← Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Iran's (buried) Uranium Treasure - with Amit Segal and Fred Kagan
00:41:47
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- [00:00]
A
As events accelerate in the Middle east, the team here at ARC Media is increasing our coverage. More conversations, more context, more time spent trying to help make sense of what's happening. And all with an expanding cast of podcast hosts, analysts and journalists. Our Inside CallMeBack subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. If you're not yet an inside call me back subscriber, this is an important time to join us. To subscribe, you can follow the link in our show notes or visit ark media.org and to our insiders, thank you. You are listening to an ARC Media podcast.
- [00:49]
B
Every war needs a picture, right? The Soviet Union flag on the ruins of the Reichstag or the US Flag in Iwo Jima, or the Israeli flag on the Western Wall. Maybe the picture of this war is gonna be Trump and Netanyahu in a mutual news conference having three black containers between them, saying, you see the Iranian people, the billions of dollars that were taken from you are here in our hands. And this is the proof that the Iranian regime didn't care about you. And I see various signs for it. For instance, leaks to international media about the risk of the Iranian army or IRGC taking this uranium from under the rubbles of Fordot or Isfahan. We have to understand now it's no longer a commando operation. You can just get there under the protection of the two best air forces in the world.
- [01:44]
C
I wouldn't over focus on the nuclear program per se because we appear to be engaged in a military operation with the objective of changing this regime. And if you actually want to end the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons permanently, the only way that you're actually going to do that, in my view, is to eliminate the regime that has been so committed to doing this. So I think that the issue of securing the nuclear materials is important, but it's only part of a larger picture here.
- [02:26]
A
It's 6:30pm on Monday, March 9 here in New York City. It is 2am on Tuesday, March 10 in Tehran. And it is 12:30am on Tuesday, march 10 in Israel, where Israelis are turning to a new day. The news these days is coming quickly. And as you may have noticed, ARC Media has been producing more frequent call me back episodes to track the big questions and dilemmas revolving around the war. But we also want to give you more frequent and urgent news updates. For this, we turn to our new ARC Media contributor, Deborah Pardes with the news update.
- [03:03]
D
This is Deborah Pardes. On Monday, an Iranian cluster bomb exploded in central Israel, killing one man and seriously wounding two others. Also, a Hezbollah missile struck the center of the country. At least 16 people were injured. Oil prices hit a new high of $120 a barrel on Monday as Iran continued attacking its petroleum rich neighbors. Since then, oil prices have eased, falling below $100 a barrel. President Donald Trump dismissed the spike in oil prices, calling it, quote, a very small price to pay for world safety and peace. He said the price, quote, will drop rapidly once Iran's nuclear threat is destroyed. Later on Monday, Trump said the war in Iran could be over soon. The war is very complete, he told a CBS reporter, noting that Iran's military capabilities have been decimated. Within a couple of hours, though, Trump was speaking to a group of Republican donors in Florida, where he emphasized that the war hasn't run its course quite yet, adding, we've already won in many ways, but we haven't won enough. According to reports, Israel's attack on IRGC oil infrastructure on Saturday surprised and dismayed the Trump administration. On Monday, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham urged Israel to, quote, please be cautious about the targets you select. He said Iran's oil economy will be essential to the Iranian people, starting a, quote, new and better life when this regime collapses. Arab leaders, meanwhile, are losing patience with Iran's aggression. Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry said Iran will be, quote, the biggest loser if it continues to attack Arab states. Even Qatar's prime minister called the Iranian attacks a, quote, unquote, dangerous miscalculation and a betrayal. These were notably his first comments to the media since the start of the war. In Toronto, gunshots were fired on three different Jewish synagogues in recent days. It's part of a surge in anti Semitic attacks across Canada, which, according to one analysis, more than doubled in the year following October 7th. On Sunday, local Jewish leaders held a press conference outside of one of the targeted synagogues, where bullet holes were still visible in the door. The leaders expressed frustration that not enough has been done to prevent this escalation. Police said it's too early to tell if the three shootings are connected. No arrests have been made so far. This was a news update. I'm Deborah Pardes.
