Iran War Part III?- with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

Summary

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Podcast Summary: Call Me Back with Dan Senor

Episode: Iran War Part III – with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal
Date: July 27, 2026
Theme: Assessing the mounting risks of renewed direct war between Israel and Iran, the possible political consequences for the U.S. and Israel as both approach dramatic elections, and the broader dilemmas facing Israelis and the Jewish diaspora.

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Episode Overview

The episode centers on the unraveling ceasefire (MOU) between the U.S., Israel, and Iran following two rounds of major conflict, and the rising probability of another war (“Iran War Part III”). Host Dan Senor leads a discussion with analysts Nadav Eyal (senior analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth) and Amit Segal (Channel 12 political analyst) to explore:

• The security situation between Israel, Iran, and the U.S.
• Strategic calculations behind potential military actions
• Political dilemmas in the lead-up to Israeli and U.S. elections
• Evolving sentiments within Israel and the diaspora, and new challenges around global antisemitism, especially in New York City

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Unraveling of the Iran MOU and Implications for Renewed War

[07:20 – 09:17]

• How did the MOU collapse?

  • Amit: The MOU was an effort by the Trump administration to reduce energy prices before U.S. midterms, though many felt it was overly favorable to Iran. After months, failed negotiations brought the situation “exactly to the same point where we had been in April.”
  • Quote: “At the end of the day, dealing with fundamentalist Muslims and specifically this very fundamentalist Muslim regime is not something that has a high probability.” (Amit, 08:53)

• Why did it backfire?

  • The agreement left critical details ambiguous and notably allowed Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz, giving it leverage.
  • The collapse has resulted in renewed violence: U.S. strikes escalate, Iran responds by contesting Hormuz, and oil markets react.

2. Likelihood & Form of Iran War Part III

[09:17 – 12:59]

• Decision Point:

  • Nadav: “The Israelis are waiting, as usual, for the decision to be made by President Trump.” Israel refuses to go back into war if it just leads to another “bad” MOU; it seeks meaningful objectives (removing Iranian enriched uranium, targeting key infrastructure).

• Signals of Impending War:

  • Increased cabinet-level and IDF security deliberations.
  • Heightened military preparedness, with “plans made in advance… all waiting for President Trump.”
  • Reports of U.S. hesitation over weapon shortages may be “psychological warfare” or decoys.

• Historical Precedent:

  • Past surprise strikes followed similar pretexts and deliberations, suggesting the increased risk of conflict in the coming weeks.

3. Strategic Calculations: What Do Netanyahu and Israel Really Want?

[13:12 – 14:28]

• Smotrich’s Doctrine:

  • Israel prefers “the US fights Iran and vice versa, without Israel being involved.”
  • Quote: “From a geopolitical perspective, for Israel, the situation now is almost perfect… because Israel is not a superpower. It does not pay the price for the energy crisis.” (Amit, 14:28)

• Endgame Theories:

  • Economic blockades/sanctions (rather than war) could push the Iranian regime to collapse by late 2026, a view held by some Israeli security leaders.

4. Iran’s Internal Calculus & Changing Attitude Toward Israel

[16:29 – 19:46]

• Iran’s Narrative:

  • The regime sees Trump as an existential rival, believes the U.S. repeatedly violates agreements, and is pressured by hardliners to “go as extreme as you can get.”

• Strategic Shift:

  • A new strand in Iranian thinking now sees value in provoking Israel into direct conflict, thereby dragging the U.S. into another large-scale war.
  • Quote: “There is an entire line of thought in Iran that says maybe we should pull the Israelis in, because… they are dragging the United States again to war. This is exactly the kind of position that the Iranians want to present to the American public and to the world.” (Nadav, 00:21 & 18:56 recap)

• Israeli Alarm:

  • Israel is on "high alert" for Iranian surprises, such as assassinations or strikes, designed to force Israeli and American retaliation.

5. Election Year Pressures in Both Israel and the U.S.

[20:32 – 22:44]

• Divergent Priorities:
  • Amit: Netanyahu needs war to secure his legacy (“this is his only way to save his legacy after October 7th”) and win an increasingly desperate election. Trump, by contrast, urgently wants to avoid war and resulting energy price spikes during the U.S. electoral season.
  • Quote: “For Trump, it’s crucial not to have war come October or November. And for Netanyahu, it’s crucial to have a war come October or November.” (Amit, 22:02)

6. Israeli Public Opinion: Appetite for War?

[23:46 – 25:30]

• War Fatigue vs. Regime Change:

  • Israelis don’t want another inconclusive round of airstrikes, but may support a decisive operation, e.g., removing Iran’s uranium with a ground force or targeting energy infrastructure.
  • Amit: “There is no appetite for another round of fighting… but, yes, there is an appetite for toppling this regime.”

• Three “Acceptable” Options:

  1. Ground operation to extract uranium.
  2. Bombing Iranian energy infrastructure.
  3. Ground campaign to open Strait of Hormuz.

7. Political Traps and Opposition Dilemmas

[27:37 – 29:18]

• Unity or Trap for Opposition:

  • Any major strike supported by the U.S. puts Israeli opposition leaders in a “honey trap”—caught between appearing unpatriotic if they criticize military action, or strengthening Netanyahu if they support it.
  • Nadav: “It puts them in this honey trap any way you want to cut it, even if it achieves nothing. And it buys him [Netanyahu] time because he’s less than three months to the elections right now and he’s in really bad shape… Wars—you know how they open, you never know how they end. And that’s very true politically for Netanyahu.” (28:00 – 29:05)

• Netanyahu’s Campaign Logic:

  • Security issues play to Netanyahu’s electoral strengths; domestic and economic debates expose his vulnerabilities.

8. The West Bank: Fears of a Third Intifada

[30:42 – 39:05]

• Rising Friction:

  • IDF is more concerned about the West Bank erupting into mass violence than a renewed Iran war; ongoing attacks, settler-Palestinian confrontations, and the collapse of the Palestinian Authority’s influence all contribute to a volatile mix.

