← Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
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- [00:04]
Dan Senor
Hi, it's Dan Sinor. Israel is heading into one of its most consequential election, and this time the whole world is watching closely. Hot takes and Daily Noise are pretty much guaranteed to populate your media diet. But as with any election, there's a deeper story about identity, religion, democracy, and what kind of country Israelis want to live in. That's why ARC Media launched Israel Votes, a special initiative across Call Me Back For Heaven's Sake and Ark News Daily. You'll hear from the leading candidates shaping the race, along with analysis and reporting from two of Israel's leading political analysts, ARC Media contributors Nadavael and Amit Segal. Join us for Israel Votes, your front row seat to the election that could define Israel's Future. Go to arkmedia.org votes to watch and listen. See you there.
- [01:08]
Nadav Eyal
You are listening to an art media podcast. Why does Eisencote still have a chance? Because Israel is now fighting its longest war. And Eisenco is a former chief of staff who's considered a mainstream officer and politician, a mainstream Zionist who again, made the highest of sacrifices during this war, and his family made that sacrifice. And people know that he's not corrupt, he's not considered a liar. And that's a lot in Israel these days. And because of that, he does stand a chance. But it's no more than a chance. Foreign.
- [01:58]
Dan Senor
It's 8:00am on Wednesday, June 10 here in New York City. It is 3:00pm On Wednesday, June 10, in Israel as one Jerusalem resident, Helen Ament Sinor, celebrates her birthday, as we call her Safta Hannah, or as she's called in the family, the mate, short for the matriarch. Israel is heading into an election and a surprising candidate has been rising in the polls. He's not loud or controversial. He's not a former minister or prime minister. He's not a TV personality or a tech entrepreneur. And perhaps that's in part what many Israelis find so compelling about him. Gadi Eisenkot did not grow up in the center of Israel, places like Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. He grew up in Eilat. He's the son of Moroccan immigrants. He climbed through the brigades and regiments of the IDF the hard way, and he became chief of staff. He also lost his son and his nephew in the Gaza war, and he is now, according to just about every poll, the most popular figure in Israeli public life. And yet the question that hangs over him is the same one that has haunted just about every army general who ever tried to make the leap to electoral politics. Does he have the killer Instinct. Now, that may be an odd question to ask of a man who spent much of his adult life in the army. But the track record of Israeli generals going into a different kind of rough and tumble, the rough and tumble of politics, of Israeli politics, no less, which can be especially ugly. That is the question. Does Gotti Eisenkot have all the skills and the stomach for politics? The Davael has covered Gotti Eisenkot for years. He knows him. He's written a profile of him titled the Quiet General, and he has been tracking his rise in real time. Today, we ask the question the title demands. Who are you? Gotti Eisencott. Nadav, thanks for being here.
- [03:52]
Nadav Eyal
Thanks for having me.
- [03:53]
Dan Senor
Dan, you wrote in your newsletter, which we'll link to in the show notes, that, and I quote here, a shift from Bennett to Eisencut is solidifying. And on inside. Call me back. You recently said to me that he's picking up between half a seat and a seat every week in the polls, meaning the polls projecting how he would do if an election were held. Now, how his party would do is just growing. And so, first of all, do you think it's real and do you think it's durable?
- [04:21]
Nadav Eyal
I think the rise is definitely real. And as to durable, look, this electorate, specifically the center left electorate in Israel, is very famously fickle. But the bottom line is that the jury is still out as to how much will it solidify to him to be in actual advantage as to Bennett and actually cross that threshold of being stronger than Bennett in the polls. Right now, the seats, according to the Channel 12 news poll that he's getting are 19 seats out of 120. Bennett is getting 21. But in terms of who the public wants as Prime Minister, Eisenkot has just passed very narrowly Prime Minister Netanyahu just in a few points. Now, his main competitor isn't Netanyahu, although Eisencot gives the impression through his campaign that he's fighting against Netanyahu. Right now, he is really fighting for the leadership of the anti Netanyahu block. That anti Netanyahu bloc is not center left. It's composed of many, many factions. Some of them, for instance, are a Zionist left, others are Zionist, very right. And now it's up to Eisenhower to prove that he can take the leadership. For all the signs that we're seeing right until now, in the last two months, he's rising like a meteor in the polls.