- [05:37]
A
Now onto today's episode. Buried deep underground near the Iranian city of Isfahan lies one of the regime's most valuable assets, roughly 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. We'll explain in a moment why that number, 60%, is so important during the war. In June of 2025, the 12 Day War, US and Israeli military operations resulted in sealing the site, effectively trapping the material underground. But a recent US Intelligence assessment has assessed that there still may be a narrow access point, meaning the uranium could potentially be recover. For Iran. The stockpile represents decades of investment and its strongest bargaining chip for the US and Israel. Removing it would eliminate one of the regime's most important strategic assets. Any attempt to retrieve it would be difficult, to say the least. The site is under constant surveillance and extracting that amount of material would require a major operation, likely under the threat of Iranian retaliation. Still, the option has not been ruled out. Reports suggest that Washington and Jerusalem are at least considering whether a special forces mission could recover the uranium. With me to unpack. This is Arc Media contributor and senior analyst at Israel's Channel 12 and Israel Hayom Amit Segel and Fred Kagan, a military historian and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He runs the Critical Threats Project at aei. Fred, Amit, thank you for being here.
- [07:18]
C
Happy to be with.
- [07:19]
B
Thanks for inviting us.
- [07:21]
A
Amit, I want to start with you. You called this 400 kilogram quote unquote treasure, as you described it in your newsletter headline this morning, that is buried under the ruins of Isfahan. So what is it? Why is it so important?
- [07:34]
B
Okay, so all the hopes of the Ayatollah regime, all the danger of fundamentalist Islam lies inside three black containers under the ruins of the Fordo nuclear or Isfahan nuclear site. Depends who you believe in Iran. Those sites were bombed by both Israeli and American jet fighters in June during the Rising Line operation and they haven't been moved since. Now here is the trophy. If Israel and the US are actually to take it, it means that the entire investment of the Iranian regime in the nuclear project would be in Western hands. That it is done, it's finished. If not, those containers actually have inside still the hope for a nuclear facility. Because from a 60% enriched uranium you can get quite easily to 99%. It's quite misleading. The difference between 0 and 60% is something like 10,000 times more than between 60% and 99%. It's quite easy to take it and to actually make it a uranium enriched to a military level.
- [08:41]
A
Your point is? Once you're at 60%, it's two weeks until you have the capacity for a king ingredient for a nuclear bomb.
- [08:47]
B
Exactly. Now, every war needs a picture, right? The Soviet Union flag on the ruins of the Reichstag, or the US flag in Iwo Jima, or the Israeli flag on the Western Wall. Maybe the picture of this war is gonna be Trump and Netanyahu in a mutual news conference having three black containers between them. Saying, you see the Iranian people, the billions of dollars that were taken from you are here in our hands. And this is the proof that the Iranian regime didn't care about you. I think this is something that both Trump and Netanyahu work on and I see various signs for it. For instance, leaks to international media over the last few days about the risk of the Iranian army or IRGC taking this uranium from under the rubbles of Fordo or Isfahan. We have to understand now it's no longer a commando operation. You don't have to do it in disguise at night without being caught. You can just get there under the protection of the two best air forces in the world.
- [09:54]
A
So, Fred, first question is, do you have anything to add in terms of the strategic implications for the war if the Iranians get to it first? And then my second question is, what would it take operationally for Israel and the US to beat them to it?
- [10:07]
C
Well, the Iranians are there first in the sense that they have been controlling this site and they've been working on this material. I would say a couple of things, and I may disagree with Amit here slightly about the relative importance of this. Yes, we have to secure this material. At a minimum, we have to make sure that the Iranians are not able to recover this stuff. Getting it out of there may be a major undertaking. It depends on how thoroughly buried it is and what facilities are there. I'm sure that it's something that can be done, but I wouldn't underestimate the challenges of actually doing it. But the first priority would be securing it and making sure that the Iranians don't actually recover it. The short term threat from this stuff actually is less about making a nuclear weapon because there's no prospect in the current environment that the Iranians are going to be turning this stuff into nuclear weapons anytime soon. But you can use enriched uranium for other purposes if you get your hands on it, including making dirty bombs and doing other things. So I think there's a lot of reasons to make sure that we actually secure this stuff. That having been said, I wouldn't over focus on the nuclear program per se because we appear to be engaged in a military operation with the objective of changing this regime. And if you actually want to end the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons permanently, the only way that you're actually going to do that, in my view, is to eliminate the regime that has been so committed to doing this. And that seems to be a major objective of the current US Israeli military campaign. So I think that the Issue of securing the nuclear materials is important, but it's only part of a larger picture here.
