Ground Assault or Diplomacy? - with Nadav Eyal and Fred Kagan

Summary

Episode Overview

Title: Ground Assault or Diplomacy?
Podcast: Call Me Back – with Dan Senor
Guests: Nadav Eyal (Senior Analyst, Yediot Aharonot) and Fred Kagan (Director, Critical Threats Project at AEI)
Date: March 30, 2026

Main Theme:
The episode explores Israel's and the United States' dual approach to the ongoing conflict with Iran: the interplay between intensifying military operations—possibly escalating toward a ground assault—and simultaneous diplomatic efforts to find an off-ramp. The conversation offers strategic, military, and political insights about where the conflict may go next, the significance of key tactical developments, and the mindset of the Iranian leadership.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Current Military Situation in Iran (03:20–07:24)

• Status of the Campaign:

  • [03:33] Fred Kagan explains that the US and Israel are mid-way through a multi-week air campaign targeting missile and drone infrastructure, air defense, and Iran’s broader defense industry.
  • Recent US/Israeli strikes have advanced eastward into central and eastern Iran; there's also been a focus on disabling Iran’s capacity to launch attacks through the Strait of Hormuz.

• Missile Attacks by Iran:

  • [04:53] Iranian missiles struck a US base in Saudi Arabia damaging key aircraft, but US operational capability is largely unaffected.

• Israel’s Approach:

  • [05:29] Nadav Eyal notes Israel’s shift from targeting regimes’ power bases to more strategically fundamental infrastructure (industry, research), prioritizing these before a possible sudden diplomatic breakthrough.

2. Regional Escalation & Proxy Actors (07:24–08:09)

• Houthi Activity:
  • [07:34] The Houthis have "joined the war," but have stopped short of closing the Red Sea, seen as Iran’s ploy to leverage negotiations with the US without full Houthi escalation.

3. Parallel Military and Diplomatic Tracks (08:09–11:24)

• Diplomacy in Wartime:

  • [08:41] Fred Kagan underscores that it’s normal to conduct military operations and diplomatic talks concurrently. He cites Korea and Vietnam as precedents for intense negotiations amid ongoing hostilities.
  • [09:20] Dismisses the media narrative that the simultaneous tracks are unusual or contradictory.

  "There's nothing irrational about having negotiations while you're fighting a war." — Fred Kagan [09:20]

• US and Iranian Negotiation Dynamics:

  • [10:51] Nadav Eyal says Iran’s leadership, dominated by the IRGC, genuinely believes it’s winning, not just posturing. This shapes their bargaining position and could pose risks for diplomatic engagement if they overestimate their leverage.

4. Iranian Leadership's Mindset & Information Blackout (11:24–14:29)

• Leadership Dynamics:

  • [11:24] IRGC is truly running Iran; other factions (like the President) have little power.
  • [11:24] Negotiation efforts underway in Islamabad are seen by some regional players as potentially rewarding Iran (fees for Hormuz passage).

• Perception vs Reality:

  • [14:38] Fred Kagan notes that IRGC’s radicalism clouds their grasp on reality, worsened by shutdowns of the Iranian Internet—limiting internal situational awareness.

  "Their perception of how they're doing is very heavily colored by their ideology." — Fred Kagan [14:38]

• Assessment of Achievements:

  • Iran feels holding the Strait of Hormuz is a strategic victory, though in reality, it hasn’t fully closed the strait.

5. The Prospect and Risks of Ground Operations (17:09–19:17)

• Possible Scenarios:

  • [17:15] Fred Kagan: Options range from limited raids targeting boats/minelayers to a full seizure of Kharg Island—an economically vital Iranian oil export hub.
  • Such actions could dramatically undercut Iran’s revenue and hold significant leverage.