- [05:41]
Dan Senor
Okay, so Nadav, if you were to say the Gotti Eisenkot brand in the Israeli psyche, when people Think of Gadi Eisenhat. They think of what to the extent
- [05:50]
Nadav Eyal
they think anything, they think about him as a mainstream general that came from Golani. Golani is the People's Brigade. It's an excellent infantry unit, but it was always seen not as the parachuters, the Red Parachuters, the Tzamin, or the elite units of Tzahal. Golani are those who are really fighting in the ditches when needs be. And he rose through the that unit to be the chief of staff of the idf. And that's no small thing. And they see him as someone very much connected to mainstream Israel. But first and foremost, I think most people, Dan will answer you that Gadi Eisenkot lost his son during the war, Garl Eisenkut, who died as a reserve soldier when he was 25. So for most people, I think that be the most important fact to mention about Eisenkot, and also the fact that he lost two of his net views during this war. And this institutes him within the broader Israeli narrative as this general who comes from a family who's willing to devote everything for Israel. Right now, according to the polls, he's the most likable politician in Israel. And there's no surprise there. He comes from the idf. He's been just a few years in politics. He sacrificed the utmost of sacrifices during this war. He comes from a grieving family. And this is rather new. And because of that, I think there's a lot of support and understanding for him, but also because of his absolutely impressive career within the Israeli defense apparatus. Now, as to his political rise, Dan, since Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister was assassinated by a far right terrorist who was trying to derail the peace process, to some extent succeeding in that assassination, the centrist bloc or the center left bloc in Israel was looking for a fatherhood figure. And they've been replacing these kinds of former generals, which again and again these voters and their sons and daughters thought might be the new Robin. The first of them was of course, Ehud Barak, who actually became prime minister under the impression that he is the heir to Rabin. But then came a number of other former generals, people that I think many of our listeners might not remember, people like Amiya Yalon or Amra Mitna or very lately Benny Gantz, again and again, this attempt to reignite the tribal fire that has died, maybe with the death of Isaq Rabin. And for these people, Gadi Eisenquote represents another attempt to recreate the robbing experience. And that robbing experience is a man who has devoted his life to security and now goes into politics with the hope of making things better, but first and foremost, guaranteeing security to the Israelis. This was the ticket with Rabi, as it was the ticket with every general that came from the Labour Party. And this is the ticket soldier by Eisencot today with his newly formed party, Nadav.
- [09:12]
Dan Senor
I said in the introduction, does Eisencot have what it takes to navigate and survive and prevail in the rough and tumble of Israeli politics? If you look at Israel's 12 prime ministers, only three of them were very senior generals that then transitioned to politics. You mentioned Rabin, obviously. You mentioned Ehud Barak, there was Ariel Sharon, those three men became prime minister, and then that was it. And in fact, what is more common for these generals who decide to go into politics is there's a lot of excitement, there's usually a surge in the polls, and then they fade. And I just was drawing up a list here as you were speaking. So you mentioned Benny Gantz, there was Shaul Mofaz, there was Bogie Alon, who didn't run for prime minister, but he was part of that triumvirate with Benny Gantz and with General Ashkenazi, another chief of staff senior officer who wound up running in politics. Not all these men ran for prime minister, but they all tried to make the trans the senior ranks of the army to the senior ranks of politics. And the most common experience is a lot of excitement, a lot of buzz, just like we're watching right now with Eisenhott, actually, it's very reminiscent. And then for some reason, they fade. So I guess I have two questions. One, why is that the most common experience? And then why do you think Eisencott may be different?
