Doha, We Have a Problem - with Nadav Eyal, Amit Segal, Ronen Bergman

Summary

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Podcast Summary: "Doha, We Have a Problem"

Podcast: Call Me Back – with Dan Senor
Date: September 10, 2025
Guests: Nadav Eyal, Amit Segal, Ronen Bergman
Theme: Unpacking Israel’s strike in Doha targeting Hamas leadership, its regional and strategic ramifications, and the knotty interplay of war, diplomacy, and hostage negotiations.

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Episode Overview

This urgent episode convenes seasoned Israeli journalists and analysts to dissect the fallout from an unprecedented Israeli airstrike in Doha, Qatar, ostensibly targeting key Hamas leaders involved in ongoing hostage negotiations. With conflicting reports on operational success, the panel explores possible motivations, immediate and long-term repercussions for Israel, and shifting regional dynamics involving Qatar, the Gulf states, the U.S., and Europe. The conversation centers around the dilemma of fighting terror, freeing hostages, maintaining alliances, and managing strategic risk in a volatile Middle East.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Doha Airstrike: What Happened?

[00:10–05:42]

• Israeli air force launched a strike on a compound in Doha believed to house top Hamas figures, especially Khalil al-Khayya, a lead negotiator and confidant of Yahya Sinwar.
• Early reports suggest the attack failed to eliminate senior Hamas targets; only the son of Khalil al-Khayya may have been killed.

  “...probably this operation did not succeed in actually assassinating. There is no formal word from Israel, but...cabinet members who are saying it's almost 100% that the operation did not reach its goals.” – Nadav Eyal [00:10]

• The operation occurred amidst high-level discussions regarding the American ceasefire proposal and followed a deadly terror attack in Jerusalem, increasing internal political pressure on PM Netanyahu.

2. Targets: Who and Why?

[05:42–10:11]

• Khalil al-Khayya was the main target, viewed as pivotal in orchestrating October 7th and in multi-front strategies against Israel.
• Khaled Mashal’s status is downplayed:

  “Khaleed Mashal, as far as the Israeli sources I'm speaking with, they do not consider him as that important today in decision making in Hamas.” – Nadav Eyal [05:55]

• There’s skepticism about whether intelligence misidentified the target location, possibly due to operational error or the Hamas delegation moving rooms for prayer at the strike’s time ([25:57]).

3. Strategic Motives: More Than Assassination

[11:09–18:59]

• Amit Segal proposes: The goal might have been as much about sidelining Qatar as a mediator as killing Hamas leaders:

  “What I'm trying to say is that...the main hidden reason for this assassination was taking Qatar off the equation of the negotiations, and the collateral damage was Hamas leadership.” – Amit Segal [11:09]

• Internal Israeli divisions: Mossad reportedly opposed the attack due to Qatar’s mediator role ([11:44–13:43]).
• Nadav Eyal counters: The primary driver was the need for a forceful response to terror within Israel, not removing Qatar from negotiations ([15:17]).
• Qatar is reported to have been pressuring Hamas to accept the Trump peace proposal more actively than Egypt.

4. U.S. Involvement & Diplomatic Sensitivities

[18:59–22:34]

• The proximity of the strike to the U.S. Al Udeid airbase in Qatar raises questions about the extent of American awareness or approval:

  “...I would be shocked...if there was not serious conversations about this particular operation.” – Dan Senor [18:59]

• President Trump’s contradictory statements and his tip-off to Qatar have triggered speculation—did such a warning allow the Hamas leaders to escape?

  “...Trump shared the secret with another country that some sees as an enemy and it was certain that they will inform Hamas immediately.” – Ronen Bergman [21:52]

5. Regional Reactions & Ramifications

[28:18–34:13]

• The attack has provoked outrage from Qatar and broad condemnation from Gulf and Arab states; the EU is contemplating trade suspensions with Israel ([00:51]).
• Segal highlights the risk that regional actors now perceive Israel as overreaching or expansionist—a sentiment that could hinder Abraham Accords 2.0 or further normalization ([29:37–31:43]).
• Bergman expects Qatar's response to be "rhetorically ballistic" but predicts Qatar will ultimately wish to retain its status as a key mediator.

6. Impact on Hostage Negotiations and Gaza War

[34:13–40:48]

• Assassinating Hamas leaders outside Gaza while hostages remain captive is seen as risky and potentially counterproductive:

  “...it's like trying to assassinate the Munich terrorists where the Israeli sportsmen are still in captivity.” – Amit Segal [25:57]

• There is anxiety among hostage families, unsure if the government’s approach advances or endangers a deal ([35:56]).
• With hardline positions on both the Israeli and Hamas sides, the path to ending the war remains very unclear:

  “The way this kind of standoff [is now]...that it's either Netanyahu gives up on his main demands or Hamas gives up on its main demands. I just can't calculate anything that could integrate both of them.” – Ronen Bergman [33:11]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Israel’s deterrence:
  “We were to make sure that they understand that we will be everywhere chasing them forever. So I understood that the BDA from their point of view is quite dire.” – Ronen Bergman [38:18]

