← Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Loading summary
Transcript53 lines
- [00:03]
A
Many of you have heard me talk about Sapir, the quarterly journal edited by Bret Stephens, columnist for the New York Times and a friend of Call Me Back, frequent guest. Sapira continues to be one of the most important publications in the Jewish world. Every issue is packed with some of the most innovative and insightful takes on Jewish thought, politics and communal life. I always say that they should be charging for it, but you can receive it in print at your door absolutely free. All you have to do is go to sapirjournal.org callmeback and fill out the form and provide your mailing address. No payment information. Absolutely free. And if you sign up now, your subscription will begin with the next issue on the topic of America for the 250th anniversary of America's founding. I'm looking forward to reading it myself, cover to cover. Go to SapirJournal.org CallMeBack to sign up for free today. That's SapirJournal.org CallMeback.
- [01:11]
B
You are listening to an art media podcast.
- [01:16]
C
To leave the Straits of Hormuz in Iranian control, especially Iranian government control, is to let the Iranians a say they won battle, B build back better, c threaten the Israelis and Arab countries and the ballistic missiles that are pointing increasingly towards Europe. According to Secretary Rubio yesterday, all of those points are strengthened. So what was all of this last 60 plus days of confrontation about? If we leave the Iranians and the IIDC government stronger 60 plus days later than they were 60 plus days ago and we just can't walk away thinking job done because job has not been done, we cannot trust the IRDC led government to genuinely decommission its nuclear enrichment program. We're being completely naive if we think that's where it's heading.
- [02:12]
A
It's 11:00am on Wednesday, May 6 here in New York City. It is 6:00pm On Wednesday, May 6 in Israel as Israelis wind down their day, 67 days after the United States and Israel launched the most recent war against Iran, what the US Called Operation Epic Fury, the most ambitious military campaign against the Iranian regime since the Islamic Revolution. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stood at a White House podium yesterday and said these words, quote, the operation is over. What that means is still being contested in real time. The ceasefire is holding, barely. Iranian forces are still harassing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's foreign minister is in Beijing as we record this. And just hours ago, President Trump paused Project Freedom, the naval operation to reopen the Strait, citing progress toward a complete and final agreement. What is that agreement? According to Axios, a three stage proposal is being negotiated via Pakistan, which which includes a 15 year freeze on uranium enrichment, a gradual reopening of the strait, and a non aggression pledge from Israel. President Trump has called the latest Iranian terms in response unacceptable. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Iranian regime has retained the core tools needed to produce a nuclear weapon. And the center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, estimates that Iran still holds roughly 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium in clandestine facilities. So EP fury is over. But the nuclear question is not, the Strait of Hormuz question is not, and the question of what Iran becomes next, well, that may be the most consequential of all. A housekeeping note. If you aren't already, please make sure to subscribe to our YouTube channel. You can find that link in this episode's description below, or you can just go to ark media.org where you can find all our links and also subscribe to our newsletter. Okay, so here to help us think through what exactly is going on with this end of war, quote, unquote, are two guests who have been thinking deeply through this war. ARC Media contributor Nadava Yel, who needs no introduction. And on the podcast for the first time, Ed Hussain, who's a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's also an adjunct professor at Columbia University's CIPA School, the School of International and Public Affairs. He has been a prolific writer. He's been writing a lot about the Gulf and this war's impact and shaking up of the Gulf. He has a tremendous network across the Gulf. He just published a piece five days ago arguing that military pressure against Iran has reached its limits and the real strategy now must be to exploit Iran's internal fractures. We'll get to that. But let's start with the last 48 hours before we do. Nadav. Ed, thanks for being here.
- [05:03]
C
Thank you for having us. Dad.
- [05:04]
B
Thanks for having us.
- [05:05]
A
Okay, so, Ed, we're going to start with you. Yesterday, Secretary of Rubio said the operation is over, as I mentioned earlier. Hours later, President Trump paused Project Freedom, the Hormuz naval operation, citing progress toward a final deal. Secretary Hegseth said the ceasefire is still in effect even as Iranian forces continue to harass shipping. So, Ed, walk us through the last 48 hours. What exactly happened and, and what is the real status of the ceasefire?