- [10:28]
Nadav Eyal
Well, first of all, he may not be different. The jury is still out. And Eisencot is not even the leader of the camp. He's rising very. But it's Naftali Bennett who still gets more seats in the polls, and he's a former prime minister. So I want to hedge a bit and say that the reason that we're doing this episode, I think, Dan, is because he's rising very quickly to be a formidable actor in the next elections. And I don't think that's going to change. But whether or not he's going to be the prime minister or even a candidate for his bloc, we still do not know. Now, as to your question, which I think is an excellent quarry about Israeli politics, look, being a general in the army is not like running in an Israeli election. I've covered so many people and I've spent so much time with politicians that were generals. And just a few years ago they were the chiefs of staff. And now they want to continue their contribution to the nation through going into politics. And here's the thing. My experience is that they don't understand the rules quickly enough. They don't. They come slightly older in their experience than other politicians. They simply do not have the time and maybe sometimes don't have the ability or the intention, the passion to understand politics for what it is. And they are too rigid. They don't understand the language. They don't understand how the Israeli society has changed. This is not the 1950s or 60s or 70s. Ishaq Rabin became a prime minister in the 1970s. He was rather young when he left his position as the chief of staff who led the IDF to its greatest victory in the Six Days War. He had many years to learn and most of his career was in politics. Now generals leave their positions much older than Rabin. They have much less time to learn the ways of politics. They assume that there are no rules in politics. There are rules in the army, there are ranks in the army, there is a hierarchy there. And of course the army in Israel is the most popular institution of the state. And when they come into politics, they know that politics is reviled by the public. It's despised by so many people. And they assume that all bets are off and they can do whatever they want. And they just need to be passionate enough or resolute enough and have the killer instinct to get to that goal of being a prime minister. And then they make all the obvious mistakes. It comes from their Hebrews. It comes from the fact that when they go into politics, they've been senior generals for so many years. You know, it comes with a driver, with a spokesperson, with an office. It comes with the defense of the uniform you wear. And in Israel that's such a substantial defense because the IDF is so popular. So they are also not accustomed to with that small, itsy bitty thing that you experience as a politician. That's criticism. And they don't react well to criticism. And because of that, most of them fail. And some others fail because reasons of adaptability, others sometimes even corruption. So what you just did now, Dan, is so important for the purposes of this episode to remind us that these people, yes, they usually do fail. And statistics is against Eisencote in that sense. After saying that, why does Eisenhout still have a chance? Because Israel is now fighting its longest war. And Eisenco is a former chief of Staff who's considered a mainstream officer and politician, a mainstream Zionist who again, made the highest of sacrifices during this war. And his family made that sacrifice. And people know that he's not corrupt, he's not considered a liar. And that's a lot in Israel these days. And because of that, he does stand a chance. But it's no more than a chance.
- [14:33]
Dan Senor
So, Nadav, I want to ask you a little bit about Eisenhower's personal journey. You wrote that he, as I mentioned in the introduction, he grew up in Eilat and that he comes from Moroccan family. And he rose through these various very classic, non sexy, non glamorous combat units and brigades. He has fought in Lebanon, he's fought in some very, let's just say, very difficult combat situations. So he's not an elitist is basically what you're saying. So can you tell us a little bit about his story in that regard,
- [15:02]
Nadav Eyal
saying that he grew up in Eilat. Eilat is a periphery. Eilat is for many people listening to us, it's a city in which you go to have a vacation on the seashore, on the Red Sea. But he was born in Tiberias, in Tveria, on the shores of the Kinneret. And his story isn't common at all. He grew up as the second child of a five sibling family. His father and mother divorced, his father remarried. He has four siblings from that new marriage. And he enlisted to Golani, again, not to the elite units of Tzahal, not to Sayeret Matkal, not to Shaldag. Unlike Ehud Barak and Netanyahu, Netanyahu grew up just to compare in Jerusalem's most academic neighborhood with Javier. His father was one of the chief editors of the Hebrew Encyclopedia and a renowned academic. And his family roped shoulders with everyone who was anything in the Israeli community of Eret Yisrael. That's not where Gadi Eisenkot grew up. And he went into the army and he also went through the ranks that are really infantry units and Golani units, all the way to serve as the chief of staff. And he was known for his intelligence, but also he was an aggressive commander. He's actually a reader, which is also something that I can't say about most politicians today anywhere in the world. He reads military history. He's more of a thinker than you would expect in that sense. And one of the things that are playing for him is that people constantly underestimated him. And that was always a mistake. And My experience is that if you have a politician or an officer that is underestimated, that could turn into an advantage. And that's what happened with Eisenkut.
- [16:52]
Dan Senor
So let's talk about that. He served as IDF chief of staff from 2015 to 2019. He was considered. Well, I've heard mixed things. He was considered a very aggressive chief of staff. Aggressive meaning forward leaning in terms of his approach to war fighting while the IDF was under his command. But there were some controversial decisions about some of the reforms that the IDF made during his time as chief of staff. What did he actually build and what decisions did he make during those four years? And what would military historians say is like the legacy of Eisencot's run as chief of staff?