• Regional rumor-mill on ‘Greater Israel’:
  “...there is a sentiment...that Israel is no longer the weak part of the Middle east like a year ago, but that the risk is that Israel becomes too strong, that Trump does whatever Israel asks him, that the US is actually providing Israel assistance to take over the Middle East.” – Amit Segal [30:34]

• On the complexities of hostages vs. military action:
  “You can only imagine...what happens to the [hostage] families...They don't understand how to read this. Israel is saying we want a deal to end the war. There is a Trump proposal...and then we see what happens in Doha.” – Nadav Eyal [36:41]

• On shifting rationale post-operation:
  “When you ask them was it successful?...‘We were not there for killing them. We were there to deter them.’...It means that it wasn't [successful].” – Ronen Bergman [38:18]

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Important Segment Timestamps

| Timestamp | Segment | |-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | 00:10 | Recap of attack, initial failures, and international reactions | | 03:41 | Nadav Eyal details what happened in Doha | | 11:09 | Amit Segal’s theory: "Qatar as main target" | | 15:17 | Nadav Eyal: Motivation was counterterror response | | 18:59 | Dan Senor on U.S. awareness and strategic context | | 25:57 | Segal: "Munich" analogy and prayer narrative for the escape | | 29:37 | Gulf perception of Israeli intentions | | 33:11 | Bergman: End-of-war stalemate outlined | | 36:41 | Eyal: Impact on hostages and families | | 38:18 | Bergman: Deterrence as fallback "success" metric | | 39:36 | Segal: Abraham Accords 2.0 and normalization prospects |

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Flow & Tone

The episode is urgent, analytical, and at times lightly wry—as the panelists invoke personal anecdotes to make political points, and gently spar over motives. The tone reflects the high stakes and ongoing uncertainty, equally apprehensive about tactical setbacks, diplomatic risks, and the moral ambiguities surrounding strategy and hostage fates.

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Conclusion

This conversation reveals the myriad dilemmas facing Israeli decision-makers: How to deal with Hamas leaders abroad; whether to risk diplomatic rupture with Qatar and the Gulf; the complications of hostage negotiations; and the unpredictability of war and politics in a region on edge. With regional alliances under tension and hard choices imminent, the guests express uncertainty about ‘what's next’—and caution that resolution is neither near nor simple.

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For detailed updates and ongoing analysis, listeners are encouraged to follow the guests’ reporting, especially Amit Segal’s daily newsletter ([40:48]).

Transcript

[A]

Foreign.

[B]

You are listening to an art media podcast.

[A]

Late last night, intelligence sources started saying that it doesn't look good, that probably this operation did not succeed in actually assassinating. There is no formal word from Israel, but we already, I'm already speaking with cabinet members who are saying it's almost 100% that the operation did not reach its goals. The main question that we should be asking in relation to strategy is why now and what's next? And what's next is a big question.

[B]

It's 8:30am on Wednesday, September 10th here in New York City. It's 3:30pm on Wednesday, September the 10th, in Israel, a day after Israelis have learned about a major military action in Qatar. Yesterday Tuesday, the Israeli air force carried out strikes on a building in Doha where there was believed to be a gathering of all of Hamas's top leaders outside Gaza, deliberating over the recent American ceasefire proposal. As of now, there's skepticism as to whether or not Israel managed to eliminate its targets, or at least all of them, with Israeli ambassador to the U.S. lighter stating, quote, if we didn't get them this time, we'll get them the next time. Close quote. The government of Qatar responded to the attack with outrage, calling it, quote, a violation of all laws and norms. Other Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, the uae, Jordan and Turkey, strongly condemned the attack, vowing to stand in solidarity with Qatar. President Trump gave a somewhat contradictory statement on the topic, expressing disapproval at Israel's decision while calling it an opportunity for peace. Trump said he instructed US Special envoy Steve Witkoff to inform the Qataris of the attack, but that it was too late to stop it. Trump's statement prompted some to question whether his tip off to the Qataris allowed the Hamas leaders to flee before the strike. Others are laying out that the US was to some degree involved, or at least aware. Prime Minister Netanyahu said he greenlit the operation following Monday's terror attack in Jerusalem in which two Palestinians from the west bank opened fire on civilians waiting at a bus stop, killing six people. The attack was claimed by Hamas. The same day, four soldiers were killed by Hamas in the outskirts of Gaza City, all between the ages of 19 and 21. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, the IDF issued its first widespread immediate evacuation order for Gaza City, indicating that Israel will ramp up its operation there shortly. Today we Wednesday, the European Union announced it will propose a partial suspension of the EU's Association Agreement with Israel targeting trade issues, with the president of the European Union decrying what she called, quote, a man made famine in the Gaza Strip to discuss the major developments between Israel and Hamas in Qatar and how this impacts Israel's other regional dynamics. Our ARC media contributors, Nadava Yel and Amit Segal and a veteran from previous Call Me Back episodes, Ronen Bergman. We will unpack the implications of different scenarios. Whether the strike succeeded in taking out senior Hamas leaders or whether it failed, and how both these possibilities changed the landscape for Israel in its multi front war. Nadav, Amit. Ronen. Good to see all of you.