- [05:31]
C
Dan, thank you for having me. Nadav, it's great to be on the platform with you and greetings to all of your viewers and listeners. What's happening is confusing not just to us, but I think it's confusing to people in the region. Minutes ago the Iranian delegation as well as other spokespeople from Iran have said that they're walking away from the current attempts at a discussion. They dismissed President Trump's attempts at trying to bring the current impasse to an end. So this has been a continuation on, if you don't mind my saying so, both sides of mixed messages and multiple parties saying different things. What stands are the following. Number one, the Iranians have successfully moved the conversation to where they want to move it. Away from regime change, away from the Iranian government's long term survival, away from the Iranian government's internal and external failures, away from its terrorism in and around Israel, that is in Lebanon, in Syria and supporting the Houthis and attacking its own Arab neighbors. That's not what we're discussing today. We're discussing the Strait of Hormuz which is where they want the conversation to be. That talk to us about liberating what we've just occupied. So I'm afraid to say we're on the Iranian chessboard and we're discussing what they want us to discuss. Whereas the Messaging from Washington D.C. has been three different messages as you correctly identified, Dan, at the outset. And what we're missing here is that Iran has crossed a new threshold and that threshold has not been addressed, which is Iran is now attacking its Arabian neighbors and has lobbed thousands of rockets into Israel and will continue to do so unless we deal with the core issue. And my fear and my concern is that we're not dealing with the core issue. We're dealing with a tactical setup that Iran has thrown in our direction, which is talk to us about Hormuz, talk to us about the limits of the Iranian enrichment program and talk to us about what our chosen interlocutors here, that is Pakistan, which shares a 900 kilometer border with Iran, can and can't do. So we're talking to them on their terms and not in the terms of the Americans and our Israeli and Arab allies.
- [07:38]
A
Okay, Nadav, we've been seeing these reports about some kind of three stage proposal that's reportedly being negotiated. Freeze enrichment for 15 years, reopen the strait and a non aggression pledge from Israel. Now you, Nadav on our show said back in June of 2025 that the Iranians best strategy was simply to say we accept that even a deal with one or two small bots would work. Is this proposal that moment where the Iranians are in the process of saying we accept. Or is this the delay strategy that Karim Sadjpur, who you've been on with in the past, has always warned us about?
- [08:15]
B
Well, I think that to put in context what I said on the show, I said that if the Iranians were playing a rational game there, the best strategy for them would have been to say to the us, you know what, whatever, whatever, we're going to agree for everything, let's start negotiating and then just let it bleed. Because the war would be over, ships would be heading back to the U.S. and for them, that would have been, I would have thought, the best strategy. Now, they didn't choose that strategy, and here's why. Because what has changed, and Ed has alluded to that, is that the Iranians think that they have won the war, and they are still thinking that. And the Iranians are basically saying that this is an American wish list that they have not accepted. What Iran is saying is that the other side really wants a ceasefire, really wants this to be over. Now, what are the details there? First of all, it's not an agreement according to what was published by Axis and others. It's a memorandum of understanding. It's not a detailed agreement. It has principles. One of those principles is material. Iran is going to stop enrichment for anything between 12 to 15 years. Conflicting reports. Another one is that the enriched uranium will leave the country. Another one that was published by the Israelis. According to Israeli sources, there is going to be some limitation on their ballistic missiles. If true, very big. What kind of limitation? Well, I get the sense that it's not the type of limitation that will secure their neighbors, but be more long range ballistic missiles, which is something the Iranians themselves have said before, that they are not developing long range ballistic missiles. So this would be sort of an achievement. But not for the uae, not for Saudi Arabia and maybe even not for Israel. So this moment is extremely fluid. And now really goes to this question. Do you think that Iran is going to let go of Hormuz? Completely. Completely. This morning the Iranians published through their formal news agencies about a new structure of regime in Hormuz. They have a new apparatus called the Persian Gulf Authority. And if you want a ship to pass through the strait, you need to send an email then to the Iranian government. My guess is that you need to pay. And at the same time they got a message coming from the west that the blockade is over or it's going to be over. So I still don't know how this is being read in Tehran. Let's also take into account that this is a dictatorship. It's also thinking mainly on posturing. So when they are going to let go or compromise, they're not going to show us that they did compromise down. So sometimes it seems like all the compromise is coming from the US side. It's just because the Iranians are not going to be honest about anything that they are actually letting go. And this is me as an Israeli trying to be hopeful.
- [11:14]
A
Wow. All right, Ed, anything to add to that?