- [11:41]
A
I want to come back to that because I take your point and I want to drill into that. But just, Fred, if you can answer this or meet, what is the physical challenge of trying to extract this? Like, I'm just trying to paint a picture for our listeners and for our viewers. What are they actually removing? Is it a few jars? Is it a bunch of boxes? Is it crates? Is it something the size of a truck? Like, what is this thing?
- [12:03]
C
Well, the immediate challenge is that we blew up the facilities and we buried this stuff under a lot of rock. So you actually have to excavate. And now the Iranians have started to excavate these facilities to try to get access to this. I don't know offhand what the status of those excavations are, but first you have to get to it. Then the challenge is it's 400kg of material and you're going to be doing this by air because we don't have a ground line of communication to do this. So there are challenges. It's not hard to get this stuff in principle together and put it on a plane and fly it out of there. Put it on a couple of planes and fly it out of there. But I don't think we should minimise the challenge, even with the excellence of our special forces and Israeli special forces of going in there, securing a facility which requires a fair number of troops, securing against rocket, drone and missile strikes, also, which the Iranians will try completing any excavation that might be necessary, which can mean bringing in heavy equipment and other stuff in order to do that, and then getting this stuff loaded. It's all possible to do, I suspect, but I think it is a pretty major military undertaking.
- [13:07]
A
Amit, anything to add to that?
- [13:08]
B
So, according to the reports, which should be taken with a grain of salt as always, and especially in times of war, there is a narrow path to actually reach those containers. How narrow the path is, who knows? Maybe it's just a trap for the Iranian forces. To be honest, I don't really know. But I'll tell you what the perception was. Around June, July, after the last round had ended, the idea was that it is buried, but Iranians are not going to take it because they don't want to actually cause President Trump epic fury. However, since there is an epic fury operation now, and since they are desperate, the calculation now is that they might want to actually reach to this uranium in order to create an improvised nuclear facility. Just in order to say that they have something to actually have something to deal with when it comes back to the negotiation table. I think we should see it as a race to the enriched uranium between Iran and Israel and the United States.
- [14:11]
A
And Amit, in your newsletter, you called this uranium stockpile the load barring beam of the regime. What did you mean by that?
- [14:17]
B
They invested, all in all, something like $20 billion. I want to give an example. Okay. According to foreign sources, when Israel tried to actually obtain nuclear weapons, 10% of the country's GDP was invested in this project. It was a huge project, and the costs have not cheaper when it comes to nuclear, illegal nuclear facilities. So I would say that a good deal of the Iranian budget was invested in this project, by the way, even more than the Israeli one, because they learned the lessons from the bombardment of both the Syrian nuclear project in 2007, the Iraqi nuclear project in 1981. So they tried to actually plant it in various locations in Iran and then plant it deep under the ground. So it was a very expensive nuclear project, which means that if it's out 100% dead and in Israeli hands or American hands, you can see the GDP of four years of the Iranian economy in foreign hands.
- [15:18]
A
I want to just put this in the context of where the war is overall right now in terms of how it's going. Fred, the first phase of the war was defined as a quote unquote, decapitation phase. Now it seems that we are transitioning to a new phase. How would you define this new phase we're in, Fred? And by the way, is it that clean that you can define these things as like, we finished phase one and now we're heading to a new phase? Or is it more of a blur?
