ISRAEL VOTES: The Political Landscape - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

Summary

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Call Me Back with Dan Senor

Episode: ISRAEL VOTES: The Political Landscape
Guests: Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal
Date: February 9, 2026

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Overview

This episode launches the “Israel Votes” series, setting the stage for Israel’s momentous 2026 election—the first since the October 7th attacks. Dan Senor is joined by Israeli political journalists and ARC Media contributors Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal to analyze the challenges, stakes, and underlying currents shaping the election. The discussion addresses Netanyahu’s political survival, the shifting dynamics around Israel’s traditionally stable voting blocs, the enduring impacts of October 7th, and how issues like military service, tribalism, and trust in government affect Israeli democracy.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Central Question: Netanyahu’s Survival Post-October 7th

• The primary framing of the election is whether Benjamin Netanyahu can politically survive the aftermath of October 7th, which exposed significant government and security failures (00:37, 11:55).
• Nadav Eyal summarizes:
  “These elections, as were the previous ones, are actually a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu…. The main question for me in this election is will the Netanyahu brand manage to survive this referendum considering October 7?” (11:55)

2. Voting Blocs: Small Shifts, Big Impacts

• Amit Segal explains how a relatively small portion of the electorate—approximately 300,000 swing voters—will determine the outcome (07:31).
• Even major historical upsets involved only tiny vote shifts:
  “Even in 1977, which was the number one upset in Israeli politics, only 7% of the popular vote moved from left to right.” (07:31)
• The election pivots on discontent with coalition partners, especially the unpopular ultra-Orthodox parties versus Arab parties (08:36).

3. The Four Key Concerns of the Soft Right

• Amit outlines the internal dilemmas of Netanyahu’s moderate right-wing swing voters:
  1. Netanyahu’s responsibility for October 7.
  2. Credit for security successes post-attack.
  3. Dislike of ultra-Orthodox dominance in government.
  4. Rejection of coalitions with Arab parties.
     “There isn’t a single party that offers or agrees with all four arguments… So we are still waiting for this party who might say we—1,2,3,4.” (10:30)

4. Netanyahu as "Mr. Security": Can That Card Still Win?

• Nadav and Amit debate whether Bibi can continue positioning himself as Israel’s ultimate protector, especially since October 7th shattered that image (17:46, 22:45).
• The narrative battle centers on what the war is called:
  “Netanyahu says, no, it’s like the Second Independence War.… The center left says, this is the October 7th War.” (17:46)
• Nadav recalls a classic Netanyahu campaign spot:
  “He says, I’m the BB sitter… I’m here to take care of your kid. Bibi is here to keep your children safe.” (24:18)

5. The War, Judicial Reform, and the Ultra-Orthodox Divide

• Three mega-issues intertwine:
  • Judicial reform (deepening left-right schisms)
  • Ultra-Orthodox exemption from military service (growing resentment)
  • The war with Hamas and broader questions around security and accountability (22:04)
• For many voters, these are all filtered through Netanyahu himself, who frames opposition as persecution:
  “He sees the judicial reform… as a way to fight a system of a deep state that has taken over the country and is trying to break him down.” (22:45)

6. Israel as a Tribal Society

• Nadav highlights persistent political tribalism:
  “In Israel, society is much more tribal and it has become much more traditional and religious than the society in the U.S.… The entire elections would be decided on about eight seats of the Knesset.” (27:58)
• Swing votes are concentrated among “soft right” urban voters with ambivalence toward both Bibi and his alternatives (27:58).

7. Protests and the Question of Accountability

• Despite major protests demanding an independent inquiry into October 7, Nadav doubts they’ll influence the outcome:
  “The conversation has become completely tribal. Netanyahu has managed completely to make the entire issue of that state commission an issue of pro and against Bibi.” (32:36)
• Netanyahu avoids commissions of inquiry to prevent binding fault-finding:
  “Netanyahu has not formed one during his entire career. And the reason…is because in Israel, these commissions have the power to say something quite radical.” (32:30)

8. Demographics and the Right’s Natural Growth

• Amit notes the right-wing’s demographic advantage:
  • Ultra-Orthodox and nationalist families average 4–6 children per family.
  • Since 2022, “the average net growth for the right wing is something like three seats out of the 120.”
    “I wouldn’t underestimate the natural growth factor.” (21:36)

9. Optimism and Concern: Personal Reflections

• Nadav worries about eroding civil discourse and potential for political violence:
  “I think that Israel is marching into this elections when the society is in its worst position in terms of tribalism and violence… It’s a loss of civility within Israeli society.” (38:09)
• Amit is more optimistic that Israel may have passed the peak of tribalism:
  “I think that we have passed the peak of tribalism in Israeli society… The outcome wouldn’t necessarily be that the election leads to a unity government.… You might find yourself in a year from now wondering why we have wasted so much time and energy on disputes.” (41:32, 43:17)
• Both hope election results will bring greater governmental focus on citizens’ wellbeing and national renewal.