• Settler Violence & Political Fallout:

  • Amit: Acknowledges rise of “Jewish terrorism,” but frames it as less deadly than Palestinian violence.
  • Nadav: “Jewish terrorism in the west bank is a serious problem to the safety of Israelis and mainly to the safety of Palestinians. And we see attacks… every day… burning down houses… to cause friction.” (35:42)
  • Both agree escalation plays into right-wing hands and could hurt centrist opposition efforts.

• Political Impact:

  • Any new intifada or spike in violence is likely to boost the right-wing bloc, scattering the opposition and moving swing voters—particularly from national-religious communities—back to Netanyahu.

9. Diaspora Challenges: The New York City Mayor’s Rhetoric

[41:46 – 49:00]

• Rise of Anti-Israel (and Perceived Anti-Semitic) Rhetoric:

  • The New York City mayor, Mamdani, has threatened to arrest Netanyahu at the UN, fueling fears among American Jews across political and religious lines.

• Growing Alarm in Diaspora:

  • “There's just a general sense among Jews here in New York specifically that they feel less safe as a result of what he's doing.” (Dan, 41:38)
  • Amit: Quips about Mamdani’s “perfect” wish for a meaningful Tisha B’Av fast; warns that such leaders are early signs of broader trends (invokes the parallel of anti-Semitic mayors in Vienna before the 20th century).

• Political Distraction or Movement?

  • Dan: Argues Mamdani is less interested in municipal governance and more in reframing the debate about Israel, representing a troubling shift in American politics that could have long-term effects on US-Israel relations.

• Example:

  • Rabbi Angela Buchdahl (Central Synagogue) issued a public rebuke of Mamdani, highlighting that his rhetoric creates an unsafe climate for Jews, regardless of their stance on the Israeli government.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Iranian Strategic Thinking:
  “There is an entire line of thought in Iran that says maybe we should pull the Israelis in… this is exactly the kind of position that the Iranians want to present to the American public and to the world.” — Nadav Eyal [00:21 & 18:56]

• On Trump-Netanyahu Divergence:
  “For Trump, it’s crucial not to have war come October or November. And for Netanyahu, it’s crucial to have a war come October or November.” — Amit Segal [22:02]

• On Israeli Public Sentiment:
  “There is no appetite for another round of fighting… but, yes, there is an appetite for toppling this regime.” — Amit Segal [23:46]

• The “Honey Trap” for Opposition:
  “It puts them in this honey trap any way you want to cut it… even if it achieves nothing. And it buys him time because he’s less than three months to the elections right now and he’s in really bad shape. However, with wars, you know how they open, you never know how they end.” — Nadav Eyal [27:52 – 29:05]

• On Diaspora Anxiety:
  “Our synagogue has armed guards and metal detectors… We need you [Mayor Mamdani] to stop using rhetoric that demonizes Jews and the Jewish state and help create the climate in which threats and violence flourish.” — Rabbi Angela Buchdahl, quoted by Dan Senor [44:15]

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Timeline Highlights (Timestamps in MM:SS)

• 00:21 – Nadav on Iranian aims to get Israel to pull in the US
• 01:06 – Amit on election dynamics: “For Trump, it’s crucial not to have war… for Netanyahu, it’s crucial to have a war”
• 09:31 – Nadav outlines Israel’s “wait on Trump” policy regarding Iran
• 13:12 – Amit discusses Israel’s preferred scenario: US-Iran fight without Israeli involvement
• 16:29 – Nadav on Iranian regime motivations post-leadership assassinations
• 22:02 – Amit on the diverging interests of Trump and Netanyahu in wartime
• 23:46 – Amit on Israeli public sentiments toward war and regime change
• 27:52 – Nadav outlines the political “honey trap” for Israeli opposition
• 30:56 – Nadav and Amit discuss growing risks of a third intifada
• 35:42 – Nadav: Jewish terrorism is a major issue in the West Bank
• 41:46 – Dan on rising anxiety among New York Jews regarding Mayor Mamdani
• 44:15 – Statement from Rabbi Buchdahl criticizing Mayor Mamdani’s rhetoric

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Tone & Language

• The conversation is fast-paced, deeply analytical, occasionally sardonic (notably Amit’s humor), but always focused on high-stakes stakes geo-politics.
• Direct, sometimes pointed, with a blend of worry over both immediate physical risks and political/communal long-term concerns.

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Summary for New Listeners

This episode is an in-depth, urgent examination of why another Iran-Israel war may be imminent, what’s at stake for the U.S. and Israel as both nations stumble toward contentious elections, and how these pressures are tangled up in both local political calculations and the existential security debates of Israelis and Jews globally. The episode deftly explores not only what may unfold militarily, but what it could mean for societies and communities worldwide—layering hard security analysis with political insight and growing concern about the Jewish experience in the diaspora.

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Further listening suggested for those interested in:

• The fate of the Iranian nuclear program post-2025
• Inside perspectives on Israel’s electoral dilemmas
• The shifting relationship between American Jews and Israeli politics amid rising U.S. anti-Israel sentiment

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All advertisements, episode intro/outro, and non-content were omitted from this summary.

Transcript

[Dan]

There's never been more coverage of Israel and the Jewish world and there's never been less of it worth trusting. That's why ARC Media exists and our subscribers are what make this possible. Join [e-mail] and to our subscribers. Thank you.

[Nadav]

You are listening to an Art Media podcast. There is an entire line of thought in Iran that says maybe we should pull the Israelis in, because if the Israelis are in and we attack the Israelis and they need to respond, they are dragging the United States again to war. This is exactly the kind of position that the Iranians want to present to the American public and to the world. Again, the Israelis are the puppeteers of the US President and Israel is on high alert as to the possibility of a surprise by the Iranian. That surprise could be an assassination of a high level official, it could be a strike in a strategic location, or it can be the Iranians going first.