- [15:43]
C
Well, it's, as always, a bit more complicated than the bumper stickers that are being presented. The first phase, which is continuing actually, was the suppression of the Iranian air defense systems, the full suppression of them, so that we could operate freely over Iran, including to do things like what Amit is suggesting, which you can only do if you have absolute air dominance. So that was actually the first phase. And. And there's another phase or sub phase of that which is going on, which is very important, which is the phase of going after the Iranian drone and missile launch sites, production facilities and storage sites in order to deprive the Iranians of the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and to attack regional allies and partners, including Israel. That's very important, Dan, because that phase is continuing, and that is a very important activity that people are not paying enough attention to, as we get into these excessively simplistic conversations about are we going to run out of interceptors before they run out of missiles? Because this phase is designed to make them run out of missiles faster by blowing them up before they can launch them. And that phase is continuing very actively. Another component of the current Israeli military operation is attacking the internal security infrastructure that the regime has used to oppress its people and would use to retain control. And this is very important because it does give a hint to the fact that the larger objective of this transcends the issue of the nuclear facilities and gets all the way to regime change. Now, the decapitation campaign was yet another sort of subphase which is also continuing. So all of these activities are going on simultaneously. And the fact that we and the Israelis are conducting them simultaneously, I think points to the larger objectives of this entire undertaking, which again, I think are fundamentally about changing this regime.
- [17:31]
A
And in terms of when you talk about air superiority, Fred, what does that actually mean? In other words, will we reach a point soon from your perspective that the Emiratis and the Bahrainis and other countries in the region, and Israel for that matter, are not sitting there waking, you know, every day, anticipating the next siren, the next projectile that's going to be flying over their skies? Like does that make that threat and that risk, I don't want to say it brings it down to zero because these things are never zero, but basically a non factor. Air travel resumes, commercial air travel resumes in the region. And I know we have a lot of listeners who are asking me, when are they going to be able to fly to and from Israel? When does that whole dynamic change? When we say air superiority, shouldn't it mean that?
- [18:15]
C
Well, it doesn't because it's a technical term and it really refers to the ability to operate manned aircraft and the ability of an adversary to interfere with that activity. It doesn't refer to the ability of an adversary to fire missiles or drones. So that's a different military mission. And that's what we're focusing on now. We have seen, as CENTCOM and others have reported, about a 90% drop off in the rate of launches of Iranian missiles and drones at regional states. Since the start of the war. We are having, I think, a lot of success getting after the Iranian launch points and storage facilities and manufacturing facilities. And now we have the news, which is very positive, that the Ukrainians are sending Ukrainian experts in drone interception and talking about providing drone interceptors to the regional states as well. Which could help them defend against the Iranian drone attacks in a much more economical fashion in a way that could be much more effective. So I think the trend lines are strongly indicating that the missile and drone threat from Iran will continue to diminish. It's hard to say without access to classified information, which I don't have, when exactly that will occur. But the combined forces of Israel and the US are getting after this and do seem to be doing a very good job, judging by the fall off in attacks.
- [19:34]
A
Amit Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that Iran should expect surprises. His word, not mine. What could that mean?
- [19:42]
B
I don't know. I can assume, first of all, the number is four to five surprises. That's what I understand. Second, I think actually taking the uranium is one of the sort of surprises. And if people expect something like the pager operation in Lebanon, just in an Iranian take on the Pejor operation, I would say this is not this sort of stuff. It's something more strategic. I'll give you the description I've just heard yesterday from a senior source. He said, listen, we have the regime in our grip and now we want to shake it. We want to shake it in order to cause it to fall. Because let's admit, as Fred has just mentioned, there isn't any way to translate directly military pressure to regime change, especially if you do not have boots on the ground. So the idea behind those four or five moves is to actually shake the foundations of the regime. That is to say, it's not merely taking the naval force, taking the air force, taking the ballistic missile system, taking the rest of the nuclear project. There are some things that are supposed to give both the protesters and the IRGC members a moment to think. Is it here to stay this regime or is it due to failure? And I think it's gonna take a while. They speak about something like five weeks from now, so they have to keep up with one surprise a week.
- [21:07]
A
Fred, what can you tell us about the US and Israeli attacks on Iran's internal security forces?
