Is the war going well? - a debate between Dan Shapiro and Mark Dubowitz

Summary

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Podcast Summary: Call Me Back — with Dan Senor

Episode: "Is the war going well? — a debate between Dan Shapiro and Mark Dubowitz"

Date: April 13, 2026

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Episode Overview

In this episode, host Dan Senor moderates a high-stakes debate between two leading experts on U.S.-Israel-Iran policy: Dan Shapiro (former U.S. Ambassador to Israel) and Mark Dubowitz (CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies). The discussion focuses on the current Israel-Iran war, America’s and Israel’s goals and strategy, and the dilemmas faced by democratic leaderships confronting tough choices in the Middle East.

Senor seeks to answer the core question: Is the war (against Iran and its proxies) going well, and what does “going well” mean in geopolitical, military, and public opinion terms? Shapiro and Dubowitz provide two sharply contrasting but respectful perspectives on progress, strategy, legitimacy, and the way forward for both the U.S. and Israel.

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Main Themes and Purposes

• Defining "success" in the ongoing Israel-Iran war: military, strategic, and political perspectives
• Evaluating the U.S. approach — planning vs. improvisation
• Public opinion and American will as a critical "clock"
• Goals: Regime change vs. limited deterrence
• Global alliances and coalition-building challenges
• The risk/cost calculus: Building on gains or risking overreach

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Opening Context — Three Clocks and Confusion ([01:30], [05:40])

• Mark Dubowitz: Frames the war as a race between three “clocks”:
  • The nuclear program (how fast can Iran rebuild?)
  • Regime survival in Tehran
  • American political will/patience

“The goal of this campaign, as I see it, is we’ve got to break the regime before it breaks American political will…” ([01:30])

• Dan Shapiro: Emphasizes strategic confusion and shifting objectives:

“The whole strategic objective of this war has been confused really from the beginning… It’s been hard to know what [President Trump] really thinks the goal of this is.” ([05:40])

2. The Latest Developments — The Blockade and Islamabad Talks ([05:40]-[08:22])

• The U.S. effort to blockade the Strait of Hormuz after failed negotiations in Islamabad is seen as both necessary and improvisational.
• Shapiro: Critiques the lack of clear objectives and alliance-building.
• Dubowitz: More optimistic about the military progress, highlighting six stages of pressure applied to Iran (nuclear, missile, leadership, economy, Hormuz/global economy, regime survival).

3. Military Effectiveness vs. Endurance of the Enemy ([08:26], [12:29])

• Dubowitz: Outlines significant degradation of Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities, but cautions it's not "terminal or permanent."

“...it’s a reasonable assessment that it’s been serious, more than people expected, but not terminal or permanent.” ([08:26])

• Shapiro: Notes Iran’s surprising operational strength and their ability to impose global economic pain, notably via Hormuz.

“They still have cards to play that can impose very significant global economic pain…” ([13:42])

4. Was the War Planned—Or Just Stumbled Into? ([02:06], [17:01])

• Shapiro: Blames the Trump administration for stumbling into war without sufficient public or congressional buy-in, creating strategic and legitimacy problems.

“Most Americans woke up on the morning of February 28th, were surprised to discover we were at war in the Middle East. Why... No one has told us why.” ([17:01])

• Dubowitz: While conceding process flaws, argues military necessity and positive impact outweigh the failures of public messaging.

5. The JCPOA Debate — Solving What, and What Not? ([17:01])

• Both see the JCPOA (2015 Iran deal) as inadequate for long-term security but differ on whether Trump’s “maximum pressure” is bringing strategic benefits or new risks.

“...all of these behaviors that we all object to... have been tried to be addressed with a JCPOA and without a JCPOA, with a maximum pressure campaign and without a maximum pressure campaign...” — Shapiro ([17:13])

6. Moving Forward — Ceasefire and Strategic Options ([23:09], [27:32])

• Shapiro: Advocates consolidating gains during the ceasefire, maximizing international pressure (not just U.S.), and avoiding further escalation, which risks broader instability and economic upheaval.

“Let’s focus on what’s essential... It would be possible, it should be possible to use the time of the ceasefire and an extended ceasefire to put that pressure on Iran to get the Strait open.” ([23:09])

• Dubowitz: Agrees on coalition-building but wants to keep all military/diplomatic levers in play, warning that Iranian strategy banks on outlasting American will.

7. The Regime Change Question ([31:36], [33:21])

• Both guests agree that real change in Iran depends on the eventual fall of the regime, but:
• Dubowitz: "Limited victory" is possible, "total victory" requires regime change, ideally led by the Iranian people but actively supported by the U.S./Israel (communications, arming, intelligence, air support).

“I think we can get limited victory without regime change, but total victory depends ultimately on regime change.” ([31:36])

• Shapiro: Without regime change, any progress is temporary (“mowing the grass” analogy), but he cautions against regime change wars and stresses American public buy-in.

8. The Surprise Strike & Political Will ([34:44]-[40:28])

• The initial decapitation strike on Khamenei and top IRGC personnel is seen as a fleeting opportunity with high costs for public and allied support due to lack of consultation.
• Shapiro: Laments not building a political coalition or making the strategic case ahead of time.
• Dubowitz: Argues that even with political process, American polarization would have prevented broad support for Trump’s war.

9. What If the War Stops Now? ([43:08]-[47:47])

• Shapiro: U.S. and Israel have made significant operational gains and deterrence, enhancing regional alliances. Risks of pushing further into war include alliance fraying, weakened Indo-Pacific presence vis-a-vis China, and economic crises from oil shocks.

“It will not have settled the core issues... My fear... is that if we go much further... we will see fraying of that regional alliance, more fraying of the US NATO alliance...” ([43:08])

• Dubowitz: Agrees on successes, warns that incomplete follow-through will leave adversaries (Iran, Russia, China) stronger and allies vulnerable. Cautions against “mowing the grass with scissors” for years if the U.S. walks away now.