[Amit]

Both Netanyahu and Trump face decisive, crucial election campaigns in the autumn of 2026. However, here they split because for Trump, it's crucial not to have war come October or November. And for Netanyahu, it's crucial to have a comes October or November because this is his only way to save his legacy. After October 7, all Netanyahu could have hoped for is for Trump to sign the MOU and then to see that Iran actually interpreted it as a decisive victory, as an outright victory. And that's why Trump will have to resume the war.

[Dan]

Its 10am on Sunday, July 26th in New York City. It's 5pm on Sunday, July the 26th in Israel as Israelis closely monitor developments in the Gulf and whether or not Israel will find itself in another direct hot war with Iran for the third time, all while heading into one of its most dramatic elections in history. Before we get to today's episode, a quick housekeeping note. We're inviting a small group of ARC media listeners to help us develop and test new products and features. And this may include interviews, focus groups, product testing, or other opportunities to share your perspective. If you're interested, you can find a short signup form in the show notes. Participation is completely voluntary and we may not be able to include everyone who signs up, but we'd be grateful to hear from you. Now on to today's episode. In June of 2025, Israel and Iran fought a 12 day war that ended with a nuclear superpower in the making stopped cold in its tracks. President Trump ordered B2 bombers to Fordo Natanz and then brokered a ceasefire of sorts within the same month. It looked like the story of the Iranian nuclear program might actually have an ending. Then, in late February of this year, the US and Israel entered an all out war with Iran with the goal of securing Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and some would say with the goal of toppling the regime itself. The war destroyed much of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, its air defenses, drone and naval capabilities, its military leadership and command structure, while also severely damaging some of Iran's critical infrastructure. Iran responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz. Over the following months, a ceasefire calcified into a memorandum of Understanding that on close reading gave Tehran almost everything, or at least a lot it needed to survive and rebuild. Enrichment was paused but for a fixed 12 to 15 year window with the fate of the enriched uranium stockpile itself left deliberately ambiguous. Ballistic missile limits only touched long range systems Iran claims it wasn't building in the first place. And most remarkably, the MOU created a new Iranian bureaucracy that decides who gets to sail through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint carrying nearly a fifth of the world's oil run on Iranian terms dressed up as diplomacy. Now it's late July 2026 and the MOU has effectively and predictably collapsed. US attacks on Iranian infrastructure have been escalating. Iran has been attacking US targets in the region. Hormuz is contested, oil markets are moving, and increasingly analysts are assessing that Part three of this war could take place, but perhaps within days, potentially with Israeli forces which have been on high alert. So the question of this episode is the one sitting in the title, are we headed towards Iran War Part 3? If so, how would it be different? And how does this all play out politically, as both the US and Israel are headed to elections in just a few months? To answer these questions, I'm joined by ARC Media contributor and senior political analyst for Channel 12, Amit Segal, and by ARC media contributor and senior analyst for Gideon Ahronot Nedavayev. This conversation right after a quick break. Earlier this month, nearly 5,000 North American and Israeli teens came together in Israel for Route 1's big tent event, the largest gathering of international Jewish teens in Israel and the first of its kind in over three years. Just think about that. You've got thousands of young Jews spending their summer in Israel, experiencing the country firsthand, building lifelong friendships and discovering what it means to be part of something much larger than themselves. Plus, they topped it all off with a concert by Eurovision runner up Noam Bataan. I've spoken about Route 1's work before, but this is exactly why it matters. This is how we build a generation of confident, proud and resilient young Jews by giving them the opportunity to experience Israel together and form real, lasting connections. If you're a parent of a teenager, you can learn more about these transformative Israel [e-mail] Foreign. Welcome back.

[Amit]

Hi.

[Nadav]

Thanks for having us.

[Dan]

Nadav, you look like you're in a different setting than you normally are in. So where are you right now?

[Nadav]

Yes, I'm in this prestigious setting and this is history in the making. It's the offices that are going to house Columbia University's Global center in Tel Aviv that was announced back in April 2023 and is going to open this summer in Tel Aviv formally, by the way, it's already, I think, on Colombia website, together with the other global centers around the world.

[Dan]

And I think one of the only Ivy Leagues is that right, that has this kind of setup in the heart of Israel and in the heart of Tel Aviv.

[Nadav]

As far as I know, there isn't any other Ivy League that has this global censure. But this is, you know, after what we saw on university campuses across the U.S. including, of course, in Columbia University, got a lot of traction in media in our criticism, it's really nice to know that this is opening.

[Dan]

Excellent. Let's jump into today's conversation. Amit, I want to start with you. A few months ago, Iran and the US Signed an MOU that we all thought was, let's say, favorable to Iran or maybe too favorable to Iran. How did we get to this point now where the MOU has collapsed and the chances of the war are going up, at least resuming sometime soon, maybe even this week, although there's some debate about that. How did we get to this point?

[Amit]

So in statistics, it's called regression to the mean, which means that, you know, two months ago people already were busy writing the obituaries for the Israel, US and the Trump Netanyahu relationships. The idea was that US Threw Israel under the bus and that not only the US Is going to have a peace agreement with Iran, it is going to provide Turkey with F35s and Saudi Arabia with a nuclear program and, and Qatar with a new contract. And Israel is it's not only that America first, but Israel is last. And we see now that writing the obituaries was actually too early. It was merely an mou, an attempt to reduce the energy prices prior to the midterms in the United States. But at the end of the day, dealing with fundamentalist Muslims and specifically this very fundamentalist Muslim Regime is not something that has a high probability. Here is the question, does President Trump want to initiate the war or to resume the war more than he wants the energy prices to be kept in the previous level or the other way around? But we see now that after, give or take, 60, 90 days of futile negotiations, we are exactly at the very same point where we had been in April, when the war was not brought to an end, but at least to a pause.

[Dan]

Nadav, you spent last week speaking with a number of Israel's top security officials. What is their assessment of the chances of a third round? And also, if there is a third round, what would an Iran War Part 3, actually look like?

