C (6:23)

Thanks, Dan.

B (6:24)

Thanks for having us.

A (6:25)

So we last spoke on the weekend when the war broke out, when the fog of war was as thick as it gets. And it's still kind of thick. But just to orient us, Nadav, I'll start with you. It was just announced that Mujtaba Khamenei was elected as the new Ayatollah. Who is he and what does it tell us?

B (6:46)

So first, I want to hedge a bit about this. It's true that it was announced absolutely, but not by the Islamic Republic, as far as I know, but by opposition media as we are speaking now. So by the time that people are hearing this, it can either be verified by the Islamic Republic or not. By the way, it was an assessment by Israeli security officials that they will hold the identity of the supreme leader, the new supreme leader, secret or will try to do so at a certain point. At any rate, this man is the son of Ali Khamenei, is considered a hardliner, was sort of seen as a possible heir to the throne or was prepared as an heir. There was a lot of resistance to this idea behind the scenes within the Islamic Republic because this looks somewhat like a monarchy, something that they desired to replace. But after the killing of Khamenei, his name was raised again. And this was partly because of the prestige that comes with the title of Shahid of martyr that was given to his father. I need to stop here and explain. I think that we devoted a lot of time for the operational assassination of Khamenei and we also devoted time for the symbolic nature of killing a head of state. But it's also about Khamenei now becoming the martyr, the most significant martyr of the resistance, the so called resistance to Israel and the United States. His figure is going to last for a really long time and we're going to see a militias, even if this war is absolutely successful and terror groups are going to use his name. So of course his son becomes much more prestigious himself. But this tells you, Dan, something important, even if it is not Mujtaba, it tells you that they are choosing a hardliner. And all the candidates that I know of right now are hardliners Every single one of them is bad news.

A (8:48)

Considered a hardliner and considered a close ally of the revolutionary Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. So with the most militaristic, ideologically rigid factions, but within the Iranian security system. Mark, anything to add to that?

C (9:03)

Yeah, Dan. First of all, I would say that's hardly breaking news that the Islamic Republic has selected not elected, but selected, quote, a hardliner as the next supreme Leader, regardless of what would have happened.

B (9:15)

War.

A (9:15)

No war.

C (9:16)

Of course, Ali Khamenei had made sure that whoever took over from him would continue the Islamic Republic and the revolutionary tradition that Ali Khomeini had started in 1979. By the way, there are no moderates or pragmatists amongst the revolutionary elite. So we are getting exactly what we expected. Nadav is right. I mean, he's a bad guy. Mostabe has never had any public role of any significance, but he has very close ties to the Revolutionary Guards. He's also very corrupt. He's estimated to be a $200 million EMP. And Switzerland and the Gulf.

A (9:51)

Yeah, he has a Persian Gulf shipping business, a Swiss bank accounts, British luxury property. He sounds like he's been living a pretty rich life. I'm looking at reporting here in Bloomberg that has gone through his financial empire.

C (10:03)

Yeah, he's cut out as this guy Ali Ansari. Not the great British historian, but Ali Ansari, who's this corrupt individual who's been building this empire, including elite properties in London.

A (10:16)

And so, as Karim Sajapour said, this is a signal that the regime and the clerical leadership are, to use Karim's words, getting ready to position themselves to break rather than bend when they choose a successor like this. These are people who are digging in for a fight and risking breaking the whole regime rather than some kind of compromise. But your point, Mark, is there's no alternative to that. They're all directionally, in terms of orientation in that mold.

C (10:40)

Yeah, I mean, it was preordained. I mean, Nadav's right. I mean, there was a lot of controversy because they are opposed to dynastic succession, of course, because that reminds them of the Shah, the grandfather and the father. But this was preordained. And this would be no surprise if Mostaba was the supreme leader. I've on your show and publicly called for not only the elimination of Khamenei, but the elimination of Mostaba. And I think the Israelis are hunting down Mortaba as we speak, regardless of whether he is the supreme Leader or not.

B (11:10)

I just spoke with Israeli security officials and they're saying Absolutely. At any rate, even if he wasn't chosen as the new leader, that their task, this is how they put it, is to unite the son with his father.