“If we don’t do that and we walk away from the fight, we’re going to leave our Gulf allies and Israel vulnerable to a reconstituted Islamic Republic.” ([45:28])

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Mark Dubowitz:

  “We’ve got to break the regime before it breaks American political will...” ([01:30]) “The question is, well, where do we go from here?” ([22:49])

• Dan Shapiro:

  “But we are where we are. So now we’re into a ceasefire, and a ceasefire does have value... Some of those bigger goals... did not reach agreement, not surprisingly...” ([23:13]) “If we think we’re going to solve all of this in a military conflict after six weeks... the cost will be astronomical.” ([23:09])

• Mark Dubowitz:

  “If you want to talk about geopolitical consequences, I think we need to distinguish between... end[ing] the war... [and] leaving our Gulf allies and Israel vulnerable...” ([45:28]) “...we’re going to be mowing the grass with a president who’s not bringing a lawnmower to the fight but instead bringing a pair of scissors...” ([45:28])

• Dan Shapiro:

  “Credit to CENTCOM, to the Israeli military... Those are positives. It will not have settled the core issues that have bedeviled the U.S.–Iranian relationship...” ([43:08])

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Framing the War and "Three Clocks": [01:30]–[05:40]
• Mark’s Stages of Pressure: [08:26]
• Military Gains, Regime Resilience: [12:29]–[13:42]
• Planning/Legitimacy Critique: [17:01]
• JCPOA and Strategy Debate: [17:01]–[23:09]
• Ceasefire and Forward Options: [23:09]–[30:06]
• Regime Change Paradox: [31:36]–[34:44]
• Surprise/American Will/Pub. Support: [34:44]–[40:28]
• If War Stopped Today – What Then?: [43:08]–[47:47]

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Tone & Dynamics

• Respectful, rigorous, fact-driven, but animated disagreement, especially over strategy and politics.
• Frequent mutual acknowledgement of agreement on core facts, but marked difference on risk tolerance, public diplomacy, and long-term vision.
• Both highlight deep frustration with Washington’s polarized politics and the difficulty of building lasting strategic consensus.

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Conclusion

This episode delivers a sophisticated, deeply informed debate on what “success” means in the current Israel-Iran war, the costs and limits of military action, and the necessity—but not sufficiency—of regime change for lasting regional stability. Both guests agree that the actions taken have exacted real damage on the Iranian regime, but differ sharply on broader strategic coherence, alliance management, and the risks of escalation versus withdrawal.

Listeners are left with a comprehensive picture of the war’s complexities, America’s dilemmas, and the ever-present limits of military power without sustained political and public support.

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Transcript

[Dan Senor]

War has returned to Israel. Israelis have spent the last days in their safe rooms and in public bomb shelters. Buildings have been hit and tragically, civilians have been killed. As Israel and the United States continue their military offensive, Israelis brace for sustained rocket fire. And at the scene of these attacks, United Hatzala volunteers, EMTs, medics, paramedics and doctors are working to save lives, often showing up in the first minutes to evacuate people stuck in buildings, supply medical care to the wounded, and provide first aid to many others impacted. Their volunteers are often in the critical first minutes after rocket impact. Their services, which are always free, are a vital lifeline to the people of Israel. You can make sure that they have the life saving equipment and supplies they need right now. Bulletproof vests and helmets, tactical stretchers for evacuations, oxygen kits, and whatever else they need to meet this moment in Israel. Visit israelrescue.org callmeback that's Israel rescue.org callmeback or go to the link in my show Notes to learn more and support United Hatzala's critical efforts. You are listening to an art media podcast

[Mark Dubowitz]

that's kind of three clocks that are ticking. The nuclear clock. How quickly could Iran reconstitute its nuclear program and potentially get a bomb through some kind of COVID breakout or sneak out? How long will the regime survive? And then the third clock is American will. And the goal of this campaign, as I see it, is we've got to break the regime before it breaks. American political will waits out Trump rebuilds, rearms, represses Iranians, develops nuclear weapons and comes back deadlier. So the strategy is, I think, straightforward, and I think it's been going fairly well.

[Dan Shapiro]

If you had wanted to prepare the American people for withstanding the pressures that we're going to be under, economic pressures, resource strains, diplomatic pressures that this will require. Marx talks about the American will factor here. Would you have gone into this war the way we did, sort of tumbling backwards into it and only then trying to fumble around and make a case for why it was necessary? Almost from the beginning, something like 60% of the American people, that's what most polls are showing, oppose this war.

[Dan Senor]

It's 4pm on Sunday, April 12 here in New York City. It is 11pm on Sunday, Apr. 12, in Israel. The question of whether the war is going well has become a defining fault line in the American public debate, one that even cuts within traditionally aligned communities, according to a recent CBS YouGov poll, to cite one of many, 41% of Americans, according to this poll, think that the war with Iran is going well, while 59% believe it is going badly. One side of the debate includes many who argue that progress should be measured in strategic and military terms, degrading enemy capabilities, restoring deterrence in signaling resolve to adversaries. From this perspective, even a prolonged and possibly costly military campaign can be going well if it strengthens long term security and reshapes the regional balance. On the other side of this debate includes voices that are increasingly centered on questions of legitimacy and competence both at home and abroad, whether the strategy reflects clear leadership, credible goals and effective and execution internationally. Some of these critics question whether the conduct of the war is strengthening alliances or eroding support and isolating the United States. We've been hearing from both perspectives of this debate from many of you in the Call Me Back community who've reached out with comments and feedback to our various episodes. So we decided to have a good faith debate here between two people who care deeply about these issues but have very different viewpoints, both of whom I've known for decades. Dan Shapiro is a former US Ambassador to Israel under President Obama. He served in the Obama and Biden administrations. In addition to being ambassador to Israel under President Obama, Dan Shapiro served at the National Security Council in the Biden administration. He served in the Pentagon and he brings decades of diplomatic experience and a focus on alliances and regional stability. And his work goes all the way Back to the 1990s on Capitol Hill when I first got to know him and Mark Dubowitz, who is the CEO of the foundation for Defense of Democracies and for 23 years has been one of the architects and most energetic advocates for the maximum pressure campaign on Iran and who in return has been sanctioned by Iran since 2019. Dan, Mark, welcome to the podcast.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Honored to be here. Thanks Dan.