[A]

Good to be here.

[C]

Good to see you, Dan.

[D]

Pleasure. Hi.

[B]

Okay, I want to jump into this, laying out what we know so far about the operation. Nadav, I'll start with you. What do we know took place militarily in doha?

[A]

Militarily, about 10 fighter jets, bombers of the Israeli Air Force traveled. They didn't actually enter Qatari airspace. And they launched their ammunition, their missiles, and they hit a house in a specific quarter of Doha with some diplomatic embassies or representatives office there. This entire compound is a compound that is associated with Hamas, if I'm not mistaken, both offices and also homes. But I guess Ronen will have better intelligence on that. You know, almost immediately the Israelis did something that shouldn't be seen as an obvious and they said, we tried to kill the leadership of Hamas that is in Doha was obvious that the main target was a man called Halil Al Haya. Halil Haya is probably the closest associate of Yahya Sinwar, the late Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas. And Khalil Al Khayya was the man leading the negotiations with Israel in two hostage deals that actually happened. He's also a man who probably knew about October 7th, before October 7th, and there were other people there, but mainly Halil Al Khayya was mainly the target. And a few hours later, Hamas said that its leadership was not harmed in this attack. The son of Halil Al Hayah probably died, say the Qataris. And late last night, intelligence sources started saying that it doesn't look good. That's quote, unquote, that probably this operation did not succeed in actually assassinating. There is no formal word from Israel, but we already. I'm already speaking with cabinet members who are saying it's almost 100% that the operation did not reach its goals.

[B]

Among the other Hamas leaders, there's Khalil Al Khayya. There's also Khalid Mashel who's in Doha. I had heard that he was not actually a target of the operation or the Israelis didn't expect him to be at that meeting. Is that accurate?

[A]

I don't know if the Israelis expected him to be at that meeting. This is the second time, of course, that Netanyahu, if indeed he was a target, that Netanyahu is trying to kill Khaled Mashal. The first time was back in the 1990s at the first term. And the result of that was the release of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin from jail. Khaled Mashal first assassination attempt was made in Jordan, again another country associated with the United States, with a peace treaty with Israel, unlike Qatar. And that led to a crisis between Israel and Jordan. And it was a huge story. Israel needed to send the antidote because he was poisoned. And part of the agreement with the king was to release the founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, from prison. But Khaleed Mashal is not that important. I want to say something about that Khaleed Mashal, as far as the Israeli sources I'm speaking with, they do not consider him as that important. Today in decision making in Hamas, some even told me maybe if this would have succeeded and only Khaled Mashal would have been left, maybe it would have strengthened Mashal and maybe this is something that we want. I think this is, you know, purely speculative.

[B]

Yeah, that is one theory I heard that Mashal was that the others were more intransigent, more extreme in the hostage negotiations. So eliminating them but not eliminating Masha may have been the at least the design of the operation. Ronen, what do you know about the results of this attack based on what you're hearing from your sources?

[D]

I think we have corroborating reporting from two intelligence agencies in the Gulf, from Israel, and at least most of the targets were not hit. I'm beginning to suspect that maybe there could be a misfire or there could be a misidentification of location. Something doesn't feel right about the scenario, that only that they had an alert and only few ran. And the son of Khalil Khayyan, his chief of staff, was left behind. And so I'm not sure that there was an alert that made them run away and escape. And there could be something that didn't happen in this scale, this level of leadership. There wasn't such a mistake where the intelligence misidentified. I still don't know that this is the case, but it seems that the targets were not hit, whether Khalil Khayya, Abu O Sama and other people that were there. One thing to know about Khalil Al Khayya is that he is extensively mentioned in the Protocols of the Small Military Council. Al Majla's Galila Busara. So the supreme leadership of Hamas, he was the envoy, the special envoy to travel from Gaza to Beirut and try to coordinate a multi front, multi regional attack on Israel in order, as Sinwar put it in his words in May 2022, he said, if we attack the Gaza division, we could take it down and cause a lot of damage. But if we are able, we mean Hamas are able to recruit the whole front, so Hezbollah, Hamas, pij, Iran, Houthis, and the militias from Iraq, we might be able to eradicate the Jewish state. And Khalil Al Khayya was at the center of gravity of trying to coordinate all of that. Now, they didn't succeed doing all of that, but he was dispatched to Doha just before the war by Sinwar because Sinuah wanted to have someone on his behal that would go there and negotiate. And one of the things that you see the protocols is how they sidelined Masha. They hate him. They really. He sort of aligned with the Jordanians when they aligned with the Iranians. He has no value today. And you actually saw the process of expelling him from any post of power when Khalil Khayyat took over. And then when Israel Assassinat, he sort of succeeded him. And he's the most senior Hamas official today, though, was trying to enforce his rule on Azadid Hadad, the senior military commander now in Gaza, and according to intelligence, not always succeeded. So there's still the difference between sometimes difference between Gaza and Hamas. Doha.