A (11:22)

Okay, Mark, key events that have taken place since we last spoke, key events over the past 72 hours. Just tell us what you're looking at, what you're tracking, and what these events suggest about the trajectory of the war.

C (11:33)

Look, I continue to sort of obsess over the operational successes against Iran's most deadly capabilities, nuclear and missile and repression apparatus. Right. I think that's really important. I think President Trump very much defined the first two as his goals of this war. They've gone after nuclear weaponization sites in Parchin. Very important. They've gone after isfahan, which the US had hit and Israel had hit during the 12 day war. And Israelis have just been going step by step after missiles, after missile launchers. And now I think. I don't know, Nadav, you may have the most accurate number, but I think it's 49 or over 50 high level senior commanders, military, security and nuclear. So I'm tracking in some detail what they're actually targeting, because I just think it's the most important thing to do in the first few days and week is to strip Iran of the most deadly capabilities. Then the second most important thing is to do severe damage to the repression apparatus. And then the third most important thing is to lay the groundwork for the next phase of the strategy, which is maximum pressure, maximum support and maximum fracturing to give Iranians the opportunity to take back their country. One more thing that I thought was of note, the reporting on conversations that President Trump had with Iranian Kurdish leaders, which I think is important and very good step, and that is to ensure that they have boots on the ground, they have armed groups that can now tie up the security services force, the IRGC and the Basij, to spread their resources all around the country, particularly to those peripheral areas. The United States knows them very well from our experience in Iraq. And they are people who have a very well trained force that is very capable of taking on the IRGC and the Basij.

A (13:22)

Okay, Nadav, I want to talk about the strike in Qom today and what the strategic and political significance of this strike is for the wider conflict. But first, can you just tell us a little bit about Qom, why it plays this very important role, arguably even a more important role in revolutionary Iran than Tehran does? What is the centrality of Qom? And then we'll talk about this operation there.

B (13:44)

Qom is central because it's the holy city of the religious seminaries of the Shia clerics. And it's a center, it's a hub of the ideas that led to the revolution. So I'm not big on equating Iran with Nazi Germany. I know the prime minister is. But if you need to go through the equation, Qom is Nuremberg. Qom is where the idea of the Waliyat Al Faqi. As to the attack itself, my intelligence sources in Israel are a bit hesitant as to the initial reports that this was the convening in which a person was to be chosen and all of them were in the room. And the Iranians said that there's. As far as they are concerned, they are not making any more convenings in the Republic. And I tend to think that that's logical, although they do really very stupid things in the recent four or five days. So I cannot confirm there might have been a convening attached to that. It disrupted something, but not this drama that we evaporated the entire Council of Guardians, at least according to them. And I'm still waiting for more information about that. As far as I know, and I'm speaking with Israeli officials, I have not spoken with American officials about that. There is a Phase B to this war. Phase one is kinetic and Phase B is indeed an attempt at the regime. We understand that the US is basically limiting expectations as to a possible regime change. Israel isn't. Israel is shooting for the stars and this could fail. But Israel has attributed a lot of resources, not in the last few months, but in the recent two years, and I cannot go into specifics to the idea that it could assist a regime change in Iran. It's a dangerous idea, by the way. It has its pros. If it works, it has its cons. We can discuss that. Israel came to the conclusion that it's better than the current situation in which the Iranians are having their secret war against Israel. And the fact that the Kurds. This is going on the record is extremely significant at this point. Now I want to give another indicator there launches towards Israel. So we're hearing sirens all day long. Dan. To Israel. Right. Can you guess how many launching of rockets have been to Israel yesterday when we're recording this March 3rd today. Tell me 2020. Do you know how many were in the first day after Israel killed the Supreme Leader was more than 90, 95. It's decreasing quickly. So when the president says they're out of MO or we're hunting their rocket launchers, he's not just speaking. I'm hearing this from Israeli generals. They're saying unlike in Iraq back then, we are actually in 1990, first Gulf War. The Israeli Air Force, the American Air Force are doing one hell of a job in taking out the entire supply chain for these ballistic missiles. Now who is paying the price? Mostly countries like the UAE because the ballistic missiles shot at Israel are mid range ballistic missiles, but those shot at the UAE and other countries are short range. That's much easier to do.

