← Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
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A
Foreign.
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You are listening to an art media podcast.
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We know now that Iran, while pausing the efforts to recreate its nuclear program, actually has accelerated over the last six months its efforts in terms of the ballistic missile program. So when President Trump says it, the Iranian supreme Leader is listening very, very carefully.
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The Iranians are so tense and they are constantly fearing an Israeli attack themselves. So if Iran senses that Israel might attack, it wants to preempt that. If Israel thinks that Iran is going to do that, it would want to preempt.
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It's 9:30am on Wednesday, Dec. 31, in New York City. It's 4:30pm on Wednesday, Dec 31 in Israel. And all around the globe, people are preparing for the start of 2026. On Monday, Prime Minister Netanyahu met President Trump at Trump's Mar A Lago residence and club, marking the sixth meeting between the two leaders, just in President Trump's current term. The highest number of meetings that the president has had with any foreign leader. Among the topics Trump addressed with the press before the meeting is he threatened Hamas with, quote, hell to pay if it does not disarm within a, quote, very short period. This comes as the president continues to seek the advancement toward phase two of his Gaza peace plan. In a private meeting between the leaders, the president and his team reportedly addressed their concern over mounting anti Palestinian attacks in the west bank, as well as settlement expansion and Israel's withholding of billions of dollars in Palestinian Authority tax revenue. There are a number of other issues addressed in this meeting. The future of Israel's relationship with Syria, obviously action against Iran or possible action against Iran, which we'll be getting into. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Israeli President Herzog criticized Netanyahu's government for establishing a politically controlled probe into the country's October 7th failure, instead arguing for a, quote, full, thorough, statesmanlike investigation that would not be influenced by political considerations. Now onto today's episode. Over the past week, Iran has been facing its largest anti regime protests in three years, sparked by a collapsing currency and the resignation of the country's Central bank chief. And probably a number of other issues that we don't even know right now. What began in Tehran on Sunday has spread to multiple cities with footage showing violent clashes between protesters and security forces. This unrest comes as intelligence reports suggest Iran has ramped up missile production since its 12 day war with Israel and the US in June. Asked about this during a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Trump warned that if Iran continues its nuclear and ballistic programs, the US Would take swift and drastic action, saying will Knock the hell out of them. For today's conversation, I'm joined by ARC Media contributors Hamit Sehgal and Nadavael to discuss where Israel stands with regards to Iran's missile threat, its nuclear program, and what we know about what could be an historic movement taking place against the Islamic regime in Iran. Nedav, Amit, thanks for being here.
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A
Thanks for having us.
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C
Thanks for inviting us again.
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B
As I indicated on early episodes of the podcast a few days ago, we thought this would be a quiet week and we wouldn't need to record anything. And here we are, we're recording something because the news, apparently in Jerusalem and in Washington and Tehran and at Mar A Lago doesn't get a break. So, Nadav, let's start with you. What is happening in Iran and what is unusual about it?
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A
We're seeing wide protests. We're seeing demonstrations in the street. We're seeing some signs or forms of strike. Still not a general strike, but. But we're seeing, for instance, and that's absolutely meaningful, the bazaari class, the class of the merchants that were essential in the revolution in 1979, some of them joining these protests. So we're seeing the videos coming from the Grand Bazaar in Tehran showing that stores there are closed, stores that are opening, probably of people who are loyal to the regime are forced to be closed by those demonstrators. And that's meaningful. These demonstrations then began in Tehran and they spread across the country. And the basic background is economy. We have seen the real plunge. It's a historic low right now, I think in the free market, not the formal currency. You'll see online, it's about 1.4 million rial per dollar. There is a video circulating on Iranian social networks showing how much of banknotes you need to use in order to buy one mobile phone. Basically, it's an entire table of banknotes of hundreds of millions of riyal just to buy one mobile phone. Now, what the government has been doing, and this has led to these protests erupting, is trying to liberalize to some extent the market, the economy, for instance, canceling some subsidies and also having some tax hikes. They absolutely needed to do that considering Iran's financial crisis, the Iranian state financial crisis. But this has led to some of these protests. However, if you listen to the slogans made in these demonstrations, you hear, Dan, that it's about the Islamic Republic itself. You hear slogans like, until the mullahs are dead, we won't be free, or death to the dictator, meaning the supreme Leader of Iran. Now, I don't want to overplay this. When I'm talking with intelligence officials in Israel, they're very careful and they're saying we shouldn't anticipate any quick disintegration or fall of the regime. And these kind of pink prophecies in the past have proven to be much, much too early. But what's meaningful is that this is erupting on the eve of a new year, when the supreme leader is weakened and after Iran has been basically beaten by Israel in war. So the entire background here, societal background here, is very tense, and it's extremely ready to some sort of change that, by the way, the president of Iran is trying to have for the demonstrators, it's not enough. And of course, he's trying to have this change within the framework of an authoritarian dictatorship.
