Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, 20 Years Later (Part 2) - with Amit Segal and Asi Shariv

Summary

Call Me Back - with Dan Senor: Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, 20 Years Later (Part 2)
Host: Ark Media
Guests: Amit Segal, Asi Shariv
Release Date: August 15, 2025

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Introduction

In the second part of their in-depth discussion on Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, Ark Media's Dan Senor continues the conversation with Amit Segal, a seasoned journalist, and Asi Shariv, a former senior advisor to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. This episode delves into the unfolding of the disengagement plan, its long-term ramifications, and parallels with contemporary geopolitical challenges facing Israel.

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The Knesset Vote and Sharon’s Leadership

The episode opens with a recounting of the pivotal day when Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan faced what seemed like inevitable defeat in the Knesset. Contrary to expectations, the plan passed, marking a significant turning point in Israeli politics.

• Amit Segal reminisces, "The sense was that the disengagement plan is about to die in a few minutes. And then the vote began." [02:03]

• Asi Shariv describes Sharon's demeanor during the tense hours leading up to the vote: "He went up to the floor and stayed there for three hours, refusing to speak to no one. He just sat there playing with his hands and wanted everybody to watch him." [02:51]

The unexpected support from key figures, including then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, underscored the plan's controversial yet eventual acceptance.

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Aftermath of the Disengagement

Post-vote, Sharon's emotional response contrasted starkly with the political turmoil surrounding him. While Sharon celebrated the political victory, the human toll—particularly on the settlers—began to surface.

• Amit Segal reflects, "Some of his best friends were settlers. They never came back to being the same as they used to." [07:13]

• Asi Shariv adds a personal anecdote about Sharon's interaction: "He told me and another assistant, we were really young... 'Never yield to blackmail. Never.'" [04:55]

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Impact on Israeli Politics and Netanyahu’s Role

Netanyahu's political trajectory post-disengagement is scrutinized, highlighting the economic challenges and shifts in voter sentiment that influenced his standing within the Likud party.

• Amit Segal explains, "His voters were very, very angry. So Netanyahu, at the end of July 2005, two weeks before the disengagement, he sees a disaster at sight." [07:18]

• Asi Shariv speculates on a counterfactual scenario: "He would have been a prime minister in 2006 because Sharon fell to his illness... When Sharon fell, Netanyahu could have stepped up." [08:46]

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Settlers' Experience and Long-Term Consequences

The swift evacuation of 8,000 settlers from Gaza is examined, emphasizing the psychological and societal impacts on this community.

• Amit Segal shares his observations: "It was the swiftest evacuation ever. 8,000 people were evacuated in five business days, not even a week." [10:09]

• Asi Shariv counters Amit's perspective on settler cooperation: "80% of the settlers who were evacuated believed until the day of the evacuation that it's not going to happen... their leaders told them, 'don't cooperate, because we need to make sure that this thing will never happen again.'" [12:41]

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Evaluating Sharon’s Decisions and Security Implications

A critical analysis of Sharon's decision to withdraw from Gaza, juxtaposed with the rise of Hamas as a security threat, forms a core part of the discussion.

• Amit Segal argues, "The outcome, maybe not 1,200 victims in one day, but of Gaza becoming an international terror hub, was inevitable once Israel left." [16:18]

• Asi Shariv expresses skepticism about any prime minister's ability to alter Gaza's trajectory post-disengagement: "If Netanyahu would have been the prime minister or Ahmed Tibi would have been the prime minister, it was the same outcome, which I cannot accept." [20:00]

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Comparisons to Contemporary Conflicts

Drawing parallels between the 2005 disengagement and current military conflicts, the guests explore recurring patterns in Israeli defense strategies and negotiations with terrorist organizations.

• Dan Senor highlights the echo of past strategies in current debates: "Only this time we'll have the hostages. And when I hear that argument, it is eerily reminiscent to what Sharon was saying in 2004 and 2005." [23:03]

• Amit Segal reinforces the challenges of re-entering Gaza: "It wasn't so simple for Israel to go back in the international legitimacy, the US support... once Hamas took over in Gaza, there's no mitigating it." [20:25]

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Concluding Insights

The episode wraps up with reflections on the disengagement's legacy, the enduring divisions within Israeli society, and the persistent security dilemmas that continue to shape Israel's policies and international standing.