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Notable Quotes

• Nadav Eyal:
  “These elections…are actually a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu. And the main question for me in this election is will the Netanyahu brand manage to survive this referendum considering October 7th?” (11:55)

• Amit Segal:
  “Netanyahu’s raison d'être has been for years being Mr. Security…. There isn’t any precedent of a prime minister in Israel surviving a security failure. But…I want to be cautious, because it’s Mr. Netanyahu who broke each and every precedent in the past.” (17:46)

• Nadav Eyal, on Netanyahu’s campaign style:
  “Netanyahu is probably the best campaigner in the Western world today, with one big exception, which is, of course, President Trump.” (20:25)

• Amit Segal, on coalition dynamics:
  “For Netanyahu, it would be better for Netanyahu to get 58 seats rather than an outright majority of 61…. The ultra Orthodox would want full exemption…For Netanyahu, it’s better to have 58 and then get what he used to [have] in the past, which is the alleged leftist part of the coalition.” (41:32)

• Nadav Eyal, on civil strife:
  “What we’re seeing right now just in pure violence in the streets that is developing… It’s a loss of civility within Israeli society.” (38:09)

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Memorable Moments with Timestamps

• Netanyahu’s BBsitter Ad Description: (24:18)
• Amit’s Demographic Analysis of the Right: (21:31)
• Discussion of the “Referendum on Bibi” Framing: (11:55, 12:18)
• Debate on the Naming of the War: (17:46)
• Protests over Accountability for Oct. 7 and Lack of Inquiry: (31:50–36:38)
• Personal reflections and hopes for Israel’s future: (38:09–43:17)

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Important Segments (By Timestamp)

• [00:37] — Framing the stakes: Will “the Netanyahu brand” survive?
• [07:31] — The power of small shifts: historical perspective & electoral math
• [11:55] — Elections as a referendum on Bibi
• [17:46] — Can Netanyahu survive political norms after October 7? The role of campaign strategy
• [22:04] — Judicial reform, ultra-Orthodox controversy, war: interwoven election issues
• [24:18] — The enduring “Mr. Security” campaign and ad strategy
• [27:58] — Israel’s tribal politics and swing voter demographics
• [31:50] — Public demand for commission of inquiry into October 7
• [38:09] — Panelists share personal concerns and hopes heading into the election

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Tone & Style

Discussion is candid, analytical, and concerned, alternating between data-driven analysis, sharp political storytelling, and personal, civic reflection. Both guests are insightful, alternating skepticism and guarded optimism about Israel’s democratic resilience.

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TL;DR

This episode dissects the approaching Israeli election, widely seen as a personal referendum on Netanyahu against the backdrop of October 7. Swing votes, coalition arithmetic, tribalism, and the war’s aftermath emerge as decisive factors, with guests divided in their assessment of whether a future of consensus or further fragmentation awaits. The stakes for Israeli society feel existential, but hope remains for a better political and civic future.

Transcript

[A]

Hey everyone, Dan here. Before we start, I'd really appreciate five minutes of your time to fill out our listener survey. Your feedback helps shape what we do at ARK Media and as ARC Media grows, and what we try to accomplish here, which is to build a place for serious conversation, respectful disagreement and real connection. The survey is anonymous, but you can opt in to win a gift, which we will surprise you with. The link is in today's show Notes. Thanks so much. I'm looking forward to hearing from you. You are listening to an art media podcast.

[B]

The main question for me in this election is will the Netanyahu brand manage to survive this referendum considering October 7th? He has lost votes according to every poll since forming this coalition. I agree with Amit that a lot of it has to do with ultra orthodox parties, but this, together with the failure of October 7th, will this lead to the end of his career? Because if he's going to lose this election, he's done.

[C]

As for the total victory, I would say that it depends heavily on the question what happens with Iran? If Iran collapses, Netanyahu would gain ground dramatically because he would say, listen, we got hit by one of the tentacles, but hey, the octopus is lying dead in front of us. Whereas on the other hand, if Iran survives, it would be way harder for him.

[A]