- [17:25]
Nadav Eyal
So generally, when he retired in 2019 after four years, he was considered a very successful chief of staff. Most of the military commentators in Israel, including those who are more critical from Haaretz to Yediot, people said that he was a successful chief of staff. But after October 7th, this could be debated again. So look, a term as a chief of staff in Israel is like being a prime minister. So many things happen. First of all, he increased the idea of a war between the wars, Mabam, the idea that Israel needs to constantly attack its enemies, mainly in the north, mainly in Syria and in Lebanon, to try to weaken Hezbollah. And during his time, there were between hundreds to thousands of strikes against Iranian targets up in the north. And he basically derailed an Iranian plan to build in Syria, basis of its air force and its intelligence. They were talking about the possibility of Shia militias in Syria that will be in alliance with Hezbollah. So this is one thing that he did. If I look at Gaza there, I remind the people listening to us. Do you remember the marches towards the fence?
- [18:48]
Dan Senor
Yeah. And these were considered, quote unquote, peaceful marches.
- [18:52]
Nadav Eyal
It wasn't really a protest. It was the Hamas regime in Gaza sending many, many thousands of people to what they labeled as the marches of the great return to Israel of Palestinian refugees. And they got a lot of international media for that. And Eisenkot needed to make a decision there. As a chief of staff, what does he recommend the government do? And what he did are two things. First of all, again, very aggressive. At the end of the day, Israel shot those who came too close to its border. It maintained its sovereignty and it was attacked internationally for that. So now when Eisenhower is rising and people like me are writing about this, you see far left, from right around the world and pro Palestinian activists reminding that the IDF was shooting at These so called protesters, they were not protesters. This was a Hamas activity. What he did not do, he did not go for a military operation in Gaza. This is one of the signature things of Eisenkot. He focused on rebuilding the force of the IDF and planning ahead, unlike different chiefs of staff. This is his claim to fame. Having multi year program that will look at the challenges of the IDF for the future, without actually having another confrontation in Gaza, fighting against the Iranians in Syria, without going into full blown war, exposing the tunnels of Hezbollah that were passing from Lebanon to the sovereign territory of Israel, without again igniting a war with Hezbollah. Now in retrospect, he is accused by far right, but not only far right, that this was a mistake, that Israel needed to be even more aggressive in real time. He was considered to be quite an aggressive chiefs of staff. Let me give you one example. One of the most important episodes of his term as Chief of Staff was the story of El Orazaria. El Orazaria was a soldier who shot a Palestinian in Hebron. After that Palestinian attempted to attack, to stab a soldier. So he was a Palestinian terrorist. He was already neutralized. He was laying on the ground and then the soldier came and shot him and killed him. And the army immediately initiated an investigation because he was already neutralized. There are videos of that incident and he was put into trial. And this was the moment in which Eisenkot and Netanyahu clashed. Netanyahu saw that his electorate was supportive of that soldier who shot the Palestinian. And the idea there was he was a terrorist anyway, what does it matter? And Azaria, that soldier said he felt threatened. The chief of staff thought differently and the entire military justice system thought differently. And they put him on trial. And this to a large extent was the birth of the mood in Israel of the right wing, the deep state and Eisenhower. Suddenly, whose mainstream became this chief of staff, who represented the system, who's going to try and put into some kind of a military jail a soldier that came from the parts of the Israeli society that support Alikud and the right wing. That clash was material for his term as Chief of staff. And if you ask Eisenkot, this was a moment in which he proved his mamlachtiyud, his essence of keeping to the Israeli rules and national principles. And this is still an issue. It's gonna be RA during this election campaign.
- [22:35]
Dan Senor
Stay with us. We'll be right back.
- [22:42]
Deborah Pardes
I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of Ark News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. That's why we started Ark News Daily. Every weekday morning I walk you through the most important, important news, give you the context you need and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything and I don't waste your time. On most days, I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully a little bit smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show notes. I hope to see you tomorrow.