• Israeli Perspective:

  • [19:25] Nadav Eyal: Israel would aid with intelligence but not likely participate in a US-led ground operation. He shares Israeli officials’ view that if a ground incursion happens, Iran may retaliate by targeting regional energy infrastructure (even threatening the UAE).
  • [21:00] Suggests a maritime blockade or targeted strikes on specific energy installations as alternatives to ground operations, as both sides see energy as a central leverage point.

  "If the U.S. takes Kharg Island...the Iranians are going to hit energy and oil installations across the region. There's going to be no limit to their response." — Nadav Eyal [19:25]

6. Debate: Blockade vs Seizure vs Destruction (23:23–24:16)

• Leverage Psychology:

  • [23:25] Fred Kagan cautions that physically destroying assets (like oil fields) removes leverage, while seizing them (like Kharg Island) permits bargaining.

  "Once you blow something up, you’ve generally lost the leverage that you might achieve by holding it at risk." — Fred Kagan [23:25]

• Complexities of Blockade:

  • [23:25] Blockade involves legal and diplomatic challenges—most tankers are not Iranian-flagged—so international repercussions must be considered.

7. Endgame Scenarios: US and Israeli Perspectives (24:16–28:41)

• US Endgame:

  • [24:26] Fred Kagan: Too early to speculate on regime change; optimal goal is ensuring Iran cannot credibly threaten the Strait of Hormuz in future.
  • Anything short of decisively breaking Iran's presumed ability to “turn off” the strait is a strategic failure.

  "If this war ends in a condition in which the Iranians feel like they have proven to themselves that they can disrupt traffic at will...that will be a very bad outcome for us." — Fred Kagan [24:26]

• Israel’s Dependent Role:

  • [26:22] Nadav Eyal: Netanyahu accepts that the US will ultimately dictate the endgame. Three options exist:
    1. Declare victory, open Hormuz, halt the campaign (not ideal for Israel).
    2. Make a broad, non-specific declaration (could be even worse).
    3. Continue military pressure for a detailed deal (the preferred path, seemingly underway).
  • Passover will likely be spent “in and out of bomb shelters”—underscoring the conflict’s continued intensity.

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• [09:20] Fred Kagan: “There’s nothing irrational about having negotiations while you’re fighting a war.”
• [11:24] Nadav Eyal: “According to my sources, the Iranians aren’t bluffing. The Iranians think they’re winning the war. This is not posturing. This is really what they’re saying.”
• [14:38] Fred Kagan: “Their perception of how they’re doing is very heavily colored by their ideology. And I don’t think that you can really separate those two things.”
• [19:25] Nadav Eyal: “If the US takes Kharg Island...the Iranians are going to hit energy and oil installations across the region. There’s going to be no limit to their response.”
• [23:25] Fred Kagan: “Once you blow something up, you’ve generally lost the leverage that you might achieve by holding it at risk.”
• [24:26] Fred Kagan: “If this war ends in a condition in which the Iranians feel like they have proven to themselves that they can disrupt traffic at will...that will be a very bad outcome for us.”
• [26:22] Nadav Eyal: "His endgame is whatever the president decides, and he understands that...the decision would be made by the White House."

---

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 03:20 – Opening of core discussion; military status in Iran
• 05:11 – Iranian missile strike on US base in Saudi Arabia
• 07:34 – Houthi escalation and strategic implications
• 08:41 – Concurrent military escalation and diplomatic efforts
• 11:24 – Detailed analysis on Iranian leadership mindset
• 14:38 – How Iranian radicalism affects regime judgment
• 17:15 – How a potential US ground operation might unfold
• 19:25 – Israeli intelligence perspective on escalation risks
• 23:25 – Debate on destroying vs. holding energy assets for leverage
• 24:26 – US strategic endgames and regime change debate
• 26:22 – Netanyahu’s probable endgames and Israeli domestic impact

---

Conclusion

The episode offers a nuanced, often sobering discussion on the complexity of the current US-Israel-Iran standoff. Both military escalation and diplomatic engagement continue in tandem, each shaping—and being shaped by—the other. The Israeli perspective reflects both strategic urgency and dependence on the US; meanwhile, the Iranian leadership’s radical worldview and information disconnect risk miscalculation. With escalation and negotiation both in motion, the region’s near-term future remains tense, indeterminate, and fraught with the possibility for both breakthrough and disaster.

