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- [00:00]
Dan Senor
Foreign.
- [00:04]
Ilan Benatar
You are listening to an art media podcast. Do you think it was a mistake for Israel to hit Damascus, the heart of Damascus?
- [00:15]
Charles Lister
Yes, it was a mistake. Unquestionably, Israel's intervention added fuel to the fire added fuel to the fire of what was originally a highly localized conflict that had nothing to do with the rest of Syria. You know, America went through precisely the same shift after 9 11. That very understandable shift to seeing potential enemies everywhere actually created self fulfilling prophecies. In other words, it created additional enemies.
- [00:54]
Ilan Benatar
It's 12:30pm on Wednesday, July 23rd here in New York City. It is 7:30pm On Wednesday, July 23rd in Israel as Israelis are winding down their day. Or at least some Israelis. I've heard complaints from some of our Israeli listeners that when I say that they're winding down their day in the evening, it sells Israelis short that they wind their day down much later. But you'll indulge me. Earlier this week, the IDF began operations in the central Gazan city of Deir El Balak, an area where Israel has not, at least until now, operated since the war began. This could be interpreted as a pressure tactic to push Hamas in ceasefire talks, which are still ongoing, or as a real move to rescue hostages reportedly held there. Two IDF soldiers were recently killed in southern Gaza Amit Khan, 19 years old from Holon, and Vladimir Loza, 36 years old from Ashkelon, bringing the total number of fallen IDF soldiers since October 7 to 895. On Monday, IDF chief of Staff Eyal zamir ordered a 30% reduction in the number of reservists deployed to active combat zones in the coming months as fatigue continues to affect reservist turnout. This all comes as Israeli negotiators remain in Doha, where they await Hamas's latest response to the most recent ceasefire proposals. A source indicated that US envoy Steve Witkoff hopes to travel to Doha by the end of the week to finalize a hostage ceasefire deal. But again, Witkoff's travel plans are not final. As of now. On today's episode, we will be talking about what is happening across another one of Israel's borders. That is, of course, Syria. Last week we witnessed the eruption of violent aggression on behalf of the Syrian government and local Bedouin tribes against Syria's southern Druze community, leaving more than 1,400 people dead. In some ways, it has been the Druze community's October 7th and prompted over 1,000 Israeli Druze citizens to cross the Israel Syria border in support of their brothers and sisters in response to the Syrian government's targeting of the Druze, Israel launched a series of strikes against military facilities in Damascus, including the Syrian Defense Ministry, prompting widespread global criticism. As of Saturday, the all sides have agreed to a ceasefire. However, we are still seeing reports and videos on social media of Druze being attacked in southern Syria and some of those videos are extremely graphic. The nature of the slaughtering and the torturing is pretty brutal. Serious aggression and Israel's military response are a sharp turn away from the predictions that Syria would soon join the Abraham Accords or was on some track to normalization. This news is probably welcomed by Turkey, which holds direct influence over the Syrian regime and is trying to isolate Israel by preventing it from securing regional alliances. Joining us to discuss what has unfolded and continues to unfold in Syria, as well as the role Turkey plays in all of this, are Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute and Chai Eitan Cohen Yanorochuk, who returns to the podcast. Charles is a Senior fellow and Director of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. He also consults the United nations on matters relating to Syria and he serves as an expert witness and adviser on counterterrorism for U.S. european and Australian law enforcement bodies. Khai is a Turkish Israeli scholar whose research focuses on modern day Turkey, including Israel, Turkish relations and the Turkish Jewish community. He's a researcher at the Moshe Dayan center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and has been on the podcast before. So Charles, thanks for joining us. Hi, welcome back to call me back.
- [05:03]
Charles Lister
Thanks for having me.
- [05:04]
Dan Senor
Thank you for having me.
- [05:05]
Ilan Benatar
Charles, I want to start with you. Could you describe, just to set up this discussion, could you just describe the events that unfolded in Syria over the past 10 days?