C (17:05)

I think over a thousand, Dan, a thousand missiles and drones that have been fired and they've done a remarkable job of shooting them down. But Nadav is right. I mean, actually it's interesting that the Emiratis have sustained much greater targeting than Israel has in this war compared to the 12 day war.

A (17:22)

So let me just ask you, one US official said to me today that on the one hand it's encouraging exactly what you're saying, that you're not getting the same velocity and volume of response from Iran that Israel saw in the 12 Day War or even some of the back and forths in April and October of 2024. But one concern I heard from one US official is he was pleasantly surprised by how well it's going. And he made the point that maybe Iran is hold back, that it learned from these previous battles, previous wars, and that they are holding back some of their capabilities to be able to fight a much more prolonged war than they have been able to in the past. And so maybe we should not be overly rosy in our assessment that Iran just doesn't have the capabilities that we thought they did.

C (18:15)

Yeah, I mean, I would say I think that's an absolute legitimate concern. Listen, if you're the Iranians, you're going to do that. You're going to hold it back. So far it's been just utter failure. But if you're the regime and you're Mujtab Al Khamenei and you're coming in as a new supreme leader or whoever it is, and you're in the new IRGC commander because your predecessor and both predecessors just got killed, you need inflict serious harm on the United States and Israel and you need to hold back your short range and medium range ballistic missiles and you better make sure you've got missile launchers which are being hunted every night and day by both air forces in abeyance and you will wait and save that for that spectacular and very painful targeting of US And Israeli civilians and forces.

A (19:00)

President Trump said today that it was unclear who would take over the country because some, many of the likely candidates were dead. Likely candidates. I guess from his perspective, ultimately someone would have to negotiate a desired end. If the plan was to work with the existing regime, it sounds like the idea is not to work with the existing regiment. What does this tell you about who Trump is thinking about as successor to this regime? Either a successor within the regime or successor to the regime?

C (19:27)

Look, I don't think Trump has ruled out the possibility of talking to people in this regime. I think he might have in mind someone who still is alive, and that's Ali Larajani, who Khamenei gave the responsibility to coordinate both the negotiations with the United States and the Iranian military response. If I were the Israelis, I'd be hunting Larajani as well. But he may be somebody that Trump has in mind. There's also Kaliba, former Revolutionary Guard commander. I think he was the head of the parliament. He's also somebody that Trump may have in mind. But Shamkhani was somebody very, very senior. And he was the head of the National Defense Council, top national security advisor. Shamkhani could have been somebody that Trump was thinking of. Shamkhani is now dead.

A (20:13)

Mark, the president today rejected the idea that Israel dragged the US into war with Iranian lunatics, as he called them. He even went as far as saying that he might have forced Israel's hand. I talked about this in the introduction. What is your interpretation of that statement?

C (20:29)

Well, he's responding to a interview that Marco Rubio gave that was taken completely out of context. And in typical social media age, part of what he had said was clipped and then spread out. And then you had all the lunatics and the isolationist right and the anti Israel left going on about how even Marco Rubio had said that Israel was going to attack. And so the United States was therefore forced to have to move preemptively because they would have faced consequences for an Israeli attack anyway. I mean, essentially that was what went out. And I think Trump put that to rest, and I think he rightly put that to rest and that Trump has had this plan in place for quite a while. Of course, it's been closely coordinated with Israelis. Of course the IDF and CENTCOM are talking to each other daily. Of course the integration is really at historic levels. But President Trump has set the pace. President Trump has made the decisions. I also find Dan very interesting. I don't know if we've talked about this on the show before, but you've got Tucker Carlson talking about how much he loves President Trump. The greatest president since George Washington, the greatest commander in chief since Dwight Eisenhower. I mean, you hear this from the maga, right? And yet here is Carlson and Megyn Kelly and the maga, right, basically saying that President Trump ordered an attack on Iran at the behest of a foreign power in a war that is contrary to American interests. Dan, we have a term for that. It's called a traitor. Now, I find it interesting that Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly are calling President Trump a traitor while telling you also that he's the greatest president and thank God that he's president and he's saving America and make America great again and America first. I don't know how maybe in some kind of conspiratorial fever swamp, you can reconcile those, those irreconcilable points of view. But Trump very quickly came out. Not only did he slap back Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly directly and said, I am maga, he also said, I made the decision. If anything, I pressured the Israelis to go when I wanted to go.