It's 10am on Sunday, February 8, here in frigid New York City as we stay inside but brace with great anticipation the super bowl. It is 5pm on Sunday, February 8, in Israel, as Israelis prepare to wind down their day this coming Wednesday. Prime Minister Netanyahu is set to meet President Trump in Washington, where, according to some reports, Netanyahu hopes to convince the President that negotiations with Tehran must not be limited to Iran's nuclear program, but according to reports, should also address Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and its web of proxies, which again, according to some reports, were not addressed during the first day of indirect talks last Friday. President Trump said on Saturday that more talks will be held in the coming week and described the first round as, quote, very good. Iran's foreign minister, who reportedly met with US Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, said that Friday was a good start in Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu's response to the state comptroller's investigation into October 7th has in many corners sparked public outrage. In the 55 page document, Netanyahu downplayed his own responsibility while placing the blame largely on Israel's security and intelligence leadership, arguing that he had been repeatedly told Hamas was deterred and that no concrete warning of an imminent attack was presented to him. Yoav Gallant, who had served as defense minister on October 7, responded on Thursday that Netanyahu quote, doesn't miss a chance to lie and incite. Former IDF chief of Staff Gotti Eisenkot, who today is also a political rival of Netanyahu's, also shot back accusing the prime minister of, quote, abusing his access to confidential records to construct a, quote, fabricated defense. On Saturday night, about 1500 demonstrators, led by parents of fallen soldiers and a number of the released hostages gathered at Habima Square in Tel Aviv, calling for an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the failures of October 7th and to restore public confidence. Yesterday in Australia, as one of our listeners there wrote to us today, the Queensland government outlawed Hamas flags and also river to the sea chants now all jailable offenses in Queensland. It took several years in a mass shooting to get there, our listener writes, but some positive change for once. Yesterday, one of Israel's most iconic and gifted musicians, Matti Caspi, passed away. A prolific singer, songwriter, composer and producer, Casbi wrote more than 1400 songs, many of which became cornerstones of Israel's musical canon. He was 76 and had been battling cancer in recent years. We'll close today's episode with one of his many timeless songs. May his memory be for a blessing. Now onto today's episode. As you probably know, this year in Israel is an election year, the first since the October 7th attack. The fault lines that divide Israeli society are likely to sharpen as many Israelis feel that the very character, if not the future of the Jewish state will be up for a vote in many ways this year. As things heat up, we want to make sure that Call Me Back and ARC Media give you the coverage you need to keep up. That's why we're launching a special series today called Israel Votes, in which we will be speaking with analysts, politicians who will be on the ballot later this year, and of course, ARC Media contributors Nadavael and Amit Segal. This will be your ARC media hub for election news, context, insight, analysis. We'll be here to help you make sense of Israel's election system, but more importantly to explore the underlying social, political, economic and ideological currents that will define the coming months in Israel. This will be the focus of today's episode. Now, today we are just setting the stage, trying to explain the stakes in this upcoming election. In subsequent episodes in this series, we will actually do for some will feel more remedial, but a more technical explainer of how the Israeli political system and electoral system actually works. But to kick this off, I'm pleased to welcome back to the podcast ARC Media contributors Nadav and Amit to help us understand how the political landscape is shaping up again, what the stakes are in this election, and what questions will determine the outcome. Nadav, Amit, thanks for being here.

[C]

Thanks for inviting us. Finally for politics.

[A]

Finally for politics. Right? Things have returned to normal when we get to talk about politics. All right, I wanna say a couple things before we jump into it. I often say when I'm talking about Israeli politics heading into an Israeli election, that this is the most important election. And we were joking offline about this. I'm not the only one who says that this is the most important election. I give a talk every year to the high school seniors at my kids Jewish day school in New York, and they do a model Knesset. And every year I tell them that where they play different roles of Israeli political parties and they work out very contentious issues. I do a little primer for them before, and every time I do it, I tell them this is the most important moment in Israeli history. This is the most important moment in Israeli politics. When I did the talk in 2022, it was when the seven party Ben Lapid government was formed and a very diverse coalition. And I said, this is the most interesting time. And it's 2023. It was the middle of judicial reform. And I said, the country's completely divided. You guys are starting this process at the most interesting time. Obviously 2024 and 2025 was post October 7th. Regardless of what I've ever said in the past, this is the most important election. And I want to start a meet by asking you if you are an Israeli voter who voted for the current government, the Netanyahu led coalition government, how are you thinking about the performance of this government that you voted for as you contemplate your choices in the next election?

[C]

Okay, so just to put it in perspective, one is that even in 1977, which was the number one upset in the history of Israeli politics when Begin took office after eight consecutive defeats in the election to the Labour Party, only 7% of the popular vote moved from the left to the right. So 93% of the entire electorate stayed exactly where they have stood in 1973, prior to the failure of Yom Kippur war. So you don't need all of the voters of the Bibi bloc to move in order to make dramatic changes. You need 5, 6, 7%, or to put it in numbers, 300,000 voters out of 2,223,000 voters to the Bibi block in 2022. That's all it takes out of an.

[A]

Electorate of roughly how big?

[C]

6,600,000.

[B]

Got it.

[C]

Okay. Out of which the turnout is 70%. So give or take 4 million and a half voters, that's all. It's like the size of New Jersey Ish. Or Georgia. Georgia would be more accurate.

[A]

Yeah.

[C]

Now, here's the thing. Those 300,000 voters hadn't wanted to vote for Bibi in the first place in 2022. They had to choose between the lesser of two evils. Either to form a coalition of the center left with the Arab parties or a coalition of the right wing with the ultra orthodox parties. Now, the ultra orthodox parties are extremely unpopular among what we call the soft right. Those who lean towards the Bibi camp but do not share with him the necessity of forming coalition with ultra orthodox parties who do not want to send their children to serve in the Israeli army and do not want to send their children to work. However, there is only one sector which is even less popular than the ultra orthodox parties, and this is the non Zionist or anti Zionist Arab parties. Now, since the last government formed by Bennett and Lapid included an Arab party, for the first time in Israel's history, the number one issue of the election was either you support a coalition with the Arab parties or not. And since the answer was a resounding no, especially by the right wing, the outcome was an outright VICT for Benjamin Netanyahu. Now, nowadays the number one issue is the ultra orthodox parties being part of the coalition. And since they are extremely unpopular, all it takes for the center left in order to get at least part of this share is not to talk about the Arab parties, because if it's focused on the orthodox parties, they are necessarily going to take 100,000 votes or 200,000 votes or even more than this. This is the entire issue of the entire elections in my opinion.

[A]

So, Amit, if you voted for this government, meaning you voted for parties that formed this coalition, are you pleased that you voted the way you voted and the outcome you got or not?

