Mossad, Ahmadinejad, and the plan to topple Iran’s regime - with Ronen Bergman

Summary

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Podcast Summary – "Mossad, Ahmadinejad, and the Plan to Topple Iran’s Regime"

Podcast: Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
Host: Dan Senor
Guest: Ronen Bergman (journalist and Mossad expert)
Date: May 20, 2026
Duration: ~35 minutes (excluding introductory ads and closing credits)

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Episode Overview

This episode explores newly revealed details of an audacious (and ultimately unexecuted) Israeli-American plan to destabilize and potentially topple Iran’s regime at the onset of the current war. The plan centered not only on military action but also on influence operations, coalition-building with Kurdish forces, and—most shockingly—the astonishing possibility of installing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former hardline president and Holocaust denier, as a transitional Iranian leader. Dan Senor speaks with investigative journalist and Mossad expert Ronen Bergman, who was a principal reporter on the New York Times exposé revealing these developments.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Unlikely Ahmedinejad Connection

• Initial Disbelief: Both Senor and Bergman express their shock at learning Mossad and U.S. intelligence considered Ahmadinejad—the longtime face of anti-Israel rhetoric—as a central figure for regime change.

  • “He’s the last person...and I think this is one of the reasons that he was chosen, because he’s the last person that you would suspect.”
    — Ronen Bergman, [01:19], [04:42]

• Ahmadinejad’s Falling Out with the Regime:
  After his presidency ended (2013), Ahmadinejad became marginalized and critical of the regime, frequently denied the chance to run for office, and placed under a kind of house arrest.

  • “Since then, Ahmadinejad became like an opposition to the regime from inside the regime.”
    — Bergman, [14:06]

• Pattern of ‘Troublemaker’:
  Ahmadinejad’s increasingly visible criticisms, accusations of corruption, and contacts abroad made him both a wildcard and, in the eyes of planners, a theoretically useful figurehead for transition.

2. Blueprint of the Mossad Plan

• Two War Aims:

  • A. Limited Aims: Initially about crippling Iran's nuclear and missile infrastructure [05:44–06:13].
  • B. Regime Change: Shifted, months before the current war, towards replacing the regime itself—solving ‘the Iran problem from the root.’
    — “If you want to solve the Iranian problem, you need to solve the problem from the root, which means a regime change.” [06:13–08:20]

• Detailed Operational Timeline:

  • First 100 Hours (Military Phase):
    • Decapitation of the regime via targeted killings, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and 40 others [08:44].
    • Bomber strikes to destroy ballistic missiles and crucial infrastructure.
    • Israeli air force to open a corridor between Iraq and Iranian Kurdistan [08:44–11:00].
    • 20,000 Kurdish militia, trained and supplied, would roll into Iran, joined by local Kurds and other minorities.
  • Influence Operations:
    • Mossad’s media/information warfare meant to ignite and coordinate massive anti-regime protests, building on tools tested for years [08:44–11:10].
  • Parallel Strikes:
    • Attacks on the IRGC and Basij (domestic security forces) responsible for brutal suppression of protests [11:00–11:26].

3. Ahmadinejad’s Role & Participation

• Selection Rationale:

  • His public split with the regime, outsider status, and popularity with certain demographics made him a surprising but strategic candidate for post-Khamenei leadership [14:06–17:23].

• Foreign Contacts:

  • Ahmadinejad’s suspicious trips, particularly to Hungary and Guatemala, and meetings with officials there raised intelligence eyebrows—potential venues for covert contact [16:26–17:23].

• What Went Wrong:

  • On the first nights of the conflict, an Israeli strike aimed at freeing Ahmadinejad injured him and killed his security. Disillusioned, he disappeared and, per Bergman’s sources, withdrew from the plan [22:41–23:06].