[Dan Shapiro]

Thanks Dan. Good to be on.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Call me back.

[Dan Senor]

I want to begin with where we are right now, which can be confusing to many of our listeners, which is understandable. Vice President Vance has just returned from Islamabad where he led what appears to be the now failed negotiations with Iran and which led President Trump to announce this morning that the United States will blockade the Strait of Hormuz. So, Dan, I want to start with you. What is your assessment of the current situation?

[Dan Shapiro]

Thanks for having me here, Dan, and it's great to be with Mark as well. The current situation is confused and that's in part because the whole effort, the whole strategic objective of this war has been confused really from the beginning. Just to state from the moment where we are. You've mentioned these talks happened in Islamabad it appears from reporting Vice President Vance gave a brief statement afterwards, but there's some other reporting that the Americans put on the table in these talks. Most of the main issues that we have been struggling with the Iranians about for years, even for decades, trying to end all their enrichment of uranium, remove their enriched uranium, dismantle remaining nuclear facilities and their support for proxy terrorist groups as part of a broader regional security effort, perhaps commitments on limiting their ballistic missile program, and some struggle with the Iranians, what they'd be getting in return if they were to take all those steps about sanctions relief, unfreezing their assets and the like. But of course, in real time, something that has to be dealt with that was really never on the table before is getting the Strait of Hormuz reopened to international shipping. When the war began, of course, President Trump talked about a lot of different things that this was about. Sometimes he said it was about regime change, sometimes he said it was about the nuclear program, sometimes he was demanding unconditional surrender. Then when the strait was closed, about a week or two in, he started saying, they have to open the fucking strait, you crazy bastards. And then saying, a civilization will die if they don't do that. I mean, it's been hard to know what he really thinks the goal of this is, but I think that an absolute requirement for going forward is to make sure the Strait of Hormuz is open. That's a fundamental aspect of freedom of navigation. It's been an international principle that the United States Navy was essentially established for and we've upheld forever. Getting all of those other things that I mentioned on the nuclear program and the missile programs and the proxies that we have wanted out of the Iranians for years, out of one meeting in Islamabad was never realistic. So it's not surprising that those talks did not produce that outcome. And then, of course, because the strait really hasn't been opened as it was supposed to be as part of this two week ceasefire, we're about five or six days into the two weeks. President Trump then followed it by what sounded to me like another very improvisational, a little bit desperate, maybe a little bit panicky announcement saying, okay, well, we'll blockade in return. It's not clear exactly what that means. That's a. Actually, to do that properly is a massive naval force project. That will take time. But it still seems disconnected from any clear and consistent strategic objective, as I mentioned, which has bedeviled this whole effort from the beginning.

[Dan Senor]

Mark, what is your assessment of the current situation?

[Mark Dubowitz]

So, first of all, it's wonderful to be back on the show and especially with an old friend, Dan Shapiro. We've been working together, I think, on this issue for over two decades when Dan was a young staffer in the Senate and I was at fdd. I'm more optimistic, as I'm sure you'd expect. I think we're far ahead of where I would have anticipated when the war began, though, as Dan says, with much more to do before we can define this as a significant victory for the United States and Israel. I have to say as somebody who has been a bit of a nervous Nelly through five years of President Trump and the Iran issue, I have been surprised by how resolute he's been in so far seeing this through. I've not been surprised by Iran's stubborn resistance. And yes, I am still concerned about what comes next, but I think to step out from where we are in the moment and just sort of look at where we've been and where we're going. I think it's helpful at least for me to understand this kind of six stages of pressure and three clocks that are ticking. And the stage one is Iran's nuclear program where I think we've done significant degradation both in the 12 day war and the 40 day war. Stage two is the missile program. It was relatively untouched during the 12 day war. And I think there's been some severe degradation done to the missile program. Stage three is really leadership and repression and that's really been the Israeli military campaign to take out Iran's leadership and repression apparatus and taken out two hundred and 50 senior IRGC intelligence and besieged commanders. Stage four is Iran's economy was in very rough shape going into the 40 day war. And by our estimates, Iran has sustained about $300 billion in direct and indirect damage in the past 40 days. Stage 5 is Hormuz and the global economy. And Dan referenced this and I think there's obviously significant concerns and we can dig deeper into that. Stage six is regime survival. How long this regime will survive. And I think that's really the race. It's kind of three clocks that are ticking. The nuclear clock. How quickly could Iran reconstitute its nuclear program and potentially get a bomb through some kind of COVID breakout or sneak out? How long will the regime survive? And then the third clock is American will. And the goal of this campaign, as I see it, is we've got to break the regime before it breaks. American political will waits out Trump, rebuilds, rearms, represses Iranians, develops nuclear weapons and comes back deadlier so the strategy is, I think, straightforward, and I think it's been going fairly well, and that is severely degrade the regime's capabilities. And then over time, we got to create the conditions for its end. And the 12 day war and the 40 day war have really focused heavily on those first four stages. Nuclear missile, military leadership, repression and economic. And I think reasonable people can disagree over the extent of the damage, and I think Dan and I probably will. But I think it's a reasonable assessment that it's been serious, more than people expected, but not terminal or permanent. And so now we're moving into stage five, and that's Iran's remaining leverage, its economic leverage, which means Hormuz. And that's why I think Trump is right to break the blockade and narrow Iran's military options. And it's now falling back on the one lever it still has to impose global pain and threaten energy flow flows and shipping. And CENTCOM is moving through methodically, patiently and carefully their Hormuz plan. And I think we'll see how that works out. But I'm a lot less pessimistic than many about their ability to actually open up the straight.

[Dan Senor]

Before I bring Dan back in, let me just push back on one point, Mark. In terms of what you're surprised and you're saying it's going well, but I am curious about any. What you've been surprised about. And I want to focus on two areas. Are you surprised about what so far appears like so far, the limits in our ability to get to that 440kg of highly enriched uranium, A and B? Have you been surprised about the scale of Iran's missile and drone capacity to keep hitting Israel and our Gulf allies? Did they have more than we thought, more capacity than we thought?