Transcript

[A]

As events accelerate in the Middle east, the team here at ARC Media is increasing our coverage. More conversations, more context, more time spent trying to help make sense of what's happening. Our inside callmeback subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. This week we published the second part of a three part series with Ronen Bergman. It's called Inside Mossad's Shadow War with Iran, which includes some of the most dramatic and dazzling operations the world of espionage. It's also quite simply a riveting spy story that has largely been kept out of public view. If you're not yet an inside call me back subscriber, this is an important time to join us. To subscribe, you can follow the link in our show notes or visit ark media.org and to our insiders, thank you.

[B]

You are listening to an Ark Media podcast. The Iranians think that they're winning the war. This is not a PR campaign or stunt. They really believe that they're winning this in the sense that their goal, that is to use Hormuz in order to extort the global economy and the rest of the region. This game, as far as they are concerned, is playing out well. Now the problem there is that if they're convinced they're winning first crisis, they're just going to leave the room because they think that they're winning. They don't know what Iran, what the Islamic Republic has lost.

[C]

I think it's likely that they don't understand the scope of what's happened because the Iranian Internet has been basically shut down completely. That interferes with their own ability to understand what's going on. So their perception of how they're doing is very heavily colored by their ideology. A lot of these guys are, if not quite apocalyptic thinkers pretty close to that foreign.

[A]

It's 3pm on Sunday, March 29, in New York City. It is 10:30pm on Sunday, Mar. 29, in Tehran. And it is 10pm on Sunday, mar 29 in Israel. In today's episode, we take on one of the central questions shaping the war. Right now, two tracks are moving in parallel. A military track pushing toward possible ground escalation, and a diplomatic track trying to shape an outcome before events overtake it. Those two paths are unfolding seemingly at the same time, in fact, in some ways feeding off each other, competing with one another, and raising the central question of this moment. Is the military buildup meant to lead to a larger operation, including a ground operation, or to create leverage for negotiations to unpack what each track is trying to achieve where each may succeed or fail and what the coexistence of both tells us about the choices ahead. I'm joined by ARC media contributor and senior analyst at Idiot Akronot Nedavael and Fred Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and a former professor of military history at West Point, Nadav. Fred, welcome back.

[C]

Good to be with you.

[B]

Thank you for having us.

[A]

Let's begin by getting our bearings on the military situation, the status quo, if there is one in Iran. I'll start with you, Fred. What are some of the recent tactical developments we should be keeping our eyes on?

[C]

So, Dan, the military campaign has been proceeding according to long standing plans as far as we can tell. And we're about four weeks into a campaign that has probably another two to four weeks left to run. That's very important because what we're saying is we're a bit over the halfway mark on this campaign. U.S. and Israeli forces are continuing to conduct strikes across Iran now increasingly in central and eastern Iran as the campaign has proceeded from west to east, striking missile infrastructure, drone infrastructure, air defense sites, and also a lot of internal security facilities. And the combined air campaign is also heavily attacking Iran's defense industrial base. And we've seen some increasing strikes on Iran, Iran's nuclear program, obviously from the standpoint of the issues that matter most to most Americans. We've also seen the deployment of a 10 Warthog attack aircraft, Apache helicopters and other assets to destroy Iran's fast attack craft, the small boats and the mine laying vessels that they would use to try to disrupt traffic in the Strait. And that's a new development which indicates a focused effort to deprive Iran of those capabilities. And it also indicates a degree of air dominance in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz that would allow the use of those kinds of aircraft.

[A]

Also, Fred, Iranian missiles struck an American base in Saudi Arabia, from what I understand, hitting AWACS and tanker planes. In terms of the significance of that, I mean, obviously it's on the one hand worrisome. But put it in the context of the larger war and the larger war plan, how do you evaluate it?