- [05:15]
Charles Lister
Yeah, sure. And thanks again for having me on the podcast. It's not an easy thing to describe in brief because it's been extremely complicated. Let me begin with the first trigger, which came on the night of July 11th when a Druze man driving his vegetable truck truck from Damascus to Sueda in southern Syria was stopped on the side of the road by a handful of Bedouin gunmen. He was taken out of his vehicle, beaten, and his truck and all the vegetables were stolen. Sounds from the outset like a relatively minor incident when you compare everything else going on in Syria. The following morning, Dru's militiamen in Sweder kidnapped Bedouin gunman, then in retaliation kidnapped Drew's men and we had a day of tit for tat kidnappings. Really extremely localized conflict that played out for about 36 hours as it was Playing out the Syrian Transitional Government, which has no presence in Sweda. It hasn't had any presence since Assad fell, per a number of agreements with all of the religious and civil leadership there. The government basically took a step back and I guess allowed things to play out. I think it was a pressure play to try to send the message that if either side, the Bedouins or the Druze, wants stability, then you need the government to come and impose the stability, I should say. The Bedouin and Druze conflict in Sweden dates decades, mostly due to land disputes, access to smuggling routes. Most of Syria's drug trade goes through Sweda is controlled in majority by Druze militia, but through the land that has historically been owned by the Bedouins. So long standing, deeply rooted conflicts. The Syrian governments took a step back and then made the decision to step in on July 14.
- [06:57]
Ilan Benatar
I don't want to spend too much time on it, but I think it's important. The Druze community was considered loyal to the Assad regime when the regime existed, whereas the Bedouins were among the persecuted minorities. So that also helps explain some of the tension between the two communities.
- [07:13]
Charles Lister
Everything in Syria is complex. There's an awful lot more gray than black and white. But generally speaking, the Bedouins would have aligned themselves more with the Sunni majority of the country, which also aligned more with the revolution against Assad. So yes, that is the case. But the key thing here is that the government stepped in on July 14 to try to quell the conflict that was escalating between these two local communities. And as a response to that, as you said, the Israeli military launched a drone campaign striking Syrian government forces as they were advancing into Sueda. But the main fuel on the fire amidst that very early stepping in of the government, it took place roughly 20 to 30 minutes after government forces crossed the line in Sueda was that they were ambushed by Drew's militiamen right as they crossed the province line. Ten Syrian soldiers were executed. Their bodies were piled up on the side of the street and then used for celebratory photographs by Dru's militiamen. And then eight other soldiers were stripped down to their underwear and marched to a nearby village and then executed along a wall. That incident triggered a rapid spiral of conflict. The government forces then took the line that this was a Druze uprising against the transitional state and needed to be put down. The Bedouin community, of course, were then fueled on by that, given their political leanings towards the transitional government. And Israel's intervent added much more fuel to the Fire that was already beginning to burn and created basically a zero sum dynamic whereby every side, the Bedouins, all of the various Druze actors, which at this point remained quite diverse, some of them wanted a relationship with the government, others were opposed to it, as well as the government itself, all embraced a zero sum idea that this was a fight. This was a fight to define the future of Sweder. This was a fight to defend the Druze. This was a fight to define what the future of Syria was going to look like. And that zero sum dynamic encouraged all of the crimes and atrocities that happened. And there is absolutely no question that government forces and Bedouin gunmen were engaged in serious crimes and atrocities. But I have to say it's important to acknowledge that there is absolutely no question that Druze militiamen also played a role in significant crimes and atrocities against the Bedouin community. Significant executions, including of women and children, several cases of beheading of bodies that had already been killed, and. And so crimes on all sides. So for me, as a Syria analyst, this just illustrates just how combustible Syria remains on all of these different levels. A political level, a sectarian level, on a national level and a local level, and just underlines the enormous challenge that Syria faces going forward.
- [09:54]
Ilan Benatar
Okay, and just. Can you just briefly describe. And we could do a whole episode on who the Druze are and who the Kurds are. And I know all these groups have major implications for the conversation we're having. So I just want our listeners to just have a brief understanding of who these groups are, because we'll be referring to them throughout this conversation. Charles, do you want to do a little primer for us?
- [10:12]
Charles Lister
Sure. I mean, on a basic level, and avoiding getting into all of the weeds, the Druze of Syria have a presence in a number of different areas of the country, a number of suburbs south of Damascus. But their real heaviest presence is in the governor of Sweda, which is right in the southeast of the country along the border with Jordan. And then in terms of the Kurds, of course, this is an ethnic minority group with a significant presence in southeastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, northwestern Iraq, and parts of northwestern Iran. The Kurds of Syria historically have always been detached from the state, given no rights as citizens of the country, forbidden from speaking Kurdish or being educated in Kurdish. So it's a minority community in the country that has basically lived under significant oppression for a long time. And the Kurds, too, like the Druze in Sweder, control their own territory and seek to have some form of a different kind of relationship. With the transitional government that we've seen take place and develop in Damascus over the last seven months.