[Mark Dubowitz]

I don't think so. I mean, I'm not surprised that we haven't yet gone for the 440kg. It's buried deeply under the rubble in two major nuclear sites, perhaps a third. It's a very complicated Special Forces operation. I don't think it's as important as many people think it is to go in there and take it. I think it's much more important that we continue to watch it and surveil it and that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu use military force anytime they see the Iranians moving on that enrichment. I'm much more concerned about hidden centrifuges, covert facilities and pickaxe mountain near Natange, which is buried even deeper than Fordeau and could give Iran a nuclear pathway, immunized against our ability to destroy it if Tehran decides to sprint quietly and quickly towards a weapon. So what I am surprised by is that we're finally able to actually address the ballistic missile program in ways that we've never been in the past. And I would say I'm a little worried that the red lines that we laid out in Islamabad actually didn't include ballistic missiles. That wasn't on the table. That. That worries me that we're not insisting on severe restrictions on their ability to reconstitute that deadly program.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Dan, in terms of what surprised you in a positive direction or an alarming direction, have there been any surprises?

[Dan Shapiro]

I think Iran demonstrated impressive capability, and I say that with obviously all the unhappiness that comes with that, to target quite accurately US Bases, including key US Air defense capabilities in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. And then, of course, the Strait of Hormuz, which was something that, of course, has been studied and planned for, for decades as a possible scenario, but really is a lever they have never used, is something that has been proven to be a way that they can play as even though they're the much weaker party in this war, they still have cards to play that can impose very significant global economic pain, which has, frankly, I think, brought President Trump to be the one who was more desperate to get to the ceasefire even than they were when we got into it.

[Mark Dubowitz]

So, Dan, if I could just jump in there.

[Dan Senor]

Yeah, please.

[Mark Dubowitz]

First of all, I think I don't know if President Trump was desperate for the ceasefire. He certainly, everybody was expecting him to fold in Islamabad and to chicken out, and clearly that was the exact opposite of what happened happen. He held to the red lines, negotiated for 16 hours with JD Vance and Witkoff and Kushner, and was unwilling to yield on those red lines. So he's, you know, there's all these predictions, I made some of them in the past, too, that Trump always chickens out. Well, he didn't shaken out. He didn't seem desperate for a ceasefire, and he seems perfectly prepared to go back to major military operations, I'd say. One other final thing. I mean, Dan Shapiro mentioned that Hormuz is not a surprise in the sense that centcom's been planning for it for many years. But it has been a surprise because Iran has shown some deadly capabilities. I just want us to imagine what Iran would have looked like if we'd proceeded along the path that we were on, both under the JCPOA and before President Trump decided to impose maximum pressure. And that was Iran was on A patient pathway to develop nuclear tipped ICBMs, 10,000 missiles, a Chinese and Russian built military, hundreds of thousands of drones, have about a trillion dollars in sanctions relief. And at that point when Iran was in that lethal end state, they could have permanently, not temporarily, but permanently, had a stranglehold over Hormuz and the global economy. And by the way, we would be much weaker, they would be much stronger, and we wouldn't be even talking about the Battle of Hormuz, because there'd be no battle over Hormuz. They would have a permanent stranglehold and they would control that key shipping lane and they would control the global economy. So it's always worth remembering where we could have gone had we not actually acted.

[Dan Senor]

So I could do a whole debate with both of you or have a whole conversation with the two of you on kind of how we got here and maybe we should do that at some point. I do, to the extent we can, wanna keep the conversation focused on where we go from here. That said, Dan, without too much of a digression from the focus, I do wanna give you an opportunity to respond to what Mark just said, which is, you know, we can debate whether or not the JCPOA was sufficient to deal with the nuclear program. And that's, you know, again, it can get very technical. But do you think the JCPOA underestimated or didn't sufficiently consider or prioritize some of these other areas that Marcus focused on, which is their quote, unquote, conventional capabilities, their ballistic missile program, their support for proxies, which is so much of what has given them incredible leverage in the region to wreak havoc and intimidate others in the hope of pursuing some kind of hegemonic position in the region. And when President Trump withdrew from jcpoa, among other things, it enabled the United States to focus on those areas which the JCPOA did not do.

[Dan Shapiro]

Well, I really don't want to have a long debate. Mark and I have had many debates.

[Dan Senor]

I know, I know, I know.

[Dan Shapiro]

Look, the JSPA, which, let's be clear, has been dead since 2018, so it's not really very relevant to the current situation.

[Dan Senor]

Yeah.

[Dan Shapiro]

Was intended to do one thing to buy as much time as possible on the nuclear issue. It didn't mean there were still needs to address with regards to the ballistic missile programs and the proxies. Obviously that was true. Obviously it was even true. Certainly I said it as the ambassador to Israel at the time, that in the later years of the jcpoa, if it had survived, we would have to come back and revisit the nuclear issue because it was not a permanent solution to that. It bought time, which would then need to be redressed to and including with military action if necessary, to prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon. But all of these behaviors that we all object to rightly have been tried to be addressed with a JCPOA and without a jcpoa, with a maximum pressure campaign and without a maximum pressure campaign, with 12 day war and Operation Midnight Hammer, which did significantly and importantly set back the nuclear program. And by the way, I, I was a supporter of that effort, both the Israeli and the US Strikes in that period, which obviously did not address the ballistic missile and proxy threat. Now Israel after October 7th took it upon itself, of course, to address to a significant degree the proxy threat. First Hamas, then Hezbollah, and then last, late last year, when Prime Minister, this is after the 12 Day War, when Prime Minister Netanyahu came to Mar a Lago and he spoke with President Trump and he explained, look, there is still a very significant problem with this ballistic missile threat which could increase to numbers, let's say up to 10,000 medium range ballistic missiles that could reach Israel, like the ones that did penetrate in the 12 day war and caused significant damage, killed 30 Israelis, injured hundreds, sent thousands away from their homes to. It could increase to be a really strategic threat to the country that Israeli air defenses wouldn't be able to absorb. And so that was a reasonable thing to work toward this year, 2026, an Israeli act operation, supported and facilitated perhaps by the United States, by centcom, the way we did even during the Biden administration, when Israel responded to the Iranian attacks on Israel. And that was where I thought we were sort of headed in the middle of 2026. Then came the protests in January. Obviously everybody hoped that that would be a pivotal moment when the regime would fall at the hands of the Iranian people. The best way may really way for regime change to occur. President Trump made his very forward leaning statements. Go to the streets, we've got your back. Literally a price to pay. Of course, 30,000 Iranians were slaughtered by the regime. And then there was this kind of jumble of what was the most pressing matter, what tools to use a small force, a short sharp strike against the regime in response to the repression versus the big buildup of force that occurred in February, which then leads to a tool that you use for something much bigger than just that kind of short, sharp strike, something that potentially tries to address all of these other issues, the nuclear program, the missile program, the proxies, the regime itself. And so we ended up launching a war without having thought through what was the strategy, what were we trying to achieve, why were we doing it now? What was so urgent? And of course, President Trump didn't explain any of that to the American people, didn't explain any of that to Congress. Most Americans woke up on the morning of February 28th. We're surprised to discover we were at war in the Middle East. Why is that happening? No one has told us why. Congress has not had its say on it. So again, I think there are gains that have been already achieved, surely have been achieved because CENTCOM and Israel have successfully degraded many of these Iranian capabilities. But just like the JCPOA didn't solve for all of them, just like Maximum Pressure didn't solve for all of them, just like the 12 Day War didn't solve for any all of them, this war also is not fully solving for all of them.