- [21:14]
C
We've seen the combined force going after the central instruments that the regime has used to oppress its population. It killed 20, 30,000 people during the last protests and keep itself in power. The combined force has done a very good job of destroying the IRGC headquarters and the other internal security forces, the law enforcement command forces, which is sort of their first line of defense against protests, and also to attack the Basijis, the large paramilitary force that the regime uses as thugs and brutal, just brutes to oppress its People. And we've seen the very heavy, very intense set of activities around Tehran. And we've also seen a very intense set of those activities in the west, particularly in the Kurdish areas, that have been historically the most restive in the protest movements. We're starting to see the campaign move from west to East. And so we're beginning to see them going after these institutions in central Iran around Isfahan and Shiraz and other places. And this is very important then, because if you're going to see regime change in a way that is. If you're going to see regime change at all, and particularly in a way that is. Is likely to lead to some positive outcome, the area that matters is the Iranian heartland. It's Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Fars. The actual core Iranian lands, not the peripheries. The regime is not going to be brought down by a Kurdish insurrection. There has to be an insurgency in central Iran, and it has to go beyond Tehran. So this is one of the things we're watching for, is the continuing role of this campaign into this Iranian heartland. And we're starting to see that. And it's very clear that the purpose of this is to destroy the regime's ability to keep itself in power and set conditions for the protest movement, which can become a revolution. But I do want to say there's something very important that needs to happen in order for this to work. The Iranians have turned off the Internet almost completely. It's incredibly difficult for ordinary Iranians.
- [23:18]
A
The regime. The regime is turned off.
- [23:20]
C
The regime, yeah.
- [23:21]
A
Yeah. The regime has shut down the Internet, which means nobody can communicate electronically, at least through the Internet right now in Iran.
- [23:27]
C
Right. There's some limited starlink access, although the regime has been working to interfere with that. If you're going to have a mass protest movement that is organized and organized well enough to turn into something that can be a revolution. People have to be able to communicate with one another. And the problem is the regime has its hands on the switch that turns the Internet on and off. So I don't know anything about what the Israeli US Plan about this is, but I will tell you that if there is going to be a prospect for meaningful regime change, someone is going to have to turn communications back on for the ordinary Iranian people in a big way. I'm hoping that may be one of the surprises that Prime Minister Netanyahu is talking about, is that the Israelis will have some way of turning this communications back on, because that's going to be essential to facilitating any kind of large movement. By the Iranian people.
- [24:15]
A
Amit. Also during the weekend, this past weekend, northern Israel has seen heavy bombardment by Hezbollah. We thought Hezbollah was sort of had exited the stage. And now it feels like Hezbollah, at least in some form, is back. Did Israel underestimate Hezbollah's ability to attack northern Israel?
- [24:35]
B
I think it overestimated, did not explain. Hezbollah began its monstrous career in the 80s and the 90s as a terrorist guerrilla organization trying to actually hit and run to target soldiers in southern Lebanon, fire a few rockets a week, a day or a month. Then after the Israeli withdrawal in the year 2000, and thanks to $1 billion annual funding from Iran, it became a monstrous terror army with rockets, more than, I think, almost every single country on the planet. What Israel did in 2024 was to destroy Hezbollah army. It took 80% of its rockets. It killed the entire leadership of the organization, including the leader Hassan asrallah. It killed 3,000 of its top fighters named the Radouan Force, and it actually reduced Hezbollah back again to the 90s version of guerrilla terrorist organization. And that's exactly what we've seen over the last few days. Hezbollah re adapted its strategy from the 90s and it took time for the Israeli soldiers to actually adapt to it. Now here is the crazy fact. The soldiers who are fighting in Lebanon as we speak were high school pupils when October 7th happened. So they haven't fought in Gaza yet. The war was quite long. So for us it's like one long story, but for them it's the first time they actually encounter terrorists. So they are not used to it. So the IDF will have to adjust to the old, new version of Hezbollah. I'm quite optimistic about it. Of course, it's a shame that Israel lost two soldiers over the last weekend.
- [26:16]
A
And what does it mean for the possible evacuation of Israeli citizens from the north?