- [11:16]
Ilan Benatar
Khai, what has been Turkey's involvement in Syria and what are Erdogan's interests here in Syria going forward?
- [11:24]
Dan Senor
We should not forget, after the fall of the Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad, Turkey has turned into the new patron of Syria.
- [11:31]
Ilan Benatar
So December of 24, when Assad, when the regime that had been in power for 53 years indeed fell. So there was civil war in Syria, hundreds of thousands of Syrians slaughtered by the Assad regime. But it still was an intact sovereign country despite its domestic turmoil. And I said like an internal civil war, massive refugees crisis, the government had held together and then the government falls. And so now you're taking us to basically the end of last year, the beginning of this year, when Turkey is looking at this mess.
- [12:02]
Dan Senor
I mean, during the all Syrian civil war, Turkey supported the opposition forces. They hosted millions of Syrian refug and of course they provided ammunition, logistics. And at the end of the day, from the Turkish point of view, since the Syrian dictator was toppled, they began to penetrate into Syria. And at last we began to see here a new friction between Turkey and Israel at the end. I mean, in the Aftermath of this October 7th, this created a very important trauma in Israel and Israel shifted its national security strategy. And the most important component here is Israel is no longer going to wait in its own borders, but rather it will penetrate into, you know, we can call Syria as an enemy territory and to settle there and to strengthen its strategic positions inside the Syrian and the Lebanese territory. That's what we have witnessed. And therefore Israel had no choice but to grab the Syri Syrian Hermon.
- [13:11]
Ilan Benatar
The Syrian Hermon is what the Syrian.
- [13:13]
Dan Senor
Hermon is a very strategic, important mountain which is more or less like 20, 25 kilometers away from the outskirts of Damascus. Of course, this really improved IDF's deterrence vis a vis Syria. But at the same time it also delivered a very clear message to the new patron of Syria, to Turkey, that Israel is no longer going to accept this new feta complete in the meaning that similar to the Iranian experience before that, the Iranians came there and settled there and they created their own rings of fire around Israel. And therefore these two countries, which in their entire history never declared against each other any hostilities, found themselves in a very clear friction in Syria. And this friction, we can see it, you know, very in a very clear manner also in the Turkish press and also in this, the Israeli press, that both of the countries began to tag each other as A threat against each other. Parallel to that, we also have seen the Turkish Red Book, which also tagged Israel as an actor which is destabilizing the region. So after providing you this background, I would like to mention here that this Jews fiction, the atrocities that we have witnessed in the Druze mountain in Syria. The Turkish press began to portray the events as if the Jews in Syria have turned into Israel's useful instruments in order to break Syria into pieces, to decimate Syria, to dismember Syria. And their most important concern here, obviously is the Kurdish question, because Turkey is seeking to achieve a unitary state in Syria.
- [15:06]
Ilan Benatar
So how did the US respond to Israel's intervention in Syria?
- [15:12]
Charles Lister
The US response, particularly privately, as I am aware, but also publicly, was shock and deep frustration. The Trump administration has placed all of its eggs in the transitional government's basket in Syria, basically aligning itself with the rest of the Middle east region, which sees the removal of Assad and the emergence of a new transition there as a historic opportunity. Of course, Syria had been under the Assad family's rule for more than 53 years. Under that rule, Syria meant nothing much more than an exporter of instability through terrorism threats, military action for many, many years. So the region, and now more recently, the Trump administration, sees the change in Syria as an opportunity to create a much more peaceful region, geographically right in the heart of the Middle east, that will help to create more interconnectedness, more integration of the region on economic level, and have positive spillover effects onto Syria's neighbours in Lebanon, which of course is in economically a dire state in Jordan to its south, equally in a particularly bad economic position, there is a hope that Syria will become more of a hub to positively benefit its regional neighbours. So the US response here, frankly speaking, was Israel's military action is a direct challenge to our approach on trying to stabilize Syria.