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B
AMIT President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu met this week in Florida. As many of our listeners, I'm sure, know, and as I mentioned in the introduction and among other topics which we will get to, they discussed the possibility of Israel or the US or both attacking Iran. Again, what can you tell us about that?
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C
So the most important thing to know about what President Trump had said is that prior to the meeting, it seemed there was daylight between Israel and the United States in a very important aspect of the Iranian effort to rearm itself. And this is the ballistic missile program, because let's get back to the night of June 12, between June 12 and June 13, in which Prime Minister Netanyahu said Israel has just begun the Rising lion operation because of two existential threats. One was the nuclear program, and the second was the ballistic missile program. Now, what he said, and this was the first time it has ever been said by an Israeli official, was that the plans of Iran to acquire thousands of ballistic missiles threatened to become an existential threat as well, because once Iran could outnumber the number of interceptors by the US And Israel combined, it necessarily means that the damage would be almost as equal to the damage of a single nuclear bomb. Now, here's the problem. When President Trump orders, on the night of June 21, the B2s to attack the nuclear facility in Verde, he does not mention whatsoever the ballistic missile program. And it makes sense because the United States of America had never till then attacked a nuclear program of another country, let alone a conventional missile program. Now, President Trump wanted to signal that there wouldn't be a second North Korea, but he never, until the Mar A Lago summit this week, never announced that he would support an Israeli attack against a conventional weapon program, be as monstrous as it could be. Now, the fact that President Trump said it means something really important, because we know now that Iran, while pausing the efforts or holding the efforts to recreate its nuclear program, actually has accelerated over the last six months. Its efforts in terms of the ballistic missile program, for instance, by purchasing thousands of ballistic missiles from China, trying to recover many, many military bases that deal with it. So when President Trump says it, the Iranian Supreme Leader is listening very, very carefully.
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B
Nadav, how is Israel's security establishment assessing these developments in Iran and whether or not the US Will get actively involved? And if they get actively involved, what does actively involved look like?
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The general assumption of the professionals I'm speaking with is that any active involvement or too much of a public statement saying to the people of Iran rise up against the regime will actually be counterproductive. This is what I'm hearing from both Iran experts in Israel, Iran experts abroad, but also security officials that you were referencing. Interestingly, a few weeks ago, I had meetings with senior security and intelligence officials, and they were telling me that there is an algorithm out there, a measurement of Iran's stability, the regime's stability. So one could imagine that both the U.S. government and the Israelis are measuring the stability of the regime of the ayatollahs. And according to that measurement, they told me weeks ago that Iran's stability is in a historic low. It's the lowest that they have ever seen. So they were anticipating this kind of events in. In Iran, and they told me that before the demonstrations broke out. So this is not like retrospective wisdom. They also said that the regime is so tense that even when it cancels subsidies of 2%, something that is immaterial, they immediately put everything on alert. The Basij, which is part of the oppression system, the police.
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B
These are security parts of the Iranian security apparatus you're describing. Yeah, and they deal with domestic. Just to be clear, the besieged, like these are outfits and organs that deal with domestic security, suppression of uprisings. They're all internally focused.