[C]

Well, I don't think that that's likely to affect our ability to conduct the campaign. It's obviously very expensive damage that the Iranians have done with this strike. And but I'm not hearing or I don't have any reason to think that this is going to compromise our ability to continue to fight the war.

[A]

Okay, Nadav, what are you paying attention to? Right now.

[B]

So I'm looking at the same things that Fred just spoke about. And also I'm looking at the way that the Israelis are conducting their own strikes in Iran, hitting industry, for instance, Iran's biggest steel complex, as far as we know. But also other targets that have dual use, military and research across the country. There is a tendency to move in terms of choosing these targets or prioritizing these targets from targets that were associated with the regime's strength, for instance, besieged bases across the country, into more fundamental targets that have a lot to do with, one could say that the industrial strength of Iran and the military complex there. Now, I'm also looking at Israel's ability to tackle the launches of ballistic missiles. We've seen an uptake of the launching of ballistic missiles out of Iran, including against the UAE and Israel. It's not significant. It's not significant, but it's there still a reduction of 80 to 90% since the beginning of the war. But still, this is extremely meaningful, of course, for the people living in the areas that are being attacked in the countries that are being attacked by the Iranians. And of course, the Israelis are constantly worried and they feel that there's a clock ticking. They don't know when exactly this will end. But they have, or at least senior sources are saying that they do not estimate that there's going to be an agreement anytime soon in the next few days. They might be surprised, of course, everything is to the decision of the president. And they understand that. And this is one of the reasons that the IDF has been told by the government, get those fundamental targets that you want to get as soon as possible right now, prioritize those right now, and not towards the end of the campaign, because we don't know when it will end. They still estimate, both politically and military sources, that it's not there yet in terms of diplomacy.

[A]

And what about the Houthis threatening to join the war? What is the significance of that? Blocking the Suez? How do at least your Israeli sources assess that development?

[B]

The Houthis have actually joined the war, but they have not closed the Red Sea and the strait there. And the meaning of that is that this is analyzed by sources across the region, by the way, not only Israelis, as Iran trying to make its hand slightly better in the negotiations towards the negotiations with the United States. And that's the reason that they're now using the Houthis. It's still not a full entry of the Houthis to this war. But the fact that the Houthis are willing to Go belligerent, to go aggressive is meaningful.

[A]

Fred, Marines are heading to the Gulf. They may already be there as part of what is talked about as some kind of ground assault. That's one track. But on another track, Vice President Vance is reportedly heading to Pakistan to advance talks or try to engage in talks with the Iranians. So why Pakistan in the middle of all of this? And how do you interpret the dynamics between these two tracks? The one track being diplomatic engagement, a big effort there. And at the same time, Marines being deployed to the region.

[C]

This is not unusual in war. You can conduct diplomacy during wartime, but you simultaneously continue to conduct military operations with full. And you do that right up until the moment when you have reached a deal. That's normally how things proceed in a war where there are negotiations going on.

[A]

And, Fred, just because you're a historian of wars and military, there are plenty of examples like this where. Because there's a narrative right now in the press that I think is off. But whatever. There's this narrative in the press that, like, what's the US Doing? On the one hand, they're trying to do talks. On the other hand, there's military operations and even escalation of military operations. And I think what you're saying is this is totally normal. This is not unusual.

[C]

Yeah, it is. I mean, I think there have been wars where there have been no negotiations until things were settled on the battlefield. And then there have been wars. The classic case is Korea, where we had, you know, intensive negotiations going on for a couple of years, while some extremely. Some of the nastiest fighting of the war was going on for different positions to set the terms of where the demilitarized zone would actually run and who was going to have the advantageous terrain. And that kind of thing lasted for, I don't know, 18 months or two years during the Korean War, and we had negotiations going on during Vietnam as well. Wars can go either way, and there's nothing irrational about having negotiations while you're fighting a war. This is going on in Ukraine is we've got a lot of negotiations on a lot of subjects with a lot of players, but the war is continuing very intensively. So this is not unusual. I think the thing that you need to keep in mind is that what the US And Israel are doing right now is the sensible thing, which is you continue to execute your campaign plan, not limited, not modified, not restricted, while you are seeking diplomatic resolution on your terms. And you should especially do that if you have reason to think that the military situation will change in your favor by continuing to execute your plan, which in this case, I think there's reason to think that that is the case.