    “He was injured, but was able to flee the scene and was never seen alive again since that night.”
    — Ronen Bergman [23:06]

• Collapse of the Plan:

  • When President Trump ultimately withheld the green light for the Kurdish advance (allegedly under Turkish pressure), the entire Mossad operation never launched.
  • “The Mossad plan was never even launched...collapsed with not materializing into toppling the regime and putting a new guy instead of the old one.” [23:06–25:15]

4. The U.S. Role and Political Dynamics

• Uncertain Commitment:

  • Despite presentations to President Trump (with Netanyahu, Mossad, and Israeli Air Force heads present), there was never a full U.S. sign-off. After internal debates, and outside pressure, Trump refused to authorize the most crucial moves [29:17–30:48].

    “It was not clear before the war what exactly each country is doing, what exactly are the tasks of each military and what is the goal of the war and how this goal is going to be achieved.”
    — Ronen Bergman [29:17]

• Confusion & Consequence:

  • This lack of unified commitment, particularly on the Kurdish element, severely undermined the plan—and is a major reason the war remains unresolved.

5. Why is This Story Coming Out Now?

• Sources & Motives:
  • Bergman emphasizes the cross-national and cross-source nature of the reporting, dismissing simple theories that the reveal is coordinated manipulation.
  • There’s always a risk of being ‘used,’ especially with intelligence sources.
  • The collapse of the plan led to “changing and rotating goals” and causes a search for accountability in Israel, the U.S., and even Iran [31:44–34:28].

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Ahmadinejad's selection:

  "He's the last person. And I think this is one of the reasons that he was chosen according to our sources, because he's the last person that you would, that you would suspect."
  — Ronen Bergman [04:42]

• On the plan's ambition:

  “If you want to solve the Iranian problem, you need to solve the problem from the root, which means a regime change.”
  — Ronen Bergman [06:13]

• Bergman’s disbelief:

  “When the New York Times first got an Iranian source saying that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could be the designated person to be ruler of Iran, I thought that this is just yet another conspiracy theory.”
  — Ronen Bergman [01:19], [04:42]

• On Trump’s decision:

  “Trump also changed his mind and decided that he doesn’t give the order…So basically, the Mossad plan was never even launched.”
  — Ronen Bergman [23:06]

• On journalistic caution:

  “We have to be very careful that they will not try to do to us what they have been trying to do to the enemy in their career. Always take this into consideration and always suspect that we are not being maneuvered or fed with information.”
  — Ronen Bergman [31:44]

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Important Timestamps

• [01:19] — Introduction of Ahmadinejad’s surprising involvement.
• [04:42] — Bergman describes his initial skepticism about the tip.
• [06:13] — Differentiating military aims vs. regime change; shift in strategy.
• [08:44–11:00] — Outline of operational plan: killings, Kurdish advance, media operations.
• [14:06] — Ahmadinejad’s marginalization and turn against the regime.
• [16:26] — Foreign trips, possibly for clandestine meetings.
• [22:41–23:06] — Ahmadinejad’s injury and disappearance; collapse of his role.
• [23:06–25:15] — U.S. refusal to greenlight the Kurdish offensive; plan fails.
• [29:17–30:48] — Uncertainty/unclarity in American commitment.
• [31:44–34:28] — Discussion on the timing and motives for the public release of the story.

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Tone & Atmosphere

• The conversation is investigative, deeply informed, and at times incredulous—capturing both the gravity and the sheer improbability of the covert plan.
• There’s clear admiration and camaraderie between Senor and Bergman, but also professional skepticism—especially around intelligence stories with high stakes and controversial sources.

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Conclusion

The episode details how an ambitious plot to overthrow Iran’s regime—backed by Israel and, to a lesser degree, the United States—relied on a risky combination of military decapitation, coordinated foreign proxies, and media campaigns, with the potential crowning of a notorious regime outcast as transition leader. Ultimately, the plan never came to fruition due to abrupt policy reversals at the highest levels of U.S. leadership and a subsequent unraveling on the ground.

Dan Senor and Ronen Bergman provide unique, deeply reported insights into the clandestine nature of regime change operations, the unpredictability of international alliances, and the strange bedfellows such plans sometimes produce.