[B]

Okay, Amit, I want to talk to you about the implications of this attack. If it was successful, then we'll get to. If it's not successful. And I just jotted down here before we all hopped on, I just jotted down a list of six lenses, if you will, through which to think about success or the implications of success. One is the lives of the hostages in Gaza, meaning what's at stake for them, for better or for worse, if the operation is successful. Two, the state of the hostage negotiations. Three, Israel's relations with the Gulf and its integration into the Gulf in the context of the Abraham Accords and beyond. Four, US Israel relations. Five, Israel's intelligence sources and methods in Qatar. Six, Israeli deterrence. Does this operation enhance Israeli deterrence? And I guess seven would be the end of the war. Now, you don't have to go through my list, but that's just kind of how I keep track of where this tracks with each of those. So what are the implications if it.

[C]

Was successful, even if it wasn't because there is a theory that says that the target of the assassination was the leadership of Hamas and the collateral damage was the relationship with Qatar. And I would like to suggest the alternative, that the main hidden reason for this assassination was taking Qatar off the equation of the negotiations, and the collateral damage was Hamas leadership. What I'm trying to say is that, sure, Netanyahu and the IDF wanted those murderous and treacherous figures to be eliminated.

[D]

But.

[C]

But when you attack in Qatar a few miles from an American base, it means that you want to send a message to Qatar that you are no longer the mediator. This is the number one implication. Now, here's the thing. Behind the scenes in Israel, there were two camps. One said that Qatar is an enemy. Qatar funded, have funded four years. Hamas, each and every rocket, each and every rpg, each and every bullet fired at Israelis was funded basically by Qatar. And on the other hand, and that's why we should fight Qatar and the other side, mainly Mossad said that Qatar is a partner because Qatar can mediate a hostage deal. Now, it's not a coincidence that Mossad was not part of this operation and was not even mentioned in the announcement made by Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Defense Minister Katz. It was the idf, because the Mossad opposed this operation. Mossad was on the side of negotiating with Qatar. So I think what Israel really tries is to actually reframe the negotiations on the hostage deal, and more important than this, in Netanyahu's opinion, to reframe the negotiations to end the war. What Netanyahu really tried to do was to take out both Qatar and the leadership that opposed the Trump deal to end the war, thus releasing the 48 hostages on the first or the second day, and then keeping on the negotiations about Israel withdrawal versus demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. So in this respect, the mission accomplished. Qatar would no longer be the place where negotiations take place. I mean, even for the technical reason, if you are a Hamas senior figure and you just survived an Israeli airstrike, would you come back to Qatar to negotiate or to try to bargain yet another deal?

[B]

But, I mean, if that was. If the goal was to just end Qatar's role as this mediator and as a place for mediation, were there simpler ways to do that? I mean, couldn't have Israel just said, we're no longer dealing with Qatar? I mean, dropping 10 bombs in the capital, you know, 44 kilometers away from a US base is a pretty intense way to make the point.

[C]

We saw hints about the Trump administration not satisfied with the Qatari Roll. For instance, Adam Boller tweeted a few days ago that it's just about time to actually let Qataris know that we are not happy, to say the least. It reminds me of a story about Nadav and me and another journalist in Istanbul 20 years ago. We happened to sit in a restaurant. We wanted a fish, a cheap, tasty fish restaurant in Istanbul. But once we set it appeared to be a Michelin star, very expensive, tiny dishes. And we doubted how to say to the waiter that we want it here in the most polite way. I offered one way. Nadav was even more polite. And then the other journalists, Inon Magal, soon to be the Israeli Tucker Carlson, said, no, no, no, let me. I know how to do it gently. And then he called the waiter and said, listen, it's very expensive here and we don't like the taste. We are going. So this is the equivalent. This was the way to announce Qatar that it is no longer part of the power.

[A]

First of all, it's a great story and I didn't remember it, but I want to say that I respectfully dissent. My esteemed colleague here on this issue.

[B]

Please, specifically bring it.

[A]