[Nadav]

So the Israelis are waiting, as usual, for the decision to be made by President Trump. It's up for the president to make that decision, if indeed there's going to be a part three of this war. And one thing is for sure, Israel doesn't want to have this part 3 if the meaning of that is to return back to the mou. So I was told that in no uncertain terms, if indeed you are going to have an operation in Iran, if the purpose of the operation is just to have a better hand in implementing an MoU that Israel thinks is bad in the first place, that's not something that Israel wants to see. If the purpose is to take out the enriched material, uranium, that's one thing. If the purpose is to attack some national infrastructure like oil and energy, that's another element. But if the purpose is mainly at this point for the US to pressure the Iranians to start implementing the MoU, no, the Israeli Defense Administration doesn't want to see that.

[Dan]

Nadav, what are the signals that you are seeing or could be seeing, that something more concrete and kinetic could take place soon?

[Nadav]

So, first of all, there are security deliberations, including of the Israeli cabinet, one, if I'm not mistaken, is happening right now as we are speaking, and they have been taking place in an enhanced capacity and intensity in the last week and a half. That's one thing. There are other signals I simply cannot discuss. There are different levels of alert throughout the idf, and there is preparation for the possibility of strikes in Iran. Now, there are a few plans that were made in advance, but they are all waiting for President Trump. We saw this morning the report by the New York Times that the president has decided to postpone a strike or an operation against Iran because of a shortage of interceptors. Take that report with a grain of salt. I don't think that the president needs General Kaine to Tell him what is the level of Interceptors? What I mean is I think that American decision makers are well aware of where they are at at this point. And I wouldn't rule out the possibility of strikes or a strike in the next two weeks.

[Dan]

Can I just stay on that for one moment before I bring Amit back in? Can you say a little more about that? What do you mean by President Trump doesn't need General Kaine to tell him what the limits are on Interceptors?

[Nadav]

Israeli sources found the report not surprising, but odd to some extent. It's not that the Americans need a specific meeting in the White House to understand where do they stand as to the interceptor, the interceptor issue is paramount in every calculation towards a possible attack or an operation. Now, I'm not saying that this is psychological warfare. I don't know.

[Dan]

You mean when you say psychological war. I mean you're not saying you don't know that it's. That it could be some kind of misinformation campaign.

[Nadav]

It's a ploy. Yeah, we've seen that in the past vis a vis the Iranians. Right. Do you remember, Dan, that before the 12 Day War, there was supposed to be another round of negotiations, and then that ended with a surprising strike by the Israelis, and then the US joined back in June 25th. So it's not something that has never happened between these people, Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump. They have had their share of the disinformation campaigns against the Iranians, and we should remember that. But what I'm saying is that right now, the Israelis don't feel that it's off the table, although this is the signal that you can hear throughout American media.

[Dan]

Okay, Amit, how do you think Netanyahu wants this to play out? Not politically. We'll get to political implications and the political calculations in a moment. But just thinking strategically and geopolitically in the region, how does he want this to play out?

[Amit]

So geopolitics are quite different than domestic politics. But my second most popular tweet ever, and not for good reasons, was last week when I quoted Israel's Finance Minister Smotrich, saying that for Israel, the best case scenario is what we are seeing now, that the US Fights Iran and vice versa, without Israel being involved. It was quoted last night by Tucker Carlson, two days ago by Nick Fuentes, which means it became popular for all the wrong reasons.

[Nadav]

Yeah, it begins with Smotrich and continues on to Nick Fuentes. What was your first most quoted?

[Amit]

Happy to report that my fourth child was born. His name Is Elam Oz. Okay, the most popular tweet was a joke about after the ceasefire about Hamas being the only army on earth that wears uniform for ceasefires, in the disguise when fighting.

[Dan]

Just to rehash. I didn't realize. I saw that report fly all over the place. I didn't realize it originated from you and from a tweet from you. But. So, just to be clear, Finance Minister Smotrich was quoted, or you quoted him, saying in some meeting or something that the current situation is the best situation as far as Israel is concerned. And why. Just. Just to explain why. Why that is at least from Smotrich's perspective.

[Amit]

Yeah, absolutely. So, again, we are speaking now about geopolitics and not domestic politics. We'll get to it. But from a geopolitical perspective, for Israel, the situation now is almost perfect. Because if we are not allowed, if Israel is not allowed attack Iran's energy facilities and in Iran's economic hubs, then a siege or a blockade is the perfect solution. Because Israel is not a superpower. It does not pay the price for the energy crisis. And that's why the assumption in Israel and by the former head of Mossad, Adi Barnea, is that if the siege and the blockade continue, the Iran regime is to collapse around the end of 2026. It's in the horizon. And that's why for Israelis, it's perfect. You know, Lufthansa is still flying here and British Airways, and the economy is performing very strongly from the data we keep receiving. So for Israel, it's perfect. This is from a geopolitical perspective.

[Dan]

Okay, Nadav, In February and March, the US And Israel killed the Supreme Leader, killed his wife, killed members of his family, many of Iran's top leaders. One can equate that to a U.S. enemy, say, killing the U.S. president, his family, half of the Security Cabinet, Pentagon officials, leaders in the CIA, and about a, you know, a big chunk of the US Congress. I'm just trying to make a loose comparison here. But the regime survived. So one could argue, some have argued that that was their win. They took these extraordinary blows, and the regime, however fractured, is still standing. So what are they looking to achieve by escalating? Like, what is the story that the regime is telling themselves? And I'm not suggesting that you are talking to the regime or have direct insight into what the regime is telling itself, but I do know you're talking to sources in the Israeli security establishment that have, let's just say, pretty good intelligence about the conversations happening within the regime.

