothers and sisters home. We end the war. And many Israelis will feel like that means Hamas won and we surrendered. Many Israelis will feel that way for good reasons, by the way, because in this war and in the Middle east, the bar for victory for Israel is much higher than the bar for the Palestinians. Our bar. From the very beginning, this was the narrative. If we have to defeat, destroy Hamas in order to declare victory. All Hamas has to do to declare victory is not to be destroyed. So their bar is much lower. And if this war ends with they have their arms, so the narrative would be that they won, and that would be horrible for our deterrence. And that is the reason why Israelis feel like if we continue the war, we lose. And if there is a deal to end the war, there will be considered the Middle east as a loss. So we're in a very bad situation now. How do you get out of this bad situation? In the Talmud, there's this interesting idea by a rabbi called Reish Lakish. I won't go now into a Talmudic discourse, but we like to think that the past creates the future, but maybe it's the other way around. The future defines the past. So it's about what happens after, after the war is over that will define was it a victory or a loss. Now, if after the war, we go to normalization. So we'll say that, okay, while it seems like there was a loss in Gaza, but that story, it's a small story inside a much larger story, a story of victory over the Islamic Republic of Iran. So the best way to shape the narrative of victory is to locate what we do in Gaza inside a larger narrative of victory. And if there will be normalization and if we have the real victory over the Islamic Republic, I think we could live with the narrative that the fact that we lost in Gaza, we lost a battle to win the war, to win the broader war against Iran, I think it's messy, it's not perfect, but we have only bad options. So our best way is to locate the loss inside a larger narrative of victory.

[Dan Senor]

You know, you said something a moment ago. You said, we end the war, we declare the war is over, we meet all these conditions, and among them is we get our hostages back. You know, I'm increasingly asking this question of our guests. I used to ask it offline. Now I just ask in the context of the podcast, why will Hamas be incentivized to give back all the hostages, to return all the hostages?

[Micah Goodman]

They probably won't give us all the hostages back, but I think we have a double moral duty. One, to bring everyone we can. If we can bring back out of the 2016, we have to bring back 16, whatever we can. I'm saying the 20 because the urgency is far broader. They're suffering there as we're talking. They're in the Shoah now, not in 1945. Right. And it's our duty to bring them all back as quickly as we can. The people that are dead, we should bring them back also. But there's not a sense of urgency. They're not suffering as we're talking. Will we be able to bring back all the 20? I don't know if Hamas will believe that this is what will really, really end the war. Maybe that's possible, since I think, by the way, that in the future we have to attack Hamas after this is over. I mean, I think in order to dismantle Hamas, we have to have a partner, and the partner is the future version of ourselves. We ourselves cannot dismantle Hamas. We can't. We meet this catch. We have bad options. But I think if we're partnering with our future self, then we could dismantle Hamas. What the left got wrong in the 80s and 90s that it spoke about peace now, and the only peace that's possible is not the peace that comes now. I think what the right, the benvil right is getting wrong as they speak about victory now, the only victory that's possible, the victory that comes later. If we make a deal now, go to normalization, but never forget that Hamas will be dismantled, but it will be a partnership between who we are in the present, who we are in the future. And by the way, that's very Middle Eastern. In the Middle east, people believe in patience. It's very Western to want achievements now. It's very Middle Eastern. In Islam, there's this idea of Sabir that God is with the people that have patience. Saber and we have to adopt. We have to be a little bit more Middle Eastern in order to defeat Hamas. To understand us, we're not going to get everything now. But what we don't get now, it could be diluted in a larger narrative of victory over the Islamic Republic.

[Dan Senor]

When you say the future version of Israel, do you mean the future, this political architecture that you're talking about that is different than the one in power now? What do you mean by the future version of yourselves?

[Micah Goodman]

I think that today we can't dismantle Hamas completely because we can't continue the war and we can't stop. Okay, we're in that situation. But the future version of ourselves will be able to attack Iran because of three reasons. One, once our hostages aren't there, and after our army has recovered. By the way, I trust Hamas. I trust Hamas won't give us one reason, but 17 reasons to attack them. That's something I do trust Hamas right now going into war, Israel is Divided, the future war. Israel will be united. That's one and two. Right now, our ability to dismantle Hamas is limited because of the hostages. Think about one troubling fact, Dan, that if Nasrallah had with him in his bunker eight hostages, he would have been alive now. Right? I'm sure. Which means that if the hostages aren't there, it's much more easier to dismantle Hamas. And three, we could use in the future the advantage of a surprise attack, which we don't have that option now. So without the hostages, Israel united in a surprise attack, that version of ourselves, we'll be able to do the job. We can't do it. We have our hostages. We're divided, and there's no element of surprise. We just can't do it. We have to accept the boundaries of our power and take this limited victory or this loss and drown it inside the larger narrative of the real victory over the Islamic Republic.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, before we wrap, I just gotta say, because a version of what you're saying, I hear a lot in the public discourse in Islam, Israel, it's so Israeli, by the way. It's so Israeli to have a debate.

[Nadavayal]

Very publicly about how it will secretly.

[Dan Senor]

Trick Hamas, as though Hamas is not consuming the same public discourse, the same media, you know, as we've often heard, the most loyal viewer of Channel 12's nightly news was Yehes Sinwar, including after October 7, he was following everything. So, again, I hear this all the time. We'll end the war. Hamas will think it's over. They'll definitely violate whatever agreement we have, and we'll have a basis upon which to go back in, and we'll get them then. And all those conditions you just laid out, the hostages, it makes it hard. Now they have this now that. So won't they think that through before they make concessions that could take away the insurance policy that they now have?

[Micah Goodman]

Probably. Probably. This is probably one of the reasons why we won't get back all the hostages. I hope I'm wrong. God, I hope I'm wrong. I hope we can bring all the hostages in a deal. I hope I'm wrong.

[Nadavayal]

So do I.

[Micah Goodman]

Right? But it's not like we have to choose the good option. We have to choose a bad option, and we have to ask what's out of all the bad options? Like, we're in a tragic situation, we're at a tragedy in Gaza, where we have only bad options. In a tragedy situation, you know, you'll choose something bad, and the only reason you're going to do something bad is because the bad thing that you choose is better than the bad options that you didn't choose. By the way, the world has a hard time understanding Israel. They think we're in a binary situation. We're choosing bad over good, and they're judging us as if it's a binary situation. When it's a tragic situation, we're always choosing bad over bad. And that's one of the reasons why Israelis feel very misunderstood. You're always blaming us as if we did something bad. The alternative was good, dude. We have only bad options. And by the way, it was designed as a tragedy by Hamas by building an army that doesn't protect civilians but is protected by civilians. And that's designing this tragedy. And we're in this tragedy. And now we have to choose between bad up. What's the option that I would say I have two criteria. One, it's not as bad as the alternative. And two, in light of the telemudic understanding in the future, we could do something that will transform the past into one more step, the journey towards a larger victory. That's what we could do. So that's what we should do.

[Dan Senor]

All right, Mika, we will leave it there. Thank you as always for your insight and your time, and I'm sure we'll be talking again soon.

[Micah Goodman]

All right.

[Dan Senor]

Shabbat Shalom.

[Micah Goodman]

Shabbat Shalom.

[Nadavayal]

That's our show for today. If you value the CallMeBack podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavayal and Amit Segal and I. I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically happen after the cameras stop rolling. Please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to ark media.org that's ark media.org call me back. It's produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin. Already sound and video editing by Martin Juergo and Mariangulis Burgos. Our director of operations is Maya Rockoff. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.