[A]

Nadav, what's your sense of how the Iranians would look at this? What one could interpret as inherently contradictory, but what Fred is saying, not that unusual scenario of where their military operations continue. There appears to be escalation by the US And Israel, and yet everyone's heading to Pakistan to try to have a negotiation.

[B]

So, first of all, you know the US Is still not in Pakistan holding these talks. I'm not saying that it's not going to happen, but it didn't happen yet. And I don't see the Iranians in Islamabad until now. But here's the thing, Dan. According to my sources, the Iranians aren't bluffing. The Iranians think that they're winning the war. This is not posturing. This is really what they're saying.

[A]

And when you say the Iranians, you mean not one faction within the Iranian leadership. It's not like the IRGC feels that way. The president isn't so sure. We're hearing, at least in public sources, that there are these conflicting views of what's going on within the leadership.

[B]

That's very true. But Iran is being now managed and completely run by the irgc, these factions. You're talking about the President. The president is, I don't want to say meaningless, but he doesn't have a lot of power right now. It doesn't seem that there is a fracture between the army and the IRGC as of yet, maybe because of some actions that were done by the regime before that. And at any rate, the senior security officials in Israel that I'm speaking with and across the region are saying that as far as Tehran is concerned, it is winning this war. This is not a PR campaign or stunt. This is not posturing. Again, they really believe that they're winning this in the sense that their goal, that is to use Hormuz in order to extort the global economy and the rest of the region. This game, as far as they are concerned, is playing out well. Now, I want to say something about that. By saying that they think they're winning, it doesn't mean that I think they're winning or that the sources I speak with think that they're winning. The problem there is, Dan, that if you want to go for an agreement, and the president has made clear that it is his desire to reach an agreement, he has put forward the 15 point plan. This is not us interpreting the president right. This is what the president is saying in order to get to a deal, they need to sit down to a table. And let me quote one source who is quite well high up in the Israeli system, and he tells me, look, the problem is that if they're convinced they're winning first crisis, they're just going to leave the room because they think that they're winning. Now, how do you see that? Today there was a meeting in Islamabad between a coalition of Muslim countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and some other countries that came there in order to reach some sort of an understanding towards an agreement between Iran and between the United States. Turns out that the Egyptians that were part of it are talking about a mechanism in which the Iranians will be able to collect some sort of fee for passage in Hormuz. So the Egyptians are talking about this now, and that means that they're managing even to sell that idea to some counterparts in the region. Again, the fact that the Iranians see this this way can say that they are detached from reality. One of my sources has told me, hey, they need to have a few days just to see what we have taken away. They are so isolated, this leadership, communications is so limited because they fear for their lives. They don't know what Iran, what the Islamic Republic has lost in those last few weeks. And maybe this is the reason that they have this perception of reality. Iran experts will tell no, no, it's because they're radical. It's because they prepared for it, and it's because they don't care. They just want to survive. But they're not only surviving this, they're also still holding two Hormuz. So it's two things that they achieved as far as they are concerned, and one of them they didn't suspect they're going to achieve, which is hold Hormuz for so long.

[A]

Fred, from your perspective, first of all, any reaction to Nadav, and why would you think that the Iranians think they're winning if in fact they do think they're winning?