A (22:27)

Nadav, any response or anything to add to that?

B (22:30)

So, first of all, Marco Rubio said that after a briefing. And I find that meaningful because it wasn't only Secretary Rubio that said that, but also Speaker Johnson and also an interview by Tom Cotton this morning. Several people said again and again that Israel would have been doing this anyway and Iran would have retaliated against American targets, and therefore there needed to be a preemptive strike. On the factual level, we're definitely in agreement. Here's where I'm definitely not in agreement. I think it is extremely meaningful for the conversation in the United States because and I see how this was carried not only by extreme right, extreme left, but also by people mainstream, really mainstream, even sometimes conservative media. And I'm talking about not conservative media that is against Israel. I saw these reporters on X and many other places. And whatever is going to be said now, the idea that Israel somehow forced the US to get into this war has been injected to the American discourse.

A (23:43)

You're talking less about the set of facts and you're more concerned about these manipulated optics that are now shaping a narrative about how we got here.

B (23:53)

Yes. And as we know, facts are not that important in this world, and opinions and the velocity and the sentiment behind opinions are really important. And what we're seeing here is that there were a series of quotations coming from very serious people that were saying something about Israel and the rest of it. Now I see Mark nodding his head. And really, I think that the facts matter. And I explained on this show that it's the president. The president is calling the shots here. The president is deciding. The president can stop this war. Picking up the phone, telling Bibi, hey, you need to stop. In two hours, he can just hang up. And this is what's going to happen. And everything that is happening throughout the White House is happening for the pleasure of the president. However, what we're seeing here, even in terms of polls and media reportage and Dan, you're welcome to weigh in on this. In terms of the discourse that we're seeing is not positive. And if stuff don't go well, Israel is going to be blamed. Now, Israel is going to be blamed anyway. Many people will say Israel is going to be blamed anyway. Yeah, well, I'm sorry, that isn't enough. If I were advising the prime minister, I would have told him, here's what's risky. We know that the IDF and the American army, or the American Army Navy and the IDF can actually deal with the Islamic Republic. What's dangerous for Israel is if Israel's position within the American public would be further eroded as a result of this war. Because things are not going to work the way that they are our planned. If this is what's going to happen, you really need to think long and hard how this is done. What's the Israeli position here? How people know that it's not Israel that's responsible for that? And that's difficult. Here's why. Because Israel did think that there needs to be a war against Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu said that. I would say this is a moment with a lot of opportunities for the region. We discussed this on this show. But there are dangers for Israel's position. I'm saying this as an Israeli. I know Mark has a lot to say.

A (26:02)

Okay, Mark is bursting at the seams. Go ahead, Mark.

C (26:04)