- [16:37]
Ilan Benatar
And how do they respond? I know they're. There are two, at least two that we know of, two rationales behind Israel's response. One was obviously that the Druze community in Israel, the Druze Israeli citizens, felt very threatened, if you will, albeit indirectly, but threatened because, as I said in the introduction, their brothers and sisters across the border were being attacked. And also from a strategic standpoint, if Israel has Learned anything since October 7, it cannot have jihadi forces right up on its border. And to the extent that Israel understood that the new regime in Syria was sending forces, or at least authorizing the Bedouins to sort of act on the regime's behalf indirectly right on Israel's border is a red line that Israel will not accept. And so it had to send a message to the regime that you have an interest in pulling back your forces or we'll take this kind of action.
- [17:30]
Charles Lister
There's a number of different things that we should cover here in terms of sort of context and what happened on July 12th. So just as that tit for tat kidnapping dynamic that I described earlier was just beginning, on July 12, there were direct talks between Israel and Syria in Azerbaijan, I should say, because Turkey is part of this conversation. The only reason why that meeting happened was because of Turkish mediation. So Turkey actually didn't play a role in any of the attacks in Sweda. They did not provide support for those attacks. The media, yes, media in Turkey is a very loud thing, but it doesn't always translate into to actual government actions. The media made a lot of noise. But Turkey's actual early position was to offer to the US to act as a mediator. Because for the last two to three months, Turkey and Israel behind the scenes have engaged in a lot of de escalatory dialogue and mediation over Syria. And anyway, this meeting happened in Baku in Azerbaijan. And my understanding is because there were American mediators in that meeting as well. So my sources, both on the US side, but also the Syrian side, was that part of the conversation that happened in Azerbaijan. They were all looking at security, understanding security agreements between Syria and Israel. And part of that dialogue covered the issue that Syria wants to be acknowledged regionally and particularly from Israel, which is that as the sovereign government of Syria, it has the right to intervene when localized conflict breaks out somewhere in its country. And the understanding, and I should emphasize here, including from the US side, was that the Israeli response to that was yes, as a sovereign government, you have the right to intervene when some form of conflict breaks out in inside your territory. And so when Damascus made the decision three days into the local conflict in Sweda to send troops in, their position is we got a green light from Israel to do this on July 12, 48 hours later. And of course, whether or not they got a green light, clearly that's not how things played out because Israeli drones flew into the sky within minutes.
- [19:32]
Ilan Benatar
Chai, what do you know about the behind the scenes which resulted in the ceasefire?
- [19:36]
Dan Senor
Before that, I would like to make another important point. The fact that only a week and a half ago we were all talking about the Abraham Accords, that Syria could become a part of the Abraham Accords. We could witness the new signing of a new agreement, a peace agreement or a non aggression treaty between El Giulani and Benjamin Netanyahu. Obviously such an agreement would not be welcomed in Ankara. And obviously if such an agreement was signed, then we could see an increase of the Abraham Accords axis countries in Syria at the expense of Turkey, meaning that Saudis and Emiratis could also penetrate there. And obviously Ankara's influence would be diminished. And today what we are seeing the exact opposite. Following the Israeli airstrike in Damascus today, we are witnessing that the Turkish Ministry of Defense declared that they are going to provide ammunition and any other weapons and of course training for the Syrian army. And today the first shipment was already sent. This current violence played to the hands of Erdogan. He strengthened his position in Damascus. We also see that this current incident in the Druze mountain toppled all of these Abraham Accords efforts. And obviously Erdogan now can deepen Israel's isolation in the region. As we can see, he is on daily basis making delegitimization against the Jewish state. Obviously he wouldn't like to see Israel to be recognized by the new Syrian government. I assume that he is very much satisfied. Fight.
- [21:35]
Charles Lister
Could I just insert something here? I don't know if you want us to debate, but yes, I welcome it.
- [21:40]
Ilan Benatar
Bring it.