- [23:28]
Dan Senor
There's a tension though. I keep coming back to Nadav, which is he was chief of staff from 2015 to 2019. Those are the exact years when many of the decisions were made regarding reduction of the number of divisions in the IDF to do more and more substitution of technology for actual ground forces for military personnel. When the intelligence conception about Hamas as an enemy that could be managed through deterrence. When that whole mindset was being cemented institutionalized throughout the idf. And you and Amit said on this podcast not long ago that obviously you both have said in different contexts that Netanyahu deserves blame, a lot of blame. But Eisenhower was running the IDF during this critical window when, if you look at how Israel was caught flat footed, Eisencot completely surprised on October 7th why that was and some of the decisions were political that led to that, and some of them were institutionally and infrastructurally military. And many of those decisions were made during the time that Eisenhower was chief of staff.
- [24:37]
Nadav Eyal
Yes, absolutely. And he is going to need to deal with that history. Look, he's mostly accused that he made the IDF smaller, and to that he reacts. I didn't make the combat force of the IDF smaller. The combat force of the IDF actually grew during my time. I founded, says Eigensenqut, the commando brigade that didn't exist before that, the Ego's Reserve brigade. He also says very straightforwardly that it was Netanyahu that accepted commission's recommendations to reduce the time of the people serving the army so that they would go into their civilian life earlier. And that put a condition on him as a chief of staff after 2015. So these are the kind of answers that he'll be giving. But if you're asking Dan, is this person part of the echelon of the Israeli security defense establishment that has basically failed on October 7th? Absolutely. And it's more than that. In Israeli public discourse today, there's the idea that The IDF is part of the deep state. And now this idea has not infiltrated most of the public, but it did indeed infiltrate the MAGA parts of the Israeli public that very much support net Netanyahu. For them, this cloak of prestige that the IDF enjoyed for decades and decades since the inception of the state doesn't exist anymore. For them, it's general after general. And they're all labor type people like Eisenkut. And this is what they're going to say about him. This is how they're going to react to him. It's not only that the spokesperson of the Prime Minister, Jonathan Ulrich, the spin master, by the way, who at a certain point was hired according to publications by the Qataris, just had a video yesterday. Dan, I think you'll find it interesting comparing Netanyahu's English and Gadi Eisenkot's English. And it shows how Eisenkot can't speak English as Netanyahu, who can speak English like Netanyahu, But Eisenkot is really not as eloquent and as presentable as Prime Minister Netanyahu. So that's going to be another issue.
- [26:46]
Dan Senor
The whole question of whether or not being effective communicator in English is an important quality that Israelis put a premium on the way those in the diaspora do for an Israeli prime minister. We had a whole conversation about on inside. Call me back. I want to ask you about the story of Eisenkot that in many respects makes him the embodiment of post 10-7-Israel that both his son and his nephew were killed in action in Gaza. And I was just thinking about this because we're about a little less than a month away from the 50 year, 50 year anniversary of the raid on Entebbe in which Benjamin Netanyahu lost his brother Yoni Netanyahu. And so much of the story, the iconic story of Yoni Netanyahu became a part of the rise of Benjamin Netanyahu and the Netanyahu family in Israeli public life. Can you talk about Eisencott is going to actually have his own version of that?
- [27:43]
Nadav Eyal
I think you're absolutely right, Dan, to recognize that the idea of sacrifice and the tragedy of being a bereaved family is something that goes and strikes really to the essence of service of the idea of service in Israel, public service and what we sometimes label as the serving elite. I just saw a post by someone who's an actor who comes from one of Israel's richest families, and she was talking about how her brother was injured in Lebanon, in how many countries around the world, Dan. Families that come from this kind of wealth will have their kids serving in reserve service, not in mandatory service, in reserve service in Lebanon. I want to give you a quote, Dan, because I think it speaks for itself what Eisenkot said about the death of his son Gal. When Gal was killed, it was the day in which I arrived to the division headquarters where he had been fighting. So he was there with Benny Gantz. And they didn't know that anything was happening. They were just touring and they came to that division headquarters. I looked up and I saw the location of Gal's battalion and the fighting in Jabalya. About 40 minutes later, Major General Nadav Padan, who was attached to the division, came and informed me that Gal has been killed while I was visiting that very division that was fighting. I then called my eldest son. I updated him and asked that no one enter the house until I arrived, because I wanted to be the one to inform the family. And this is what happened. I tried throughout the two months that I served in the war cabinet, up until the moment that God was killed, to separate the fact that I was God's father from the fact that I had to make the right recommendations. It was clear to me from the moment I joined the cabinet that a broadcast ground maneuver was necessary and that Hamas had to be dealt a severe blow. And I knew that my son was there. And he also lost two of his nephews, one his sister's son, and one is the nephew of his wife, during the war. And a question there is, what would be, and I'm sorry to turn this back to politics, what would be the political aftershocks? We're already seeing people viciously attacking Eisenkot for not understanding what the army needs, for not caring about soldiers. I just saw a clip from some TV channel, someone arguing he doesn't care about the soldiers. So Israeli politics is that cruel that just a couple of years later, people, I don't want to say forget, but they will try to completely disregard this fact and would also make the argument that, that he should be respected as a brief family. But it doesn't mean that he's right. And he also decided to withdraw from government, which he did during war. And Delhi Kud is already attacking him for withdrawing from government.