[C]

I don't think you can separate the radicalism of this leadership from its ability to parse reality. This is that the leadership that fought the Iran Iraq war, these guys all participated in the revolution, they all fought the Iran Iraq war. There's some terrific work that's been done about how the IRGC became more and more radical as the situation became worse and worse over the course of the Iran Iraq war. Because a lot of these guys are, if not quite apocalyptic thinkers, pretty close to that. Their perception of how they're doing is very heavily colored by their ideology. And I don't think that you can really separate those two things. I think that Natav is right. I think it's likely that they don't understand the scope of what's happened. We're also in a weird moment here because the bombs are still dropping, the campaign is still unfolding. They don't know what lies ahead for them, and they're not in a position to take full stock, as Nadav said, about what their current situation is. The Iranian Internet has been basically shut down completely. That interferes with their own ability to understand what's going on. They have obviously, other means of communication, but everybody uses the Internet extensively, and they've turned it off, so they don't have a sense of what's happening. And I think we also need to be careful about when we're talking about holding Hormuz. What the Iranians have done is to demonstrate that they can damage ships that attempt to pass the strait. They have not mined the strait. They have not closed the strait. They have not taken naval possession of the strait. They're not capable of doing the latter. It's not clear how successful they would be if they tried to mine the strait fully at this point, based on the developments that we talked about previously with us A10s and Apaches and other aircraft looking for the mine layers. So right now, what we have is the Iranians are doing close to the minimum necessary to persuade the international shipping community not to transit the strait. And so this is a dynamic that where the Iranians are playing with the thought process and risk tolerance of ship captains and the countries of flag and the insurers. And I'm not suggesting that people should run the strait at this point. I don't think that conditions have been set for that. But I think we need to be careful because we give them too much credit if we say they've closed the strait, because that has a sort of a military implication. That is not, in fact, the case right here. But all of which, having been said, Nadav is right. This is one of the things, one of the mechanisms that the regime has long built up, the capability to do, that they regard as their trump card, and they see that it's working. The price of oil is rising. Everyone is losing their minds. There's a lot of pressure building on President Trump to end the war. From their perspective, that looks like success.

[A]

And, Fred, how would a US Ground operation work? What would that look like, and what do you think it could achieve?

[C]

You could do a variety of things with US Forces on The ground ranging from sort of raids or taking positions on the coast of the Strait of Hormuz in order to find and destroy the fast attack craft and the minelayers and make sure that they can't do that. But the operation that everyone is talking, talking about, of course, is seizing Kharg island, which is Iran's oil terminus. And I've forgotten what percentage of Iranian oil exports pass through Kharg, but it's an enormous percentage. And that would be economically crippling to Iran because right now the situation, as is how exquisite everyone has been reporting, is that Iran is able to export oil and we, our partners and allies, are not able to receive it because the Iranians are only exporting it to what they regard as friendly states. So the seizure of Kharg island would do enormous damage to the regime's ability to receive income and continue to pay its supporters. That's certainly an operation that the US Military could conduct. I don't think there's any reason to think that that would be a particularly challenging operation in the circumstances. There would be risk involved, of course, but I think that that could be done. I think there are questions that one can ask. How much pain is the regime willing to tolerate and how much pain is it able to tolerate in terms of loss of revenue and over what period of time and under what circumstances would it ransom Kharg back and then, of course, would it be able to escalate in response to that? And all I can say to that is the combined campaign is obviously taking every measure to destroy Iran's ability to escalate. So it's too soon to tell.

[A]

And Fred, before I bring Nadav back in, does the US have most or all of the ground forces in the region and easily accessible and deployable that they need for the scenarios you're talking about, or are we still waiting for U.S. forces to arrive?

[C]

CENTCOM reported that the USS Tripoli amphibious ready Group with Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked has arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. So presumably that's either on station or close to being on station. The other forces that people have been talking about deploying, I don't know what their status is. I don't think we've seen confirmation of where their location is, which is good.

[A]

And Nadav, how would a US Led ground operation change Israel's role in this? What could be this next phase of the war?