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A
They're the guys that we sometimes see in those grain videos shooting people in the streets of Iran or moving with their bikes and trying to abduct people from the streets. And they are sort of a paramilitary that the Iranian regime is using to oppress its population. And they're saying everything is on alert because the Iranians feel they might lose control very quickly. Now, looking at the demonstrations and talking with experts, they're seeing. We don't see the masses yet. I want to be absolutely clear about that. We're not seeing massive hundreds of Thousands of people in the street. We're not seeing as of yet a revolution style protest or demonstration, but we are seeing that the entire Iranian state is to some extent, I don't want to say disintegrating, but the fraction there, Dan, is very clear. I'll give you one example. They closed down government institutions in Tehran to save energy prices. And schools are closed down in some parts of Tehran to save energy because it's so cold right now in Tehran and they can't afford it. The state can't afford it. The state finds itself in a position in which it needs to have a lot of resources allocated for its security apparatus as a result of being completely vanquished by the Israelis trying to rebuild what Amit spoke about. On the other hand, they have this kind of internal need to have more money for energy and they need to reform their markets. It's an impossible situation for the regime right now.
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B
So, Amit, first of all, what are the chances? During the 12 Day War in June, Israeli infrastructure, Israeli buildings took a heavy hit. I've seen cost estimates in the billions. Research institutions, apartment buildings. I mean, it was not insignificant the cost Israel and the infrastructure hit. So obviously that must weigh on Israeli decision makers as they assess the possibility of another war with Iran. So first of all, how likely do you think that there will be another war?
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C
Okay, so maybe war is a big word to use, but I'll put it differently. There is no logic behind Israel taking care of Iran like he takes care of Hezbollah or Hamas. Which means that you cannot allow yourself as a country, taking into account the threat that you've just described, to have another round of fighting every six or eight months. First, because you don't have enough interceptors. Second, because of the implications nowadays, when I want to book a flight, I can actually choose between EL AL Delta 150 air carriers. That wasn't the case six months ago. It came at a huge cost of each and every international foreign air carrier stop flying to Israel. And it takes a minute to make this decision and months to renew this activity. This is one thing. Second is because you can allow yourself to attack Hamas without being hit by rockets because they no longer have. And you can allow yourself to pinpointly killing Hezbollah officials because they don't have the ability to attack, or they don't have the will to attack Israel, but it is not necessarily the case. And now we have to add another thing, which is that Israel doesn't want to hinder the efforts from within Iran to actually topple the regime. I mean, if the Iranian regime falls, it would be definitely an outcome, at least partially, of the very successful war of Israel against Iran. But in the short run, it actually created a march to the flag. I mean, you could have seen very interesting things. For instance, that the leadership of Iran.
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Rally around the flag, inside Iran.
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C
Rally around the flag, sorry.
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Yeah, so increases nationalist sentiment.
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C
So whereas the Ayatollahs usually refer to Iran as the Islamic Republic, they began treating it as Iran, even emphasizing symbols from past generations that in ordinary days they see as pagan. They said, okay, we know it's not only the Islamic Republic, it's Iran. So let's have a rally to the flag. And Israel doesn't, and the US as well, by the way, do not want to create it again. So I guess it will take at least a few months.
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B
And in terms of the. I don't want to always revert back to what it means for Israeli politics, but we are now entering a year where there will be a lot of Israeli politics. There certainly will be an Israeli election. How does that factor in to decision makers in Israel in terms of the timing of what happens?
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A
It's of course completely immaterial. They never take into account any domestic politics or the need to win an election.
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B
Nadav, can we, you know, the cynicism.
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No, it's not cynicism. It's a slight irony.
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C
No, I mean, any politician would have done so, but not Benjamin Netanyahu. No, I'm kidding. Anyways, let's speak about it from a political cynical perspective. The Rising lion operation was the number one achievement of Prime Minister Netanyahu in its political career. It is considered 100% success. No casualties among the IDF actually taking out the Iranian nuclear program, which was the number one existential threat. So this is how total victory looks like. Another attempt, might one be more risky. And second, might put a question mark at the end of the operation. Rising lion, because if it was a total victory, why do you need yet another fighting round of fighting eight, nine, ten months later? That's why I think if Netanyahu is cynically seeking for a pre campaign achievement, I don't think he will find it in Iran.
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B
And also if things do heat up with Iran, the volatility it introduces just. There's just so much unpredictability.
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C
Absolutely.
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Yeah.
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C
So it's a double edged sword.