• Asi Shariv envisions a future without Gaza settlements: "I think in five years, Israel will not be in Gaza and there will be no settlements in Gaza." [21:42]

• Amit Segal contends that the disengagement's failure was a pivotal moment that set the stage for subsequent conflicts: "The disengagement was a security thing. The idea was, we can actually divorce Gaza once and for all and just forget about it. And it failed." [14:26]

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Key Takeaways

• Political Maneuvering: The passage of the disengagement plan, despite initial opposition, highlights the complex interplay of leadership, party dynamics, and public sentiment in Israeli politics.

• Human Impact: The rapid evacuation had profound effects on the settlers, both emotionally and socially, with long-term implications for community cohesion and identity.

• Security Landscape: The withdrawal from Gaza is critically linked to the rise of Hamas and enduring security challenges, suggesting that disengagement alone was insufficient in addressing underlying threats.

• Historical Parallels: Current debates on military strategy and negotiations mirror the contentious discussions surrounding the 2005 disengagement, underscoring recurring strategic dilemmas.

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Notable Quotes

• Asi Shariv: "Never yield to blackmail. Never." [04:55]

• Amit Segal: "The disengagement was a security thing. The idea was, we can actually divorce Gaza once and for all and just forget about it. And it failed." [14:26]

• Dan Senor: "Only this time we'll have the hostages... it is eerily reminiscent to what Sharon was saying in 2004 and 2005." [23:03]

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This comprehensive analysis offers listeners a nuanced understanding of a defining moment in Israeli history, its unfolding, and its enduring consequences two decades later.

Transcript

[Asi]

Foreign.

[Dan Senor]

You are listening to an art media podcast.

[Asi]

You look at the Israeli government now. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voted in favor. Defense Minister Yisrael Katz voted in favor. National Security Advisor Zachary voted in favor. Most of the Israeli government, the Likud members, voted in favor of this plan. You know, Sharon used to quote a lot, one of his favorite sentences, and it's a good answer to what you said about Netanyahu and his support for the plan. In Israel, the future is unclear. The present is unknown. Only the past keep on changing.

[Dan Senor]

It's 3pm on Tuesday, August 12th here in New York City. It is 10pm on Tuesday, august 12th in Israel. In yesterday's episode, we started a conversation about Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, which took place 20 years ago ago. I was joined by Arc Media contributor Amit Segal and Ari Sharif, who served as senior advisor to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who led the Gaza withdrawal. Today's episode is part two of that conversation. Yesterday we tried to understand how Prime Minister Sharon, as the leader of the right wing Likud Party and a lifelong supporter of Jewish settlements, ended up spearheading the dramatic move to withdraw all 8,000 Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip. We left off the story right as the Knesset was about to vote on Sharun's disengagement plan on October 26, 2004. The day started with a general consensus that the plan was dead. In a shocking turn of events, the withdrawal passed with even Benjamin Netanyahu voting in favor of it. Amit still remembers it as the craziest day of his career as a journalist. Today we'll discuss the long term effects of the withdrawal and whether things would have turned out differently had Sharon remained in power. Let's get back to it.

[Amit Segal]

The sense was that the disengagement plan is about to die in a few minutes. And then the vote began.

[Asi]

You know, sometimes you see old videos and you see them in black and white. So this event, even while it was happening, I saw it and it was black and white. We knew its history back then. The same day, it was the craziest day ever. And for me, Sharon was back then University of Leadership because he was blackmailed. And three hours before the vote, when everybody was running like crazy, he went up to the floor and stayed there for three hours, refusing to speak to no one. He just sat there playing with his hands and wanted everybody to watch him. It was live on tv obviously, and the ministers and Netanyahu and all of them are running. And he refused to speak.

[Amit Segal]

And Then the Votan is alphabetically. Now Netanyahu is in nun.

[Dan Senor]

The letter nun.

[Amit Segal]

The letter nun.

[Dan Senor]

Like N?

[Amit Segal]

Yeah, like N. It's the last of all the rebels. Okay? The first one to be called by name was the weakest one. I don't want to mention his name. A lot of pressure was put on him. One of Sharon's advisors just yelled at him in front of everyone at the Knesset. And he just went in and voted. And then Israel Katz today is the Defense Minister. And then came Netanyahu. When he voted yes, everyone was shocked. I can still quote each and every shout by Knesset members. And it was clear to me that once it happened that the Gush Katif, the settlements, their story is over.