- [30:42]
Dan Senor
I want to ask you about that because he served in the war cabinet. So Netanyahu created this emergency war cabinet on October 11. So just days after October 7, 2023. And it was a very small decision making body. I think it included fewer than, you know, it was like Half a dozen members included Benny Gantz and Eisencott. It was formed October 11, 2023, and Gantz and Eisencot resigned from the war cabinet on June 13, 2024. He didn't run for office until 2022. In the 2022 elections, he gets into office, and then within no time, there's October 7th, about a year later, and then suddenly he's in this body for a short period of time. So we do have a snapshot of him, decisions he supported, decisions he may have opposed during that time, that can shed light on his decision making. What do we know from the time he was in the War Cabinet?
- [31:35]
Nadav Eyal
So, first and foremost, Eisenhower goes into the War Cabinet even before being sworn in as a minister. Netanyahu brings him and Benny Gantz into the War Cabinet, and suddenly it's October 11th, it's four days after Hamas invaded Israel. They go into the Cabinet room, and there's a huge drama they didn't understand was happening. The idf, the Israeli Air Force, is about to strike Lebanon and try to kill Nasrallah and surprise attack HEZBOLLAH. And it's October 11th. The IDF is still reeling. They're still looking for terrorists in the South. And Benny Gantz and Eisenkourt are just stunned. They have not been sworn in. Netanyahu wanted them in that discussion because Netanyahu is actually against that strike. But the IDF wants to strike now. Gallant, as we know, he wants to strike immediately. And Netanyahu needs the help of Gadi Eisenkurt and Benny Gantz to prevent that. He thinks it's a mistake. He's inviting pressure from President Joe Biden to call him during that discussion. And then Eisenkut during that discussion in which the majority of ministers at the beginning wanted to have this surprise attack to open a new front. Eisenkut employs all the gravitas he has as a former chief of staff. And he's faced with IDF officers that he himself nominated. He knows them very well. At a certain point, he walks up physically during the Cabinet meeting to the head of the research division of the Israeli military Intelligence, and he basically shakes him up and says, you have a duty to say what you really think about this strike. And that Lieutenant General says, I'm against the strike. And it is so decided that together with Netanyahu, Eisenholt and Gantz managed to prevent a surprise attack against Hezbollah and against Nasrallah. Now, if you ask Gallant, that was a terrible mistake that Israel made. If you asked Netanyahu and most of the IDF right Now would probably say, that's true. The IDF needed more time. The IDF was on a mode of trying to respond. It was humiliated. On October 7, it had this chance of a great achieve. But they were opening a second front. And the point that Eisenkot was making is, you're not ready yet. Be prepared, Come prepared. So that's one example. Another example, a short example, are the hostage deals. It was Eisencourt in the room that was pushing for hostage deal after hostage deal. And at a certain point, the hostage deal back in 2024 was supposed to develop into the return of all the female hostages, including the IDF supporters that were captured by Hamas. Now, the hostage deal was said that they would be returned at the end. And at a certain point, Hamas violates the deed. And they were saying, we're not going to hand you back the female IDF supporters. We're willing only maybe to release the elderly men that we took. I'm talking about men that are over 70. Now the Israeli Cabinet convenes, and it needs to make a very hard decision. And this is what we spoke about. I remember that episode, Dan, when I told you it was a decision from hell. Because the Shin Bet is saying, if you now are willing to live with this violation, we might not see the female spotters again. Because Hamas doesn't want to get them back, because it doesn't want them to tell us what happened during captivity. And on the other hand, you have a chance to release elderly Israelis that were taken from the Kibutim. What do you do? And the majority of the Cabinet said no. We're saying no. Hamas violated this agreement. We're going to go back to war until we manage to release them all. Qadi Eisenkurt says, get everyone you can get right now. The Cabinet decided against it. I am not going to judge that decision. But I can tell you that these men died. Many of these men that were not returned died or murdered in captivity by Hamas, the supporters. Luckily, those that were not murdered in captivity went back home in the final hostage deal. So that's an example to Eisenkurt in the government.
