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A
Foreign. You are listening to an art media podcast.
B
Hi, it's Dan. This is a sneak peek from the members only edition of our show Inside Call Me Back, where we pull back the curtain and have the conversations we typically have after the cameras stop rolling. This week, Nadav was on the hot seat taking your questions. I hope you enjoyed this segment. And if you want to get the full episode and support our mission at ARC Media, please become an Inside Call Me member by following the link in the description or by going to ark media.org that's ark media.org and to all our insiders, thank you. It's your support that keeps the lights on at ARC Media. The Dove welcome back to the Inside.
A
Thank you. I'm glad to be here.
B
Good to be with you. We have a lot of questions and so some of them actually pick back up from our last Call Me Back episode with you and Amit. So I'm gonna start with those Katie from Hartford, Connecticut. She writes, Unlike the days that preceded the 12 Day War, meaning last June, unlike the days that preceded the 12 Day War, Iran doesn't seem to be interested in negotiating with the U.S. if war breaks out between the U.S. and Iran, what form would it likely take? Would it be similar to the 12 Day War? Or do the Iranians have other ways to strike Israel or the US which they didn't use back in June of 2025? Nadav, this is something you've been covering in your newsletter. So Katie, if you're not already, please subscribe to Nadav's newsletter. The title of the newsletter suggests a level of intimacy between Nadav and each one of his readers. The title is Between Us, so you think you're about to get some inside scoop between us, between you and Nadav, but you don't realize it's between you, Nadav, and and his thousands and thousands of readers. So not so intimate. But anyways, I digress. Nadav, tell us what a military engagement of Iran now looks like compared to June of last year.
A
So first of all, there's indeed, Katie, a worry with Israel that Iran will try to strike first. Iran knows that this is right now heading towards a confrontation. The armada, as President Trump has put it, is already in place. The military buildup is there. They understand that negotiations have stalled and failed for now, by the way, I suspect negotiations will continue in some sort of form until the last moment. They understand that the president is going to make a call. And most probably, according to sources across the region right now, if the Iranians are not willing to hear what the President is saying and to acknowledge his demands. It's likely that the President will order a strike. Therefore, and this is what Israeli officials are telling me, they fear that Iran will decide to strike first.
B
And that's because Iran could never meet the demands that the administration is making of them in their minds, in the Iranian leadership's mind.
A
So I'm both a student and a teacher of strategic surprises and intelligence failures. And one of the things that you learn about strategic surprises is that it's not only about the facts, but also about empathy and trying to feel what the rival is feeling. The Iranians, with their entire construction of regime and this Supreme Leader specifically, are not pragmatic enough, and they cannot envision the pragmatism needed in order to say yes to the demands of the President. Not this Supreme Leader, by the way, the previous Supreme Leader, Khomeini, was pragmatic enough and signed a ceasefire in the Iran Iraq War, 1988. And he said, I drank the cup of poison. It's a very famous expression. Why? For the country. But this supreme Leader is much more rigid, is less clever, and it's the assessment of every Iran expert that I speak with that the Iranians won't be able to just say yes to what the President is saying unless there's going to be a change within the regime.
B
Meaning they can't get to yes. Unless it's preceded by some kind of change within the regime, a more moderating force.
A
Unless the Supreme Leader is somewhat removed.
B
Yeah, somewhat.
A
Or loses its power or becomes symbolic. And generals in the Revolutionary Guard, for instance, Dan, are telling him, hey, we want to say yes to the President, and you are losing your ultimate absolute power. You cease to be the absolute leader of this country. And you need to hear us. This kind of development is more likely than the Supreme Leader saying, you know what, President Trump, I'm willing to agree to your terms. Having said that, the Israeli officials suspect that Iran, because it's the weaker side, because it's cornered, because it was attacked by Israel in the June War, the 12 Day War, and suffered such an immense damage that it will try maybe to strike first. And what Israel right now is bracing for is the possibility of a first strike by the Iranians against Israel and not against the United States. And why is that? Because it also has an inner logic politically. If the Iranians do that, they manage to assume the initiative, regional prestige heightened to some extent, taking some military abilities of Israel. They would think that. I think everything I'm saying is a miscalculation. By the Iranians. But I continue on to think like the Iranians think. And Dan, and you'll find this interesting, if the Iranians do that and then the US acts. The US is acting after Israel has been attacked. It's running to the aid of Israel, which is a different thing politically than the President has made his mind. This kind of calculus that I just presented is not a theoretical exercise. It is what Israeli officials are fearing and they are airing that suspicion in order to prevent a miscalculation by the Iranians. And I am airing it because I've heard it from them. Now we know we that the Israeli chief of intelligence have been spending time in Washington D.C. these days. I do not know the content of their conversations with the CIA, the Pentagon and the White House. I suspect, knowing the United States, that if Israel was successful in the 12 Day War and the US thinks it was successful, and they give credit to Israeli intelligence, the Americans would want to hear from the Israeli intelligence towards their own plans. And I want to say something that I think is important on track to a surprise. Usually there's an atmosphere of conflict. Everybody knows that something's going to happen, but some side is surprised at the end. It's immensely interesting because before 1967, this is the case, right? The waiting period. And then Israel manages to have a strategic surprise. In 1973, there is a lot of tension in the air, including the possibility of war. Israel is surprised. October 7, 2023 Less of an excellent example. Israel didn't suspect that at all. But the June war with Iran, it was absolutely the case that Dan, you knew, your listeners knew that Israel and Iran are headed to a conflict. And Israel managed to have a surprise with strategic meaning.
B
Part of that surprise was enabled by the US Administration and coordinating how they communicated what was actually going on, of course.