[Asi]

I want to say something about this vote. You look at the Israeli government now. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voted in favor. Defense Minister Yisrael Katz voted in favor. National Security Advisor Zachary N. Egbi voted in favor. Minister of Foreign Affairs Gidon Sar voted against it. He was back then the whip of the Likud. He didn't resign. There were other members who resigned. He stayed in office. So you look at how this, the current Israeli government is based. Well, we have Nir Barkat, the Minister of Affairs. Most of the Israeli government, the Likud members, voted in favor of this plan. But that's. You know, Sharon used to quote a lot, one of his favorite sentences. And I think it's a good answer to what you said about Netanyahu and his support for the plan in Israel. The future is unclear, the present is unknown. Only the past keep on changing. So we are working on changing the past here. And after this vote, as I said, Sharon walked out of the Knesset floor. And he was really excited. He understood what Amit just said, that he won it, his plan will go through. And he told me and another assistant, we were really young. I want to say I had a much better haircut. But Amit was there, and, you know, it was the same one. And Sha' on took us. And he said, you're a Yankee. It's a great lesson for you. Never yield to blackmail. Never.

[Amit Segal]

I just want to say something about it. Then, politically speaking, he was right. But now my inner settler speaks. Okay, yes, he didn't surrender to Netanyahu, but for us, he surrendered to terror. He surrendered to Hamas.

[Asi]

That's a different story. But for him, he thought that he's doing the right thing.

[Amit Segal]

Exactly.

[Asi]

This is a different argument.

[Amit Segal]

I mean, the whole idea, we speak about it in a retrospect of 20 years wasn't of something that should be glorious. It wasn't like the peace with Egypt that everyone was. There was excitement in the air because you saw your worst enemy coming to hug you and to actually hear the national anthem here. It was a tragedy in the writing, no matter what. Even if there hadn't been October 7, the idea of evacuating 10,000 people that the government had sent them was a tragedy. I suspect that it was the case for Sharon himself as well, but not for his newly circle of support from the press and and the left.

[Dan Senor]

I want to ask you about that Asi. Did Sharon ever doubt that he was doing the right thing?

[Asi]

I'm pretty sure he would.

[Amit Segal]

He did.

[Asi]

I'm pretty sure it was a big thing for him. I think he thought, is it worth it? Because the internal problems and the war and the fact that there was a rift in Israel's society, is it worth it to do it? And regarding what Amit said, I think that day of the vote in the Knesset was probably the last happy day of the disengagement plan. Because during the plan itself, the 30 days, it was devastating days for him. The day that Kfarada almost evacuated was the worst for me watching. He was the worst day for him ever. I never saw him more depressed, more sad. It was his friends, it was places that he was that he saw, places that maybe he helped building. So the fact that he won on the political aspect of 2004 was very happy day for him. But I'm not sure the rest of it. The actual plan was something that or feel him happy.

[Amit Segal]

He was happier to destroy Bibi than to destroy Gushkatif.

[Asi]

That's part of being politician. You want to beat your opponent. But regarding the settlers, I think it was a terrible thing.

[Dan Senor]

You mean meaning what happened to the settlers?

[Asi]

Some of his best friends were settlers. Zambish. We mentioned him before. I think he might have been his best friend. And they never came back to being the same as they used to.

[Dan Senor]

Amit. So Netanyahu then at this point decides to resign from the government.

[Amit Segal]

Here's the thing. Netanyahu's political positioning was heavily damaged, not because the disengagement, but because of his being Israel's best finance minister. It was very painful, especially for the right wing's political base because for instance, he actually cut all the stipends for the ultra Orthodox families. He reduced taxation on the top earners, whereas having higher taxation on lower income Israelis, which were mainly right wing supporters. That was the reason why following the disengagement, the Likud under Netanyahu failed to only 10% of the popular vote, not because of the disengagement, but because of the economy. His voters were very, very angry. So Netanyahu, at the end of July 2005, two weeks before the disengagement, he sees a disaster at sight. He says, I'm extremely unpopular because of the economy. And now if I keep supporting the disengagement plan, I'm going to lose the right wing as well. I'm going to lose the ideological right. So he tried to actually revert to the old ideological base, saying, I am the son of an historian, I want history to remember in a hundred years from now that I oppose this thing, et cetera. In retrospect, by the way, had he stayed in the government when the disengagement happened, I don't think he would become a prime minister three years later.

[Asi]

He would have been a prime minister in 2006 because Sharon fell to his illness. Think about it. When Sharon fell to his ill months after the disengagement, I see there was.