- [11:17]
C
I broadly agree with Nada, but I think that the most important takeaway for all of us here should be that this is a regime that's controlled by the irgc, the Revolutionary Guard. They are a deeply strategic organization. They have a long range view. And that is a view that we in the west don't understand. Our Arabian allies in the Gulf as well as our Israeli friends do understand, which is the Iranian government wants to minimize U.S. presence in the region. That's their objective. And the grand strategy in doing that is to chase away the Americans to minimize their allies power in the region. And by doing those two things, by allies here, I mean our Arabian friends as well as our Israeli friends. When you create that void, which is what they want, Iranian government wants to create, then you maximize Iranian civilizational leadership of the entire quote, unquote, global south, but at least as a minimum, the Middle East. So we've gone from Iran having long arms against Israel directly to now, shorter arms, but more money in their coffer in order to support the long arm. Again, there's a strategy at place here. And that strategy, exactly as Nadav says, requires money to build back better, build back better in Lebanon, in Syria, in Gaza, in Yemen, in Bahrain, in the Eastern Province, and attack again the UAE and other American allies. So the Strait of Hormuz isn't just about shipping and isn't just about American vessels and isn't just about opening up that choke point. There's an Iranian strategy behind it, and that's what we've got to supplant, remove, understand, and ultimately end. And unless we do that, my fear is we're just responding to their agenda.
- [13:02]
A
And just to be clear, Ed, by your lights, the IRGC still maintains the most powerful position within the Iranian governing system. So even if there are voices or factions that want to figure out some kind of softening, they are sort of overwhelmed by the irgc.
- [13:17]
C
Absolutely right. I don't think any credible voice would deny that.
- [13:20]
A
Okay. All right, Nadav. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that Iran still has the core tools to build a nuclear weapon. I mentioned the CSIS. The center for Strategic International Studies points to Iran's 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. That stockpile, which we've talked a lot about on this podcast, half of it is, according to reports, in a facility near Isfahan. How much of the nuclear program has actually survived and needs to be in any agreement for it to not be in some kind of JCPOA model or JCPOA in disguise?
- [13:53]
B
That's the biggest question that we have. And of course, the problem there are what Donald Rumsfeld used to call the unknown knowns.
- [14:02]
A
Right, or known unknowns.
- [14:04]
B
Exactly. We already know they're probably hiding stuff. The big question there, are they are hiding 1% that we don't know about, or are they hiding 15%? And that's a material difference as to their capabilities. Now, one of the things that the Israelis, the Americans said after June was basically hit back at them in this war is everybody told them, you said you devastated their Iranian nuclear program, so why do you need to go for this war? Again, the Israelis never said it's mostly about the Iranian nuclear issue, this specific war. They were more worried off the record about ballistic missiles, for instance. This was a thing for Israel's security. But they did say there are material issues that you want to cut down there and you need to take out the enriched uranium. So, first of all, according to different elements that were published in the U.S. the U.S. intel community still says that they do have the ability at a certain point to develop or to break to some sort of an installation of sorts or a primitive boom of sorts. And the question is, how much time do you have? How much time did you buy in that regard? If we're thinking about the jcpoa, and I think we need to think about the Obama agreement right now, because we're going to have an arms monitoring agreement here that says that they can't enrich at all, which is going to be a big achievement, even if it's for 15 years.
- [15:31]
A
And with a lot of their offensive and defensive, conventional, offensive and defensive capabilities seriously degraded.
- [15:38]
B
Yeah. So I'm going to take you to the crux of the question very quickly. Are they going to cheat? Because the Israeli Defense Forces back during the Obama agreement, the JCPOA said on the record, it's not me saying the chief of staff got the Eisenhut at the time said they're not cheating, as far as we know in intelligence, they're really not cheating. And they can because it was a very tight agreement at the time. And I Remind the people listening to us, it's very hard to hide radioactive development when you have monitors on the ground, when you have people on the ground, because it leaves signs unlike ballistic missiles or drones, it leaves signs that you can measure in all types of ways, some published, some less published. Now the question there is, would the new leadership, the irgc, which Dab Bahamin, all the rest, will they say, you know what, we're going to sign this agreement. We're not enriching for 15 years, but we did manage to hide some of this enriched uranium and we're going to surprise the world with a nuclear test or something. And nobody knows the answer to that. And that's one of the reasons that Israel is extremely worried from any agreement that he's going to inject billions of dollars to the Iranian regime. But they also understand that the war will end. And if the war will end, the regime will be injected with billions of dollars. And if they're going to prioritize a secret plan, then the question is, will the west be resolved enough to go after them or even to monitor it through intelligence or people would be, we don't want to hear about Iran. We just don't want to know about this. This is such a failure for some parties or some perceptions. We just don't want to know. The Israelis, I think the uae, Israel to some extent Saudi Arabia, countries in the region are very worried about this prospect that they will be sort of left to their own devices as long as President Trump is there. I don't think they will. The President is very committed. He's been extremely aggressive towards the Iranians in his first term. But the President is not going to be there forever, most probably.