Not to say a lot because I don't disagree with Nadav on a number of things he said. But let's sort of back up a second. Fact of the matter is Israel had to go and eliminate Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities, regardless of the political discussion in Washington. What Tucker says or Megan says or Bernie Sanders says, whatever, who cares? They're facing a significant threat from a regime that has used those capabilities already, firing ballistic missiles on three, now four occasions at Israeli civilians. They're building up a nuclear weapons program. They have got a terror army around the region. I'm sorry, an Israeli prime minister. I don't care if it's Netanyahu or Bennett or Lapid or somebody from the left or the right has got to make that decision and would have made the same decision. And that's why you've seen uniform support across the Israeli political spectrum for the decision made by Prime Minister Netanyahu. That's number one. Number two, the reason mainstream Republicans are saying what they've said, Nadav, and you're right, is because in December at Mar a Lago, when Prime Minister Netanyahu met President Trump, the reporting from you and others, and it was accurate, according to my sources, is that President Trump greenlighted an Israeli strike on Iran's missile capabilities. And then when the prime minister was back in Washington a while ago, met at the White House with the president, the president once again reiterated that. So, yes, we all knew that Israel was going to have to strike Iran at some point to remove those dangerous missile capabilities. But there's a big leap from that to Israel pressured President Trump to do that. And President Trump wouldn't have done that without succumbing to the enormous pressure from an Israeli prime minister of a country of 10 million people that's almost wholly dependent on the United States militarily, politically, and not entirely, but to a large part economically, that's quite a large leap of logic. And I think that's when you start to get into the anti Israel fringes that I think those Main Street Republicans are not part of and certainly we should avoid. The third thing is, and I just want to again reiterate this, those missiles threaten the United states, they threaten U.S. forces, they threaten U.S. embassies, they threaten U.S. bases, they threaten U.S. gulf allies, and Iran has an active intercontinental ballistic missile program that when it's complete, and I don't agree with President Trump, I don't think it's imminent, but when it's complete, we'll target the American homeland. So the United States of America has every interest in removing ICBM capabilities, ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear weapon capabilities and terror capabilities from a regime that declared war against the United States in 1979 is killed, killed and maimed thousands of Americans. That is in the absolute interest of the United States of America. And I'll just finish it finally. This way. We didn't do the Israelis a favor. The Israelis did us a favor. Because what the Israelis did is they took on one of our most dangerous enemies. And in the June war, in the first 11 days, flying alone without American fighter jets or American support or American boots on the ground, they devastated the air defenses or our most dangerous enemy. And they allowed President Trump in the 11th day to fly B2 bombers and destroy the Ford O facilities. Thank you, Israel. And by the way, what are they doing now, Dan? And we talked about it a little bit earlier. They are literally flying as a peer ally. They were responsible for 50% of the strikes against Iran in this war. They flew 1,000 miles to bomb those targets, while our guys, incredibly brave and very effective, were flying off carrier strike groups just off the coast of Iran and from bases close to Iran. We have never, in the history of modern American warfare, had an ally that has had carried that kind of burden against a common enemy that has killed Americans. I just want to make the case as an American. Thank you, Israel. You didn't pressure us. Maybe we pressured you. But at the end of the day, you did us a favor. And thank you for helping us defeat an enemy with so much American blood on its hands. I'm not at a political rally. I don't represent President Trump. I don't represent Prime Minister Netanyahu. I'm an American who is furious that the Islamic Republic of Iran has killed Americans and maimed Americans and taken our men and women hostage since 1979. And we have been feckless often in responding to that threat. Listen, the brave pilots of the Israeli Air Force have made it possible for us to finally confront an enemy and do so with less risk and pay less cost than we otherwise would have had to. So just wanted to lay out that case.

B (30:38)

I agree with the case. So we are in agreement on all the facts, as you stated.

A (30:42)

Yeah. I will say this, Nadav, and I think you have made this point, actually, that the Israelis and the Americans both calculated that there was certainly risk in this war and certainly risk in removing the Supreme Leader. But the risk of the Supreme Leader and the regime remaining in place was higher in the assessment of the Israelis and the Americans than the risk of proceeding from with action. That's the first point. Now, it's important to that action be successful. And as Mark laid out in June, we saw something that looked and was spectacularly successful, which was able to be completed by US involvement, the B2 bombers and other bells and whistles that were sent along the way. But there's no doubt that Israeli success made it much more alluring to the US to participate. And I think what we are going through now, this war we're experiencing now, is in many respects much more complex than what we dealt with in June. And it's going to have many more twists and turns and perhaps some setbacks and surprises and tragedies. But if we are successful, and the Middle east has transformed from, as John Pod Horiz put it the other day, the Middle east has been the sinkhole of world history and geopolitics for the last, I don't know, half century. You can go all the way back to the oil embargo. And if this region can be transformed, it's a massive step forward, it's a big win. And the finger pointing about how we got into this is not going to matter. But if there are stumbles, there is going to be endless finger pointing and endless even conspiracy theories about how we got into it. And I think that's the risk that, that everyone involved in this has to take. Right? If it goes well, then there are going to be very few questions asked. But if it doesn't go well, there's going to be a lot of questions asked and there are going to be a lot of uncomfortable questions asked.