[Dan Senor]

No one else but Omert and had Bibi had been there.

[Amit Segal]

But now here's the interesting question, because we spoke about the disengagement, but then Sharon decided to actually dismantle the Dikud, to leave the Dikud and to form a new center party called Kadima. That the idea was to actually clean this arbitrage gap, that he is the master of politics in Israel nationally, but he's not the homeowner of Likud. Now I think maybe Asi thinks differently, that Sean would have left Likud anyway to form Kadima, isn't it?

[Asi]

So Netanyahu initiated a referendum in Likud again saying Sharon did the disengagement. It's not Likud way. We need to do an election in Likud, only Likud to bring forward the primaries and Sharon beat him. Now, personally, I hope we lose because I wanted Sharon to leave Likud. I thought he will get much more seats if he will leave Likud and be a center and not right wing. But some of the people who worked for Sharon did a marvelous job and he beat Netanyahu. After the disengagement in Likud, people tend to forget it because disengagement was so popular in Israel. He was even popular in Likud back then in 2005 and afterwards, even though he won, he left.

[Dan Senor]

I want to go fast forward here. So tell me how the disengagement actually unfolded. How did it if you were one of the 8,000 settlers living in Gaza, what was the experience?

[Amit Segal]

I was there when it happened. It was the swiftest evacuation ever. Why? Maybe because the settlers were noble and they didn't want to initiate civil war. Maybe because there was so many soldiers. So it was quite clear for everyone that it's a done deal. But statistically speaking, 8,000 people were evacuated in five business days, not even a week. So the idea of following the disengagement was what was all the fuss about this thing? And then new ideas emerged. For instance, broader evacuation in Judea and Samaria in the West Bank. Now, Sharon denied it. It's not the idea. To be honest, I didn't believe him. I thought that once he is elected with Israel's biggest majority ever, he would evacuate dozens of settlements in Judea and Samaria, thus actually ending the 50 year conflict about the settlements. But history wanted something else and Sharon got the stroke and he never recovered. And Kadima won. I don't know. Olmert was a lame duck and it didn't happen.

[Dan Senor]

These settlers, what was their future inside Israel?

[Amit Segal]

So it was the second promise that Sharon broke to the settlers. The idea was that every settler has a solution. As we speak, there are still hundred families that live in log cabins, the Israeli version of log cabins. Sean wanted them to have better lives and there were many, many initiatives to actually resettle them. But I have to say something. Had October 7th not happened, I don't think someone would still see the disengagement in the way it is seen today. I mean, it was a sectorial trauma for the national religious sector. It was a failure for security reasons. But what made it so dramatic was of course October 7th that came from Gaza Strip. Otherwise I don't think you would ever record a Call me back episode about 20 years to the disengagement.

[Dan Senor]

Well, maybe because we talked a lot about disengagement and the impact on these settlers and their supporters during judicial reform, because many of these people felt screwed by the system and they lost trust in the Supreme Court, which didn't have their back when they tried to head off disengagement through the court.

[Asi]

I disagree with Amit on this issue. 80% of the settlers who were evacuated believed until the day of the evacuation that it's not going to happen. And their leaders told them, don't cooperate because it's not going to happen. We're going to stop it. The 20% that believed that Sharon was stronger than the leadership of the settlers prepared for that day. And they moved to their houses, which they built now, I think for a political reason and as a strategic consultant, I think they did the right thing. Their leaders told them, don't cooperate, because we need to make sure that this thing will never happen again. And if this evacuation will be smooth and everybody will have a solution, it will be much harder. I don't underestimate the personal trauma of each and every one of them. I'm sure they suffered. They live. Some of them live their whole life there. They received a lot of money. I think it was 2 million shekels back then. To a family of settlers, that's a lot of money. In Israel, 20 years ago, they could have chosen to stay in their communities and to be built. Some of them did that, some of them not. There are huge success stories coming out of Gaza. There are a lot of people who are alive now because they left Gaza. Because when I was a young kid, the biggest curse you could tell someone is, go to Gaza. It was the most awful place on earth.

[Amit Segal]

Go to Gaza is a curse. It was the worst place. But today it's worse than it was. And the idea of the disengagement plan was, let's leave Gaza. And it failed. The disengagement was a security thing. The idea was, we can actually divorce Gaza once and for all and just forget about it. And it failed. And it was so obvious that it's going to fail because you cannot leave a place 700 meters from you, lock the key, take all the settlers, and just imagine that it disappeared.