- [17:38]
A
And Secretary Rubio said that the ceasefire is about restoring commercial shipping. But as we've seen, Iran is still seems to be attacking vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. And that could just be some friction during the transition of to a new phase. But suppose this friction continues. What leverage does Washington actually have left in the Strait of Hormuz?
- [18:01]
C
I've been speaking to family and friends in the UAE yesterday and today, and it's not just about the Strait of Hormuz. They're on the receiving end of Iranian drones and missiles. They, like the Israelis, have a psychological threat of an Iranian government dominated by its most extreme wing that will continue to target them directly, kinetically and indirectly, in non kinetic terms. And the point you raise about what the Americans and especially the Trump administration has at its disposal is that it has ever more willing allies, both in The Arabian countries that Nadab just highlighted, particularly led by the UAE and one or two others that don't want to be named and Israel. And what is needed most urgently is an alliance led either by NATO or others to take full control of the state of Hormuz. These are not Iranian waters. These are international waters. This cannot be under Iranian occupation. And to leave the Straits of Hormuz in Iranian control, especially Iranian government control, is to let the Iranians A, say they won, but B, build back better, C, threaten the Israelis and Arab countries and the ballistic missiles that are pointing increasingly towards Europe. According to Secretary Rubio yesterday, all of those points are strengthened. So what was all of this last 60 plus days of confrontation about? If we leave the Iranians and the IRGC government stronger 60 plus days later than they were 60 plus days ago. And now the Iranian government has crossed a threshold which is to attack Israel directly, repeatedly attack nine other countries, including its Arabian neighbors, directly, and now claiming control of the Straits of hormones. And I think worse than all of that, which is asserting its dominance across Iran, we just can't walk away thinking job done because job has not been done. We cannot trust the IRGC led government to genuinely decommission its nuclear enrichment program. We're being completely naive if we think that's where it's heading.
- [20:01]
A
But even if it seems like the irgc, you know, you and Nadav both made this point that the IRGC is telling itself a story, that it's one, it has the upper hand. You're, I think you're basically saying, at least right now, operationally that may be the case, at least as it relates to the strait. That said, isn't their economic situation in free fall? I mean, it was freefall before the war and now it's like, I can't imagine how you say they're going to build back, they're going to be free to build back better. I just feel that they're just at a completely different. Their baseline is in a much worse place than it was before the war. So the idea that they just, they have this new leverage and now they can just build back better. I think their political leadership is a mess. Meaning that so many of their key leaders, military, political, security, don't know if they, they'll make it week to week or month to month. Their offensive and defensive conventional capabilities have been seriously degraded and their economy is a basket case.
- [20:54]
C
90% of their oil sales go to China. This is a country that's been designed since 1979 for this moment. This is A country that fought the Iraqis for almost 10 years and lost hundreds of thousands of its people and called them martyrs. This is a government led by clerics that feed its people theology and martyrdom. We find it difficult to comprehend that martyrdom mindset. This is a government that hasn't seen its so called supreme Leader for the last two months. And yet there's a population that's been radicalized, about 50% of the pope, Persian population at least, that wants to continue to feed on its martyrdom complex. I know it's hard for us to comprehend. I know we think people want bread because that was the French Revolution's principle to give us bread. But this is the theology and eschatology that wants to confront, that wants to win and that is prepared to starve in the pursuit of that. Just as the way Hamas was prepared to kill Palestinians to secure Palestine, the Iranian government is prepared to kill Iranians to secure the IRGC led government. And unless we understand that we're asking questions about materialism that doesn't register with a martyrdom complex.
- [22:02]
A
And Ed, when you say the IRGC was built for this moment, they've been preparing for a version of this moment for 40 plus years. Can you explain how does one prepare for this moment?