- [21:41]
Charles Lister
I think a lot of what Dr. Hay has just said is true, but we mustn't overplay Turkey's influence here. And also it's really important not to misunderstand Turkey's role. The only reason why this transitional government in Damascus originally initiated a line of dialogue with Israel is because of Turkish Turkey. So this idea that Turkey is completely opposed to the new Syrian government and Israel having a security accord is just factually not right. Turkey wants and specifically mediated talks to push forward a security accord between Israel and Syria. And the origins of those talks was a direct Turkish Israeli dialogue to establish a security accord between Ankara and Jerusalem, which now exists. There is now a hotline, a deconfliction mechanism. All of that is as a result of Turkish Israeli talks that then led the path to Syrian Israeli mediation. We then had subsequently Trump's engagement with the new Syrian government which gave it additional impetus. The other thing here is there is not going to be an Abraham Accords agreement between Syria and Israel anytime soon. And it's got nothing to do with what happened in Sweda. The core framework for an Abraham Accords agreement between Syria and Israel will demand, demand way too much from both sides that neither is willing to give. At this point, the Syrian government's official negotiating position is that they want all of the Golan Heights back, which of course, is never going to happen. But I know for a fact that their compromise position is a return to the 1974 disengagement line, which from a US perspective, should be possible. That's the Trump administration's position. That's the compromise that we should be able to reach. That is something that Turkey. Turkey has actively been involved in facilitating from the very beginning. So, again, everything in Syria is much more gray than black and white. Turkish media makes a lot of noise about Israel, there's absolutely no question about that. And frankly speaking, Israeli media makes lots of noise about Turkey too. So both are six of one, half a dozen of the other. But the reality on the ground behind the scenes is much, much more nuanced, and it is pointing aspirationally towards de escalation, which should be something that we're all supportive of both.
- [23:54]
Ilan Benatar
So I want to talk about Syria's new president, Ahmed Al Shara, who's formerly known as Al Julani. Charles, what do we know about his motivations here?
- [24:02]
Charles Lister
Well, his, his real motivations are he wants to retain power. And he has been on a long path of evolution. I mean, frankly speaking, since he was about 8 years old, we don't have the time to get into all of it, but he grew up in the most elite suburb of Damascus, elite district of Damascus. He went to one of the most expensive schools in Damascus. And he basically cutting an extremely long story short, is someone who, along with thousands of other young Syrian men, travelled to Iraq to fight the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. But having spent most of his time in prison, he built himself up in the ranks of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which of course, much later on became isis. After his time, over the last eight years, having consolidated his control of a small corner of northwestern Syria, about 3 1/2% of Syrian territory, he has been gradually changing. He is a deeply personally conservative person from a religious perspective. But the change that we have seen is that that conservative religious belief is no longer a defining feature of his political ideology. This kind of development of a more somewhat more pragmatic political posture isn't new. And again, just to place it in the Western perspective, his movement, this has never really been made public. His movement has been working with us, French and British intelligence for years to counter ISIS in northwestern Syria. His movement was responsible for facilitating US drone strikes in northwestern Syria since at least 2020. And so when he walked into Damascus, this was a figure with plenty of troubling history that Western intelligence agencies were very familiar with, with, which also explains why the us, the uk, France and many others were so quick to trepidatiously cautiously embrace him. Otherwise, if there had been no prior relationship, we wouldn't have seen anywhere near such a fast rush into Damascus. It took the US about 10 days to go in, took the UK about a week. And that was because there was this prior relationship. So it's hard to give a complete picture. He is someone with a very troubling history, no doubt about that. But when you speak to senior U.S. officials, including in the CIA, their line right now is despite that troubling history, there is no person in Syria who could have held this transition together over the last seven months, except for him. He just seems to have this kind of convincing effect. Some of the country leaders in the Middle east, and I won't for obvious reasons, name names who have historically been the most hostile trial to anyone with a political Islamist background, have come out and including said to me in meetings, including one of the most senior of those figures who said when he first met Ahmad Al Shara, he came out and the word he used was awed.
- [26:57]
Ilan Benatar
This is the view of Middle east leaders. This is the view of European leaders. Macron in France is apparently in awe.
- [27:02]
Charles Lister
Of him and the us.
- [27:03]
Ilan Benatar
I've heard this from multiple people.
- [27:05]
Charles Lister
So again, it's not a defense of him now or of his history, but it is to convey the reality.
- [27:11]
Ilan Benatar
No, no, no, it's just this. It's this aura and this reputation he has.
- [27:14]
Charles Lister
Right, exactly.