A
And it was greenlighted by the American administration. It was enabled by President Trump and by the support he gave to Israel. If President Trump would have told Prime Minister Netanyahu, don't do it, Prime Minister Netanyahu wouldn't have done it. So it's actually a decision made by the White House to some extent at the time. And of course, the US Joined the war and it played the critical role of destroying the most critical component of the nuclear program. Now, if I would put myself in the American thinking to this, I would ask this question, Daniel. How can I make it count? How can I make the strike count? How can we make it matter, strategically speaking, be both surprising expansive and be effective strategically? There's only one way it's going to be effective strategically. Two ways, if it's going to lead Iran toward the direction of an agreement or if it's going to somehow lead to an internal change. So one of the things that was published is the possibility that the US Will try to take out Khamenei. I don't know if that's true. Another thing, thing I would suspect is do they have some sort of a contact to an armed faction within Iran or a faction within the Iranian regime? Sort of what we saw in Venezuela to some extent. Are there people willing to speak with the American administration? So this is an extremely interesting moment. And I need to stress that the president can always make his mind that it's not the right time to strike at all. And at the end of the day, this decision lies only with the president of the United States. He can also decide. Israelis are saying that he can also decide. You know what? Let's give it a few months to mature negotiations. Let's see what's going to happen. It's not their assessment, but they're saying it's up to the president.
B
Okay. Barry from the Philly suburbs. Barry writes. The inside with Tal Becker was great. How much does the growing Qatari influence in American politics, Education, institutions. That's it for our sneak peek today.
A
If you.
B
If you want to catch the full episode, please subscribe to Inside. Call me back by following the link in the description or by going to ark media.org that's ark media.org your support is what allows us to do what we do here at ARC Media. I hope to see you there.
Podcast: Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Host: Dan Senor (B), Ark Media
Guest: Nadav (A)
Date: January 31, 2026
Episode: INSIDE Call Me Back sneak peek
This episode provides an exclusive "Inside" look at post-broadcast conversations, focusing on current Israeli anxieties about an Iranian preemptive strike. Nadav, an analyst and writer, responds to urgent audience questions, exploring how Israeli intelligence is interpreting Iran’s posture, the calculations inside Tehran, the role of U.S. policy, and the lessons from previous conflicts—particularly the June 2025 "12 Day War" between Israel and Iran.
"There’s indeed, Katie, a worry with Israel that Iran will try to strike first...they fear that Iran will decide to strike first."
— Nadav (A, 02:08)
"The Iranians, with their entire construction of regime and this Supreme Leader specifically, are not pragmatic enough...every Iran expert that I speak with [believes] the Iranians won’t be able to just say yes to what the President is saying unless there’s going to be a change within the regime."
— Nadav (A, 03:13)
"Not this Supreme Leader, by the way, the previous Supreme Leader, Khomeini, was pragmatic enough and signed a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War, 1988. And he said, 'I drank the cup of poison.' ...But this supreme Leader is much more rigid, is less clever..."
— Nadav (A, 03:13)
"Unless the Supreme Leader is somewhat removed...or loses its power or becomes symbolic...This kind of development is more likely than the Supreme Leader saying, 'You know what, President Trump, I’m willing to agree to your terms.'"
— Nadav (A, 04:29)
"[Iran could] manage to assume the initiative, regional prestige heightened to some extent, taking some military abilities of Israel...If the Iranians do that and then the US acts...the US is acting after Israel has been attacked. It’s running to the aid of Israel, which is a different thing politically..."
— Nadav (A, 04:32–05:45)
"Usually there’s an atmosphere of conflict. Everybody knows that something’s going to happen, but some side is surprised at the end…In 1973...Israel is surprised. October 7, 2023, less of an excellent example. Israel didn’t suspect that at all. But the June war with Iran, it was absolutely the case that you knew, your listeners knew that Israel and Iran are headed to a conflict. And Israel managed to have a surprise with strategic meaning."
— Nadav (A, 06:09)
"If President Trump would have told Prime Minister Netanyahu, don’t do it, Prime Minister Netanyahu wouldn’t have done it. So it’s actually a decision made by the White House to some extent at the time. And of course, the US joined the war and it played the critical role of destroying the most critical component of the nuclear program."
— Nadav (A, 07:52)
"I need to stress that the president can always make his mind that it’s not the right time to strike at all. And at the end of the day, this decision lies only with the president of the United States..."
— Nadav (A, 09:24)
"So one of the things that was published is the possibility that the U.S. will try to take out Khamenei. I don’t know if that’s true. Another thing, I would suspect is do they have some sort of a contact to an armed faction within Iran or a faction within the Iranian regime? Sort of what we saw in Venezuela to some extent."
— Nadav (A, 08:31)
On Iranian Intransigence:
"Not this Supreme Leader...is much more rigid, is less clever, and it's the assessment of every Iran expert that I speak with that the Iranians won't be able to just say yes to what the President is saying unless there's going to be a change within the regime."
— Nadav (A, 03:13)
On Preemptive Strike Risk:
"They fear that Iran will decide to strike first."
— Nadav (A, 02:08)
On U.S. Strategic Choice:
"The president can always make his mind that it's not the right time to strike at all... this decision lies only with the president of the United States."
— Nadav (A, 09:24)
This sneak peek offers dense, high-level analysis of the precarious situation between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Nadav and Dan probe the psychology of the Iranian regime, the potential for miscalculation leading to war, and how strategic surprises shape Middle Eastern history. The episode emphasizes the unpredictability of the coming months, the power of U.S. decision-making, and the deep anxiety in Israel about being caught off-guard.
The episode ends on a cliffhanger, shifting to a new question about Qatari influence in the U.S.—an incentive to listen to the full version as a subscriber.