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B
I think this was by far the number one mistake of Israel since October 7th. This was a huge prize for terrorism.
- [26:29]
A
Meaning the first evacuation. Meaning after October 7th when they pulled 100 plus thousand citizens after October 7th?
- [26:35]
B
Yes.
- [26:35]
A
Yeah.
- [26:36]
B
No one is going to do it again. It would be a grave mistake. And the idea, the entire idea after October 7th is that every time there is a danger, it's the other side that should evacuate itself rather than your side. By the way, I think that another evacuation necessarily means that a few dozens of the Israeli villages on the northern border would never be inhabited again because no one is going to leave their house twice in two years and come back for the third time.
- [27:04]
A
But can you just for listeners to understand those Listeners who are not in Israel. What it means, it's one thing in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem or other parts of central Israel, when there are sirens that go off and you have a little bit of response time before you have to get into your mammad, into your safe room in the north, when those sirens go off, it's, let's just say, virtually no response time. When that siren goes off, you have to be in your safe room immediately.
- [27:26]
B
Exactly. It's something between 15 seconds, 15 and 1 minute.
- [27:32]
A
Right.
- [27:32]
B
So it necessarily means that you cannot actually have normal life, even if technically, officially you can go to work. No one is going to actually go to teach or to study or to have their shop Open if within 15 seconds you have to find a shelter. And hence there aren't any tourists, any students, any shoppers, which means that the entire north is paralyzed. I don't think this situation can actually keep on for long. And I think therefore that we are going to see a dramatic escalation, especially when Hezbollah is in such a disastrous situation in Lebanon. And I think this is the number one change in the last five or six rounds. Hezbollah was perceived as the protector of Lebanon, as the one that actually defends it from the Israeli aggressor. Nowadays, everyone understands, even those who do not like Israel, that Hezbollah is the protector of Iran, that this has nothing to do with Lebanon, only with the Ayatollah regime, hence the dramatic decisions made by the Lebanese government. I think that what we are going to see is a dramatic escalation from the Israeli side followed by yet another step taken by the Lebanese government to actually dismantle Hezbollah as an army within the country.
- [28:47]
A
Fred, does that sound plausible to you?
- [28:49]
C
Yes. I mean, I think it's also important to keep in mind what Amit said about the damage that Israel did to Hezbollah and the fact that the IDF largely pushed the Hezbollah forces out of the area south of the Latani River. And so Hezbollah is having to rely more and more on long range strikes from deeper into Lebanon. And it has lost the ability to threaten northern Israel in the way that it had previously. Because when you had the Radwan forces right on the border, when you had Hezbollah fighters with short range missiles and, and drones and things that could strike right mass, right south of the Litany on the border, the threat to northern Israel was much greater. Now Hezbollah has to rely on longer range systems that first of all give more flight time, second of all have opportunities to be shot down, and third of all, they just don't have the same amount of mass. So the IDF has done a terrific job of degrading Hezbollah's ability to threaten northern Israel to begin with. And now, yes, I agree that as Hezbollah has demonstrated that it is fully prepared to commit suicide on behalf of the suicidal Iranian regime, that the IDF will probably continue to fight here and
- [29:58]
A
degrade it further and back to Iran. Mutabah Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, the now deceased supreme Leader, has become the new supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. Any thoughts in terms of what you think we should be focused on about him? How significant is it that he's been elevated to the rank of ayatollah? Or is this just we're now going to be in this steady stream as leaders are killed, they're going to be replaced, and the nature of the regime is not changing.