- [27:15]
Dan Senor
If you allow me, Charles, you just mentioned that. Let us not exaggerate Turkey's role, but I would also like to remind Turkey's very important role. Just in the aftermath of the fall of Assad, the Turkish Director of Intelligence, you know, Ibrahim Kalan and later the Turkish Foreign Minister has confidant. They were the ones who paid the first visits to Damascus and they provided him the first legitimacy. The first embassy that was integrated in Damascus was the Turkish Embassy. And I believe that the jacket and the tie that Mr. Giuliani is wearing, I think that's also made in Turkey. Let me tell you, okay, this is the Turkish strategy. They are, you know, they baptized him in this pool of legitimacy and now Al Julani is gone instead. Now we have a brand new person called Ahmed Ashara. And later he was also invited to Ankara. I mean, this is Ankara's most important foreign policy project. Under Erdogan, Turkey is adopting a neo Ottomanist foreign policy. And Erdogan is crowned at home as the so called Sultan who brought back Syria to Turkey. And in this regard, maybe you would not like to hear what I'm going to say, but Al Julani Ahmed Ashara is a kind of Turkey's governor in Syria. So government of Ahmed Ashara is very, very much dependent to Turkey, I think more than you think.
- [28:54]
Charles Lister
I think we could go around in circles on this. It's not just dependent on Turkey would like everybody to think, think that it's the kingmaker in Damascus. The first senior external leader to go to Damascus was not Turkish, it was Jordanian. It was a Jordanian foreign minister. And of course, most of the region already had their embassies open in Damascus when the Turks decided to reopen theirs. The country, the regional state that has the most influence, and I've seen this firsthand, having repeatedly been there, going back again in about a month, is Saudi Arabia. And that was a very strategic reason that was made within days of Ahmed Al Shara walking into Damascus. The first place he went, Saudi Arabia, the place he has most visited, Saudi Arabia and the uae. Because Turkey doesn't have money to rebuild Syria. So the Syrian government wants to maintain a clear and for obvious reasons, relationship with the Turkish state. There's no question about that. But what Syria needs the most is money. And it knows that the places where it's going to get that is the Gulf. And that's why we've seen by a country mile, the biggest investment in the relationship with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE and their embassies in Damascus and are far more active than the Turkish embassy. So again, Turkey does a very good job at portraying itself as the kingmaker. And of course, its media will continue to play that game because it has that kind of almost antagonistic relationship in the way it conveys its role. But the facts on the ground in Damascus are that the Gulf states have, by a. I mean, right now Saudi Arabia has 120 of its wealthiest individuals in Damascus. They're about to invest $4 billion in Syria in terms of construction and reconstruction. Turkey to this day hasn't invested a dollar in Syria. So they do an awful lot with making a lot of noise, but in terms of the infrastructure and rebuilding, very little. And again, if you talk on the security level, the biggest investors into the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior right now are Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Turkey again, makes a lot of noise, but has done much less.
- [30:52]
Dan Senor
Who is going to rebuild Syria if not the Turkish subcontractors?
- [30:56]
Charles Lister
But yeah, but they don't make the money from it.
- [30:58]
Ilan Benatar
Charles is basically saying that, yes, you're right, Kai, that the labor force will largely come from Turkey, but the capital is gonna come from the Gulf, from.
- [31:06]
Charles Lister
The Sunni Gulf, which gives the Gulf a great deal more leverage, especially Qatar.
- [31:10]
Dan Senor
And please do not forget that Turkey and Qatar are together. This Muslim Brotherhood alliance should be treated as a one piece.
- [31:19]
Ilan Benatar
But Charles, let me ask you a question because from Israel's perspective, and Khai can obviously weigh in on this, there is this perception, I mean, if you just look at the increase in resources in the Israeli security establishment, specifically in the Israeli intelligence community in the Mossad, the increase in resources in understanding Turkey and understanding what Turkey is up to has increased exponentially over the last six to nine months. And it's not just because there's this perception of growing Turkish power, but the ambition for this restoration of this neo Ottoman reach within the Middle east that could, if it reaches right into Syria, could abut Israel's border. So I can't believe the Israelis are concerned about something they shouldn't be concerned about. It can't be that there's nothing to this.