[Nadav]

The Iranian regime is telling itself first and foremost that the US Keeps violating the agreements that it has with them. They see President Trump as a mortal enemy. What we have seen in the funeral of the supreme leader, Khamenei, these slogans and signs about killing Trump, that is no joke. They think that President Trump has made himself the most important rival of the Islamic Republic since its establishment. And they are not looking only on the killing of Khamenei or allowing Israel to attack in June of 25 or launching a war against Iran again this year, but also, for instance, the killing of Qassem Soleimani at the time. So he has this track record that has made him such a nemesis of the Islamic Republic. And what they're telling themselves is they signed this MoU, which includes specific clauses as to the passage of Hormuz, that gives them some sort of leverage there, at least during those 60 days. And the President has again and again refused to allow them what they see as their own right according to the agreement that they signed. They see this as a violation of the agreement in total. And there is a strict within the administration, within the Iranian regime that thinks that the only way to play this game with America is to go as extreme as you can get. And also believes that the President is not going to dare do anything substantial to the Islamic Republic in the form of taking territory or destroying its entire energy sector because he himself, the president, is deterred because of the November elections. So this might be a good time to get some advantages out of the weakness, as far as they see it politically of Israel and the United States. They are also seeing the friction between Israel and the United States. They are seeing the polls, they are seeing the criticism as to Israel. And one of the interesting things there, Dan, is that there is an entire line of thought in Iran that says maybe we should pull the Israelis in. And this is a change they didn't want the Israelis in. And they are now rethinking this. Because if the Israelis are in and we attack the Israelis and they need to respond, they are dragging the United States again to war. This is exactly the kind of position that the Iranians want to present to the American public and to the world. Again, the Israelis are the puppeteers, that anti Semitic archetype. They are the puppeteers of the US President. This puts them in a very nice position as far as they are concerned. And Israel is on high alert as to the possibility of a surprise of sorts by the Iranian. That surprise could be an assassination of a high level official. It could be a strike in a strategic location. Or it can be the Iranians going first, and the Israelis fear that moment because they know the Iranians might be considering trying to drag Israel and the United States into conflict before the US And Israel do something themselves.

[Deborah Pardes]

I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of ARC News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. That's why we started ARC News Daily. Every weekday morning I walk you through the most important news, give you the context you need, and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything, and I don't waste your time. On most days I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully a little bit smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show Notes. I hope to see you tomorrow.

[Dan]

Amit we are headed to elections both in Israel and in the US in late October for the Israeli elections and then obviously November. We have our congressional midterms, a number of gubernatorial elections. How do you assess the political will in Israel for a third round? And then I want to talk to you about the U.S. but let's just start with Israel.

[Amit]

Okay, so here's the contradiction, and I would like to make an introduction. The introduction is that I think Netanyahu and Dermer former Minister Rondeur, is still one of the most informed and influential Personas in the Israeli administration. If not officially, they were the least hysterical about the relationship post the mou.

[Dan]

You're saying they're the least hysterical?

[Amit]

Yes. They were way more worried about the situation in Lebanon at the time than the situation in Iran for two reasons. One, they understood that Israel and the US are allies and they have overlapping interests. But it's not fully overlapping as always, like the UK and the US in World War II. And the second thing is that they saw it through the lenses of Trump and Netanyahu being politicians. Now here's the contradiction. Both Netanyahu and Trump face decisive, crucial election campaigns in the autumn of 2026. However, here plate because for Trump it's crucial not to have war come October or November, and for Netanyahu, it's crucial to have a war comes October or November.

[Nadav]

Why?

[Amit]

Because Netanyahu still has to topple this regime. This is his only way to save his legacy after October 7th. And for Trump, his only possible path to actually win the midterms against all the odds against history is to keep energy prices low. This is the crucial or the fundamental difference between the two leaders, and that's why they couldn't come to terms. Basically, all Netanyahu could have hoped for, and this is exactly what we're seeing now, is for Trump to sign the MoU and then to see that Iran actually interpreted it as a decisive victory, as an outright victory, and that's why Trump will have to resume the war.

[Dan]

Amit, my only question, I guess, as it relates to Israel is, is the Iran war, what Israelis have experienced so far with regard to the Iran war, is it not very unpopular? Meaning it was one thing during the 12 Day War, during Operation Midnight Hammer, where Israelis were in their Ahmads, their bomb shelters, whatever you want to call it, for 12 days and completely shut down. But there was a very specific goal. There was a sense that was achieved, whereas with Epic Fury, it went on much longer than 12 days. And I got the impression, I got this impression anecdotally, and also you saw in some of the public polling that early on the Israeli public was very supportive of military action against Iran. But then people just got kind of exhausted and worn down. And then there's a sense during the MOU period, from the Israeli perspective, that they don't have much to show for what they endured during the totality of Operation Epic Fury. So you're telling me now there's political appetite among the Israeli public for going back to war with Iran?

[Amit]

Okay, so there is no appetite for including Iran in the policy of yet another round of fighting, like against Hamas in the first two decades of this century. But, yes, there is an appetite for toppling this regime. And that's why, in my opinion, this is where the political and geopolitical roads coincide. I'll explain why. Because Israel is not interested in having another round of fighting in which Israel and the us, The US Air Force and the Israeli Air Force are going to bomb again, 300 more targets in Iran? No, there is no point in this from the Israeli eye and from Netanyahu as a politician. From Netanyahu's point of view, however, if there is going to be a change in the way this war is managed, so, yes, the Israeli public will support it. I'll give you three examples. One is to extract uranium in a ground operation. Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told me yesterday that there was a feasible option to do it during the Epic Fury operation, but the opportunity was missed. And he's not sure, quote, unquote, whether it's still feasible. Option two is to Bomb the energy facilities of Iran. If you heard the Iranian foreign affairs minister, he said that the most painful hit that Iran took during the Epicure operation was the destruction of factories during the last week of the operation. So just to escalate it dramatically. And the third option is to have a ground operation to open the Strait of Hormuz. Those are the three options. Israel, of course, will be interested in the first two and especially in the first one.

[Dan]

Nadav, your response to that?