[B]

Well, Israel is already cooperating, of course, with the United States on intelligence and planning as to Hormuz in general. And this was confirmed almost on the record by the Israelis. I do not know of an intent by Israel or a desire or request by the United States that Israel itself participates in a ground operation. If there would be a ground operation that isn't a commando raid, for instance, to take out those few hundred kilograms of enriched uranium that are really one of the strategic elements that the US And Israel are trying to solve in this war. I want to remark something that was told to me by people I've spoken with as to the possibility of the US Conducting some sort or any ground operation, any ground operation, and here's what they told me. They said, look, if the US takes Hog island, takes either islands, tries to take control of the strait itself, of Hormuz, which is more difficult, most probably, or more complex, if it tries to do any of the sort, the Iranians are going to hit energy and oil installations across the region. There's going to be no limit to their response because they will see this as an invasion and it will be an incursion to their sovereign territory. By the way, the Iranians have been threatening, for instance, to invade the UAE in response. So if they're going to do that anyway, said that official I spoke with, we believe that the best way to go about this is to go for energy anyway, maybe without risking ground forces. If your assessment, and that is the assessment, at least by the Israeli intelligence, that the Iranians will basically involve energy, maybe the first thing you need to do is to block the tankers that are crossing the Hormuz Strait, approved by the IRGC right now. In order to cross Hormuz, they designed a corridor, a maritime corridor, using mines. And that corridor is close to the Iranian shore in the strait. And you pay according to shipping sources. You pay about. And this was published also by Lloyd's. It's not only my sources, about $2 million per tanker. I think Thailand has announced that it's discussing, for instance, with the Iranians, free passage there. It's not going to be free. This 2 million are paid through crypto, according to other sources. So maybe the first thing to do there is to have a maritime blockade, which is an essential thing to do, first of all, stop Iran from exporting oil, which it still does. It still does. It's not doing this exactly the same rate that it did before the war. This has changed, but it's still doing that. Secondly, if they are going to hit energy installations across the region and processing and what have you, maybe the right way to go is to begin by telling them instead of a ground operation. And I'm now, again quoting the experts that are officials from within the Israeli apparatus, they're saying maybe the right thing to do is to tell them, look, we're going to take one energy plant after one oil factory and so forth and so forth, an oil field, and we are going to escalate instead of going for any ground operation. Now, they're not saying that because they're afraid of a ground operation or they don't think the US can do that, or they think it might get nasty. They're saying that because they're saying if you're using this as leverage in order to release Hormuz to free this passageway, and it's all about energy, and they're going to attack energy in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and all the rest. So begin with energy. Why do you need to use this leverage of taking control of Hag or taking control of the Strait? And by the way, I'll be very interested to hear, I'm sure, that there is another angle to this. I'm presenting stuff that I've been discussing with my own sources, but I'll be happy to hear what Fred or yourself have to say about that.

[A]

Fred, any reaction to that?

[C]

Yeah, I mean, look, we can have a lot of discussions about what's the best way of going about taking away Iran's ability to export oil. Once you blow something up, you've generally lost the leverage that you might achieve by holding it at risk, and that's a problem. And certainly you can make a list of things and say, we'll blow them up one at a time, but you're destroying leverage as you do that. A blockade is a little bit complicated because what you're, among other things, what you're talking about doing is interfering with the free passage of neutral shipping. That is not Iranian flag in most cases. And that is not. I mean, that gets you into various complexities with the various countries with whose tankers you're actually interfering. So you need to make some decisions about what the cost benefit of doing that is. The argument for taking CARG instead of blowing it up is exactly that. You've taken a massive hostage at that point, and you can offer to give it back. If you blow it up, then you can't offer to give it back.

[A]

Okay, well, Fred, let me ask you this then. Based on what you are seeing, based on just your analysis of what you're seeing in terms of public sources, what is the end game here from the US Perspective?