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Transcript

[A]

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[B]

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[A]

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[B]

when the New York Times first got an Iranian source saying that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could be the designated person to be ruler of Iran, I thought that this is just yet another conspiracy theory. Because he's the last person. And I think this is one of the reasons that he was chosen, because he's the last person that you would suspect.

[A]

It's 7am on Wednesday, May 20, here in New York City. It is 2pm on Wednesday, May twentieth, in Israel. Last night, a story broke in the New York Times that reframes so much of what we thought we knew about Israel's war against Iran. The headline alone sounds like fiction. Israel and the United States went into the war with a plan to replace the Iranian regime. And the man they had in mind to play a key role in the new Iran, or an interim leadership, was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the man who who once called for Israel to be wiped off the map. The man who made a name for himself in part by denying the Holocaust. The man who was for years the face of everything Israel said it was fighting against. Ahmadinejad had been president of the Iranian regime from 2005 through 2013. Ronen Bergman, a frequent guest on Call Me Back, is one of the four bylines on that New York Times story. The plan, as Bergman reports, it was years in the making. Mossad influence operations designed to accelerate Iranian street protests, Kurdish ground forces trained and armed to enter Iranian territory, a blueprint for internal alternative leadership and a precise operational timeline that came within hours of execution before the US under pressure from Erdogan, at least according to public reports, pulled the plug on at least one aspect of that the Kurdish aspect. On night three of the war, before our conversation, one short housekeeping note. If you haven't already, please make sure you are subscribing to our daily podcast, Ark News Daily. Each morning Deborah Pardes thoughtfully walks you through the most important news concerning Israel and the Jewish world in under 10 minutes. Trust me, it is extremely efficient. You can find that link in the description below or you can just go to arkmedia.org where you can find all our links and also subscribe to our newsletter. With me is Ronen Bergman to tell us how this audacious covert plan was built, why it seems to have failed, and what it means that we're only finding out about it now. Ronen, welcome back.

[B]

Pleasure being here.

[A]

As is usual with you, you're having this conversation with very little sleep. So we will try to get right into this. Before we get into this jaw dropping story that you and your colleagues have reported, I just want to set the table a little bit because you've been reporting on the Mossad now for four decades. You've written books about the Mossad. We did a four part series on Inside Call Me Back on Mossad's shadow war with Iran. So I think it takes a lot to surprise you. What was your initial reaction to this story as you stumbled upon it and started to connect the dots?

[B]

I didn't believe it. This is one story, the story that we just published with Fanaz Fasihi, Julian Burns and Mark Mazzetti, my colleagues from the New York Times. This is one component of the overall plan to topple the regime and constitute a new regime instead. This has been going on for years and the fact that someone tried did not surprise me. But of all the candidates that the Mossad would try to crown instead of the current regime, if there's a line, the one they picked would be not even in the line, not even in the queue, like out of the room. Because he's the last person. And I think this is one of the reasons that he was chosen according to our sources, because he's the last person that you would, that you would suspect. In fact, when the New York Times first got an Iranian source saying that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could be the designated person to be ruler of Iran, I thought that this is just yet another conspiracy theory, that this is not real.

[A]

Okay, before we get in talking about Dinejad, I think his name is not recognizable. It's probably not recognizable to a lot of our listeners. So I do want to come back to him. I just want to establish the terrain. Your reporting draws a clear line between two different war aims. The first was a limited goal of hitting nuclear infrastructure and missile capabilities. And the second, a much more ambitious goal of regime change. Walk us through that shift. When did it happen? Who drove it? How serious was it?