[Mark Dubowitz]

So, Dan, if I could just sort of jump in quickly there, because I think Dan Shapiro and I are in agreement on a lot of things. I mean, so Dan and I agree that the JCPOA didn't solve for everything and that had sunset provisions that gave potentially patient path to nuclear weapons and we'd have to renegotiate it in the later years. Dan and I both agree that you need to put significant pressure on the regime. Dan and I both supported the 12 Day War. Dan and I both supported a US military strike when the regime was massacring tens of thousands of Iranians. Dan called it a sort of short one, a symbolic one, but he certainly backed strikes, as I did. Dan also backed the Israelis going after Iran's deadly missile program with US Support. I think where Dan and I differ is my belief has always been that Israel cannot take care of Iran's missile program on its own, that it needed the United States in the same way that it needed the United States to destroy the Fordow facility during the 12 day war. Because, like Fordeau, the missile infrastructure is deeply buried. And therefore, we need the United states, we need B2 bombers, we need Massive Ordnance Penetrators, and that the Israeli Air Force, as competent as it is, couldn't do sufficient damage to degrade this deadly missile program that threatens not only Israel, but threatens US Allies, US Bases, US Embassies, and an intercontinental ballistic missile program that one day threaten the United States homeland. So I think where Dan and I differ is my belief is that President Trump needed to join the Israelis in this war in order to destroy as much as possible that deeply buried missile infrastructure. Dan, and I also agree President Trump could have done a better job of explaining it. He could be a more disciplined speaker. He could have done a better job of alliance management. I mean, all of that is certainly in agreement. But I think the real question on the 40 Day War is, is it justified, was it necessary? And where are we today, given the achievements and some of the risks and costs? And so then the question is, well, where do we go from here?

[Dan Senor]

Okay, so that's where I want to take this conversation. I'll go to you, Dan, in terms of the best course of action or strategy going forward. I know as you've established that you were in support of this war, you're supporter of the 12 day war in June, but you are where you are. And if you're advising the President of the United States, regardless of how you feel about how we got to this moment, what is your advice to the administration and where to go from here?

[Dan Shapiro]

Right, so that's right. I mean, I was not for this war this way.

[Dan Senor]

Right.

[Dan Shapiro]

There are other times when I think military force by the United States against Iran was and could be appropriate, but not this war this way. But we are where we are. So now we're into a ceasefire, and a ceasefire does have value. Again, I think President Trump was the one who was more in need of that ceasefire. As he was watching oil prices continue to creep up. I think we got to about $116per barrel for Brent crude. We were seeing him every Sunday night try to talk down the markets before they would open in Asia. Some weeks a little more successful than others. So he got into the ceasefire. Now that we're in the ceasefire, the question is what would be the cost of going back into full scale military actions? We'll get back to the cost maybe a touch later. But what I think would make sense would be to try to stay in that ceasefire, but be, you know, clear in our own minds that those bigger goals, the ones that were on the table in Islamabad and did not reach agreement, not surprisingly, you don't reach agreement in one meeting. That's going to take longer. And the costs of continuing this war to try to achieve those objectives, which essentially means a regime change objective, are astronomical. And they're really a cost that we are probably not going to be able to bear. So let's focus on what's essential. One of the things that's puzzling about the administration's approach is how they really tried to do everything themselves. Of course, there was no effort to recruit allies into the war before by briefing them, by making the case that they should participate. There was a belated effort by browbeating allies why they weren't participating that wasn't very effective. Not surprisingly, although there is some effort by the UK and France and perhaps some others to pull together some naval assets that over time could be deployed to help keep the strait open. But on the diplomatic side, it shouldn't just be the United States sitting in that room, at least metaphorically with the Iranians. There are a lot of countries who desperately need to have the strait open so that their own energy supplies, fertilizer supplies, other commodity supplies are, are reliable. So why are the Chinese even not used as a lever here? Why do we not engage India, Malaysia, Indonesia, European countries as well, to put their own pressure on the Iranians? It would be possible, it should be possible to use the time of the ceasefire and an extended ceasefire to put that pressure on Iran to get the strait open and then to use that time for CENTCOM to clear the mines, to actually do the work in the water, to make it safe for shippers and insurers to know that they could send their crews and tankers through there and come out the other side. That would be how you'd capitalize on the ceasefire, to get the most pressing need met. And then we're going to have a longer slog, not militarily, to continue to monitor those nuclear highly enriched uranium and any attempt to reconstitute the mostly destroyed nuclear sites, just as we were doing after the 12 Day War. And I really don't think there's a very convincing case that Iran in, In February of 2026 was any closer to breaking out toward a nuclear weapon than they were in July of 2025 after the 12 Day War. So we were in a place that we could deal with that problem while continued work went on to try to negotiate toward an end to that program for the good. And then, look, Israel has a long standing practice, it's sometimes derided, but I think it has some value called mowing the grass. When a threat is present, you can't necessarily be able to prevent it from periodically reconstituting, but you hit it as you need to hit it to make sure it doesn't become a strategic threat. So that might be an approach on the missile program. And then we should be always focused on supporting the Iranian people toward consolidating an opposition that actually can pose a threat to the regime from within. Because I'm very much in favor of regime change in Iran. I'm not in favor of regime change, wars in the Middle east, but I want the regime to change. We need to help the Iranian people do that. That's a long process. You've probably spoken about it on other episodes and of course it's been set back by the massacre of the protesters in January. But if we think we're going to solve all of this in a military conflict after six weeks, and if it kicks up again, if the ceasefire ends over how many more weeks? I don't know, maybe it's months. The cost will be astronomical. The ability to achieve all those objectives is very suspect. So I'm for using this time to consolidate the ceasefire, the opening of the strait, and then shift to those other means to address those longer term threats.