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A
I agree with Amit as to the risk and I am less hesitant as to the possibility that we will see some sort of a strike in Iran before the elections. And I want to detail something from the Internal security apparatus, discussions. They are extremely worried about what's happening vis a vis Iran first and foremost, because the Iranians are so tense and they are constantly fearing an Israeli attack themselves. So their first worry is miscalculation. They are absolutely there in talking about the possibility that the Iranians, for instance, I'll give you one example, when President Trump said, together with Prime Minister Netanyahu, we might see surprises by the weekend when they met this week. So this immediately, speaking with my friends and my sources, they said this immediately to the Iranians together with what the President had said about Iran means, oh, we might be attacked. And that means that they're changing stuff on the ground as a result. If Iran senses that Israel might attack, it wants to preempt that. If Israel thinks that Iran is going to do that, we want to preempt that. So that's one factor. The other factor is purely political. It's my opinion that Netanyahu will need to have some sort of a combative act before the elections. Again, as Amit said, just cynically analyzing this in order to garner more support towards the election. One sort of a military activity, whether it is in Gaza or it is vis a vis Iran or it's in the north. If I would have politically advised, completely cynically, I would have said that it would have worked for him. And if there is nothing like that, the impression of the successes might fade. To some extent, I agree with Amit that the risks are too high. And of course, as an Israeli citizen, I would want them to consider these things solely on base of its merits. I want to say something that we don't usually say about Iran in general and about these people in the streets. I think we lack an appreciation to these brave men and women that are fighting in their streets for their freedom and they're risking their lives and the safety of their families in a dictatorship. For me, every time I see these demonstrations, I'm absolutely astounded by how brave they are, because they know that they can absolutely die for just being photographed, their images shown in the streets. They can be tracked back to their houses, their wives, their kids can be taken away from them. And for us, we're sitting in democracies in Israel and the United States and we're thinking about these demonstrations. But I find this absolutely inspiring that people in Iran, after so many years of this dictatorship, are fighting for their freedom and for their liberty. And many of these people fighting are also saying, we don't want to have war with Israel or with the United States.
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B
So Nadav I completely agree with that, and I share that sentiment. I think the people fighting the streets, they would like, I presume, all sorts of support from players around the world, but at a minimum, they're actually not asking for much. They're asking for moral support. They're asking from leaders around the world to just publicly declare solidarity with this protest movement, whatever incarnation it is. There's been a number of them over the last number of years, going back to 2009, we'll recall. Soon after President Obama became president, there was just that big protest movement. And President Obama said virtually nothing about it. And the protest movement was saying, we want the US Just to say something, to put a spotlight on what we're doing and to stand shoulder to shoulder with us. We're not asking for technological support. We're not asking for electronic support. We're certainly not asking for military support. We're asking for the moral authority of the US Government to stand with us shoulder to shoulder, very publicly, which would guarantee continued attention on the protest movement internationally. And President Obama later said that he regretted not stepping up. And however this current version of a protest movement shakes out, I hope the US in particular is very public in its standing in solidarity with the movement. I want to move to what is happening in Gaza, which really seemed to me the focus of President Trump's meeting with Netanyahu and that specifically the implementation of the Trump peace plan. I'll start with you, Nadav, and then come to you, Amit. Just quickly walk us through what was announced after the meeting and what does it mean for the future of Gaza?
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A
So, first of all, it was a fantastic meeting for Prime Minister Netanyahu. And I think it's extremely warranted to remark that again and again there are predictions made towards these meetings that they would be tense. I didn't participate in this specific celebration of we're expecting a tense meeting. So I can say that I just.
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B
Want to contextualize what Nadav is saying, because I don't know if all our listeners are following the inside press ecosystem coverage of these meetings between Netanyahu and President Trump in the lead up of literally of every one of the six meetings now, six meetings that Prime Minister Netanyahu has had with President Trump in the lead up to everyone, there is a flurry of press activity, present company Nadava Hameed excluded. But among many reporters in the Israeli press community, there's a flurry of activity about how Trump, Trump has had it with Bibi. Things are tense between Washington and Jerusalem. It's gonna be a Bad meeting and there's gonna be a lot of finger wagging and a lot of pressure and then these meetings happen. And even what's publicly reported on the inside, privately about what happens behind closed doors, as well as certainly the public statements, it just completely belies the press coverage leading up to it. And so that's why I think many of us are kind of amused, if not at some point we stopped being surprised. Now we're just amused by the, what we call in the U.S. like around sports, like the pre game hype of this showdown that's going to happen and then the opposite happens. So anyways, I just wanted our listeners to understand what exactly we're talking about.