[B]

So I think it's easy to draw between the two last operations or round of war between Israel, later Israel and the US against Iran. The one in June that the US joined in the middle and the one the region is currently in. In June 25, Israel went to strike Iran in order to limit if not to fully destroy. That was the goal. Iranians nuclear capabilities, ballistic missiles, air defenses. So in general to destroy as much of its military capabilities as possible. This was why, when it was discussed before June 25 whether the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is a legitimate or a suitable target for this operation, it was decided not to kill him. It was even the US that suggested that at the end of this short 12 days war, there will be a need to have a ceasefire agreement with someone. So maybe he should not be killed because he would be the someone, the authority to sign a ceasefire. All of this perspective changed towards the next round. So the one that started now we know in February 2026, coming from the assumption that whatever and how successful the Israeli raids and the American attacks on Iran are at the end. Iran is this massive country with very much developed industries, a lot of technological knowledge and know how they will be able to reignite the project. They will be able to rearm, buy more weaponry from China or other places. In short, if you want to solve the Iranian problem, you need to solve the problem from the root, which means a regime change. And this is when like five months before the war, this is when Mossad started to put in place the different components of the plan that they hoped and believe and still believe by today is able to topple the Iranian regime.

[A]

Okay, so your piece describes a plan with a long Runway. So it appears that it was years in the making. It included, as I mentioned in the introduction, influence operations inside Iran, Kurdish coalition building, outreach to the Kurds, shaping an alternative leadership track. You're in close contact with various players in the Mossad system. So walk us through the outline of the plan.

[B]

So the plan called for the first 100 hours to be done and executed by the two militaries, the US and Israeli military. Starting with something that was Crucial, not enough, but crucial step, which is the decapitation of the leadership, including the assassination of the supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Ali Khamenei was to be taken out by the Israeli military air force together with 40 other individuals. And then 100 hours that will include these targeted killings. Destroying as many ballistic missiles as possible to try to make sure that the Israeli and the Gulf states home front is hurt as little as possible. And at the end of that, the Israeli air force starts opening a corridor between Iraq and the Iranian Kurdistan. So after 100 hours, 20,000 armed Kurdish militias would start rolling from Iraq into Iran with the hope and the planning that when they enter the Iranian Kurdistan, they will have more of the locals joining them and they will start a wave rolling towards Tehran. Those who came from Iraq and other minorities that would join them on the way. This is one pillar of effort. At the same time, what is called the influence mechanism of Mossad. This is the ability to use different kinds of media, social, tv, radio, in order to mobilize and instigate the protest in Iran. Mossad has been developing different mechanism of influence for the last five years. And they were tested according to the Israeli intelligence, proved to be effective in the years and months and days before the beginning of the war. And they should have been put into action to reignite the protest. That sort of stopped after the civil society in Iran started being butchered by the regime in mid January. At the same time, Israeli air force would start bombing the besieged and the IRGC stations.

[A]

And the besiege, just for our listeners. The besieges, the domestic security, militias, operations. That is a key instrument of domestic repression within the country.

[B]

Yeah, exactly. We're talking about the IRGC and the besieged are basically the two units, the two organizations that were behind the mass killing of demonstrators in January.

[A]

So we talk about 30,000 plus Iranian slaughter. This was the besiege in the IRGC.

[B]

Horrible. The biggest massacre in this kind of protest. It's the establishment of the regime and they have stations and representation everywhere. They were patrolling the streets. Mossad agents on the ground were supposed to identify the different targets with locations for the air force. The air force was supposed to come and raid the bomb and kill these oppressors. And at the same time the air forces of both countries would be able to hit targets belonging to the energy sector, to the supply of electricity to some parts of the country. All in all together create such a, I would say, shattering effect of the regime destabilization of the whole country that Mossad hoped Israel Hoped, the allies hoped would bring down the regime.