First of all, I think that if you're trying to assassinate the leadership of Hamas, the first thing you're trying to do is to assassinate the leadership of Hamas. Here's the context. The context is that there was a terror attack in Jerusalem. And Netanyahu was so pressured by this terror attack, he went physically to the place, although some argue that maybe if it wasn't a court date, he wouldn't go so quickly to the place in the same day. But he did go to that place. And he did issue a video saying, look, here's what we're doing in Gaza. And this issue of terror within Israel after October 7th is a very touchy issue for the Israeli society and politically speaking, very poisonous. And they were looking for a response. Now, the IDF had this plan ready for months now. Okay, it's actually this plan was there a long time ago. Again, Rene would know better than me. But they had that plan and then they ordered it. As you said, Dan, if they wanted Qatar out, they could have just not picked up the phone from Doha. My understanding is that the Qataris, the Qataris have been the ones who have been pressuring Hamas in the recent two weeks to accept the Trump proposal more than the Egyptians, because the Egyptians have a different vision and framework for how to proceed. So the Qataris were actually pushing the Trump proposal that was accepted by Israel and not accepted by Hamas. And The Trump administration to some extent, and we'll talk about this, to what extent did they know about Israeli intentions? I'm also interested in what you have to say about that, Dan. To what extent did the Trump administration maybe did have an idea that Israel is going to do that? Let me tell you one tailor as to that. I think that the fact that President Trump said immediately after that he spoke with the Emir of Qatar and he told him it's the last time and nothing like that would happen again in Doha. And that also answers a meat point about Qatar not mediating. Qatar is saying in the last few hours that it's not seizing mediation. Now, if they just got an immunity from the US President and if Israel failed, I don't know what's going to happen now.

[B]

But the question is, will Hamas, will the Hamas leaders feel comfortable? I mean, Meat's point is, even if Qatar says they're willing to host again, are Hamas leaders going to be comfortable swimming around Doha?

[A]

Maybe they're not comfortable, but they have only one option left in the world, Two options. But actually, one, they could either go to Turkey, which I don't think Turkey would accept them. I think that their main option is to go to Tehran. And I don't think they want to be there from several different reasons. And by the way, in Tehran, they might be much more susceptible to an Israeli strike than if they go to Istanbul or they stay in Doha. They just got a promise from the president of the United States that Israel is not going to attack again in Doha.

[C]

I don't think Israel would like to actually hinder the relationship with Iran. So I don't think we are going to attack there.

[A]

I have a joke about that, but it's the sort of jokes that you, you should tell Amit or I will get like in the comments, I will get like 5,000 people saying that. But basically, you know, we need to check up, you know, what about the.

[C]

Iranian funding of the prime minister's office.

[A]

Exactly. And this is how we know. But I'm actually really interested, Dan, to hear what you think if this was coordinated to some extent with the White House and what does Rone know about with the Qatari's role in the last few weeks?

[B]

So, Ronan, I'll go to you, I'll just preface it by answering Nadav's question without getting into too many details. I think that between coordination with CENTCOM and the new CENTCOM commander who was just in Israel late last week and conversations between senior Israeli officials and US Administration officials, it's been Publicly reported that Ron Dermer was in the US over the last couple days, including meeting with Steve Witkoff. The idea that there were all these meetings happening in Israel, in the United States between the most senior level Israeli and American officials and the prospect of an Israeli strike at a location, as I said, that is like 13 or 14. I know this because I lived in Doha. I worked on the Al Udeid Air Force base in the lead up in the early stages of the Iraq war in 2003. So I was at Camp Asalia, which was Central Command Forward still is largest US base in the Middle East. The idea that Israel would launch an operation 40 plus kilometers from this US base, 13 kilometers from the US embassy within 48, 72 hours. Within a week of very senior level in person meetings with administration officials, CENTCOM officials and them like ooh, we forgot to mention. Oh, by the way, sorry we didn't give you. I mean I just, it's implausible to me. I know there's differences of opinion among this group about how Netanyahu does many things in foreign policy, but managing the relationship with President Trump and the Trump administration is something that Netanyahu and his team deals with great care. And I would be shocked in the context of all these conversations that there was not serious conversations about this particular operation. But Ronen, I'm curious what you think.

[D]

I have a serious question to you. You say there might be differences of opinion. So I wanted to ask who thinks differently among us?

[B]

Differently than what I just said?

[D]

No, no, differently about the, the foreign policy of Netanyahu. But Dan, just continue from your point. If they knew then why would Trump at the last minute or the Witkoff to go and tell the Qataris. Now this is a moment and I'm just taking what the President said as the facts. And this is also verified from a conversation that I just had with someone in the Qatar administration. This is quite a dramatic moment. Israel is sharing its most secretive secret of that moment that it's going to strategic strike. And then Trump shared the secret with another country that some sees as an enemy and it was certain that they will inform Hamas immediately. I just think if it was Bennett, the Prime Minister and Bennett was bombing Hezbollah and would tell President Biden and Biden would call the Lebanese what havoc would start if that happens. So unless maybe there's something behind the scenes that we don't know.

[B]

Right.

[D]

Some kind of very, very sophisticated.

[B]

Well, I think there's major sensitivity. My impression, Rodan, is there's major sensitivity right now about the Blowback from the Gulf, and not just from Doha, the blowback from throughout the Gulf that the White House is very sensitive to right now. So, again, it's hard to know what exactly.

[D]

There was a very high rank Qatari official that almost got killed. If there's some kind of conspiracy, it's very sloppy or has some sophistication that I cannot answer.

[A]

But a sloppy conspiracy these days, Runan, we live. You know, maybe I'll write a book about this era and a sloppy conspiracy. I'm going to steal that from you. I think this describes well our era.