[Asi]

Amit, you know, I sense that you are not a big fan of Ariel Sharon. If Sharon would have been the Prime Minister since 2009 until now, you think this was the case? You think he would.

[Amit Segal]

Yes, yes, yes. And I'll tell you. And I'll tell you why.

[Dan Senor]

And Asi, you're saying if Sharon had lived and been prime minister, he would have headed off, I think. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think what you're saying is he, Sharon, would have headed off the security threat from Gaza. Amit, now you're disagreeing with us.

[Amit Segal]

I fully agree with Asi that Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu have made many, many mistakes. But I do think that the outcome, maybe not 1200 victims in one day, but of Gaza becoming an international terror hub, was inevitable once Israel left. And I'll give you two proofs why it would have happened even with Sharon as prime Minister. One is that Sharon was Prime Minister since August, when the disengagement occurred. Till January, when he collapsed with a stroke. Hamas fired rockets and Sharon promised, even to me in an interview that we are going to bomb the hell out of Gaza. He responded proportionally, thus proving Hamas that he can get away with it. This is one thing. Second, I have a better proof. Sharon was the leader of the very successful and painful military operation in the Palestinian cities in the West bank in 2002. It cost the life of 45 Israeli soldiers. But then Sharon was hesitant and didn't dare to do the same thing in Gaza. Although Gaza, as Asif just said, was the worst place between the river and the sea. And because he feared the cost of, let's say, 50 soldiers before the tunnels, before the RP missiles, the outcome is that he decided to invade the settlements and evacuate them rather than Gaza. So I would never accept the idea that Sharon, three or four years later, would actually enter the very same Gaza Strip.

[Asi]

Saying that it was inevitable was disrespect to Netanyahu because basically it's saying that if Ahmed Tibi would have been the prime minister in 2009, nothing would have changed. The situation in Gaza would have been the same because of the disengagement. The disengagement was a very painful measure we had to took. It's like somebody was amputing his leg. But after he's doing that, he keeps on drinking and keeps on eating terrible food. He's not exercising and he's using drugs. And after 20 years, he's dead. And then he said, well, the amputation was failed. Something happened between 2005 and 2025, and Sha' on would have never in a million years would have paid money to Hamas.

[Amit Segal]

Asi, I fully agree with you. There was a possibility to avoid October 7, but the idea behind the disengagement was that the level of terror was something like 10 victims a year, 15 victims a year, and we would reduce it. So between 15 and 1200 in one day. There is a gap. And I think that the reason Sharon avoided responding disproportionately in September 2005, after this engagement, is that unlike the explanations to the disengagement, that we now have a full legitimacy to act in Gaza. No, the international community doesn't give you this. So you pay the price. You pay the price, the huge price, and you don't get the commodity back.

[Asi]

The pillar of this engagement, it was the 25 casualties, obviously a year, was the fact that Sharon thought that the day will come, we will not stay in a Tzarim and these places. And he thought that we are 8,000 people on 25% of the land and eventually will not be there. And in his view, Judea and Samaria. I'm not saying west bank because I'm a student of Sharon. Right. Judea and Samaria is the most important thing and we have to keep that.

[Amit Segal]

I support you, I support this position. I just say that even if I believe Sharon, that he didn't want to evacuate Judea and Samaria, the deal he reached was very bad. One, I'll give you an example. President Bush signed this famous letter saying two things, three things. One, refugees would never return to Israel.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Just, just, I want to. This is. This we're getting. We're going down a rabbit hole. I just want people to understand as part of the Gaza disengagement, in the context of Gaza disengagement, there was a side letter that President Bush sent to Sharon that said one second and third generation descendants of Palestinian refugees from Israel will not be allowed to return. This had always been a demand, a condition by the Palestinians for any deal that their descendants should be able to return to Israel. And Bush said no.

[Amit Segal]

But there were other two pledges. Two was that the US Recognizes the major settlement blocks, meaning no going back.

[Asi]

To the 67 border.

[Amit Segal]

Yes. The third thing, which I think even ASI forgot, was another pledge in this letter that if terror emerges from the evacuated areas, the US Would feel obliged to act there and to prevent terrorist organizations from being there. So not only the U.S. of course, did not invade Gaza. Do you really think when you see what President Obama did during the 2014 military operation, that the US really respected it? So I believe you are see, but I think Sharon had reached a very, very bad deal.