[A]

All right, so just to summarize, the plan was, according to your reporting, decapitate the regime, the Iranian regime, open a corridor for the Kurds, activate an influence campaign, and bomb the besieged. So now I want to get to the part of the story based on US Sources that, again, is really hard to process. I actually had to read it several times. As I said in the introduction, it read like fiction. The man Israel in the United States had in mind to play some kind of role post collapse of the regime was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Again, not just a Holocaust denier, but someone, I think, who hosted conferences focused on the denial of the Holocaust, a fierce supporter of Iran's nuclear program, someone who spent his presidency calling for Israel's destruction repeatedly. I mean, I was working in government and in politics in the U.S. ronen, for many years while Ahmadinejad was president of Iran. And he was the symbol, I mean, the way we talk now about Khamenei, he had that kind of presence. There was a huge controversy when he would come to New YORK for the U.N. should the U.S. allow him even into the United States, the U.S. government even allow him in the United States to address the UN General assembly because he was accused of war crimes, incitement of genocide against the Jewish people. I mean, and you're saying this man that I'm describing here, Ahmadinejad, was deeply involved in this plan that you've laid out. So how did Israel arrive at this choice of Ahmadinejad? And why did Israel believe he was primed to flip?

[B]

So this guy, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was really for us in Israel, for you, in the US for many around the world, the face of evil. Now, since he ended his term in 2015 as president of Iran with a massive clash with the Supreme Leader, he fired the Minister of Intelligence. The Supreme Leader gave him the authority to do that. And they completely separated. They were very, very close, and they completely depart. Since then, Ahmadinejad became like an opposition to the regime from inside the regime. And he positioned himself, first of all, as he was always part of the sort of like the worker class, the low level class. He stayed in his small flat in not the best neighborhood of Iran. Second, he started to criticize the corruption of the regime. And part of the corruption, if you look back at his speeches, is to say how vulnerable because of corruption the regime is to Mossad infiltration. So it was Ahmadinejad who said, you know, in a public speech to the Iranian people, you know, that the guy who is in Charge of counter intelligence. So the number one guy in Iran that is in charge of catching spies of the Mossad is the Mossad operative. He positioned himself as a troublemaker to the regime. So the regime did not allow him to run for presidency for three times. He was very bitter. They have like a special legislative council that needs to approve the candidates, and they did not allow him. They also put him under some kind of a house arrest. He had security details, but they were there to protect him, but also to make sure that he doesn't go out of the line. So he was considered to be a loose cannon. And some people around him started to cause some attention. One of them was prosecuted, his chief of staff. And in his trial, they said something about relations with British and Israeli intelligence. And there were some also questionable trips abroad, few of them to Guatemala. And most, I would say these that attracted a lot of attention were the ones to Hungary, to Budapest.

[A]

And when he was in Hungary, do we know that he met with Viktor Orban or met with officials in the Hungarian security apparatus?

[B]

So this whole envelope of when, how and for what he was recruited, this is still shrouded with difficulty with sources, security, lack of reporting. This is not full in our. And I assume that we will soon get the full picture of it, but he went to Hungary, Viktor Orban, he went to teach or to give lectures in a university that is under the influence of Orban. It's very hard to assume that Orban didn't know that Ahmadinejad was a very powerful and very present person. Didn't know. He didn't know about that. And if Orban knows, it's very hard to believe that his two allies, Orban's allies, so the US And Israel wouldn't know. I would say that it's not the number one target for trip for someone like Ahmadinejad to go to Budapest. And now looking in retrospect, it's interesting,

[A]

okay, so he's doing these meetings with, you know, Guatemala or Hungary, maybe other places.

[B]

And coming from the last one, just few days before the war.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

During which Iranian sources are telling my colleague Faras Fasihi, he observed some of the plans of the war. So he had contacts during these visits with people that are not identified by the Iranian sources, but he had contact with people that showed him some of the plans of some of the thinking what's ahead with the war and that. I see the question mark on your face, and I understand that because this is a.

[A]

It seems preposterous to me. I know Ahmadine Jar I don't know him personally, but he was such a strong presence in my mind, in my analysis and observation of events in the Middle east for so many years. The idea that these Israelis or through intermediaries are sitting down with this guy and showing him some of the plans for a war that's about to happen, it's just, like I said, it's fantastical.