[C]

So let's put aside the 90% who are going to vote for the Bibbie block anyway and focus, zoom in on those 10% who are going to decide the outcome of the election? I would say they believe in four different things. One, Netanyahu is fully responsible and bears the full accountability for the failure of October 7. Second, he is responsible for the success from October 8 onwards, defeating Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. Third, they hate the idea of being dependent on the ultra orthodox parties because of the unwritten contract between them and the country. We do not serve in the army, we do not take part in the workforce. And fourth, they don't want a coalition with the Arab parties. Now, there isn't a single party that offers or agrees with four out of four of those arguments. Bibi says the orthodox parties are great and I Never failed on October 7th. It was the army. Bennett says Netanyahu failed on October 7th, but he would never credit him for the successes. The opposition says that it would rely heavily on the Arab parties. So we are still waiting for this party who might say we. 1, 2, 3, 4. And if not, I would say that it's too early and too close to call who they are going to vote.

[A]

Okay, Nadav, for those who voted for parties that did not form this government, how are they evaluating what they got as a result of the way they voted?

[B]

The opposition is united on some very important notions as to this election. First of all, we just heard from Amit a very granular description of the elections. And I don't agree with everything he said as to the framing of the elections. But I want to say the obvious. These elections, as were the previous ones, are actually a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu.

[A]

Wait, you're saying every election in the.

[B]

Last number of elections, every election since 2015. And I think Amit will agree with me. Every election since 2015 is a personal referendum. It's not about the economy. It's not about whatever is being achieved. It's not about the Abraham Accords. It's not about COVID 19. It's a referendum about Netanyahu. And these elections are the first referendum about Netanyahu since October 7th. I think this would be an accurate framing generally of Israeli politics. And let me explain in a word, what has changed for many people hearing us right now. Dan, Israeli politics was always mixed with this old conflict of land for peace. Positive or negative. What are your opinions as to land for peace? You had one bloc that was more pragmatic, more left leaning. You had another bloc that said the whole Eretz Israel as a maximalist approach as to controlling the territory, much more skeptic as to the possibility of achieving peace agreements. And you had the ultra orthodox that were playing in between the camps to some extent. Netanyahu is the Ronald Reagan of the Israeli politics, or more than that. He absolutely would love this comparison. I think it's not fair towards Ronald Reagan. Let's talk about this a bit later, because Netanyahu is right Now, I was.

[A]

About to say Reagan is one of my three favorite presidents in American history.

[B]

If Reagan managed to make trade unions much stronger and part of the Republican Party, it would be a fair comparison to Reagan. But let's put it aside. So you have this person who's Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan in terms of his conservative gravitas within the Israeli discourse, and that's Netanyahu. And he has changed Israeli politics. He has changed Israeli discourse for the opposition. He is destroying the country. This is the notion that goes through every demonstration that you see in every speech made. If it's a rather centrist politician like Gadi Eisenkurt or Yair Lapid, or if it's much more left leaning like Yair Golan, if these are Arab Party leaders or others, all of them are united around a principle idea that people who support Netanyahu will call the Netanyahu derangement syndrome. And those who are criticizing Netanyahu will say the derangement syndrome is of those who support him. But opposition is, to your question, united around the idea that this leadership is leading the country to its demise. Nothing less in terms of their general rhetoric now, doesn't mean that Bennett, for instance, who absolutely thinks that and is attacking Netanyahu aggressively, doesn't mean that they won't go and sit in a coalition with Netanyahu afterwards. So I don't want to overplay this, but this notion that I'm speaking about is uniting the bloc. Since Israeli politics has moved from talking about principled issues to talking about a Persona and its influence on Jewish history and Israeli history, this is again a referendum of Netanyahu. And the main question for me in this election is will the Netanyahu brand manage to survive this referendum? Considering October 7, we have seen that he has lost votes and support according to every poll since forming this coalition. I agree with Amit that a lot of it has to do with ultra Orthodox parties. Not necessarily only October 7, but this together with a failure of October 7, to which every reasonable person, including Amit and myself, think that Netanyahu bears a responsibility to an extent. I don't want to put words into the mouth of Amit. Will this lead to the end of his career? Because if he's gonna lose this election, if he's not gonna form the government, he's done. And this is another agreement I think we're hearing across the field.

[A]

Let me try to simplify this. Every election in almost every democracy comes down to a central question. The question being about the past, almost like a Referendum on a version of what you were just saying, Nadav. A referendum on who's been in charge. So looking back, right, you think about Reagan in 1980, asking voters, Are you better off today than you were four years ago, Basically trying to force the election into a referendum on Jimmy Carter's four years. Or Reagan in 84 when he said it's morning in America, meaning we've bounced back, judge me on the four years since Carter. Referendum on Reagan's four years. He won 49 out of 50 states in that election. You think about George W. Bush running for reelection in 2004. It was the first presidential election since 9 11. So one is a look back, a referendum. That's the question. Another question or another category is the here and now. I don't wanna have a referendum on the past. I'm just dealing with the here and now. And the here and now is security, safety, quality of life issues right here, right now. What's in front of me, who's. I don't care about who did what in the past. I gotta figure out who the best person is right now. And then the third category is looking deep into the future. What does the future of my country look like? Is the Middle east gonna be transformed? Is there gonna be integration and normalization with Saudi Arabia? Who's gonna be the Moses that's gonna take me to the promised land? It's usually every election can fall into one of those three categories. So first of all, do you agree with my categorization, Amit? A and B? If you do, based on what you know now, which of those three is gonna be the defining question? And I know each party and each voter for each party and each tribe, if you will, has their own angle on this question. But ultimately these elections come down to transcends all these different groups.