[C]

Well, I don't know. The thing that we haven't not talked about Today is the question of whether we think that there's some regime change option that is still on the table. It's premature to make any kind of assessment about what the prospects for something like that are, because that's not something that is going to be underway while a massive air campaign is unfolding. We've certainly seen, especially the IDF striking a lot of internal security targets. That clearly has the intent of destabilizing the regime. We won't be able to know what the actual effect of that is going to be until the bombs stop falling. I know that a lot of people have been very quick to say there hasn't been an uprising yet, therefore there won't be an uprising. Therefore this is a failure, and this is the regime we're going to be dealing with. I say, okay, the odds are that this is the regime we'll be dealing with, because a successful uprising is a very low probability event. But it's really premature to make a call about that. If we're not talking about that, if we are talking about this regime, then the end game obviously depends on what President Trump is prepared to accept. From my perspective, the optimal end game is one in which the United States and Israel have demonstrated to the Iranians they do not fact have the ability to disrupt traffic through the strait. I think that if this war ends in a condition in which the Iranians feel like they have proven to themselves that they can disrupt traffic at will through the strait and that we will surrender at the end of the day, as long as they show that capability, that will be a very bad outcome for us. And that's why I think that it's important that we carry on with the campaign to its conclusion and try to generate the effect of depriving Iran of that capability and demonstrating that we can deprive Iran of that capability. Can we do that? I don't know. But I think that carrying on to the completion of the campaign and focusing on that is worth trying.

[A]

Nadav, just wrapping here, it looks like this year's Pesach holiday, Passover in Israel, will be celebrated in and out of bomb shelters and safe rooms. What is Prime Minister Netanyahu's endgame? We talked about what the US Endgame is. Possible endgame. What is Netanyahu's realistic endgame, given that reality?

[B]

His endgame is whatever the president decides, and he understands that. He understands that There are right now three options. The first option is for the United States to say unilaterally, to some extent, we have degraded Iran's military and nuclear capabilities, we have won and end the war and reach some sort of an understanding that Hormuz will open in some sort of way, or maybe at a certain point. Last week I heard the president saying something about it's not oil that reaches the U.S. they'll need to take care of it. So this was raised. Now, I'm not saying that this is likely. I don't think this is likely.

[A]

Okay.

[B]

The second possibility is a variation of the first to reach some sort of a general statement, general principle, declaration of the sides that ends the war, but no specifics. That is, as far as Israel is concerned, as worse as the first option, probably even worse. This is the kind of declaration that you don't want to have because it means that it's sort of wrapped up, but it didn't. Third option is to continue on the pressure and escalate, whether it's with ground forces, with a new aerial tactic, the stuff that will pressure the Iranians and will make sure that they understand that they have still a lot to lose if you can actually reach that. And in that sense, if you can do that, reach some sort of an agreement that be specific and include parts or ideally the 15 point plan by the President. These are the three options. And what's absolutely the common denominator here is that the decision would be made by the White House. As far as my sources across the region, not only Israelis are saying right now the US Is signaling that it's swaying to the third option. It's also. That's what it's doing right now. It's increasing its ability to act in the region with ground forces. It's continuing its attack. It's saying, we're willing to reach an agreement, but based on these 15 points, and they are definitely preparing for weeks of more fighting. And that means for Netanyahu that indeed Pesach will be spent, some of it. And you can make sure, you know, it's absolutely the case that Tehran will

[A]

do its best to try to ruin Pesach. Right?

[B]

Yeah. And I want to say in that regard that this is indeed becoming difficult. It's becoming difficult for the Israeli economy. It's becoming difficult for Israeli citizens. It's not an easy thing by now because everything is on a standstill. And people who are listening to us, who have family members in Israel or wanted to travel to Israel to have Pesach in Israel with their family or friends, they probably understand and can acknowledge that.

[A]

Nadav. Fred, thank you for doing this. Very quick, efficient, but important update. And we'll be back with you guys soon.

[B]

Thank you.

[C]

Thank you very much.

[A]

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavael, Amit, Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arkmedia.org that's arkmedia.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.