- [32:04]
Charles Lister
No, no, no, absolutely the ambition is there. But again, my line is we can't just rely on the words. The ambition is unquestionably there. I mean, within weeks of taking Damascus, of the Syrians taking Damascus, the Turkish Ministry of Defense Defense tabled what they called a military strategic accord with the new, very, very new Syrian Transitional Government. At the time it was called a caretaker government. And that deal, that accord included all the things that triggered the panic, particularly in Israel, around access to air bases, deployment of air defenses, language around asserting Syrian sovereignty, which obviously was directed towards Israel, Israel, which demands or expects freedom of military action over Syrian airspace. So absolutely not questioning that the Turkish ambition is there. What I'm trying to say is the stuff that's not publicly visible, which is that the transitional government knows that probably its biggest existential threat, it's not terrorism, it's not sectarianism, it's being perceived as a Turkish puppet. Which is why they have made the decision to invade far more with the Gulf states, which is why they made their first visits to the Gulf states and which is why they refused to sign that military accord with Turkey, because it would have signalled their death knell, basically, because, as I say, it triggered all the red alarm bells in Israel. But frankly speaking, if they did that, it would also trigger great frustration in the Gulf. I was in Saudi Arabia about four days after Assad fell, speaking to the Foreign Ministry all about Syria, Syria. The two things that were foremost on their mind was Ahmad Al Shara and what he wants and Turkey. So The Gulf is very well aware of Turkish aspirations and ambitions too, but so is Damascus. And if they were ever to be seen as whole hog under the thumb of Turkey, they would lose the Gulf investment because immediately it would be seen in the way that Dr. Hay is describing as a kind of Ottoman project. So again, the important thing is not just to rely on what's publicly visible and being publicly said, but also to look under the surface at much greater grey than black and white.
- [34:14]
Dan Senor
Today the first shipment of the armored Turkish made armed vehicles were sent to Damascus. You can find it online. The pictures are everywhere. And this is the only the first shipment. So. So the Turkish presence is there whether we would like to see it or not. And I believe that their penetration in Syria will go deeper and will be much more significant day by day. And I believe that in the very near future we will also going to see their Turkish military bases not only in northern portions of Syria, but also they will seek to integrate these bases in the center of Syria where Israel bombed in April. Israel. I would like to remind that Israel bombed three different locations. Hama, T4 and Palmyra were targeted by the Israeli air forces only for one reason, because Israel got the intelligence that I mean the Turkish armed forces could settle on these military bases. So it was a very clear message to Turkey that it was calling them. Please don't come here.
- [35:25]
Ilan Benatar
Hi. What is Israel's strategy on Turkey? I think what we all agree are Turkey's ambitions in the region. I know there's a disagreement between you two about how realistic it is for Turkey to achieve those ambitions, given that there are other power centers in the region that could have more influence in Syria. But what is Israel's strategy and is it coherent?
- [35:42]
Dan Senor
That's a great question. Obviously we are not planning to hit Turkey. Turkey is still considered as a friendly country. So since 1949. And this is very important for Israeli national security to preserve the bilateral relations with Turkey, at least on this current level and not to see a further deterioration like the declaration of hostilities. This is the first issue, but I really wish that Israel really had a real strategy for Ankara. Turkey is, is still not at the top of the list, but let me tell you, Ankara is doing its best in order to be on the top of the list. Today we are witnessing a delegitimization campaign against the State of Israel almost on every platform. Turkey imposed economic sanctions against the State of Israel. Turkey is a part of the South African lawsuit against Israel in the hag. Right. And the Turkish government is also seeking to legitimize its very strong relationship with the Hamas. Again, I'm emphasizing we are not looking for a war. Israel should do everything possible to preserve its relationship with Turkey. But after October 7th, we have to open our eyes and we should not say no, it will not happen. If I would tell you only two or three years ago that Houthis will going to launch once a week or twice a day missiles against the Israeli civilians from Yemen to Israel, would you believe me? Two years ago, no, you would have laughed at me. It doesn't mean that trying to mend the fences is a sign of weakness. Israel is not a weak country. We demonstrated our strength, strength, in my opinion, very well during the last war against Iran. We have the intelligence superiority, we have air superiority. And I think all of the nations in the Middle east, whether they like it or not, they really understood and internalized it.
- [37:52]
Ilan Benatar
Before we wrap, Charles, I guess the big question is sort of where we began. Do you think it was a mistake for Israel to hit Damascus, the heart of Damascus, or will this just turn out to be a footnote in the history of the chaos of the post Assad regime? Chaos. As Syria sorts out its internal affairs and as the regional powers sort out how they're going to deal with Syria, Israel's bombing of the Defense Ministry in Damascus will be just a non event.
- [38:23]
Charles Lister
Let me first say that I'm obviously not Israeli and neither am I Jewish and neither have I suffered any of the consequences of October 7th. So I come at my answer from that perspective, from more of an outsider's perspective. And I would say to your question that yes, it was a mistake. I would also go as far as to say intervening full stop was a mistake. Unquestionably, Israel's intervention added fuel to the fire added fuel to the fire of what was originally a highly localized conflict that had nothing to do with the rest of Syria. Syria. And that we had seen bouts exactly like that, tit for tat, kidnappings, a few shootings here and there that had then subsequently been fixed, solved, negotiated out and stabilized.