[B]

When Farnaz, who got the first tip from Iranian sources very close to Ahmadinejad shortly after the beginning of the war, when she wrote to me, is there a chance that Ahmadinejad is working with the US And Israel and that come on top of other conspiracy about other Iranian, important Iranians, I said, yes, he's having coffee near my house in Ramad Hasharon. He's just about to come over to visit me. So this cannot be. And only much, much later in the war, much closer to where we are now on the timeline where American sources started to speak about that for me, did I started to really observe and cross check the validity of them. Now, at the end of this, it's not enough to topple a regime. You need to have someone to replace. It's not even the regime. Look at what happened in Venezuela. It's not a regime change. It's a leadership change.

[A]

Right?

[B]

And I think that what fascinated what maybe enchanted President Trump in the plan that was presented to him by Prime Minister Netanyahu, who sat by him in the Situation Room in the White House, and by the Mossad chief, David Bonaire on February 11th of this year, Trump saw a plan that reminded him of Venezuela. So you do not take out the whole regime. You don't take out the whole administration. You don't need to rebuild everything, you know, bitter lessons of the US from the past. You only decapitate the leadership in Venezuela. You take them, you abduct them in Iran, you kill them, and you put someone that you believe would be easier to handle, like in Venezuela. And if it worked there, maybe it will work in Iran.

[A]

Before we continue, I want to take a moment to talk about daily life in Israel right now. One day can seem relatively calm, the next, sirens, rockets, everything changes. So the question isn't just what's happening at this moment, it's whether Israel is ready for what comes next. Hadassah hospitals in Jerusalem have built that readiness into the foundation of their work and their facilities. When a crisis hits, entire departments move underground in minutes into fortified maternity wards, ICUs and cancer units. Doctors and nurses continue treating patients in real time, even under fire. But here's the reality. It's not enough. More advanced underground operating rooms are urgently needed so that even in the most extreme conditions, Hadassah's life changing care continues. Hadassah is working right now to expand these emergency zones because in Israel, preparedness isn't theoretical, it's essential. If you want to help make sure Israel is ready. Go to hadassah.org and support this important work. That's H A D A s s a h.org because you never know what tomorrow will bring. Ahmadinejad, as I mentioned, he was present through 2000 into 2013, and then he was out, obviously. And he'd had these clashes with the Supreme Leader, but did try to run again, right? He tried to run again in 2017. He tried to run again in 2021. I think he may have even tried to run again in 2024. And each time his candidacy was disqualified. Yeah, disqualified and shut down by the Council, the Supreme Leader's counsel, that determines who's an eligible candidate and who's not. So the regime knows this guy's a troublemaker. The regime knows he's vying for power inside Iran. Would they not have been suspicious that he could be talking to enemies of the regime? It's also surprising to me that he was able to do the kinds of things that he was doing. Traveling to these countries, having these kinds of communications.

[B]

I don't have all the answers. Your questions are very valid. If he's under house arrest, then how can he be allowed to travel to Budapest again, not some Gulfy state that he wants to have a vacation in? So by itself, it's suspicious. I don't have the answer to this. I think that he was considered to be someone that you don't mess with. What is for certain is that he positioned himself as yet a fresh alternative to the old Guard of the Revolutionary Guards, of the Supreme Leader, not supplying the Iranian people the basic life conditions.

[A]

Okay, you say that he was under house arrest in Tehran and the plan included an Israeli strike that was designed to free him in the first days of this war. He was injured in that strike. On the war's first day, he survived. And then he, and I'm quoting from your piece here, he became disillusioned with the regime change plan. So walk us through what was supposed to happen and what actually happened to him on February 28.