[B]

So, wait, you're saying, Ronan, that a senior Qatari official was that. That is one.

[D]

No, no. Was almost killed. There was one Qatari policeman that was killed. Yeah, he was in that room. But there was someone who I was told was getting close to the area when they bombed.

[B]

Yeah.

[D]

If that person was killed, then the catastrophe that we are looking or the possible blow that we are looking would be in a different dimension. Look, the question is, I think, what was the risk assessment? Not if it fails, but what was the calculus in case it succeeded? Let's say that they wiped out the whole leadership. Now, I see some publications in Israel in the last 24 hours saying that it was indeed, in fact, the leadership of Hamas in Doha that prevented the negotiation. When Haniyeh was killed by Mossad, I asked the hiring Israeli official, what do you think would be the outcome? He said, this will benefit the hostages because Haniyeh was the obstacle. And throughout the last two years, we see from different Israeli officials, if we just take that Hamas combatant or that terrorist or that leader, then it's going to be smooth and we will have a deal. And I saw yesterday a few stories saying that Izzeddin Haddad, one of the masterminds of October 7, the senior military commander now in Gaza, he is the moderate, he is the more sane person, one that you can trust his word and can be the person to negotiate with. Now, I think that all of these things, and I even heard the minister saying something, we wiped out those guys in Doha. We can do business with Azadeen Haddad, Azzadine Haddad was there on October 7. He was sending his troops to massacre. He is not a nice guy. And he was, according to what I know from Israeli intelligence, he was the one opposing the deal that Trump proposed. I think that all of this, if this was the attempt to try and sort of reshape Hamas or reshape the team that Israel is facing, this is very presumptuous.

[B]

Okay, so let me ask you a different question. What if, and I'll put it to all three of you, what if the message is simply that Israel will go anywhere and everywhere to hunt down its enemies? I mean, Khalil al Khayya said more October 7. He said that after October 7, there's that footage, there's that clip of him.

[D]

Giving interview that all of them said that.

[B]

Right? So what about this is like a Munich, like post Munich, like moment. And Israel's making clear that we are now entering the phase where we go anywhere and everywhere to hunt down those that were involved in October 7th. And even if it failed, it cannot be lost on the leaders of Hamas that survived, that their days may be numbered.

[C]

First of all, you are right. Israel has assassinated, chased and assassinated the Munich terrorist 20 years after the attack. The last one was assassinated in Paris in 1993. And three months later, Israel signed the peace agreement to the Oslo Accords with the same plo. However, the situation here is a bit different because it's like trying to assassinate the Munich terrorists where the Israeli sportsmen are still in captivity. That's the equivalent, like, meaning it's still.

[B]

1972 and they're trying to assassinate them while the athletes, Israeli athletes are.

[C]

Exactly. So this is one thing, by the way, many people ask themselves, has the assassination probably failed because Trump leaked the information? And from what I hear, the story is crazy. And the reason it failed is not because of Trump, the Trump phone, or because of a leak, but because the Hamas delegation just moved to the other room to pray. There are five prayers a day, according to Islam. So they left their phones in the negotiation room, moved to pray, and that's why the wrong room was attacked.

[B]

Meaning because the Israeli intelligence was picking up the signals from the phones and the phones were in the other room.

[A]

That's, by the way, what the Qataris, I think, are publishing as to, you know, their assumptions. They're going to have an investigation, a real investigation there. And one of the key elements there, Dan, is that Qatar is using, unlike Iran, is using American defense systems. And the fact that, you know, they didn't pick up any of the attack, I'm not talking about the aircrafts that probably did not shoot from Qatari territory, which is at any rate very small. But the fact that they didn't see this coming at all is something that is going to be investigated. And every attack like that exposes a possible ability of Israel that not all of the nations around it, both friendly and unfriendly, know about. And I agree with Amit's point about taking down the terrorists while they are still holding the hostages. I would say that I think that to a large extent, the question is, what's the strategy? What's the strategy here? Let's say that they were killed. What does it mean? And the type of answers I'm getting from within the Israeli government is we feel like Ronen said that the next person that will negotiate will be more moderate. First of all, history doesn't tell us that, just the history of this war specifically. And secondly, if that's the aim, at the end of the day, there's gonna be some sort of an agreement. Even if Israel gets everything it wants in Gaza, there's gonna be some sort of an agreement. And the question is, how is this going to be there?

[B]

Right.

[A]

If Israel wants to wrap up the war in the next few months, and I think it does, how does targeting the leaders of Hamas abroad. These people would have died anyway. The clock is ticking for them. It was only a matter of timing. The main question that we should be asking in relation to strategy is why now and what's next? And what's next is a big question in that regard. It's also, it has a lot to do with what the US Is going to do now. Is the US Going to say, as President Trump has basically said, it's business as usual. You know, let's get a deal, let's end the war, business as usual. Qatar is going to mediate. You know, just forget about this. Is this how it's going to go down? I don't know.