[Nadav]

Yeah. Another bombing campaign is really something that the Israelis don't want to see. And also it would be very non beneficial to Prime Minister Netanyahu. So if the Israelis are going to go to their shelters and experience another round of ballistic missiles shot against this country, and unfortunately, buildings destroyed and people may be losing their lives and probably injured, and the result of that is another mou, that's something that is actually going to hurt him. And I'm saying this because people need to understand. After June of 2025, he didn't get a real bump in the polls, but his position strengthened somewhat of Prime Minister Netanyahu. He expected to get much more after June of 2025. And I suspect that this is one of the reasons that Israel endeavored to the war in February, because Netanyahu thought, I'm not seeing anything for my efforts against Iran. I need to make another effort. So the Israeli public understands how serious I am. At any rate now, after this war fought between February and April, he just saw, I don't want to say a consensus, but many, many Israelis agreeing that the security situation of Israel did not improve, but actually is worse than it was before the war against Iran between February and April. And because of that, another round in which you can't show actual results is really bad politics to begin with. And this is something I suspect that Netanyahu understands. Having said that, if President Trump says, we need you in this war and he basically gives the order, you're a US Ally, you're in with me on this. You supported this to begin with. And I need to end this, and I'm asking you to join. I don't see any Israeli prime Minister who says no.

[Dan]

And do you think the leaders of the opposition, the leading opponents of Netanyahu heading into this election, would support the prime minister very publicly in assuming he makes the decision, which I assume he would, to accept the president's quote, unquote invitation to join an operation?

[Nadav]

Oh, this I see also Amit is smiling and I'm smiling, too. And let me tell you why we're

[Amit]

going to say exactly the same thing.

[Nadav]

So, Madhav, yes, this is the most appealing thing in the entire operation.

[Dan]

That's why I'm asking. I suspect it. But I want you to string it out here.

[Nadav]

I want to be as focused as I can in my answer. Politically speaking. It's not the achievement that you are going to get in Iran, but the way that you are going to embarrass your opponents. If you're Netanyahu and you're going to strike, because look at their options. They can say Netanyahu, he's attacking Iran right now together with Trump. But we've seen that it didn't lead to anywhere in the previous round. That's not a good position because the Israelis hate the Iranians, because the Israelis fear the Iranians, because it will look like a small, kind of itty bitty kind of calculation, political calculation. If they do that, they can support the strike. And by supporting the strike, they actually give credence to the unity exposed between President Trump and the prime minister. So it puts them in a fix. It puts them in this honey trap any way you want to cut it, even if it achieves nothing. And it buys him time because he's less than three months to the elections right now and he's in really bad shape. However, with wars, you know how they open, you never know how they end. And that's very true politically for Netanyahu. We don't know what the Iranians are going to do. You don't know where they're going to hit. You don't know how many casualties you're going to get because of that. Netanyahu is going to play it safe. If indeed he can have a dramatic attack, strike operation, he's probably going to go for it. If he's not, he's probably going to recommend stay out of it at this point. But he'll do what the president asks him to do.

[Amit]

And first and foremost, because of the agenda. Usually, historically speaking, Netanyahu wins election when he deals with security and diplomacy and loses the election when he deals with domestic issues and economy. Now, for the last month, ish, the debate has focused on the ultra orthodox question, which is the Achilles heel of Netanyahu's political career. So for him, if we are going to have a discourse about security and existential threat, Iranian nuclear program, et cetera, et cetera, he can only earn from it. We're 95 days prior to the election, 93 days. And so far the election hasn't focused on this issue. Now, this is a Very rare failure of the Netanyahu campaign because so far on the campaign trail, Netanyahu failed to actually dictate the issue of the election campaign. Usually he's the spin master. He always spins it to the very question he wants the entire public to focus on. So far, he has failed. But you don't have to be a world expert in campaigning to know that if Israelis are going to go to the shelters again and if the Israeli and the US Air Force are going to attack Iran again, so you can actually control the agenda and to actually direct it into security and diplomacy.

[Dan]

Nadav, at the same time, Israeli security officials have been warning these past few days of a third intifada breaking out in the West Bank. How did we get here? And what do you think the likelihood is of that happening?

[Nadav]

So if you ask me what the IDF actually fears, it has plans to strike in Iran. It's prepared to strike in Iran. It actually fears the possibility of a third intifada of sorts. And I need to say something about the wording intifada, because there are two different intifadas. There is the first intifada back in 1987-1992, 93, that is mostly Molotov cocktails, throwing stones. It's a massive popular unrest and attacks against the idf, against settlers, against Israelis. I don't want to downplay the violence there, but it's a popular revolt. And there's the second Intifada. The second intifada is a military attack, suicide bombing attacks, mostly against Israeli citizens, but also against the IDF settlers, who are, of course, Israeli citizens across the Green Line. So these are different issues. And I don't know, and the IDF doesn't know what kind of third intifada we might be walking into. But what's happening across Judea and Samara, the west bank, is that friction is extremely high. One of the things that the government did do in its four years of term, it changed completely what's happening in the West Bank. We see a lot of taking over lands with agricultural farms. We spoke about that. We see that Palestinian Authority is corrupt and very unpopular and doesn't hold the territory well in terms of security. And we see increased attempts by Hamas to rebuild itself across the West Bank. And we see Iran trying to send weapons to the West Bank. And at the same time, we see far right terrorist violence against Palestinians. And this all boils up and is continuing to boil up now. The last 96 hours, two Israelis, one civilian and the other one an officer, were killed. And four Palestinians were also Killed in an attack that happened near a Palestinian village, which was an attack in which a group of Israelis traveled to a B area of a Palestinian village. There was a confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The IDF was there. And by the way, everything I'm saying right now, highly, highly problematic within the Israeli language. Even Israelis can't even agree about what happened there. The army says it's a terrorist attack. A lot of the left wing part of the Israeli politics is saying it wasn't a terrorist attack because the Palestinians didn't come armed. They grabbed a weapon from a soldier. I think this is semantics. In the end of the day, a Palestinian shot a military officer, IDF officer, he shot a civilian there. They died. Then the soldiers opened fire and four Palestinians were killed, including the shooter. And this is just an example of the tinderbrooks that is the west bank right now. And it can all blow up.