[B]

So Ahmadir Jadrav lived in this modest flat in the outskirts of Tehran. And they had a small house, small shed not far away where his bodyguards were basically protecting him, but also Making sure that he doesn't move without their supervision. And on the first day, sorry, the second day, the first night of the war, news came from Tehran that Among the Iranian VIPs that were killed is also Ahmedinejad, but he was not killed. This facility where the bodyguards were stationed that was bombed by an Israeli strike, almost all of them were killed. And according to American sources, Ahmadinejaz was injured, but was able to flee the scene and was never seen alive again since that night. Since that first night, second day of the war, he was injured and according to some of the sources, that basically set him in a different mood. Catching cold feet or changing his mind into his participation in the overall plan. So changing his mind not to be the person to be designated, to be crowned, to be the next Supreme Leader. That in any case didn't happen because even that the Supreme Leader was killed two days later when President Trump had to authorize the Kurdish invasion, the Kurdish maneuver into Iran. Trump also changed his mind and decided that he doesn't give the order. He got a phone call from foreign leaders. He was under pressure from opponents of the plan inside the White House, and he decided at the end that he doesn't give the okay. So basically, the Mossad plan was never even launched. This whole massive campaign that we discussed before was not given the okay order to start and therefore basically collapsed with not materializing into toppling the regime and putting a new guy instead of the old one.

[A]

Okay. But Ahmadinejad built his entire political identity, at least in the years that I was following him on resistance to Israel and the west. And he suddenly, it seems like signs up at some point for an Israeli backed regime change plan. One doesn't do that out of ideology. If you are who he is, signs up because he wants something. Now, I understand he had disagreements and criticisms of the regime based on corruption and other issues, but what was he asking for? What did he want out of this? And were there any guarantees that Israel could offer him?

[B]

So, first of all, we are not talking about Israel. It's Israel and the us meaning us basically sign off on the plan and the CIA was involved. I assume that as far as we get from the success possible, success, we will get more and more organizations and unity people who said, no, no, no, we were not, we objected. This is going to be a growing number as history usually show. So this is the two countries. Second, you know, he's a politician. He wants to be the president or the Supreme Leader. They prevented him. They deprived him of the fact of even the chance to run. So this plan gives him the opportunity to be crowned as the Supreme Leader of Iran, or at least the president of Iran. This is his life dream, to go back there and just assessing, just fantasizing, but to show them, to show the old guards, you didn't want me. Here I am doing that in spite of everything you tried to do against me. But still, what guarantees? What was that moment that he decided that he wants in and then what was the exact reason that he wants out? And what happened to him? I said that he vanished. He vanished into thin air. There is nothing except for one message from a spokesperson congratulating Muchtabahomenai for being appointed to be the supreme Leader. There is nothing, nothing. And he's a very, very, very, very public person, very present, as you said. So there's still questions to be asked. But again, even if he didn't change his mind, the whole plan collapsed before starting. It did not happen. Not the Kurdish offensive, not the influence campaign, the bombing of the energy sector, cutting down the electricity. A little bit of striking Israel is striking the Basij, but not in the magnitude and volume that they planned. All of that didn't happen. So we didn't reach the point where the services of Medirijaz were needed. Which leads us to this specific day where we are still in the midst of this conflict and still with the dilemma what to do now at the hands of President Trump that I think that these very hours would need to make a call on where to pick up after this plan failed or didn't even start it. He needs to pick up and decide what to do and how to lead the free world in this offensive, because this is the place we are in on the timeline is the exact result of the failure or the inability to execute the plan to topple the regime. It all started there. And here we are.

[A]

Ronen, one thing we've heard from Israeli sources repeatedly is that the Kurdish part of the plan was the Kurdish empowerment and arming and organizing was a key part, not the only part, but was a key part of any regime change plan. And Israel had put forward a series of pieces to the puzzle of regime change. And the US Only committed to some of the pieces, but not all of the pieces, which limited the odds of success directionally towards regime change. But I guess I'm confused by some of the reporting both from you and from other sources. Is it that President Trump committed to regime change, but the US didn't commit to all of the aspects that Israel thought was necessary that were necessary for regime Change, or is it not so clear that President Trump committed to regime change? He was looking at it, he was observing to it. He was open to it, but he actually, there was never real commitment to it.