[B]

Okay, so that'll be my question for each of you. Amit and Ronen, what are the implications for. Again, Israel's very focused on further integration into the Gulf, as I said earlier, and they want Abraham accords 2.0, you know, with Saudi Arabia and potentially others in the region. So what are the implications for Israel's integration to The Gulf? Is 1 and 2. What are the implications for the end of the war? Israeli officials are now talking about, as we all know, talking about the war ending, likely ending by the end of the year. So with that in mind, what does this event mean for both of those, the integration to the broader Middle east and end of the war. I'll start with you, Amit, then go to Ronen.

[C]

The main question is what the Sunni countries think about the current events. And from what I heard, well, of course, basically they would like Israel to eliminate Hamas once and for all. The army of the Emirates fought six different wars against the Muslim Brotherhood. I would say that they understood the risks by the Muslim Brotherhood way before Israelis understood it. However, there is a sentiment, and I keep hearing it over the last few days and especially after the assassination in Qatar, that Israel expended too much. There is a discourse. I know it sounds crazy in the Middle east, but people really believe in this, that there is a secret plan of Greater Israel not with Judea and Samaria and Gaza, but with Jordan, parts of Syria and Iraq now. It's ridiculous. I know. As far as I know, there are no plans to occupy Amman, in Damascus and Baghdad.

[D]

They forgot to send you the memo.

[C]

The perimeter Baghdad would be. But no, but here are the evidences. Netanyahu gave an interview to a marginal channel named i24 in Israel. He got a gift from the encoreman, a Netanyahu supporter with the Greater Israel necklace. So there was a whole bunch of rumors that this is a secret plan. Okay. And other things were of course, the. And then came the attack in Qatar, Yemen, Iran, etc. So there is a sentiment that Israel is no longer the weak part of the Middle east like a year ago, but that the risk is that Israel becomes too strong, that Trump does whatever Israel asks him, that the US is actually providing Israel assistance to take over the Middle East. So this can be very problematic in my opinion. And there should be a message saying that this is still a defensive operation. Israel doesn't have expansion plans.

[B]

All right, Rodan.

[D]

I think the initial reaction from the Qataris is and will be in the coming weeks, ballistic.

[B]

Not literally ballistic.

[D]

Yeah, well, maybe not the right word here, rhetorically ballistic. So I think that they will be very angry and they'll show it at the probably severe negotiations. But at the end, I think their status as negotiators, as mediators is what they want to show as honest brokers would be seen more important to them. Amit said that Netanyahu is just wanted to expel them or to not to use them anymore as mediators, but that's of course up to him. And I also don't think that Hamas, especially if the operation failed and their main leaders were not killed, I don't think that they will change because at the end of the day, Khatad Al Haddad, sitting in Gaza surrounded by Israeli forces and have the hostages, his interest didn't change whatever happened in Doha or didn't happen in Doha. He has his own interests and his own difficulties. So what happened would be seen by different countries as different things. But it doesn't change the basic dilemma that Israel is in and Hamas is in. I heard the reporting or the rumors about ending the war at the end of the year, and I just wonder how. Meaning the way this kind of standoff, the two sides now is that it's either Netanyahu gives up on his main demands or Hamas gives up on its main demands. I just can't calculate anything that could integrate both of them. And to think that, of course I'll be. I think all of us will be happy if the war is over and all the hostages are released. But how is this going to play out? How is this. The government put out five demands for end of the war. Hamas has its own five or four. And they just contradict so strikingly that at the end it will be up to, I think, the Israeli government and the prime minister to make a call. And it was the same call since the beginning of the war. Now, of course, things change. Hamas is weaker, et cetera, but it's the same call. And the call is whether to go all in, conquer Gaza, deal with the subterranean, collect all the weapon, something that at least the military, the army Sundays will take three to five years, or do something else that would have his own risk and his own compromises, but could potentially save at least many of the hostages. And I just. Maybe my colleagues have other ways, but I just couldn't figure out any. Any of them.

[B]

Okay, we're going to wrap. I just want to ask this of you all. You don't all have to have an answer, but if any of you have an answer, I welcome it. When will we know if it was a success or not? When Israel took out Mohammed death, weeks and weeks went by before Israel knew for sure that they got him. Now, when Israel targets these guys in places like Gaza, you know, like if someone's killed in the Khan Yunis, it's sometimes hard for Israel, Israel doesn't have eyes all over Khan Yunus, to know whether or not someone can kind of climb out of the rubble and resume their existence. But it seems to me in Doha, it's going to be pretty hard for Hamas to drag this out and wait a while before revealing whether or not the operation was successful. So any sense, and I know this is a totally speculative question, but any sense of when we'll know whether or not the operation was successful?

[C]

The system in Ronan is, Is the expert when it comes to intelligence, but.

[B]

It'S called BDA Battle Damage Assessment, dropping acronyms here.