B (32:36)

I agree. What I'm saying that as far as the Israelis are concerned and considering Israel's position today with younger voters in the United States and an erosion of its position according to multiple polls, studies and others, what we're seeing here today is something that could be extremely consequential to its position Now. I don't think it's the Iraq War, and I'm explaining why. I do think that the Islamic Republic has really put so many Americans, Arabs, Iranians at risk, and of course, Israelis, and is responsible for an immense waste of both human life and quality and money and resources across the region. And if you manage to take it out or even somehow reform it from within, something that the President is obviously open to and is mentioning again and again, if this is the case, this could be huge for the region, indeed, the first time in history that from the shores of the Mediterranean to the borders of Afghanistan, the dominant force is gonna be the United States of America. And it's gonna be the dominant force in an area that is essential for geopolitics and for energy. So the opportunities here are huge. For American security, deterrence of China, I've made all of these points. But for Israel, it's not going to be about political bickering. It's going to be about its alliance with the United States. This is what is at stake here. It's not only about Iran. This is my only point. And this is why, as a good Israeli, basically, as a good Jew, I worry about this. And I think that there is stuff to worry about. I have an update because as you were talking and you were hearing the insights by Mark, I was speaking with a security official in Israel. He told me something really interesting about the gathering of the Council of Experts, which I think wasn't published. He said, we did hit the place. There was a gathering of these people who were supposed to choose the leader. That's true, but we didn't try to kill them all. And I was struck, said, are you sure? He said, yes, we wanted to have this as a signal. And I said, why? These people are an organ of the Republic. It's not that you're shooting at a mosque or something. We concluded that these are religious leaders and that signaling is more important and more effective than actually killing them all. And let me translate what was said to me. I think they feared that if they're going to kill them all, this might become much more religious and sort of even give more religious energy to that. But they did want to say to these people, we know where you are and we are going to disrupt and know that we can do this again. So it was a decision. And as far as I know, this wasn't published. I might publish it before you air the episode. But this was like real time kind of gathering of info.

A (35:48)

Fascinating.

C (35:49)

A quick thing about some of these aims, because you mentioned John Pod Horat's the sort of transformative impact potentially of down in the Islamic Republic. And Nadav has, I think eloquently on this episode and previously talked about what a free and prosperous Iran could look like. I must say I'm. I want to make sure I'm less. What's the word? Panglossian, overly optimistic about where we're heading. Because I think it's very important to define narrow aims for the president to achieve them, for the Israelis to say they have achieved them in order to beat back against this potential public relations political damage that Nadav is rightly worried about in America. And again, I think that a successful military campaign that strips Iran of its nuclear and military capabilities and missile capabilities will be an American success. But then the most important thing is we don't just celebrate and go home, but that the United States and Israel work very closely together. CIA and Mossad, NSA and 8200 IDF and US military. We make sure that we have a program that builds on the military success to bring much greater political success. And I know Nadav is reluctant to talk about exactly what's going on, and I am as well. But I think your listeners should be confident that a lot more is taking place behind the scenes between the two security establishments in thinking through how to take advantage of a much more weakened, fractured Iran where we can use other instruments of American and Israeli power in order to weaken, undermine, and if history smiles on us, ultimately bring down the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A (37:33)

Gentlemen, before we go, I just want to get a handle on a few other events that have been happening and what to make sense of them, I guess. Mark, what is your sense of Iran's strategy, as far as you can tell, generally based on what they're doing and how they're fighting. What's their strategy? We all agree that they're not folding quickly, so they're fighting. Even if we all agree that their munition supply is probably not what it was. What's the game plan here?

C (37:58)

Here I'd call it the Hamas strategy. It's survive, keep your weapons, declare victory, and wait out Trump. That's what the Islamic Republic will want to do.

B (38:08)

And there's another something that they could do, and I think that's the wisest thing they can do. They could nominate, like one Iranian dissident told me today, a smiley president or a smiley leader. They could take people like Rouhani or Mousavi and make them foreign ministers or prime ministers or. Or president or something, and then give the impression that they have changed while they have not. And as far as Israel is concerned, this is the most dangerous scenario that something would be presented as a meaningful change when it is not. I don't think that the administration is going to fall for it. We didn't say that. I want to say something about the things that the president has said today in the White House. Clarity, strategic clarity, the rise of coherence. There is a lot to say about that, and he will be immediately. And he was immediately criticized. This is too simplistic and all the rest. What I heard is a Ronald Reagan moment.

A (39:13)

I had the same reaction when I listened to him. It's like he totally understands what we're up against and who we're up against, and that there really was no other option. That's what I hear when he's speaking in context, though, Nadav, of what Mark just said in terms as to what the Iranian strategy is then. Over the past 24 hours, Iran has increased its attacks on the UAE and Qatar. How do those attacks fit into that strategy? Have those countries reacted either militarily, politically, diplomatically, whatever? How do you assess the significance of the war broadening in the region?