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A
Unless it's a Jets game, right?
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B
Yes, definitely no hype.
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A
So at any rate, it was a fantastic meeting for Netanyahu. Basically got on the record everything he was asking for. The question there as to Gaza is to what extent did he get what he was really asking for? And that is for Netanyahu, let me put it plainly, another withdrawal in the Gaza Strip without the Hamas actually disarming.
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B
So another Israeli withdrawal without Hamas meeting all its obligations of the Trump 20.
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A
Point plan and without the ISF International Stabilization Force, part of the Trump Plan, part of the UN Security Council decision being placed in Gaza, that could be extremely problematic for Netanyahu, politically speaking, definitely will meet resistance with Israeli right wing partners to his coalition. Now as to that question, President Trump made sure that everybody understands that his position is that Hamas needs to disarm or they'll have help to pay. However, and I'm opening this up to discussion, maybe Amit has an insight as to that. My impression, just hearing what the President said is that he didn't mean that Gaza's rebuilding or that a next Israeli withdrawal is completely conditioned on a full disarmament of Hamas. And what is Hamas? Disarmament is, by the way, something that nobody ever defined as far as Arab partners to this agreement are concerned. They're talking about tunnels and they're talking about heavy weapons, which by the way, Hamas doesn't really have. As far as Israel is concerned, disarmament of Hamas is them basically completely being disarmed and not holding the monopoly over violence in the Gaza Strip, which very few people in Israel believe is actually going to happen. So I'm wondering as to the actual results of the meeting. But he did get a green light for possible strike in Iran. He did get this declaration that Hamas needs to disarm, which is fantastic for him. He did get the President saying, oh, erdogan, might get F35s right, which isn't good news. But in general, the general way that the President addressed this, saying that without Netanyahu, Israel would not have existed. This is what really Netanyahu was looking for. It's an election year. He got that from the President. So for him it's a win. As to the withdrawal from Gaza, I'm wondering what the Americans are going to do right now. And I'm still collecting evidence.
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C
Amit, unlike Trump's image, especially in center left media outlets, that he is hard to expect what he's going to say when it comes to Gaza and to Israel, he's boringly consistent. President Trump has just repeated what he has been saying for almost a year, that Hamas must be dismantled and if not, he would leash hell upon it. That was the thing and that is still the thing. And the only surprise is by those who were briefed by anti Netanyahu sources from within the White House, this is what President Trump insists on. Now we are having three options. One is that Hamas dismantles itself. I'm quite skeptical about it. Everyone is quite skeptical about it, but we have to take it with a grain of salt because we were quite skeptical about the option of Hamas releasing all the hostages. So let's say there is 1%, it's going to happen. The other option is that international forces would actually dismantle Hamas. I would give it 0% because Hamas is not willing to do it. I don't see any high skill fights in Gaza between Indonesians or Italians and Hamas terrorists. So we're left with the last option, which is the idf. Now I want to tell you a secret. I think Israel prefers to actually envelop Gaza as it is doing right now as we speak, with 58%. By the way, it was 53%, but now it's 58% of the territory of the Gaza Strip. When Hamas is enveloped and when recovery is not happening, or which is the least favored option of 3, 4, 5 Israeli divisions re entering Gaza, why is it less preferred? One, because it's going to be a very long war. Second, because President Trump, I don't know if he believes in full peace in the Middle east, but I don't think he wants a full scale war in Gaza Strip. And the third thing is that even if Israel wins, let's imagine a situation in which the IDF actually destroys each and every tunnel, takes the last RPG missile, kills another 50% of the Hamas terrorists and takes 2/3 of the Kalashikov rifles which the number are estimated to be something like 60,000. It still means that Hamas has or in the Gaza strip, there are 20,000 Kalachnikov rifles. Now we are left with two bad options. One is that Israel has to directly control 2 million Gazans, 1.8 million Gazans, which, I mean the vast majority of Israelis do not want. And the second option is that then the international force would be demanded to get in. So then again, we are with the inability of an international force to fight Hamas, even if it's 90% weakened than its current position. That's why I'm quite pessimistic about the prospects of yet another military operation. And I do think that the armistice agreement between President Trump and Netanyahu is exactly what we are seeing now. The IDF controls the vast majority of the Gaza Strip, and Hamas, isolated, unable to recover itself, and controls a bunch of rebels in the last 42%.