[Amit]

Amit, I have a story to tell. On Tuesday I drove far, far into or deep into the so called West Bank, I call it Judea and Samaria. And I met with someone. People told me, you must meet Itamar Cohen. Itamar Cohen is the legendary founder of a farm, agricultural farm, just 20 minutes from Nablus, from Shechem. He is a magician figure. He's like a cowboy in the west in the 19th century. But the Wild west is the wild west bank in this case. And for an hour we were talking about possible settler violence and how it can be managed and contained. And 48 hours after he was seriously injured from a Palestinian terrorist attack, they put a field on fire and then as a trap. And when he came to put it out the fire, he was stabbed. He almost died. I do not ignore the so called settler violence. I know there are some hundreds of Gen Zs and millennials that attack Palestinians. I think this is a Jewish terror or Jewish terrorism and it should be dealt with and crushed by the Shin Bet and by the police without any hesitation. However, it's still more dangerous to be an Israeli. And I'll give you an example. If you see the footage from the event, so called events on Friday in which two Israelis were murdered, you see that they were holding firearms, but they didn't shoot, even when hundreds of Palestinians surrounded them. And then the Sheikh, the chief of the village, the leader of the village, stole the weapon from the soldier and shot two Israelis to death. So it's just a demonstration what happens when Israelis hold firearms and what happens when Palestinians do so?

[Dan]

Nadav, what's the political context in which all of this is happening.

[Nadav]

So just that our listeners will understand there are differences, serious differences of opinion between Amit and myself as to what's happening in the West Bank. I do not deny Palestinian terrorism or the attempt of Hamas to kill as many Israelis as possible or the challenge to the Israeli control of the West Bank. But I do want to say that Jewish terrorism in the west bank is a serious problem to the safety of Israelis and mainly to the safety of Palestinians. And we see attacks. There are days in which we see attacks every day. And by attacks I don't mean only throwing stones, which is an attack, but also burning down houses, going into villages with the extrep attempt to cause friction. To cause friction. And here we come to your question, Dan. This friction and a third intifada in the west bank, any way you want to play it, is going to play well for Netanyahu. I'm not saying that Netanyahu is pushing for it. I'm not saying that Benvir is pushing for it, although many are thinking that for instance, Ben GVIR is pushing for it and he's the minister responsible for the police. But it will play very well for the right wing bloc and for Netanyahu. If there's going to be an armed confrontation, a massive confrontation in Judea and Samaria between the Israeli army and between the Palestinians, it's going to be fantastic for the election campaign of Netanyahu. I don't think anyone one can deny it.

[Dan]

Amit, if Nadav says nobody can deny it, do you deny it?

[Nadav]

He can't deny it. I just said that it's impossible.

[Dan]

Well, that's why I'm testing it. I'm testing your thesis.

[Amit]

I'm denying the undeniable, give or take. 75% of the Israeli public, especially the Jewish public, think that a Palestinian statehood is a very bad idea, that the Palestinians are to be blamed for the situation in Judea and Samaria and that there should be no withdrawal. Therefore, the Judean Samaria, Palestinian west bank, you name it, is a region to avoid from the perspective of both Eyencode, Bennett and Lieberman, because they cannot justify a leftist policy. And on the other hand, if they fully recognize themselves with a right to staunch right wing policy, they are to lose votes to the left. That's why the loudest voices against settlers since Friday have been articulated from the Democrats Party, from the Ergolans Party, the only party in Israel to define itself as leftist. And this might cause a huge problem for the opposition comes October. Why? I want to explain. Because the swing voters these Days are first and foremost from the national Orthodox sector, which is the pattern of the settler movement. Now, they are swing voters because of identity politics, because of Israel being more Jewish than democratic or the other way around. But when it comes to the Palestinian question or the settlement question, they are are far to the right wing. And that's why when they keep hearing politicians from the left saying that their brothers, sometimes the real brothers, are to be blamed for the terrorist attack on Friday or any other terrorist attack, this is the only thing that can drive them back to Netanyahu's political camp. And that's why it might be a disaster from the point of view of Eisencot and Bennett. And that's why this is a region to avoid from their point of view.

[Nadav]

That was a really long answer. To say that I'm right and he doesn't deny it.

[Amit]

You might very well say so. I cannot possibly comment.

[Dan]

Nadav, you've got to go. You've got much more important business to attend to. So thank you for joining. Amit, I want you to just stay on for a few more minutes before I let you go. Amit, I do want to spend a moment on an issue that I think is breaking through, unfortunately, and galvanizing Jews across the Diaspora, and that is the recent escalation in rhetoric by the mayor of New York City, the city home to the largest Jewish population, Jewish community, certainly outside Israel in the world. And this escalation, I think, has unnerved a number of Jews from right to left, from Orthodox to Reform communities. I mean, this is not about where one stands religiously. This is not about where one stands politically. I think there were many Jewish leaders who had held their fire in terms of rhetorically responding to concerns that others felt about Mamdani and responding directly to Mamdani over the last number of months. And that is beginning to change as a result of the things he has said and done over the last couple weeks, where he laid out these threats, to, quote, unquote, arrest Netanyahu if he comes to New York City for the UN General assembly, which of course he does not have the authority to do. It was preposterous. He knew, by the way, when he issued these threats during the campaign, when he issued these threats as recently as a week ago, he already knew. We now know for sure, but I suspected it. He already knew for sure that he couldn't do this and he wasn't going to do it. But he used the threat of an arrest to, as I said, to escalate the rhetoric, to put forward a number of accusations against Israel that are just provably false and to really, I think, change the center of gravity of debate about Israel, not only among his supporters, not only within the Democratic Party, but I think he's looking to really change the US Israel relationship as we've known it and as we think about it, it. So I'm just curious how it's playing in Israel, because here I will tell you, Amit, everywhere I go, when I'm with listeners to this podcast, they always want to ask me the latest of what's going on in Israel and what's going on with the Iran war and the stuff we were talking about earlier today or what's going to happen with the Israeli election. And I've just been struck in the last couple of weeks. Every time I spend time with supporters or listeners or subscribers to the podcast, all they want to talk to me about Mamdani and what it means. And there's just a general sense among Jews here in New York specifically that they feel less safe as a result of what he's doing. I am just curious if this is also something that people are talking about in Israel. Yes.