- [22:11]
C
This was built when in 1981 war began with the Iraqis. The then leader, both Ayatollah Khamenei and his successor Ayatollah Khomeini, saw that it wasn't the conventional Iranian army that was the most effective fighting force, that was prepared to lose lives, give up their own families and starve in the battlefield, create thousands of martyrs, walk into minefields to detonate themselves. It wasn't the Iranian army, it was the irgc, the Revolutionary Guard, the elite command force. And that IRGC gained more and more power inside Iran's factions, both civilian and military. And therefore the IRGC controlled Iranian government has been built for this moment since 1979. 1981, the war in Iraq. They're fighting in Syria against the American backed forces, against Turkey, them fighting in Iraq against American backed forces, against Kurdish forces, them fighting and preparing Lebanon and them training IIGC training Hamas in Gaza. We have 40 years of them preparing for their ultimate showdown with Israel and with America. And their moment has come. And guess what? They found Israelis, the Americans and their allies wanting to, they're saying, come invade us. And that is not something that we're prepared to do rightfully. So they've choreographed fight them in Hormuz. And one of the things we forget, Dan and Especially. I don't mean to pick on you as an American.
- [23:42]
A
I'm used to it.
- [23:43]
C
It's just that we don't have a long enough historical memory. When you sit down with Iranians, with Persians, they talk about the 700 year war with the Greeks and the Romans, where they fought the battle of Marathon, where they were defeated at a similar choke point. They refer back to those moments and they don't want to go and be defeated in another choke point today, which is hormones. So they're people of strategy, theology, philosophy, history, and we're people of MBAs from Harvard that looks at strategy and tactics in a short range term. And we have democracies in the elections that think in four year terms. So there's an imbalance here which we've got to understand. And that's why I say they've been built for this moment and we've got to understand their psychology in order to win for us and our Arabian and Israeli allies.
- [24:27]
A
I want to get to your CFR piece because it's an important piece, but before I do, I just. Nadav, I want you to respond to what Ed is saying because I was having a conversation with our friend, our ARC Media colleague, Amit Segal, in a conversation we recorded for Inside Call Me Back that'll be released on Friday. That's our subscriber members only podcast. But he made the point that what's being reported in Israel right now is the Mossad estimates that the Iranian regime could still fall, might still fall, will fall in 2026, by the end of 2026. Now he got into the political Dyn. If the regime were to fall in 2026, does that mean before the end of October 2026 or between the end of October 2026?
- [25:05]
B
First of all, I'm always happy, Dan, to be the platform in which you actually promote the inside. Call me back with Amit.
- [25:12]
A
No, no, no. I promote yours too. I promote yours too.
- [25:15]
B
And secondly, so you went into the political calculus of what's going to happen in Israeli elections if the Iranian regime will fall. This is what you're telling me?
- [25:24]
A
No, no, no. I'm saying that was the context in which Amit was discussing it. We were having a conversation about Israeli politics. And my reaction to him saying that Nadav was how does the Mossad is the. I said, I asked him, I said, does the Mossad really think with some precision that they can estimate that the Iranian regime falling will be a 2026 event regardless of whether or not it's the second quarter of, I mean, the third quarter of the year or the fourth quarter of the year, that's besides the point, but just the idea that in 2020, because I'm listening to Ed and I'm thinking he's speaking about this scenario or this trajectory on a completely different hemisphere in terms of time horizons. And do you have the same reaction I have, which is what on earth is the Mossad thinking, if this is what they really believe? I don't know what the real assessment is. Assume the Mossad assessment is that regime change will happen soonish. And then you listen to Ed and he's like, you people are on another planet.
- [26:17]
B
So, first of all, to your question, just very directly, I hold the Mossad professionals in the highest regard in their field. I don't think that they can have any calculated estimate as to when the regime will fall. And I can also add to that, and I'm sorry, Dan, for doing that. It's a sort of an inside call me back conversation. But all of those listeners that didn't register, this is the kind of stuff you'll be hearing, if you will. The head of the Mossad is finishing his tenure, Dadi Barnea, and he is leaving behind his legacy. And it has its share of success and it has different type of stories. And I think that right now, one of the issues at hand is that the Mossad for years estimated during his reign as the head of the Mossad that they can either lead to or contribute substantially to regime change in Iran. The former heads of the Mossad, like Yossi Cohen and Tamir Pardo before him, were much more skeptic than Dadi Barnea. Now the jury's still out if there's going to be a revolution in Iran in the next two years. Dadi Barnea was right. Because it's a known fact that Israel has invested many resources in assisting the possibility of a regime change in Iran. It's just a fact. And these things can take time. But at any rate, to your question, very plainly, I don't think we have the tools to see that the country is defunct, the country is bankrupt, and because of that, a revolution or regime change can happen. But here's the thing. In dictatorships, totalitarian dictatorships, and this is what we're facing, it can happen tomorrow, it can happen in two months, and it can happen in 12 years. I have Iranian friends, they are also saying, you, the west and Israel specifically, and the United States, have assisted our cause in ways we have never imagined. You have killed the leader, you have killed his generals. It's on us now, which is a message that also is coming from America. We have helped you. It's on the Iranian people now.