[Dan Senor]

Mark?

[Mark Dubowitz]

Yeah, I agree with most of that. We're dancing around this a bit, but I think we've gotten to this on the Hormuz conversation is the American will clock. I mean, how long is the United States and its allies prepared to absorb economic, political and human costs? And I think Tehran is betting that the American will clock runs out before the regime's survival clock does. And that's why Hormuz, which is sort of the stage five, has become so central now. They know they're weaker militarily. They know their nuclear program has been severely degraded by the way they wanted a ceasefire desperately because they were losing senior commanders and senior leadership daily. I mean, they were getting killed by the Israelis. So they were quite desperate to survive. And the negotiators who showed up in Islamabad were given immunity by President Trump for as long as they were willing to, to negotiate. All of those men could be eliminated by Israel at any time. So what is Iran trying to do? They're trying to accelerate pressure on American political will. They're trying to inflict a severe economic and political costs on the president. They're trying to make the president lose the midterms, and they're trying to create a wounded president who limps to January 2029 and then gets replaced by either a Republican or Democrat who, having seen that, is not willing to confront the Iranians because they've seen the political price that President Trump has paid. And then they can go and reconstit all of these deadly capabilities. And so the right response is we got to deny them leverage and we got to keep every element of pressure available to us on nuclear, military, leadership pressure and economic pressure. And again, I think we've got to make sure the regime knows that we are prepared to return to major military operations, and we're starting to build an international coalition. I think Dan is exactly right. I mean, I think Trump's ham fisted diplomacy and his unnecessary threats to NATO allies, including over Greenland, were completely unnecessary and have undermined support for us that we otherwise would have. But the reality remains that all of these countries are much more dependent on Hormuz and on Middle Eastern oil and natural gas than the United States is. So they have every incentive to participate. And I'll say one final thing on the Chinese. I mean, I haven't negotiated with the Chinese Communist Party. Maybe Dan has. My sense of them is they're not exactly the most flexible players in the world and is that we're engaged in serious strategic competition with them. And as they eye the Strait of Taiwan to take over Taiwan's semiconductor industry, the only way we can get the Chinese to move is to play hardball. And right now, by blockading Hormuz and making sure that Iranian oil cannot flow to Beijing the way it has been, that's going to put significant pressure on them, to put pressure on the Iranians to start to play ball.

[Dan Senor]

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[Mark Dubowitz]

Short answer is yes. The longer answer is that I agree with Dan. The way to get regime change is ultimately to support the Iranian people. Dan and I wrote this piece together. Dan. I think it was in Politico. I remember when it was a few years ago where Dan and I came together. We disagree on jcpoa. We disagree on this, we disagree on that. What we agree on is the United States of America should support the Iranian people to take back their country. The only way the Iranian people are going to take back their country is if we have done severe damage to the regime and its repression apparatus. Otherwise, what will happen is what happened on January 8th and 9th of this year when 32, 2000 Iranians were slaughtered. So it is absolutely both immoral and impractical of us to believe these people can take back their country unless we give them the means to do so. And we've severely weakened the regime that will brutalize them again. I think we can get limited victory without regime change, but total victory depends ultimately on regime change. And regime change depends on boots on the ground. But it depends on millions of Iranian boots on the ground, with the United States supporting that by arming them, by providing the communication devices with financing and a coordinated effort so that the next time they're on the streets, there are Israeli drones in the air picking off IRGC and Basij or checkpoints, maybe Israeli, maybe American fighter jets in the skies bombing those key supply lines, cyber attacks to blind the security forces. I mean, we need a comprehensive policy that's not just rhetorical, but actually is material to provide maximum support to the Iranian people. Because without regime change, yeah, we'll be mowing the grass. But you know what? We'll be mowing the grass with the President of the United States in 2029 or 20, 30 year later, who is not committed to using instruments of American power against this regime. And then this regime will reconstitute and it'll be as deadly as a regime as it's been for 47 years.

[Dan Shapiro]

Dan, if I could just jump in. I mean, just a couple of points Mark's made. Look, if you had wanted to prepare the American people for withstanding the pressures that we're going to be under, economic pressures, resource strains, diplomatic pressures that this will require. Marx talks about the American will factor here. Would you have gone into this war the way we did, sort of tumbling backwards into it, and only then trying to fumble around and make a case for why it was necessary almost from the beginning, something like 60% of the American people, that's what most polls are showing, oppose this war. And that's going to go down if we go back into major operations. So. So it goes to, again, having a strategy and knowing how to communicate that strategy, if you were serious about a regime change strategy for Iran, and I want the regime in Iran to change, you would do all of those things that Mark and I have written about and Mark just laid out to support the Iranian people. Some of that has gone on, some of it a little bit laterally, some of it when the protest started. But instead what we've ended up with is a military campaign that is cut across multiple objectives. But many of them, to your question, can't really be achieved without regime change. And that's sort of what we encountered in Islamabad when we got the big no on most of the big questions. We've gotten the big no on for 15 or more years.