[Amit]

But on the other hand, he wished every Jew a meaningful Tisha B' Ava fast, isn't it? Which makes him the perfect New York mayor. Hey, it's quite a joke. Usually I have a rule when it comes to Israel, but I think it applies for the United States as well. When politicians on the domestic level start speaking about politics on the national level, it means that they want to distract the discourse from their failures. How convenient it is for the New York City mayor to speak about Netanyahu rather than about education and transportation and the failure to have subsidized supermarkets and freeze the public transportation and the deficit in the budget, et cetera. Yes, Israelis are very involved with it. There is a hope in Israel, I think, that the faster the situation in New York City deteriorates, the faster New Yorkers will understand what a grave mistake it was to actually elect Mandani as a mayor. However, since New York City is way stronger than Mamdani, it might take some time. And that's the warring point in which there are going to be many, many Madanis between the two oceans between Los Angeles and New York City. And that's what worries Israelis the most, I think.

[Dan]

So what worries Israelis most is just to the extent that it's not Mamdani specifically, it's that Mamdani represents a movement in American politics that over time could transform the US Relationship with Israel, we

[Amit]

both talked with Rem Emanuel. So Ram's version is that Mamdani and the squad and The Planetary Platinum, etc. Are just a fraction of the Democratic Party. And at the end of the day, they decide nothing and they mean almost nothing only in the dark blue states and cities. However, Israelis feel that even if it's the extreme, it's not an extreme in Ronkonkoma, it's an extreme in New York City. I think this is the most important city in the United States of America. So one cannot argue that it is a marginal phenomenon. And the theory is that it's going to be Austria, Austria, Hungary all over again. I'll explain the turn of the centuries, between the 90th and the 20th, the Emperor of the Austro Hungarian Empire was a very pro Jewish ruler in Vienna. Was, you know, it was the golden age for Jews in Vienna, Herzl and poets and authors, et cetera. However, for the mayor of Vienna, all of a sudden there was a very outspoken anti Semitic figure was elected. And that was the hint that that times were changing. And people are afraid that the same process is going to occur in the United States of America.

[Dan]

What I'll just say, Amit, that is most striking about this moment is there are many Jewish leaders in the United States who are uncomfortable with the current Israeli government. And there are many Jewish leaders in the United States who, while they don't have a vote in Israeli politics, they would be happy to see a new Israeli government. But what is, like I said, what's unnerving about what's happening now and the rhetoric that Mamdani is using is it's making those same, many of those same Jewish leaders feel unsafe in their own city here in the United States. That's what's different. And I just want to give you one example. And there are many, by the way, there are many. I'm struck by the voices that are speaking out. But just to use one example that got a lot of attention, Rabbi Angela Buchdahl, who's the chief rabbi of Central Synagogue. She's one of the most influential voices in kind of the pluralist Jewish community in the United States in Central Synag. Gog is one of the largest Reform synagogues in the United States. So she put out a statement last week and she talks about how Mayor Mamdani, during the campaign, during his campaign, made a point, even though he's critical of Israel, very critical of Israel, actually doesn't recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, that he's focused on dealing with anti Semitism in New York City and is worried about the safety of New Yorkers and Rabbi Bukhdal. And I'm not going to read the entire statement. It's a long statement, but we can link to it. In the show notes, she writes that safety is about creating a CL in which Jews do not need to feel maligned or indicted by the city's leaders, where we do not need to feel there is a bullseye on our backs. Our synagogue has armed guards and metal detectors, and we had to confront an attack and an additional threat last month alone. And then she goes on to express appreciation for the NYPD helping to provide security. But she says, but we need you. She's referring to Mayor Ramdani. We need you to stop using rhetoric that demonizes Jews and the Jewish state and help create the climate in which threats and violence flourish. Your latest video presented accusation as verdict and your ideology as indisputable truth. Once again, you singled out the world's only Jewish state as uniquely monstrous, using dehumanizing language reserved for no other nation about a war Israel did not begin. She goes on to say that he is contributing to this climate where Jews feel really unsafe with good reason. We saw this attack last week, clearly an anti Semitic attack. And we have seen staggering, a staggering rise in anti Semitic violence and harassment of Jews in New York City since Mayor Mamdani has been sworn in. So, Amit, where I do take issue with you is I don't believe what he's doing is designed to distract from other challenges he has in governing the city. It is kind of nuts that this is a guy who leads a city that has something like 330 to 350, 50,000 employees. All right, 330 to 350. Approximately 330 to 350,000 full time employees. A budget of over $125 billion a year like this is bigger than the budgets of most countries around the world. So it's not that he is trying to distract from his failures, although I do think he has real failures. I think this is one of the reasons he really ran for mayor of New York City. He realizes he is the ultimate bully pulpit. He has the ultimate platform, and he's not that interested in governing a city. The scale in size and the cost of what he's leading, as that data that I just mentioned illustrates, he's in part motivated to be mayor because it gives him the ability to try to reframe a debate that he's in the process of doing.

[Amit]

Or he's an agent of Florida. Right? He was sent and he gets money from Florida in order to encourage people to emigrate. To be honest, I'm not that familiar with a phenomenon like New York City, which is a. I mean, it's allegedly domestic, but it's bigger than the state of Israel and half of the countries on earth. So I don't know how international politics, you know, play into the domestic one. All I know is that usually residents care way more about their education level and the public transportation and the housing prices rather than a little of country far, far away. That's all I meant to say. And of course, the future of the Democratic Party is quite, I don't know, gloomy, to say the least. From an Israeli perspective.

[Dan]

I do think over time, residents of New York City, not just Jewish residents, will wonder what he is doing spending all his time on this issue. Like it is weird that he is so fixated on an issue that not only makes Jews feel unsafe in New York City, but more importantly is not the reason he was elected. But we will. We'll be spending more time on this topic, Amit. Until then, thank you. As always.

[Amit]

Thank you so much.

[Dan]

Look forward to talking soon.

[Amit]

Bye bye. Bye bye.

[Dan]

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