[C]

It's not that Israel is going to actually dig inside, like in some parts of Gaza, but it's mostly about gathering SIGINT information, phone calls, etc. When it came to Muhammaddev, it took a few weeks before Israel got the approval that he was assassinated. Mainly because nothing was left out of him after he suffered 84 tons of bombs in southern Gaza. Here it's going to be a bit simpler. There are attempts to understand where they can hide because Qatar is not like Gaza. There are no tunnels there. So if you want to actually arrange your stay in one hotel or a secret location, you have to actually make some phone calls. So I guess it's going to take a few more hours.

[B]

Anyone have anything else to add?

[A]

Yeah, I agree, I agree. I think it's not going to take long for Israel to understand and I also agree to some extent with, with Ronen, that something's got to give Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu think that the operation in Gaza City is going to do the trick, that this is going to be the moment of the war and because Haddad is the last remaining regiment commander of his scale in the Gaza Strip, that this is going to be meaningful. I think we didn't say something important that's about the hostages. And before we wrap up, I want to add this. You can only imagine, Dan, what happens to the hosted families when they hear that there is a new Trump proposal. And this Trump proposal corresponds with a change of policy by the Israeli government that went from wanting a phase deal to demanding a comprehensive deal. And then Israel tries to assassinate the Hamas negotiators for that proposal. So I spoke with hostage families in the last 48 hours. I heard their worry, their grievances as to this. They don't understand how to read this. Israel is saying we want a deal to end the war. This is what we want, a deal to end the war. There is a Trump proposal and Hamas should accept that Trump proposal. And then we see what happens in Doha. And I think, you know, hearing what they have to say in that regard is important because this is a sort of a mystery in this entire conversation. Because if we would have spoken like four days ago, I would have said right now, strategically, what Israel is trying to do is to pressure Hamas to agree to the Trump proposal. Right. I guess Ronen has stuff to say about this too. But this is the essence of where we are at right now. It's tilting towards, no, Israel wasn't waiting for Hamas answer. Israel is waiting to the operation in Gaza and the operation in Gaza. The maneuver is going to happen and it's going to happen rather quickly, not in a few months. And we need to look at that and see if something, if there could be a breakthrough before that maneuver. But that maneuver is already there. Okay, it's going to happen in the next few weeks, I guess on the.

[D]

Success or lack of success of the operation, I have a sign that usually works with Israeli officials. On success or the opposite. When you ask them was it successful? And they say, well, you know, but they changed the goal of the operation. It means that it wasn't. So last night I called someone and I said, listen, sources in the Gulf are saying that it was not such a success. He said, you know, we were not there for killing them. We were there to deter them. We were to make sure that they understand that we will be everywhere chasing them forever. So I understood that the BDA from their point of view is quite dire. I think that the maneuver in Gaza is smaller than people believe. I think the military would be more than happy not to go to that. And if going, it will be slowlier, smaller on a much thinner scale. But I think that nobody knows, maybe the Prime Minister and Minister Dermer, but I think that the military as well is in the dark. What's after, what's going to be the next stage other than conquering the whole of the Gaza Strip?

[B]

And Amit, before I let all of you go, we didn't really address the idea of Abraham Accords 2.0 possible Saudi deal whenever that may occur. Does this set that back or no impact?

[C]

I think that the number one obstacle for expanding the normalization is the war in Gaza, not the assassination in Qatar. But the situation became very heated and there is another obstacle which is the annexation plan by the Israeli government. Now here's the thing. Netanyahu and Dermer, as far as I understand, don't want to annex parts of Judea and Samaria at this point because they are under the impression that Israel has enough on its plate before creating another diplomatic crisis about the West Bank. But they have to respond for what France is planning. France and Saudi Arabia, by the way. So I think they are investing much of their effort in actually trying to reduce the tensions with France, to reduce the level the magnitude of the French announcement scheduled for September 22nd and if it fails under the pressure of the settler leadership and the right wing ministers, they will try to do something as marginal as possible. But I don't think it's going to be marginal enough in order for Saudi Arabia to ignore it. So here's another crisis.

[B]

Thank you for that. You know, plenty to talk about. Thank you all. I just wanna say this conversation for our listeners will be released today, Wednesday. We normally release it at midnight going into Thursday. So many people hear it for the first time Thursday. But because of the urgency of the news, we're releasing it today on Wednesday. For Inside Call Me Back subscribers, you will get still have the Inside Call Me Back conversation which Nadav and I will have, and that will be released on the regular schedule on Thursday. But this conversation listening to right now will be released on Wednesday. And if you want to continue to follow reporting of what's going on, follow all three of these gentlemen. We will also Amit's newsletter It's noon in Israel. We'll have the link, as always in the show notes and he's just doing constant updates in his daily newsletter. We highly recommend you subscribe. And that is it. Nadav, Ronen, Amit, thanks for doing this.

[A]

Thank you.

[C]

Thank you so much.

[D]

Thank you. Pleasure.

[B]

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavael, Amit, Segal and I respond to challenging questions questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. Inside Call Me Back will come out every week as an extension of the Thursday episode. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arcmedia.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin. Already sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Marian Chalice Burgos. Our director of operations, Maya Rockoff research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.