- [28:22]
A
Hi, it's Dan. Over the past couple of years, Call Me Back has grown into something much bigger than we ever expected. A place for clarity, context, and honest conversations at a time when those things can seem hard to find. That's what ARC Media is all about. Building a truly independent voice, which means no one shaping what we say or how we say it. To help support our rapidly expanding operations, we created Inside Call Me Back, our members only feed where we answer your questions and bring you into the conversations that typically happen after the cameras stop rolling. If CallMeBack has been meaningful to you and you want to be part of what we're building, I hope you'll join us. Right now, we're offering an annual subscription for $60. That's just $5 a month. Your contribution goes a long way in helping us show up when it matters most. You can subscribe@arkmedia.org or through the link in the show notes and to our insiders. Thank you. Okay, Ed, I want to get to your CFR piece, the Council on Foreign Relations piece you published, which our listeners can find via the link in the episode's description below in our show notes. And your piece argues that military pressure against Iran has reached its limits. And the real strategy now is to empower Iran's ethnic minorities. The Kurds, the Baluchis, the Arabs, the Tajiks, the Turkmen. I mean, can go on and on and on and try to put pressure and kind of capitalize or accelerate tensions based on these fractures. But Iran's ethnic minorities didn't rise up during the 67 days of bombardment. Now, to be clear, that President Trump said early on he discouraged them from leaving their homes. So that may have been a factor. But do you think this could happen now? Can you just explain a little bit, give us a little bit of background on how you're thinking about this opportunity and how it could work now and whether or not you think it could work now.
- [30:16]
C
For decades, Dan, our friends in the Arabian Peninsula, while opposed to the regime and its nuclear program, didn't really want the regime removed because it would create refugee flows, it would disrupt the balance of power in the region, and it would create uncertainty for their own economic plans. Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. So they were just kind of just maintain some kind of balance. Don't develop a nuclear weapon. And you just. You guys in Tehran, you're mullahs. We disagree with you. You're Shia, you're Persian dominated, but we'll just let you live in peace. It was a cold peace. But something happened in the last 70 days that changed the dynamic for our friends in the region. And I think it changed for those of us who have sympathies and friends and family in the region that Iran crossed a line. Iran attacked Israel repeatedly. Iran attacked the Jordanians, the Saudis, the Bahrainis, the Romanis, and most intensely the Emiratis. Because the Emiratis hold up an alternative model for being both Muslim and being both traditional, being tied to Arab identity, but also making peace with the Israelis, dealing with the Chinese, as well as being a close ally to the Americans. That third way model is a model that undermines the Iranian Mullah led regime. So what I'm about to say and what I wrote, I write with a heavy heart. And I say with a heavy heart, which is the Iranian government has lost credibility and has nullified the social contract with the Iranian peoples, plural, which is you are all governed by the wilayat al faqih ideology, which is to say the Messiah or the Mahdi will return. And in the meantime, we the clerics are going to be your government. That contract that the Iranian Persian led government from Tehran had with the Baluchis, with the Ahwazi Arabs, with the Kurds and with the Azerbaijanis, Azeri minorities and others no longer stands because in their name it has attacked not just the Jewish state, but multiple Arabian states. That contract is now null and void. So we're now in a new world, not of our making, but of the Iranian government's making. And our response to that, Americans, Europeans, our Arabian allies, our Turkish friends as well as our Israeli friends and allies, is to say what the Iranians have been saying since Ahmadinejad's time, since Khamenei's time, that Israel must be wiped off the map. And we all thought it was limited to Israel, but now they're saying that the Arabians must be wiped off the map. They're attacking the United Arab Emirates ruling family, the Saudi ruling family, the Bahrainian ruling family, the Jordanian ruling family. Now it's our time to say we're going to flip the game on you. We want to see the end of the Iranian regime and we want to see a more empowered Azerbaijan. We will back that from Arab countries as well as Israel, as well as Europeans as well as Americans. So the Iranian government has now created four major enemies in its own domain. We've now got to cross that red line like They've crossed many red lines. They say, no, we don't recognize that control anymore. We don't recognize that government anymore. And our allies in Arabian countries, in Israel, in Europe, in America and the diasporas, plural of those countries, are prepared to now support breakaway minority, federalized governments against the control of the mullahs in Tehran. And here's the last point, Dan. Whether we win or not, I believe is in the hands of go. What we should do is at least cause hell for the Iranian government inside and stop fighting as they want us to fight in Hormuz and in Gaza and in Lebanon and in Syria and in Iraq and in Bahrain and the Eastern Province in Saudi Arabia. No, take the fight inside where it hurts them, where they're vulnerable. And we know that because the supreme leader keeps talking about this being the Israeli and American strategy. I'm not Israeli, I'm not American, I'm Sunni, I'm Muslim. And that was not our strategy. But you, the Iranian mullahs have now made it our strategy because you've attacked Arabian and our allies and friends in the region that did not enter this war. So this is the comeback that the game you want to play on us, we're prepared to now play back on you.