- [30:11]
A
What you're saying, Amit, just to be clear, is that you think that Netanyahu is not going to go for any disarmament of Hamas, that the Hamas is going to control 50% or 42% of the Gaza Strip and all of its population, and it's going to be the regime there because it is, you know, growing stronger, collecting money, collecting taxes, and it controls there, and it has the weapons to control there. It's not going to be disarmed and it's going to control what's left of Gaza. That's what you're saying.
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C
Yeah. But then again, the question arises, is it a stable situation? Americans for the Americans, for instance, think that you cannot just press the pause button because then again, Hamas would somehow recover. Hamas is a very strange, peculiar animal that knows how to function and prosper in difficult terms. So you have to take it once and for all. Okay, so this is one option, and then you just actually postpone it. You just push it back a year or two. But at the end of the day, the IDF must enter Gaza in order to take care of Hamas. And the other option is immigration. You just open the gates. The third option is that you open or you establish the new Rafah within the area controlled by Israel, thus creating an arbitrage gap between Gazans who live in the freed East Gaza and enjoy prosperity, enjoy Emirati education system. Everything is relative. Right. And those miserable Gazans live in West Gaza.
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A
Can I offer a fourth option? That disappeared from the menu?
- [31:45]
C
Sure.
- [31:45]
A
And that actually was mentioned by President Trump, which is, I think, a teller in that sense. The President has been warming up to the Palestinian Authority. Here's A heads up. I'm hearing this from various sources. He always had some sort of a connection with Abu Mazen. He's been complimenting him publicly. But I think it's not Abu Mazen right now. I think it's also his heir apparent, Husseina Sheikh, who is very much hated and despised by Palestinians. And the Palestinian Authority, I should say, is rotten, is corrupt, and also despised by the Palestinians. So I don't want to say anything different to that. But the bottom line is that the Palestinian Authority is the only militia, so to speak, that you can have in the Gaza Strip that will actually, to some extent threaten Hamas that isn't the idf.
- [32:37]
B
So I want to stay on that for one moment because I've heard similar things from U.S. officials that whether it's the Palestinian Authority or other Palestinian officials or Palestinian leaders that could be emerging in Gaza that are not Hamas, that are not PA necessarily, although some may have ties with the pa, but that the US is seeing the emergence of Palestinians ready to take a leadership role in Gaza that are not Hamas. And there's a sense that we will be hearing more about that.
- [33:03]
C
Yeah, but the problem then, and Nadav, is that it doesn't really matter whether you call it the Palestinian Authority, a reform Palestinian Authority, or another Palestinian reform movement at the end of the day, as long as Hamas has dozens of thousands of Kalachikov rifles, it is way stronger now than it was in 2007 when the PA was the official ruler of the Gaza Strip and yet defeated in 48 hours by Hamas. So even if I accept the idea of the Palestinian Authority, which I don't, but even if I accept the idea, I mean, it doesn't make any sense to think that now they can take care of. I think Hamas really wants it because they prepare for the seven bad years in which they have to hide. I don't think Israel should, and the U.S. of course, should give them a go in that respect.
- [33:52]
A
I'm not saying that it should or it shouldn't. What I'm saying is, and I think Dan is echoing that from his own connections, is that the US is warming up to a larger role of either the Palestinian Authority or Palestinian moderates affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip specifically, if you look at the Council of Peace and the isf, not exactly forming at the speed that they would have wanted to see, and that the only threat, and by the way, the only way to win against Hamas, this is me now saying the only way to win against Hamas is to somehow take the Palestinian society away from Hamas control or affiliation. I'm not saying that the PA can do that. I'm not saying that the Fatah can do that. I'm saying what the chief of staff has told the Israeli cabinet a year and a half ago in Gaza. There are three options. One, Hamas, second, Fatah, Fatah, Penn. And the third is the IDF in a military occupation. These are the options. Ministers. Now, you take your pick. This was true, I think, a year and a half ago. It's true today. By the way, if there's going to be an ISF to our listeners, I'm just reminding them that the isf, that body, that armed body, is not tasked with fighting Hamas. It's not supposed to fight Hamas. It's supposed to monitor. Nobody can fight Hamas, and nobody will fight Hamas or disarm them either. Then the IDF itself, Hamas itself, which I agree, Amit, I don't think they're gonna do, or a competition within the Palestinian society. Now, I'm not saying that this competition is coming, but I'm saying that these are the options out there.