- [30:25]
C
Well, the nature of the regime is clearly not changing because Mojdoba is a continuation of his father's policies. This is a hardline dude. He is heavily networked into the irgc, especially the IRGC intelligence organization. He served during the Iran Iraq war with some of these guys and has maintained tight IRGC networks. He advocated for Ahmadinejad in the 2009 election and then he played a role in suppressing the protests that followed Ahmadinejad's election. This is a continuation of the Khamenei regime, in fact, and not just in name. It's noteworthy that he took power in the midst of a bit of a power struggle. There was an effort by what people require, you know, a faction that people regard as more moderate or pragmatist folks, led by Ali Larajani, but that also includes Hassan Rouhani and other so called moderates and pragmatists to try to avoid having Mojtoba selected. Right now, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and other hardline factions were pushing to get Mujtoba selected very rapidly, among other things, because they want to get Ali Larajani, who has been effectively running the country since Khamenei's death, death, out of there, and they want to regain full control over what's going on. They won. So that hardline faction won this mini power struggle, which tells us that it remains dominant, which means that the regime is still the regime. Which brings us back to what I think is the key point here, which is having started a war of this scale and having set conditions, as US and Israel have been doing, to facilitate hopefully a revolution that will bring about the change of the regime, it's very important to push forward and it's Very important to do everything we can to make that happen. Because if we leave a regime that is like this, that is headed by Mojova in power, then I fear that whether or not we get the enriched uranium, we will have missed a multi generational opportunity to eliminate a fundamental threat to the region.
- [32:18]
A
Amit, before you go, Israel's actions suggest that one of its objectives in this war is regime change. Although they are sometimes more or less explicit about that, depending on the day. Do you think the US sees the end game differently from the Israelis? In other words, some days one thinks that from the US perspective, just neutralizing the nuclear threat, neutralizing the regime's capacity. Whoever's in charge in Iran, neutralizing their capacity to be a menace in the region is the objective. And it's like who's actually governing the Iranian people is not as paramount. The Israelis, I think, view things a little differently. Is there a world in which there's a divergence here in terms of how this war ends? Do you worry about that?
- [33:00]
B
I think we should actually turn the table around and think for the first time about the US in more ambitious terms than Israel. Let's admit the fact. I mean, no one is going to say it explicitly, but if in a week from Now, Iran has 70% less ballistic missile launchers, 99% less naval force, 100% less air force, no nuclear threat, Ayatollah is dead and so does the leadership of the irgc. Israel is very happy with the situation because Iran is no longer a threat to Israel. However, for President Trump, the mission is way more ambitious. He is actually in the business of regime change. I know it is not said deliberately, but there is no other way to interpret it. By the way, for Israel, it's quite clear. I mean, Benjamin Netanyahu has had many political problems. He was accused of for many times over the last two and a half years for initiating a war for political purposes in Gaza, Lebanon, et cetera. No one actually says it when it comes to Iran because everyone in Israel understands the situation, that Iran is an existential threat to the Jewish state. This is not the case in the United States. I know it's not the lion's share of the Republican Party, but there are something like between 15 and 19% of the Republican Party supporters that actually wonder what the hell do we have to do with Iran.
- [34:20]
A
Yeah, but the polls are showing really across the board that majority of Republicans support what Trump is doing in Iran right now.
- [34:27]
B
Of course. No, no, what I'm trying to say in Israel, it's a bipartisan question.
- [34:31]
A
Ah, I see.
- [34:31]
B
In the United States, in the best case scenario, it's a Republican cause.
- [34:35]
A
Right.
- [34:36]
B
So President Trump desperately needs a regime change, even if it's not spoken out loud, in order to say, hey, listen, when the war began, this was a very problematic evil fundamentalist octopus. And now we brought back Iran to the Middle east as a pro Western, pro Israeli, pro American, peaceful nation. So for Trump, the horizon is broader than for Israel.
- [34:59]
A
Amit, we know you have to drop. We'll say goodbye to you. We're gonna keep Fred on for a few more minutes. Thanks, Amit.
- [35:04]
B
Thank you so much. Bye Bye.
- [35:06]
A
Fred, any response to my question of Amit and his response?