- [34:19]
A
Okay, I just want to project out with the nuclear stockpile in question partially intact. You know, it depends how we, how serious of a problem we consider it to be. But Hormuz clearly still contested. This three stage proposal, at least as it is currently drafted, feels to be deferring some of the hardest questions. So I guess my final question for both of you is what does the US actually do now to avoid waking up in five years with a nuclear Iran and a closed strait?
- [34:49]
C
Just to respond and reflect very briefly on where we are with Arabian states. And by Arabian, I'm not referring necessarily to Egypt here or to Syria or Lebanon. I'm referring to the heart of the Arab world, which is Saudi Arabia, uae, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar. Those are the OG Arabs, if you like. There's something there in the peninsula between the uae, Saudi Arabia and those countries that can project outwards that helps ultimately solve. Is too strong a word, but helps reduce the tension with Israel and by extension the Jewish people. After Gaza, we have a real problem with high level radicalization. Private polling inside Saudi Arabia and multiple other countries shows that younger Saudis had no problem problems with Israel before October 7th, they didn't know Israel being any different from Serbia, Bosnia, Moldova. It was just another country for the average Saudi under the age of 25. Now that young Saudi is much more radicalized. And the Saudi Crown Prince, Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, in order to make sure that his government and his vision is legitimate and he's still in, in line with that younger generation of Saudis has got to take a different position in relation to Israel and in relation to the Palestinians. But then and now I still believe, and this is where it becomes really difficult in terms of the Israeli public opinion has also shifted. Doesn't want to see a Palestinian state, doesn't want to see any form of Palestinian nationhood. And I think there we're onto something. If we can crack that, in other words, from the Israeli government now or a future form of government, some kind of 10 year, 15 year roadmap to an entity, a state, a nation, a land, whatever you wish to call it, then we are giving real rope to the Saudis and the Emiratis, to the Algerians, to the Syrians, to the new Lebanese government, to the Indonesians and others that look, the old model of resistance that the Iranians champion has not worked. We are now entering a new era pioneered by Arnold Toynbee's creative nations here, the uae, Bahrain, Morocco and Israel to say we can trade, we can partner, we can coexist, sure, we don't have to like Israel and Israelis don't have to like us. It's not about like, this is not a relationship, this is about coexistence. So nod to the hostility and say this is not about liking, this is about living together and stopping the mutual killing and give the Palestinians some form of home hope horizon that allows for MBS to say my older brother, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed was right and that way we reduce the tension that we're seeing between the Saudis and the Emirati that's ultimately harming American and Israeli allies. And here's the damage, it's helping the Iranians against the uae, India, Israel. And that's a dangerous development that forces the Americans to take a position and in the long term, to answer your question, Dan, not even the long term, short term, find America in this very difficult position of choosing between a NATO ally, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, home of Mecca and Medina, and the Saudi Crown Prince and India, which is a nuclear power, against Pakistan, which is a nuclear power, and against Israel, which is a nuclear power. And the way, one way, not the only way, one way to do that, and I think a quicker way to do that is to A, remove the regime, but B, work on some kind of Palestinian home hope, whatever we wish to call it, that allows for the Saudis to maneuver and become closer to the Emiratis and therefore change the regional architecture. And unless we do that, I'm afraid we will be manipulated, denied, deceived, and as Nadav rightly said, forced to be in a position of do we trust the Iranian government or not? And the answer there hasn't got to be, oh, maybe we do, maybe we don't. The answer there is decisively no, we don't trust a government that has unleashed hell on our friends and families over the last 60 plus days. And God help us, what happens if we leave them in place for the next four years, five years?