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B
Just realistically speaking, gentlemen, we're gonna leave it there. Be learning. I think pretty soon, in the weeks ahead on this very specific topic, I think we're going to see some plans being rolled out by the US Very swiftly into the. At the beginning of the new year. We'll have a lot to unpack. Before we wrap, though, I just want to alert our listeners that they should subscribe, if they haven't already, to Amit and Nadav's newsletters. Amit, hey.
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C
Hey.
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A
Amit's newsletter is old. My newsletter is new.
- [36:01]
B
Then you know, it's like a parent asking to choose between their children.
- [36:05]
C
Yeah, but we know, Dan, that every parent has the favorite child, so I noticed. I know you are a man of words that you mentioned my newsletter first.
- [36:15]
B
I did. So the two newsletters are It's Noon in Israel, which has been a daily staple of my life since soon after Amit started publishing it. And the new addition to my daily staple, or maybe not daily, is Nadav's newsletter, which is called Between Us, which when you first sent it to me, Nadav, when you sent it to me on WhatsApp, between us, I actually thought you were sending me, like, a private message between us, like, hey, and then you were gonna tell me something and then open this thing up. And I said, this is not between us. And I felt like we had a special relationship. The whole titles suggest a kind of intimacy. It's like the title of a romantic comedy or something.
- [36:52]
C
By the way, it's misleading to it. It's known in Israel because it's 2pm when it's morning in New York City.
- [36:57]
A
But.
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C
But I highly recommend Nadav's newsletter.
- [37:00]
A
I do the same for Amit.
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C
And I think that there are many things there that. I mean, as I said, I'll say it for the second time in this podcast. There is a huge arbitrage gap of knowledge because Hebrew is relatively a marginal language. But there are many, many quality articles, and there are many things that Nadav writes that should be read by a wider audience, especially policymakers and people who are interested in the Middle East.
- [37:27]
A
Wow, Dan, that was a warm endorsement. No, Oh, I thought between us is, you know, I was misled. It's a romantic comedy. No, no, you should learn from Amit. You know, Amit, thank you so much. And you know that I follow your newsletter and I think it's a daily brief of what's happening.
- [37:48]
C
Let's leave it here before it becomes too sticky.
- [37:49]
A
Okay.
- [37:50]
C
Too.
- [37:50]
B
Yeah.
- [37:51]
A
Okay.
- [37:51]
C
Can I say something optimistic?
- [37:53]
B
Yeah, of course.
- [37:54]
C
In the spirit of the season. A year ago on December 31, 2024, we were in the middle of a war with Hamas in Gaza. There were still more than 100 hostages in the Gaza Strip. Now we have one. Iran still had its nuclear program functioning and making a rapid progress. So a year after, I think the situation of Israel and consequently the Middle east has dramatically improved. And in addition, if you invested $1,000 in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange one year ago, you now have $1560.
- [38:32]
B
This is one with the greatest, you know, appreciation.
- [38:35]
C
Yes. Yeah. But this is not a recommendation to purchase stocks whatsoever.
- [38:39]
B
This is not what we do on Call Me Back. If you want to. If you want to hear any. Any investment insights, you should listen to what's your number? But yeah, I think that was an important piece of reflection and let's hope for continued news like that and developments like that when we meet over this next year. Thank you, guys.
- [38:55]
C
Thank you so much.
- [38:55]
A
Thank you so much.
- [39:05]
B
That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavayal Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arkmedia.org that's arkmedia.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Sound and video editing by Liquid audio. Our associate producer is Maya Rockoff. Community management by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.