[Asi]

Okay. So I have no intentions of defending President Obama, but I think both sides failed in what they promised to do in this letter. But you know what? Let's say Sharon was wrong and he was naive and all the supporters were naive. They didn't know. They thought something else would happen. Netanyahu and most of the current Israeli government, they said this is what's going to happen in 2005 and still did nothing about it for 20 years.

[Dan Senor]

Because this is important, Asi, because what you're basically saying, I think, is that those who were opposed to disengagement back in 2004 and 2005, they still had the power to try to mitigate the damage of that mistake in the subsequent years, and they didn't. But what Amit is saying is there was no mitigating it once Hamas took over in Gaza and you have Hamas headquartered, you know, 40 miles from Tel Aviv. There's no mitigating it.

[Asi]

So if Netanyahu would have been the prime minister or Ahmed Tibi would have been the prime minister, it was the same outcome, which I cannot accept.

[Amit Segal]

No, I'll give you an example, Asi. Maybe Sharon would have go into Gaza after a terrorist attack with 100 victims. It wouldn't take 1200 victims a day to do it. That's the difference between BBTB and Sha'.

[Dan Senor]

On.

[Amit Segal]

But I think it was inevitable at the level that there was no legitimacy to re enter Gaza. Let's admit it. I mean, and I said in 2019, there is a very viral video of me saying that we should enter Gaza. But I hesitated for three long minutes, which never happens to me on channel 12 because it was perceived as a lunatic thing to say that the IDF would re enter Gaza.

[Asi]

One of the most memorable moment of this engagement, in my opinion. One of the rabbis, I forgot his name, said that we are being evacuated because we failed to get into the hearts of the Israelis. And we'll be back in Gaza only when we'll be back in the hearts of the Israelis. 20 years have passed. I agree with you that the public perception of the disengagement is that it failed. But I still think that most Israelis doesn't want to go to Bush. Katif, maybe we'll be back here in five more years to discuss. But I think in five years, Israel will not be in Gaza and there will be no settlements in Gaza.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Asi, I want to ask you a question and then we'll wrap up just trying to tie it to the debate now. Okay. I hear Israelis all the time who want an end to this war that we're in right now, that Israel's in right now, which I completely understand. They just want it to be done for a variety of reasons. And they say, let's get out of Gaza, let's get all our hostages back, and then we'll reboot, replenish, we'll give the army a break and we'll live to fight another day. And Hamas will give us, they say, the IDF in Israel, a reason to fight another day, because they will do something that will justifiably. Justifiably provoke a response from us. And then we'll go back in and finish them off. Only this time we'll have the hostages. And when I hear that argument, it is eerily reminiscent to what Sharon was saying in 2004 and 2005, that if Hamas fires one rocket, don't worry, we will be able to go back in and obliterate them. And the reality is, for the reasons Amit was saying, it wasn't so simple for Israel to go back in the international legitimacy, the US support, whatever you want to point to, it wasn't there. And the idea that Israel can now just cut some kind of, you know, omnibus deal and get out of Gaza and get all their hostages out of Gaza and then just come back into Gaza, this is like echoing of this discussion 20 years ago.

[Asi]

Just replace the word Hamas with the word Hezbollah. This is what we are doing. We haven't dismantled them completely, but we still went out from most places and we attack them whenever we want. My concern is that Hamas will not accept a deal and eventually what will happen? I don't know if it's going to happen in two months, in six months, in two years, we're going to go back to unilateral movements. Because if you cannot negotiate with them and you don't agree with them, and I don't believe in total victory. I'm sorry, but do you also believe.

[Dan Senor]

That Hamas is not serious about a real negotiation?

[Asi]

I think when Hamas look at their situation now, they think they're winning, not losing. This is different because every day Israel is losing in the international community, it changed around March or April, but now for them, they are ready to prolong this war.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Asi, we're going to let you go. I have a feeling we're going to have you back on, but thank you for helping us make sense of a wildly important moment in our history. Thank you both and see you soon.

[Amit Segal]

Thank you so much, Dan. Bye bye.

[Asi]

Thank you. Bye bye.

[Dan Senor]

Foreign that's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavael Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically happen after the cameras stop rolling. Please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to ark media.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Elon Benatar. ARC Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti Sound and video editing by Martin Juergo and Mariangulis Burgos. Our director of operations is Maya Rockoff. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.