- [36:04]
Dan Senor
In the war cabinet, Eisencott was often very critical and publicly opposed to decisions the government was taking, especially in 2024, the decision to push into Rafah, which was a very divisive issue. And I don't want to go through every one of these decisions. But generally speaking, Eisenhower was opposed to this. In retrospect, will that be a liability for him politically? Because will the question be, would Israel have achieved the ultimate gains it achieved the fall of 25 final deal that got the remaining hostages back. That wouldn't have happened had Hamas not been under enormous pressure. The escalating military pressure in the months and months and months leading up to that was essential. And Eisenhower was opposed to it.
- [36:44]
Nadav Eyal
I think this is going to be raised during the campaign. They are going to paint Eisenhower as a lefty. And this is exactly what, to a large extent, what Bennett is saying, not Bennett himself, but his people. His people are saying that Eisenkot is a Fata Morgan. It's a mirage. Eisenkot is a classic example of a general who's actually center left, who can never bring the votes from the right wing, say the Benin people. And now the camp is infatuated with him as they were infatuated by Benny Gantz, as they were infatuated by many other generals we mentioned during this episode. But the only Persona that can actually win in Israel is someone who has right wing credentials because the electorate has moved to the right. And that argument is going to be based on many, many elements that Netanyahu is already weaponizing. Now, as to Rafah specifically, Eisenhower says he wanted to go into Rafah three or four months before Netanyahu. He was more aggressive. It's Netanyahu that didn't want to go into Rafah, says Eisenhower.
- [37:48]
Dan Senor
Eisenhower says it's not that Netanyahu didn't want to go in, but that his criticism is that Netanyahu waited too long. He waited three or four months longer than Eisenhower wanted to do do it.
- [37:56]
Nadav Eyal
So one of the questions is, will he be able to maintain this Mr. Security aura around him in a way that will defend him against that criticism? We call this Mr. Teflon, and that is something that Isaac Rabin enjoyed because he was so appreciated for security. So Eisenkot isn't as known as Rabin was at the time. He doesn't have the same name recognition of Rabin or of, of Ehud Barak. And he doesn't have very plainly the same charisma that other generals had.
- [38:27]
Dan Senor
So you've just explained what his opponents will say. What will his supporters say about these issues?
- [38:32]
Nadav Eyal
I'm raising for his supporters. Eisenkot is great. Eisencot is resolved. Eisenkot is the real deal. Why? Because first and foremost, he doesn't lie. He builds on plans. He actually has more robust and specific plans as to how conscription to the army, to the IDF will look like. How is he going to actually move from a general waiver to the ultra orthodox to most of the orthodox Serving, you can say that these plans are not viable, they're not going to work. But unlike other politicians, it's not only slogans. He has a plan on how to get back the Israelis that left Israel during the war. And they're saying he's an honest person and he's not corrupt. He's Eretz Yisrael. Hayeshanave Hatuvah, the good old Eretz Yisrael. And when you say that in Israel they don't mean this in irony. It's not the good old boys club, it's the good old Eretz Yisrael. And this is what people get from him. And this is why his supporters are so enthusiastic about him. And there is an enthusiasm there. As to aizenquote, the question, and I think this is my take home message is very simple. Can this person bring votes from the right wing who actually support Netanyahu? That is the question. Because Bennett does bring some right wing votes, usually by the way, not from observant Jews, not from Israelis in the settlements. They despise him. They see him as a traitor to the cause. They see him as someone who rob their seats in the Knesset in order to form a coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood. This is how he's seen by Israel's hard right. But the lite right in Israel that voted for Netanyahu from urban areas, they like Bennett. Will they like Eisencot enough? Can he actually be the bridge on which people will cross from one block to the other? This is the question of the elections as to Bennett and also as to Eisenhower.