[C]

Okay? So first of all, I know we are going to discuss it extensively on the next episode about the know how of the elections in Israel, the system, the electoral system, how Canadian members are elected, et cetera. So I will just put a general assumption here that when you have a multi party system, you have a multi topic elections. That's the main thing. I mean you can run three, four, five parallel campaigns simultaneously. And in order to win, you don't have to take it down to the wire to a single issue, be it the transgender policy of Kamala Harris like President Trump did. No, Netanyahu has to win three, four seats. Now I would like to explain it as follows. Even without October 7th and the Judicial reform before Netanyahu would have hard times to re win an outright majority. One, because Netanyahu defeated the left, not in terms of the popular vote, but because of the threshold. The center left failed to organize itself in a proper way, and three parties failed to pass the threshold. Second, since the issue is no longer the Arab parties, but the ultra orthodox parties, he has lost ground weeks after the 22 elections, and then came October 7. Now, Netanyahu's claim to fame, Netanyahu's raison d' etre, has been for years being Mr. Security. It's not my assumption or my analysis. It's what Netanyahu himself has repeatedly said over the years. He said, I want to be remembered as Mr. Security now. That's the reason why when a New York Times reporter called me on October 8, 2023, and asked me, will Netanyahu survive it? I replied, there isn't any precedent of a prime minister in Israel surviving a security failure. But I want to be cautious, because it's Mr. Netanyahu who broke each and every precedent in the past. Now, what Netanyahu has to offer in the upcoming election is to say, listen, this is not about October 7th. It's about the entire war. And that's why the fight over the name of the war is crucial. The center left says, this is the October 7th war. And Netanyahu says, no, it's like the second independence war. We began it, yes, with October 7th, exactly like World War II began with Pearl Harbor. But no one calls World War II in the United States the Pearl Harbor War. Now, it's too early to say which of the sentiments is to prevail. I would just like to say two things. One, Netanyahu is a better campaigner than his rivals.

[B]

That's an understatement.

[C]

Exactly.

[B]

Netanyahu is probably the best campaigner in the Western world today, with one big exception, which is, of course, President Trump.

[C]

Netanyahu's statistics is better. Trump won two out of the three, and for Netanyahu, it's the 12th campaign, and he lost, I think, only three campaigns. And the second thing is, Netanyahu is in office now. He who runs the Prime Minister's office runs the agenda. You can invite President Trump a week before the election. You know, when military operations are to be held, you can actually order specific legislation, et cetera, et cetera. And the third thing is the natural growth. Now, I would like to explain the statistics of Israel. Three out of the four highest growing sectors in Israel belong to Netanyahu's block, the ultra orthodox six children on Average per family, the Black Kippas, the National Orthodox, the knitted kippas, 4.1 children per family. And those with keepers in their pocket, the Conservative, those who actually do not observe Shabbat in an Orthodox way.

[A]

Now, mainstream main, the last category is like mainstream Likud voters. Just for people to understand what you're talking about.

[C]

Exactly. Now, since 2022, the average net growth for the right wing is something like three seats out of the 120. So allegedly, Netanyahu can allow himself to lose three seats and still preserve the majority. I do not say that necessarily he's going to win the election. I wouldn't say it now. It's too far. And most of the polls do not put him even nearly as close as to winning the election. But I wouldn't underestimate the natural growth factor, Nadav.

[A]

Over the last few years, anyone, even casual observers of Israeli politics would know that there are three big topics, three big themes. I'm not putting them on the same plane, but let's just go through them. There was the big fight within Israel about judicial reform most of 2023 that really divided the country and you would have thought was definitional for Israeli politics. There's more recently the big fight over whether or not the ultra Orthodox, as Amit has talked about being exempt from service in the idf. And then of course, the war. How do you think about those themes as we head into the election? Is it really about the war and nothing else? Or do all these themes represent something going on in Israeli politics that will shape this next election?

[B]

All of these themes are of course connected and the connection is again the personality of the Prime Minister. This is the position of both the Prime Minister. He sees the judicial reform, as he labels it, as a way to fight a system of a deep state that has taken over the country and is trying to break bringing down, through a criminal political trial, a witch hunt against him personally? This is not my analysis. This is what the Prime Minister is actually saying about his corruption charges. As to the ultra orthodox and the conscription, Netanyahu sees this first and foremost as a political issue. At the end of the day, ultra Orthodox men got a waiver for many, many years under many governments. Now it has become an issue again. The judicial system is saying, you can't do this anymore. If you speak with Netanyahu, Netanyahu will tell you the reason that they are now pushing this is because it's but another way to act for my demise. But I want to answer also your earlier question about the future or the past? I think it's a crucial question. Netanyahu always won elections in Israel because he was talking about personal threats to security in the future if he will not be elected. The underlining motto or messaging of Netanyahu, which you could see, for instance, in a TV ad that he released in one of the previous elections called the BBCitter, in which he knocks on a door, a couple of parents open the door, and he says, I'm the babysitter for your kids. I'll keep them safe.