- [35:10]
C
I think President Trump himself is vacillating a little bit between exactly what he's prepared to accept here, and he had signaled at various times that he would accept destruction of the nuclear program and so on. I think the selection of Mojtaba to replace his father is likely to continue to encourage Trump to drive for the more complete outcome that Amit is talking about. I think we need to be careful talking about pro Western, pro whatever Iran, because as Amit pointed out, we're not putting US Boots on the ground to control the transition here. So I do think we need to be clear, right, about the fact that knocking over this regime, assuming that that's feasible, is going to lead to a very messy situation and then very likely a civil war. And it's very hard to say exactly what's going to come out of that. I personally think that it is for all of the badness of that, which is very bad and the dangers of that, that it is better to accept that situation than to accept continued decades of this regime. So in that regard, I was pleased to hear President Trump saying he's not excited about having a Kurdish army go in and really put the ethnic aspects of the potential civil war on steroids there.
- [36:18]
A
Fred, I know you do have real concerns about the possibility of civil war. We've had others, like Elica Leban just on our podcast. We recorded her on Sunday. Iranian, obviously. Karim Sagapur has been on the podcast and elsewhere talking, and they're less concerned about the possibility of civil war. Obviously, they're not saying it's not a zero possibility. But tell me what you think they're missing or what you're more concerned or alarmed about in terms of the threat of civil war.
- [36:46]
C
Well, look, we have four or five ethnic minorities in Iran that have historically been restive and historically been unhappy about the way that the country, country is governed The Kurds have been the most active in this regard. The Baluchis have been very active as well. And they are organized. Both of them are organized in ways that I think would make insurgent action of various forms likely. And there are other minority groups as well. So to begin with, I think there's a high likelihood that we would see some effort on the part of some of those organized minority groups to push for some kind of federalization or something else which the core Iranian population will oppose. But I also think we should not imagine that the people who really believe in this regime, which is the core IRGC guys, the core basijis, the guys who are really invested in this stuff, are going to go quietly into that good night. There will be what in the context of 2003, we call it bitter enders. There will be an effort on the part of the people who are committed to this regime just to wage their own insurgency. I just think it's very path dependent if how the regime actually goes down, if it goes down because it can go in certain directions where this risk is minimized. But we will not be in control of that because we're not going to send hundreds of thousands of troops into Iran to control this transition. So I think we have to take very seriously the likelihood that there will be multiple factions that will compete for power, including people who will be trying to restore the regime that has fallen. So from my perspective, I think a 1989, 1991 scenario with a sort of peaceful collapse of Iran like the Soviet Union is unlikely and we should be prepared for internal conflict that could spill over borders.
- [38:32]
A
And one of the big differences from the end of the Soviet Union is that you had leadership in the Soviet Union that had made the decision that was implicitly without fireworks, the kind of gradual decline and wind down of the Soviet Union. I think what you're saying is it's not clear there's a leadership in Iran today, in the regime that has that same attitude about that this is the regime's last chapter.
- [38:56]
C
No, on the contrary. I mean even the so called moderates, pragmatists like Laranjani have been prosecuting the war. He hasn't been surrendering. He hasn't been. So you're talking about removing the entire leadership of this regime one way or another. And that will leave a power vacuum because there is no organized force to take over. This isn't like 1979 in the sense that Khomeini had huge numbers of followers. He had an organization, he had the wherewithal to bring about a planned revolution that he controlled, which of course brought about this evil. Even so, and even with the Shah stepping aside, there was a civil war in Iran in 1979 that Khomeini ultimately won. So this is the more normal way that regimes go down. And again, I don't think this is an argument for not continuing on with an effort to bring this regime down. But I just think that we need to be clear eyed about what a serious risk is of what may follow here. And we should be thinking about how to mitigate that risk as best we can without, of course, planning to commit the hundreds of thousands of American troops to this which we don't even have available.
- [40:00]
A
All right, Fred, we will leave it there. Thank you for this and I'm sure we will be seeing and hearing from you in the days and weeks ahead. Honestly, I think the Critical Threats Project at AEI and the products and research and analysis from the Institute for the Study of War, which I know you and Kim Kagan are spending a lot of time on with a terrific team, are invaluable always, but especially now. And we will link to all of these resources in the show notes and encourage our listeners to turn to them. I know we do. So thank you for this.
- [40:31]
C
Thank you very much, Dan
- [40:34]
A
Foreign. That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavael, Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arkmedia.org that's arkmedia.org Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levena Reddy. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.