[Mark Dubowitz]

I think all of us need to be honest about why President Trump didn't give the big speech, because I think Dan's right, he should have. He gave the small speech, an eight minute speech on February 28th after major military operations had begun. But if you remember, what was the first thing that happened in this war and that is that the Israelis took out Khamenei and his top 40 IRGC and political advisors. And that was an element of surprise. That was an element of, quote, exquisite intelligence that the Israelis and or the Americans were both obtained that showed that Khamenei was going to be meeting with his top 40 senior military and political advisors above ground in his compound and we were going to strike to eliminate that.

[Dan Senor]

And to be clear, it was a fleeting moment.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Yeah, yeah.

[Dan Senor]

The Israelis had intelligence that this meeting was occurring in the center of Tehran, as you said, above ground. If the strategy was at least partially to decapitate the regime, this was an opportunity that would probably not avail itself. Again, just to set the context.

[Dan Shapiro]

Yes, true. But if you're then going to go into a campaign that is going to put American service members lives at risk. We've lost 13. If you're going to have to deploy two aircraft carrier strike groups for extended periods of time, leaving none in the Indo Pacific to tend to our security interests there vis a vis China. If you're going to encounter a global economic crisis potentially leading as far as a recession, if we end up in months, which we could, of military conflict, you have to make a decision at the beginning. Are you committed to the American will that's required to sustain that? And if that's in tension with the needs of one opening strike, that requires an element of surprise. That's a pretty big trade off, which I think helps explain why six weeks in, 60% of the American public says we don't want to be doing this.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Should Trump have given the speech that he gave a week ago or whenever it was on February 28th? Absolutely. Should it have been more than an eight minute quick speech with a MAGA hat on? Absolutely. But we're not talking just about process. And the other thing is, do I believe that Democrats would have supported Trump if he had given that speech and laid out their clear objectives? I do not believe that. I don't care how good a speech it would have been, how clear those objectives would have been. Democrats would not support Trump at all. By the way, most of them opposed Trump in the 12 day war that Dan supported. The irony is many of them were calling for Trump to bomb Iran during the January protests. And then when one month later, Trump bombed Iran, now they're all opposing Trump for having bombed Iran. So again, I think, unfortunately in our country, politics plays a major role in how we analyze these things and what we advocate for. And the Iranians know that, which is why they are so adept at intensifying the political fractures and fissures between Americans. Because what they've lost on the battlefield, they're winning in the information, operations, space. And you can see so many examples

[Dan Shapiro]

of that, which is why you need administration to take that into account.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, but Dan, I want to ask you at a very practical level because you've been obviously been on the inside of major war and peace decisions. They've gone through a more conventional process, interagency process, and also external process briefing allies and some of the areas you had wished had been pursued more in a more traditional way with this war. But back to the element of surprise, don't you think that pursuit of the opportunity would have been jeopardized if you had been in close communication with all these various allies throughout Europe and Congress?

[Dan Shapiro]

Well, it could have been, it could have been harder to conduct that particular strike. Now, let's not forget throughout the month of February, we were building up our force in the Middle east in very visible ways, bringing a second aircraft carrier strike group into the region, bringing massive amounts of air power, fighter jets and jammers and tankers. So it was very clear that we were positioning ourselves for potential military action, at least to give President Trump the option to engage in major military operations. That was no mystery. There was no surprise element about that. Then if it's been described, you know, in the days leading up to February 28, specific intelligence about that specific meeting and location and who was participating, creating, create an opportunity. If you were engaged in a full on debate at that point with the American People with the Congress, with allies to try to build a coalition, then it's possible the Iranians would have been more careful and that opportunity would not have presented itself. It's certainly possible. But look what the costs are on the other end. The costs are that you don't have what Mark is looking for. American will, at least at the level of a publican Congress that never had their say, never were briefed, never were had this explained at them. You don't have a coalition who feel that they have buy in to this and then they are browbeated and criticized by the president for, well, why didn't you come? But I don't really need you. But now I do need you. And you know, I'll even threaten to withdraw from NATO because I'm not getting the cooperation I want from NATO allies. Actually, there is cooperation coming from NATO allies. That's fairly below the surface, but there are a lot of costs here. So it's a legitimate question, could that particular strike, which as you've pointed out, didn't actually did decapitate the regime, but didn't actually lead to the downfall of the regime? Not at all. Would that have been an opportunity that would have been missed? It's possible. But we're paying very high costs on the back end for not doing the more conventional, which you were part of before the Iraq war, which other presidents have done before major military engagements, of building political support, getting Congress's buy in, making clear what the strategic objectives are, making sure allies are briefed and on board and possible participating. And then when you don't have that and you get in kind of a messy situation, you really wish you did have that.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Yeah. But again, Dan, I mean, let's be fair here. If President Trump had done all that, given the speech, pulled the allies in early, gone to Congress, at the end of the day, you still oppose the United States bombing Iran, doing a regime

[Dan Shapiro]

change war in the Middle East. I did you? Yes.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Well, President Trump never again, to be fair, when President Trump does speak about this and he gave that said speech that you talked about belatedly, as you are rightly pointing out, but he made it very clear the US Objective is not regime change. I mean, when I talk about regime change being important, that's Mark Dubitz's objective. I would argue that's also the Israeli objective. But I don't believe that's President Trump's objective. Because the only thing President Trump has ever said even hinting in that direction is on February 28th when he said, after laying clearly out out our military objectives, which are to destroy the war making capabilities of this regime, he said, and then at some point, Iranians will hopefully, once in a generation, opportunity, take back their country. But he has not operated as if the regime change is the United States objective. And he's been very clear. If you've been following the White House in his speeches and the White House press secretary over and over and over again, they've made it clear military, missile, nuclear, navy, air Force, they haven't even signed onto an economic warfare campaign which the Israelis have been running. So I agree that President Trump should have done all those process things. I disagree that anything would have made any difference because it wouldn't have convinced Dan Shapiro, it wouldn't have convinced you as a reasonable Democrat. It wouldn't have convinced any Democrat. It's hard pressed to believe it would have convinced many of our NATO allies to have joined the United States. I think the reality is President Trump, by his own doing, but also because of the nature of who he is and the fact that, let's face it, he's a Republican and our politics is so toxic that there's nothing President Trump could have done that would have brought at least 50% of this country with him and that would have brought the majority of our NATO allies with him. I think that's just the reality of where we are today. Let's face that, let's acknowledge that, and then let's try to design a strategy going forward that compensates for that.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, I want to just wrap here with one question. Same question for both of you, which is we don't know what's going to happen next. We really don't know when this episode drops. There are scenarios we're speculating, but we don't really know where things are going. If the war were to stop basically now, some version of now, if we're just kind of frozen now with the gains and the costs absorbed or advanced, depending on how you look at it along the way, what would that mean for the US And Israel, just in terms of geopolitical terms? Because there's a number of measures and metrics we could use. But just in terms of the geopolitics of the region, U.S. foreign policy, what would it mean to stop now? I'll start with you, Dan, and then go to Mark.