- [38:42]
A
Nadav, same question to you.
- [38:44]
B
I think that at the end of the day, the most important thing to be clear eyed about is that the general trend is towards ending this because of many, many reasons related to economy, related to politics. And therefore it's what Ed was saying there about the big ideas as to the region and the vision for the region that we should be focused on. And we need also to take into account that the interest of the world and specifically of the United States is not going to be with the Middle east as it was maybe in the last year and a half, including in the war, and with Gaza. And it's going to be on us to try and figure this out. I think this is a clear message and Israel will need to take its place there in trying to assist in having this united alliance of sorts or limited alliance of sorts.
- [39:36]
A
I think there's a conventional wisdom in the US that the Trump administration wants to pull back as it gets closer to midterms, the midterm elections. There is a sense among many in the administration that they've exerted enormous military pressure on Iran, enormous pressure on the regime, and there's a limit to the returns you get with continuing this military pressure. So it's not to say they don't want more pressure on the regime. It's just there's just a sense like there's not that much more value to be gained by continuing to exert a lot of pressure.
- [40:04]
C
I hear that very quick interruption, if I may. Dan, I haven't interrupted you intentionally throughout the whole.
- [40:09]
A
Please. I welcome interruptions.
- [40:10]
C
But if I may, just to give all of us a sense of we thought Bashar al Assad in Syria was firm. We called for removal of Assad since 2011 and it took 14 years. He's now gone. So if the regime that is a more powerful regime over a smaller land with a more cohesive population that was much more infiltrated into Syrian households I lived in Syria for two years, visited often. Can collapse. Don't underestimate what could happen in a bigger Iran, much more divided, with many neighbors and superpowers involved in its disintegration. And the regime falling is good. On balance, it's a net positive for almost everyone other than the most troublesome people in the world. So the forces of gravity are much heavily weighed against this government than with Assad and with others. So I think we should be optimistic. As Nadav said, it's a question of time. Not if, but when.
- [41:01]
A
But that's always the case, Ed. That's why I was curious about Nadav's reaction to that Mossad, the report about the Mossad saying, you know, in 2026 the regime could fall. Intelligence communities everywhere, including our own here in the United States, often gets these things wrong. It's very hard to predict. You said that the Assad reg 14 years of pressure on the Assad regime and then there was a new uprising that no one, or at least I didn't see coming. And then the regime fell in 14 days. And Bashar Assad and his family are somewhere like in the outskirts of Moscow right now living. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the predictions in some corners in the intelligence community was that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours. And here we are four years plus later and Kiev is still standing after 9 11. When the US went into Afghanistan, all these predictions was that the Taliban would never fall. And of course the US and the coalition rolled right into Afghanistan. The Taliban eventually fell. So again, I'm not the intelligence community missed the fall of the Berlin Wall. It's just very hard. Cuz there's a whole flywheel that needs to be in effect when these regimes fall and things like this dramatic change. But what you're basically saying is the regime's under a lot of pressure. Who knows when, but it'll probably happen.
- [42:05]
B
Yeah.
- [42:06]
C
And it's made new enemies. Something has changed. It's made new heavyweight enemies that it did not have confronting it directly previously. Ultimately we win, win and the Persians lose, as they had previously lost in 7th century wars and the Sassanids had fallen. So if they're listening, and I'm sure some of them do listen to your podcast, Dan and Nadab is that Iranians lost the Sassanians in the 630s and they will lose again. Whether it's in the 2000s or the 2000s. Their destiny of loss is guaranteed. It's a question of when. And we will win. We will prevail. Our side will win by the grace of God, as you would say in Israel.
- [42:45]
A
You know, I don't know if Nadav will say that. He's very secular. He may not say that.
- [42:48]
B
I say that more times a day than you because I'm Israeli, Dan.
- [42:52]
A
Okay, fair enough. All right, gentlemen. Ed. Nadav, thank you for this very rich conversation. Ed, we'll look forward to having you back on. Nadav will be back no matter what. But, Nadav, we will rope Ed to join us again. Thank you, guys.
- [43:06]
C
Thank you.
- [43:07]
B
Thank you.
- [43:16]
A
Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Weiner. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan. Senor. Sam.