- [40:39]
Dan Senor
Nadav, when I talk to people, they seem much more contemptuous of Bennett than they do of Eisencott. Eisencott, they say we disagree with some of the decisions he made. But there's not this animosity towards Eisencot that I sense just in conversations I've been having. They hold towards Bennett. Why is that?
- [40:57]
Nadav Eyal
Because Bennett, as far as they are concerned, is a traitor. He was elected as a right wing politician that literally signed a sworn testimony that he will not form a coalition with the Ayala' and he formed a coalition with the Ayala' and was joined by an Arab based party only with a few seats to become the Prime Minister. And because he's one of theirs they have this tendency to, as you used the word, despise. And that's true for many people in the Israeli right wing. Now this shouldn't be overplayed, Dan, because it's true that the insiders and the hard right despises Bennett. But again there are light right wing voters, Likud voters from urban areas. In places like Richelieu Lizion or Cologne or Ramad Gane, they really like Bennett and they see him like an updated startup edition of Netanyahu. He can speak to different sections of the society. Eisenkourt doesn't have the same kind of resistance because until now, then he wasn't such a threat. So he was flying underneath the radar. And that's really important in politics. By the way, flying underneath the radar is sometimes 30%, 40% of actually winning. So he flew underneath the radar. A B Eisenkold is very mainstream. He's considered mainstream. He wasn't a prime minister, he wasn't a politician. He doesn't have that history. He simply doesn't have the baggage that many of these people do have because he wasn't in politics. He's new to this game. And that also means that he doesn't have some of the experiences needed maybe in order to actually win. Now we're having this episode, I'm hedging again. I wouldn't rule out, of course, Netanyahu. We've said that again and again. I don't want to count out Bennett too. Bennett is still the leader of the camp as long as Eisenkut doesn't pass him in the poll numbers. And right now Bennett is fighting very hard to maintain that position. Even if Eisenhower does pass him, Bennett is going to run for prime ministership. And then the question is, what's going to happen with this block? You have at least three people who think they're going to be the next prime minister on that bloc, Lieberman, Bennett and Isaac. On the other bloc, you have only one, and that's Netanyahu.
- [43:17]
Dan Senor
Right, so then in wrapping, what does Eisencot do to kind of win the playoffs, to use a sports analogy, if not to position him to get into the finals, into the championship, what does he do to win the primary, if you will?
- [43:27]
Nadav Eyal
Well, the game here, you need to pick up a fight with the biggest gorilla in the room. And the biggest gorilla in the room is, of course, Netanyahu himself. So Eisenkot is not running a campaign against Bennett at all. Eisencot is running a campaign as though he's already the candidate for prime minister. And he's attacking again and again, Netanyahu. Now, he enjoys a very good creative team on his campaign. So for instance, his ads, his videos are extremely aggressive. And it also mainly gets your own camp excited about you, because they see that Eisenkot can be aggressive against Netanyahu. Now he can do that because it's Bennett who's trying to attract the votes of the right wing. And that's a trap. The trap here is for Bennett, if he fights Eisenkurt for the centrist votes, he needs to let go of his appeal to the right wing. If he turns to the right wing, he's going to lose the majority of the camp who's squarely in the center or center left. And this is the problem for Bennett.
- [44:32]
Dan Senor
All right, Nadav, we will leave it there. Thank you.
- [44:34]
Nadav Eyal
Thank you so much. Nim.
- [44:44]
Dan Senor
Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Bennett. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. As events accelerate in the Middle east, the team here at ARC Media is increasing our coverage. More conversations, more context. More time spent trying to help make sense of what's happening. And all with an expanding cast of podcast hosts, analysts and journalists. Our inside Call Me Back subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. If you're not yet an inside Call Me Back subscriber, this is an important time to join us. To subscribe, you can follow the link in our show notes or visit arkmedia. Org and to our insiders, thank you.