[A]

Just for our listeners who haven't seen it, the ad is a young couple at home with her baby. They get a knock on the door. Prime Minister Netanyahu's at the door. Instead of saying, I'm the babysitter, as Nadav says, he says, I'm the BB sitter, meaning Bibi, I'm here, but basically I'm here to take care of your kid. Bibi is here to take care of your kid. And the message being, I'm the one that you can trust to keep your country safe and your children safe. That was like the theme of the spot. He's Mr. Security, or he's always been portrayed as Mr. Security.

[B]

So let me bring you a quote as to that from one of his interviews. The ability to identify danger in time and to organize against it. It's the test of survival for every collective body. The Jewish people have not excelled at recognizing dangers early. The last time, they were taken by surprise in the most horrific way. He was talking about the Holocaust. That will not happen under my leadership. I see a danger to the Jewish people, and I'm organizing to repel that danger. This is an interview from a few years back. Let me bring another TV ad which was considered highly toxic by the centrist bloc in Israel, in which you see a pickup car of ISIS and they stop and they ask from an Israeli, they ask directions, and the sticker on their car says, turn left for isis. Meaning if you elect left in Israel, what you're going to get is the Islamic State. That's a formerly coup TV ad. Then we saw the white Toyota Hamas pickup trucks coming from Gaza. In Sderot, we saw this surprise attack, much worse than Pearl harbor in the sense that it attacked civilians. The incursion was to buy land to the sovereign state of Israel. And the question again is, will he be able to play that card again of looking to the future? Because he never was. The idea that I'm absolutely the best at that, but look at the alternatives, said Netanyahu. Do you really think that they are going to be as hardline as I am approaching the regional threats now here in these elections, something is changing because of Bennett. Bennett is to that extent the possibility of a transformative change. Why Bennett can argue that he is to the right of Netanyahu. For instance, Netanyahu gave up Hebron to the Palestinian Authority. Netanyahu said he wants a Palestinian state. Bennett never said that. Netanyahu has left that position. But Bennett has never been in that position. Bennett basically grew up within what we call religious Zionism. He was the chairman of the settler lobby in Israel, Moetzet Yesha. He just has every single spot in his career but one. He went to a government with the centrist bloc, with the left wing. And he, as far as many right wing voters, betrayed the camp. And many of them I see this with my friends say we would rather vote for Eisenkot or for Benny Gantz than vote for Bennett, because Bennett is the traitor among us. They see him renegading on his promise not to go with the Arab parties, not to go with the Arabid as something that is simply unexcusable. However, if you look at polls today, Dan, you see that in terms of measurement for prime minister, belief that a person could be a good prime minister. Bennett and Netanyahu are polling right now, I think the Channel 12, the last Channel 12 poll, 40% and 40% each. So they're tied. We've never seen anything like that.

[A]

Can I ask you a question, Nadav, and maybe it's a question for me.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

This fact that Bennett is polling now at about 40% roughly, it must represent some voters on the right.

[B]

Oh yes, it does.

[A]

Including voters who voted for the current government.

[B]

We return to the basic essentials which Amit mentioned at the beginning. I have to say something. Israelis don't understand American politics. And in general, Americans don't understand Israeli politics. In Israel, constantly you're fighting on persuading 10 seats out of 120. Amit said the same thing. However, in Israel, unlike in the us, society is much more tribal and it has become much more traditional and religious than the society in the US Just if you sort of measure shul going to church attendance. Yes. So a tribal society has even less leverage of change. American politics is amazing. The Americans elect George W. Bush for the second time during the Iraq war. And seven years after 9 11, they elect Barack Obama to be their president. And then they shift from Obama to Trump. This is not the story of Israeli politics. If you look at Israeli politics, 1948 to 1977, basically Labor, 1977 up until now, basically Likud, with some exceptions. That's it. It's a much more tribal society in terms of politics. So the entire elections would be decided on about eight seats of the Knesset. And I can tell you who they are. They are from the Likud, usually, or traditionalists. They live in cities, mostly in the center of Israel. Places like Holon, Batyam, Ramatgan. They voted Likud. They see themselves as having attachment to Jewish tradition. They dislike Netanyahu in general. But they're saying, who's the better of these two devils, Netanyahu or Bennett? These people are going to decide the elections. And on what merit? I think that less so about the war and more so about the future. And in terms of future, if they think Netanyahu is going to go with the ultra orthodox again, they're going to vote him out. But I don't know if this is what's going to be his campaign.

[A]

Okay, Amit, I want to give you an opportunity to respond to what Nadav said. But I also want to ask you, do you think that Israelis feel that they got the victory that was promised to them after October 7th? That's not to say that they don't have current security concerns, but do they feel that this government promised, quote, unquote, total victory and they got it?