[B]

Well, I think it's more the latter than the former. When President Trump met with Prime Minister Netanyahu on February 11, he heard and he saw the new head of the air force and the chief of Mossad on the encrypted conference. They detailed the plan to him. Everything about the different parts of the plan to overthrow the regime. The war was about overthrowing the regime. President Trump said, okay, I got it. He didn't push back, but he didn't say, okay, I sign off the plan. And next day, he met with his team without Israelis in the same room and heard quite a strong objection to the plan. It sort of was created that they continue to accumulate forces, join plans, but until the third day of the war, that they rediscuss the Kurdish offensive. And then Trump, probably under pressure from the Turkish government, Trump said, you know what? No. So it was not clear before the war what exactly each country is doing, what exactly are the tasks of each military and what is the goal of the war and how this goal is going to be achieved. That led to confusion. And these are at least parts of the reasons why we are here today after two and a half months. And still this is not resolved. And still it's not clear what this war is all about.

[A]

Okay, Ronan, I guess let me close by asking a question that is hovering over this entire conversation. You've now published what we know of to be the architecture of a Mossad regime change plan. As we said, the Kurdish forces, the influence operations, the now we know the Ahmadinejad plan. Then there was obviously President Trump, the US Pulling back, or at least pulling back on aspects of it. We're learning all this all while the war is still active and the nuclear negotiations are on, off, on now, it seems, back off. The sources who contributed to your reporting had reasons to share this new information or release new information in the public. That's in the public light. They chose to share it. Now. Why? Who benefits from this story being out there right now? Do you sometimes worry that you're being used in some way? What's going on here? Help us contextualize your reporting.

[B]

So, first of all, and I'm not being evasive with the question, but it's not just my reporting, we are talking about four reporters of the New York Times, Fanas Fasiqi, speaking with Iranian sources, Julian Burns and Mark Mazetti are speaking with American sources, and I'm speaking mainly with Israeli sources. So to think that there's a joint conspiracy between former officials in three countries, even four countries that in Kahoot know that we will approach them and all of them trying to feed us with some kind of a coordinated version of a conspiracy and push the information in the real, like in a specific time. I think this is. You need a lot of sophistication to do something like that. We have been reporting, I think the first story about that this is all about regime change, plan of Mossad was published by Mark and me and some other colleagues maybe, I think maybe a week, maybe less. After the beginning of the war. It's a gradual process. Every time we. We add a brick. It's a hard process to do because the plan failed, and because it failed, now all the parties are trying to get away from it and saying, no, this was not our plan. No, this was not what we thought. This is why we are getting so many different and changing and rotating goals of the war throughout the two and a half months since the beginning. So we have to be very careful. We are talking about some of them are trained intelligence officials. We have to be very careful that they will not try to do to us what they have been trying to do to the enemy in their career. Always take this into consideration and always suspect that we are not being maneuvered or fed with information. But I think we have sources everywhere. And then you know that you are not being tricked by one side because it comes from all over. When you have someone who is so close to Ahmadinejad who is telling you a story early in the war. And when I heard it, I said, yeah, he's coming to have coffee. Ahmadinejad to have coffee in my place in Ahmad Hasharon in few minutes. And I didn't believe, but that happened then. Now we have American sources. So all of that together, I think, leaving us that it's basically up to us, our capabilities, our connection, our sources, our defensive sources in a slow but gradual process to solve the mystery. Because we are looking at the mystery, a big mystery of what the hell happened here? Why are we here? What led us to be here? This is not, I assume everybody understands this is not the best position that both leaders, the prime minister, the president, wanted to be in. So what happened? This is the question we are trying to answer, and we are getting to it slowly but truly.

[A]

Okay. I'm sure there'll be other shoes to drop. Although Ronan, this was a pretty big, big shoe to drop, but there will be others. So we will be staying close to you as you continue to lead us through this magical mystery tour. Thank you for doing this on short notice and we'll talk to you soon.

[B]

Thanks so much. See you soon.

[A]

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