B (39:45)

So we are hearing that both the Saudis and the UAE are considering joining the war. The Gulf countries are stunned, stunned, strategically surprised by the brutality of the Iranian attacks against them. They're not angry. They are just beyond themselves. Something strategic happened in the last few days. One of them is that Israel, with the backing of the United States, killed Ali Khamenei. The other one was the Iranians basically broke everything they tried to build with the Gulf countries and with Saudi Arabia. And these countries are not going to Forget this for 100 years. Now, this is what they're telling me. This is not my assessment. And that's meaningful for the architecture of regional defense.

A (40:34)

Nadav, I want to close by asking you one question. And obviously, Mark, feel free to add, from Israel's perspective, what do you think the minimum threshold for Israel to consider this war a victory? I guess my first question is, what is that minimum threshold? And then just from your perspective, how plausible is it for Israel to achieve that outcome?

B (40:57)

I think it's a great question. The IDF is still skeptical about a regime change. A victory would be either a significant change in the regime. And by a significant change, I mean a regime that is still the Islamic Republic, but says, we're going to give up our ballistic program, we're going to give up our nuclear enrichment. Exactly according to the demands that are supplied by the fdd. And Mark Dubovitz, okay, so very clearly. And we're not going to fund Hezbollah anymore. We're not going to fund these militias, even if this is still the Islamic Republic. It's not the Islamic Republic anymore. As far as the Israel is concerned, it's fine. But a real victory is a change of regime in Iran. Now, in between, there is a spectrum. And in that spectrum, for instance, if Iran is weakened, if it's degraded after two, three, four weeks, it has been fighting the Kurds. There is an armed opposition. That also would be seen as an achievement.

C (41:59)

Dan, I would just add to that. I'm watching Pickaxe mountain. You know, FTD's been a bit obsessed about. And that is this site in Natanz under a mountain where the Iranians are going very deep, hundreds of feet. And the idea is to build a heavily fortified immunized enrichment facility, centrifuge manufacturing facility, and weaponization operation. And if they succeed and we don't bomb it and severely degrade it, then I worry that even if we take out all the other nuclear sites, all the other missile sites, degrade the navy, take out the top echelon, that they emerge standing, declaring victory, not only heavily armed, but they have a facility that may not be, when completed, that we won't be able to bomb with our massive ordinance penetrators, and that the Israelis would have a very difficult time degrading, certainly not from the air. And they might have to resort to special forces on the ground and some creative ways to try to make that facility inaccessible by human beings for a century. And without getting into the details of what that means. But I think we have to take out Pickaxe Mountain, and we take that out and we take out all these other capabilities, I think we can confidently declare success even if the regime is still standing. And then we've got two and a half years to grind this regime down and make sure that whatever is Left standing in January 2029 is no longer a threat to the United States, to Israel, and to the region. Because to get back to politics, I don't anticipate a president of the United States in the oval office in January 2029 with the kind of commitment, resolve, and demonstration of power and credibility that President Trump has vis a vis the Iran issue.

A (43:40)

Nadav Mark, thank you for this illuminating but also spirited conversation. I think it's important. The most important thing I think Nadav said, which was also a statement of the obvious, is I'm just worried. I'm worried, which is like an evergreen statement for so many of us on this podcast who are guests and hosts of the podcast. And I'm sure a big chunk of our audience were just most worried. Okay, let us express our worry. Let us reflect on our worry. Let us try to concentrate our anxiety in one place, which is the Call Me Back podcast.

B (44:15)

But then that's the reason we have you, because you're such an optimist. So. No, seriously, you wrote books. You wrote manifests of optimism. Not, not many people do that. And it's good that you're here to, to balance me being worried. Read.

A (44:29)

All right, Nadav, Mark, thank you for this and we will be back in touch soon. Thanks, guys.

C (44:34)

Thanks so much, guys. Thank you.

A (44:45)

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Back Inside Call Me Back is where Nadaviel, Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arkmedia.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin, a Red. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wiener. Sound and video editing by Liquid audio. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan. Senor.