[C]

There is a difference between those who define themselves as right wingers and those who define themselves as Bibi supporters. The share of Netanyahu's supporters is something between 45% to 51%, depends on the year. And the percentage of those who define themselves as right wingers these days In Israel is 65% of the popular vote. So, yes, there are many, many voters who define themselves as right or right center and yet vote for other parties. By the way, that's the reason why the opposition for Netanyahu these days do not consist of Rabin Peres, Ehud Barak and Olmert, but Naftali Bennett, Victor Lieberman, the settler, and many, many other figures who oppose Palestinian statehood, et cetera, et cetera. So this is one thing. That's why the only important question for voters, if you want to know whether there are swing voters or not, is who have they voted for in 2022? Bennett doesn't have only to capitalize on right wingers, but on right wingers who had voted for Netanyahu in the first place. As for the total victory, I would say that it depends heavily on the question, what happens with Iran if Iran collapses? Netanyahu would gain ground dramatically because he would say, listen, we got hit by one of the tentacles, but hey, the octopus is lying dead in front of us. Whereas, on the other hand, if Iran survives, it would be way harder for him.

[A]

Okay, Nadav. Last night we saw significant protests in Tel Aviv demanding an independent state commission of inquiry on how October 7 happened. Why has there still not been a commission of inquiry? Many voters, including people like me from outside, are wondering, wait a minute, doesn't Israel always have a commission of inquiry? Why no commission of inquiry? Is it really a galvanizing issue beyond just a narrow number of very intense anti government activists? Or is it an issue? The state commission of inquiry and the fact that there hasn't been one and there doesn't seem to be a real plan for one, is an issue that transcends different segments of the Israeli electorate in ways that are hard to calculate right now, but could be a major factor in the election.

[B]

So, first of all, I don't think it's going to be, unfortunately, a major factor in the election.

[A]

Why don't you think it'll be a big issue?

[B]

Because the conversation has become completely tribal. Netanyahu has managed completely to make the entire issue of that state commission an issue of pro and against. Bibi. One of the things that Netanyahu used to do during his career, when his advisors would have brought him an issue of a government crisis, was to say to them, make it political. And he excels at that because it doesn't cross enough of party lines and partisanship to really influence the elections in a way that can jeopardize Netanyahu or that it can be an advantage for the opposition. Now, why don't we have it? The answer is very simple. Netanyahu has been a prime minister more years than any other prime minister, including David Ben Gurion. Israel had numerous national state commissions of inquiry. Netanyahu has not formed one during his entire career. And the reason he doesn't want to do that is because in Israel, these commissions have the power to say something quite radical. They can say that a minister and the prime minister is a minister in his government. By the way, legally speaking, he's not elected directly by the people. He's a minister. That a minister has performed in such a negligent way that he cannot or should not perform that duty again. Now, this is the reason for our listeners who remember that after the massacres of the Christian militias in 1982 in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra and Shatila, massacres that were conducted by Israeli allies, those Christian militias. There was a national commission of inquiry formed by Menachem Begin, and it placed the responsibility with a man called Ariel Sharon. And the meaning of that verdict was that Sharon could never be again a defense minister. He was thrown out of office. And even when he became prime minister, he didn't take that position because he knew that they would take it to the Supreme Court. Netanyahu knows that if such a commission of inquiry will be formed, it will be formed by the Supreme Court president who will pick the person leading that commission. And because Netanyahu sees the entire judicial system as his personal enemy, and specifically this president of the Supreme Court, he has brought other offers to have some sort of a political commission, and they will have a report. But everybody understands that this means nothing. Let's say that Bennett is saying, I'll come into power. I'll have a commission of inquiry. Great. Who's going to believe the results of it? Half of the public is going to say, you know, this game was played by the judicial system. And of course, Bennett formed it. And it's immaterial. There would be no public trust. I want to underline this point. This is what Netanyahu does. If you talk with his allies and adversaries within the Likud, they go crazy. By how many hours Netanyahu devotes a day to to make sure that there is no opposition within the Likud against him. He destroyed already four generations of other opposition there. And to make sure that things are framed publicly in a way that they will not threat him. In a sense, even if we will have that national state inquiry, it will bear no meaning to Israeli political repercussions unless it will discover new facts that we don't know of. Now, Netanyahu, just this week, Dan, because you raised the issue just this week, began his campaign as to October 7th. He came to the Defense and Foreign Relations Committee of the Knesset and he started basically litigating his case. Why? It's not his fault. He brought a bunch of documents, quotes that he selected and he declassified, and he started litigating his cases to October 7th. I see this as the first moment of the elections. Maybe Amit thinks differently. He's just setting the ground. Now, every other official that is connected to October 7 failure besides Yoav Gallant, remained silent.

[C]

But even more than this, it's not about those keeping silent. Netanyahu doesn't need an achievement in the shape of I was right and the entire military apparatus was wrong. No, all he has to do in order to Win the next election is for enough people to say, okay, he is to be blamed for October 7th. But he wasn't the only one responsible for it. He, the IDF chief of staff, the head of the Shin Bet, the entire security establishment, et cetera. Politically speaking, once Netanyahu says, Listen, October 7th is for the entire country, I'm responsible. But every other. The media establishment, et cetera. But when it comes for defeating Hezbollah in Iran, it's me. It's me, myself, and I. So that's what Netanyahu really seeks in actually publicizing those protocols.