- [39:11]
Ilan Benatar
But Charles, let me just say on this, but given how Israel's doctrine seems to have changed since October 7, that Israel's no longer in the business of trying to deter threats and deter enemies. Israel's in the business is when enemies and threats get too close to Israel and too close to Israel's border, Israel removes them. Not deters them, removes them. And in a world, in a post October 7th world in which jihadists were on Israel's border, meaning in Sueta, and seem to have been backed by the regime, or at least blessed by the regime in the post October 7th world. Israel's gotta take action.
- [39:48]
Charles Lister
Well I do. And the reason why I started my original answer with what I said about, you know, not having a direct stake in this, this as Dr. Hay and others do, and yourself perhaps too, is that I understand why that change of security posture happened. Of course I do. It's the natural response. You know, America went through precisely the same shift after 9 11. But as the US learned over time, that very understandable shift to seeing potential enemies everywhere actually created self fulfilling prophecies. In other words, it created additional enemies. And as a Syria specialist, and I come to this conversation purely through that lens, and also as a Syria specialist that speaks with all of the Syrians involved in positions of influence and have done over the last 14 years. When Ahmad Al Shara walked into Damascus in December, I very much understand that Israel's security assessment would have been my, obviously I can't swear on this but like, oh my God, that's not going to be know bad news, right? So I totally get that. But what I also know is that within days messages were conveyed through intermediaries to Israel to make it clear that this transitional government in Damascus was not a threat. It had no hostile intent. Over the last seven months, Israel has conducted 1,119 airstrikes in Syria, 323 ground incursions into Syrian territory. And that doesn't count the additional Syrian Herman occupation that developed very quickly in the same time that those hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of military actions took place. The Syrian government has committed zero hostile actions in response. In fact, the most assertive thing that Damascus has done in those seven months is file two complaints through the UN Security Council. So the ground should be there for the dialogue that already exists. And there are these meetings as we've talked about, out to then make more progress. But they will never make progress. If the perception is we don't trust who you are and we will never trust who you are because of who you used to be. If the CIA can go from having been killing Ahmad Al Shara's commanders over many years to where they are right now, which is daily sharing intelligence with them in order to fight isis, this so too can Israel. It takes a bold and brave step to do so, especially given what's happened over the last two years, and I fully understand that. But Israel will be in a much safer place if it takes that bold and brave step to embrace dialogue and some early trust building measures than if it were to continue its current posture and again, if Iran is the center of the conversation here, the Syrian government and the forces that make up it, you could not find, in addition to Israel, a more anti Iranian force. And in fact, since January 1st this year, they have intercepted 47 Iranian weapons shipments headed to Hezbollah in Syria. When did the Assad regime ever do that? Never. It facilitated those weapons shipments. So in theory, again, we have all the building blocks, in theory to start building a relationship up from the ground level, level, acknowledging there's very little trust. But I know for a fact that Damascus wants, because it has to, to see that relationship develop. I know that the Americans want to see it. I know Turkey is accepting that it has to happen and I know the Gulf wants it to happen. So all of the building blocks are there. But Israel has to make the decision to accept that. It has to trust at this early stage that process. And we're not there yet. And I think what happened over the last 10 days demonstrate that we're definitely not there.
- [43:36]
Ilan Benatar
I think it's a tall order to ask Israel to trust given what it's been through. But I have a feeling this is not going to be the end of this conversation, so we're going to leave it there. Chai and Charles Chai joins us from Israel. Charles, normally based in D.C. but in the UK right now. Thank you both for this conversation, which gave me actually a lot to think about. Hopefully our audience will feel the same and we'll look forward to having you both back on.
- [44:00]
Charles Lister
Great. Thank you so much for having me.
- [44:01]
Dan Senor
Thank you very much.
- [44:12]
Ilan Benatar
That's our show for today. If you found this episode valuable, please share it with others who might appreciate it. Time and again we found that our listeners are the ones driving the growth of the Call Me Back community. So thank you. And to offer comments, suggestions, sign up for updates or explore past episodes, please visit our website, ark media.org that's arkmedia.org where you can deepen your understanding of the topics we cover. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Mariangelis Burgos. Our director of operations is Maya Rakoff. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.