[Dan Shapiro]

Well, we have achieved significant operational successes and any weakening of Iran's ability to project power, there's goodness in that and that's to be welcomed. And so credit to centcom, credit to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs Credit to the Israeli military for successful operations that have made it much harder for Iran to project power with its missile program, its drone program, its proxy network, its navy, its air force, and to defend itself with its air defenses. And those are positives. It will not have settled the core issues that have bedeviled the U. S Iranian relationship and maybe in some ways the Israeli Iranian relationship for decades. The nuclear program which was addressed but not satisfied in Islamabad, the missile program which may not have even been addressed in Islamabad. It does show that the United States and Israel are very effective as a combined military alliance that has value, that has deterrent value. The fact that Gulf states who have been attacked by Iran, who were non combatants in this war, have made clear that they stand with the United States and they stand with Israel, that has the makings of strengthening that regional coalition that we've been trying to build from the Abraham Accords and in the hopes that other countries will normalize the relations with Israel and under centcom's leadership. My fear, and I won't belabor the point, is that if we go much further and we get back into a much longer military operation, we will first of all see fraying of that regional alliance. Second of all, we will see probably even more fraying of the US NATO alliance. We will see Russia benefit from the higher energy prices that will come. And Ukraine have access to fewer interceptors, means a longer war in Ukraine. We will see less US military capability currently and in the future available for the Indo Pacific, really weakening our ability to deter China. So we have a lot that we put at risk if we go much further into this war as well as all of the global economic fallout and American economic fallout out if we're dealing with $150, $175 per barrel oil. So it's what you gain and what you can consolidate by what you've achieved now, but also what risks you don't bear by pushing further into a really unsustainable and astronomically expensive further campaign.

[Dan Senor]

Mark, same question to you.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Well, that's interesting. I think Dan and I completely agree about the remarkable successes of the 40 Day War. I mean, if Dan's definition of a viable strategy is to mow the grass, then Dan laid out how well the United States and Israel mowed the grass and actually ripped out the weeds and have done severe damage to Iran's war making capabilities. I think Dan and I agree. Let's take advantage of the ceasefire. I think there's more opportunity for coercive diplomacy beyond just one meeting. In Islamabad. But the question is we need to test the Iranians and to see whether they are prepared to give on their red lines. We cannot let Iran retain enrichment capability, which. Which is what they retained in the 2015 deal. But the only way we're ever going to get additional diplomatic wins on Hormuz or on missiles or on nukes or anything else is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has got to know that an American president is prepared to use overwhelming military force. Otherwise, we're left negotiating with the Iranians, who time and time again have beat American presidents at the negotiating table. I think that Dan and I are in full agreement on this regime change issue. I think no matter what happens, happens after major military operations are over, it is incumbent on the United States to support Israel and together to support the Iranian people to bring about the end of this regime, because otherwise, we're going to be mowing the grass for years to come. And my fear is we're going to be mowing the grass with a president who's not bringing a lawnmower to the fight, but is instead bringing a pair of scissors to cut one blade of grass at a time. And that's not how you address the significant threat from a theocratic, general, genocidal regime that has been killing and maiming, kidnapping, and torturing thousands of Americans for 47 years. If you want to talk about geopolitical consequences, I think we need to distinguish between what it means to end the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. I think we finally are fighting a war against Iran after 47 years. But if we don't do that and we walk away from the fight, we're going to leave our Gulf allies and Israel vulnerable to a reconstituted Islamic Republic. And that is just going to redound to the advantage of the regime of China, of Russia, and ultimately would be throwing the Iranian people under the bus to face what will become severe, severe repression from this Islamist regime. So let's continue the war, but that doesn't necessarily mean we have to continue fighting major military operations for the next months and years to come.

[Dan Senor]

All right, gentlemen, Dan Shapiro, Mark Dubowitz, thank you both for doing this, for this spirited but very civil conversation. I look forward to having you both back on together. In the meantime, I encourage our listeners to be sure to look out for the most recent episode on Inside Call Me Back of our series with Ronen Bergman on Mossad's shadow war with Iran. We just released episode three, and the final and fourth episode will be released later this week. And you can find that on the inside Call Me Back feed. Or if you're not a subscriber, you can find the sneak peek of it on the main Call Me Back feed. Again. Dan Mark, thanks for doing this.

[Mark Dubowitz]

Thanks so much Dan.

[Dan Shapiro]

Thank you Dan.

[Dan Senor]

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Back Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavael, Amit, Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arc media.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's Executive Producer is Adam James Levenorette. Our Production Manager is Brittany Cohn. Our Community Manager is Ava Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. If someone just collapsed right in front of you, you'd call an ambulance. In New York City, that ambulance would take 12 plus minutes to arrive. United Hatzala of Israel often gets there before the ambulance, regularly in three minutes or less. How Innovation United Hatzala's iconic orange ambucycles ambulance motorcycles weave medics through truck traffic, GPS systems geolocate the nearest volunteers and their AI driven technology helps predict when and where the next emergency will occur. This all means faster care and more lives saved. I have family and friends in Israel that count on United Hatzala and you can too. They'll help anyone who needs emergency care every day, fast and for free. So if you live in Israel, just dial 1221 for help. If you're looking for a cause with impact, support United Hatzalah of Israel. Donate [e-mail] callmeback and add this number to your phone right now. If you live in Israel, 1221.