[A]

Okay, I want to wrap this up, because this is gonna be an ongoing conversation that we'll be dipping in and out of over the next few months. You guys are both keen observers and journalists and analysts of Israeli politics, and you are participants in Israeli life and Israeli civic life. You know, you have family and children and loved ones, and you both have served in the idf. So you have so many different angles, I think, with which you approach any election in Israel. I want to ask you both just personally, what you're most concerned about heading into this electoral period and what you're most hopeful or optimistic about. I'll start with you, Nadav, and then come to you, Amit.

[B]

So I'm extremely worried because I think that Israel is marching into this elections when the society is in its worst position in terms of tribalism and violence and discourse in general. I think that the war and the trauma has made things worse and more toxic. Right after October 7th, there was a decrease of that tribalism. There was some sort of a national emergency government. That phase has ended. We used to say, let's not return to the days of October 6, 2023. But now in the Israeli society, I think we're going to miss those days. We're going to look back with nostalgia to the days of the big demonstrations as to the judicial overhaul, because what we're seeing right now just in pure violence in the streets that is developing. It's still street violence, right? It's nothing lethal yet, but it's a loss of civility within the Israeli society. And people who listen to this show know that I place the responsibility on Israel's current leadership. And I'm specifically troubled about the possibility that the police that is controlled by Itamar Ben Grier, who's a Kahana disciple and a racist and a man who's been convicted in court for incitement, that the police would somehow become a tool and that there would be a clash between, for instance, the Arab public and Israel in between the police towards the elections that would serve the far right, for instance. I know that this sounds maybe to some of the listeners as just a horror scenario of sorts, but for anyone who's really been covering Israeli politics and seeing what has happened in the Israeli police, that is, by the way, collapsing anyway. And we see this across the country. I'm not only talking in terms of benvir. Not benvir. There is a shortage of staff. There's a rise of crime and murders. It's not such a science fiction kind of scenario. So this is what I'm really worried about. What I'm hopeful about is that this would be an election of change. I'm very hopeful that the government that we will have after the elections would be a government that managed to get stuff done. Look, the Weizmann Institute got hit by Iranian missiles. The government isn't there. Kiryat Shmona needs to be somehow rebuilt and for its civilians to go back there. The sense of the government in that sense is not there. The education system is in crisis. I know that people who listen to this show are sometimes less, I don't want to say interested, but it's not their focus. They want to focus on the war and getting the hostages back. But for Israel to really thrive, you need to take these things into consideration, and I think that's essential. So some more focus on these kind of priorities with the next government. I think that would be especially needed. I see you smiling, Dan, just because.

[A]

I want it of equal weight what you're concerned about and the hope.

[B]

And I got a lot. No, but I want to say this. I believe that even if Netanyahu wins this, he will either not want or it will be heavily restricted informing the same government that he has right now. And I'm very, by the way, intrigued to hear from Amit if he thinks that. I think that Netanyahu won't be able to make the same type of coalition again, but maybe I'm too optimistic.

[A]

Amit, bring us home here. Bring us home.

[B]

Bring Dan home. He means bring Dan.

[C]

Okay, so I think for Netanyahu, it would be better for Netanyahu to get 58 seats rather than an outright majority of 61. Because if he gets 61, it necessarily means that his partners come back to the cabinet table with a lot of appetite. The alt orthodox would want full exemption of serving in the army, Ben Gvir and Smotrich with, I don't know, annexing settlements, etc. For Netanyahu, it's better to have 58 and then get what he used to had in the past, which is the alleged leftist part of the coalition. Now Bennett or Lieberman would be branded as leftists, but this is better for Netanyahu. I'm a bit more optimistic. I think that we have passed the peak of tribalism in the Israeli society. It was something around September 2023, prior to the war. I think even before the war there were many fights about public prayers in Tel Aviv, which frightened many people from the both sides to understand that there is no reason why Jews would fight, literally fight in the streets of the first Zionist city for prayers. And I think that the outcome wouldn't necessarily be that the election to lead to a unity government. I do agree, however, that tribalism is not going anywhere. But I do think that it's like those Escher paintings that you can see two things in one painting. You can see the black side or the white side. I think that you might find yourself in a year from now now wondering why have we wasted so much time and energy on disputes that will have already been solved in two weeks of coalition negotiations?

[B]

But who knows?

[A]

All right, gentlemen, thank you for kicking off this series. Like I said, we're just scratching the surface here. We will be getting more technical, we'll be doing more explainers so our listeners can understand how this system works and how to understand how it will be working heading into this election, in addition to getting into to who the players are, who the parties are, what the issues are. And I'm grateful to Amit and Nadav for being along for this ride and helping us guide and understand and narrate all this complexity. As I mentioned in the opening in the introduction, I want to end this episode with one of Mati Caspi's songs, which in Hebrew is titled, which means the English translation is what will be, which is appropriate given this episode. CASPI SINGS I'm doing the English translation here. Oh what will happen? Tell me what will happen Happen here They promised legends to me and you we must not despair and we must not leave. I have no idea what will happen, but in my heart I still want to hope that not all is lost, that we will live here forever. That's from Mati Casby. And before you go, please take a moment to click the link in the show notes and fill out our survey. Your input makes a real difference. Amit Nadav, thank you.

[B]

Thanks very much, Dan.

[C]

Thank you so much.

[A]

Bye bye. That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where nadavayalamit, Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arkmedia.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our Production manager is Brittany Cohn. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.

[B]

Sam.