Phase II of Trump’s Gaza Plan - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

Summary

Podcast Summary: Call Me Back - with Dan Senor

Episode: Phase II of Trump’s Gaza Plan – with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal
Date: January 22, 2026

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Main Theme & Purpose

This episode provides a deep dive into “Phase II” of President Trump’s postwar Gaza plan, analyzing its structure, the emerging global oversight mechanisms, and especially the implications and challenges for Israel’s government and Israeli society. The conversation, featuring journalists Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal, aims to unpack both the diplomatic maneuvering and the everyday realities for Gazans, while reflecting on how these developments reverberate through Israeli politics ahead of a critical election.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Overview of Trump’s Gaza Plan and International Oversight

• Board of Peace: Oversees global conflict resolution under Trump’s chairmanship, with key invitees (including Netanyahu, eight Muslim countries, and prominent Western figures like Tony Blair and Marco Rubio).
• General Executive Committee: Senior advisory group that sets agenda, mostly Trump associates and influential international voices.
• Gaza Executive Committee: Implements policy on the ground—includes Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, Nikolai Mladenov, plus Turkish, Qatari, Emirati, and Egyptian officials.
• Technocrat Committee: Palestinian professionals tasked with daily administration in Gaza.
• International Stability Force (ISF): Multinational security meant to maintain order and enable civilian administration in Gaza.

“There’s a lot there to digest… The ‘bull’ is the key body, the Gaza Executive Committee… the bureaucratic government, the Palestinian government on the ground in Gaza. That’s the most important thing.”
— Nadav Eyal [06:06]

2. Palestinian Administration: Selection, Accountability, and Practical Challenges

• Palestinian technocrats (largely connected to Fatah or the Palestinian Authority, not Hamas) are to manage day-to-day life. All have been vetted by Israel’s defense authorities.
• Most come from prominent families and have complicated relations with all Palestinian factions. Some are outright enemies of Hamas, risking their lives to assume office.

“General Samin Usman… is an intelligence official of the Palestinian Authority… has an arrest warrant against him that was issued by Hamas… and he’s supposed to sit in Hamas jail for 15 years… and that’s the man waiting to enter the Gaza Strip. So he’s an arch-enemy of Hamas, and that’s a huge story.”
— Nadav Eyal [10:30]

• Key unresolved issue: Who will fund the new Gaza bureaucracy? U.S. and Israel unlikely; focus turns to the wealthy Arab states.

3. Hamas' Future and the Challenge of Disarmament

• Discussion about whether Hamas might leave Gaza completely—and skepticism that full disarmament (particularly the turnover of all weapons and destruction of tunnels) is realistic.

“Hamas has had 17… very, very good years… but now it gets used to [being a guerrilla organization]… As long as we don’t see 60,000 Kalachnikov rifles handed over to the new government, we know that Hamas is still there.”
— Amit Segal [13:00]

• Israel insists on full demilitarization as non-negotiable, but doubts remain over meaningful enforcement and the genuine scope of Hamas’ departure or disarmament.

4. “Yellow Line” and Division of Gaza

• Continued debate about whether Gaza will split into a demilitarized, internationally-administered zone and a “Hamastan” enclave.
• IDF reluctant to retreat further without total demilitarization; any further withdrawal tied to U.S. pressure and coordination at the highest levels.

“Israel doesn’t want to give any grounds right now in Gaza unless it knows… Ghaza had been demilitarized. Meaning also the tunnels and everything else.”
— Nadav Eyal [14:41]

5. Israeli Government’s Dilemmas and Friction with the U.S.

• Visible dissatisfaction from Netanyahu’s government—especially the far right—about the inclusion of PA-associated technocrats or even the appearance of coordination with former Hamas patrons like Turkey and Qatar.

“For Israel, it was quite a compromise, which made sense to actually put up with this and write a comment when Shabbat ends and the National Orthodox Knesset members start being furious about it, to publish an announcement only in Hebrew, in which SAR is to talk to Rubio.”
— Amit Segal (with biting sarcasm) [18:10]

• Netanyahu’s government is trying to placate both the U.S. and his domestic right-wing coalition, carefully managing public messaging and private negotiations.

6. Role of the International Stability Force

• The ISF is envisioned more as a peacekeeping police for internationally administered areas than as a direct force to combat Hamas militarily in its remaining strongholds.

“What it is actually going to do is to be like the police in the eastern part of Gaza, controlled militarily by Israel, the new Rafah, funded by the Emirates, secured by Israel, and policed by the international force. They are not going under any circumstances to fight against Hamas inside West Gaza…”
— Amit Segal [20:00]

• If full disarmament stalls, an Israeli re-invasion could become the “default” outcome—undermining Trump’s achievement of “ending the war in Gaza.”

7. Everyday Life for Gazans

• Dire humanitarian conditions: Most Gazans live in tents, face winter with inadequate shelter, sanitation crisis, and the near-collapse of public services like education.
• The economy is heavily reliant on external aid, much of which is allegedly diverted by Hamas; no real horizon for reconstruction since Israel restricts materials seen as dual-use for military purposes.

“Life is miserable in Gaza. Many Gazans live in tents… There is no sanitary systems… children soaking wet… Most of the schools… don’t exist anymore… Unemployment is skyrocketing… The economy isn’t really working.”
— Nadav Eyal [27:30]

“Now 80% of Gaza are basically a huge refugee camp… There is no horizon… Israel refuses to enter into Gaza anything but food, iPhones, and some other marginal products, which means… there are no buildings to be built in the coming future.”
— Amit Segal [29:11]

• New idea floated: Barter weapons/tunnels for reconstruction (e.g., 500 rifles for a new high school), incentivizing demilitarization for tangible civilian gains.

8. Impact on Israeli Politics & Upcoming Elections

• Deep divisions, with Netanyahu caught between coalition far right (critical of any empowered Palestinian Authority role) and centrist opposition (accusing him of inaction or capitulation).
• Both sides use the Gaza situation as rhetorical ammunition.
• Crucial, high-stakes election imminent; Gaza and security policy will be defining issues.

“If you want Netanyahu not to head to the center and agree for everything, you need us strong. Don’t vote for the Likud, vote for the far right… Of course, Lapid and Bennett and Lieberman are using this to make the point… Netanyahu is full of hot air. And that’s it.”
— Nadav Eyal [34:00]

• Netanyahu likely to campaign less on Gaza and more on “regional transformation,” his record on confronting Iran, and international statesmanship (e.g., U.S. partnership, normalization).

“I think Netanyahu would try to zoom out. It’s not Gaza, it’s the entire Middle East.”
— Amit Segal [36:06]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Gaza’s future bureaucracy:
  “Who’s going to fund the bureaucracy of the Palestinians in Gaza? Who’s actually paying the checks starting basically tomorrow morning?”
  — Nadav Eyal [08:35]

• On the farcical nature of diplomatic announcements:
  “It reminds me of the story when I’m afraid of speaking to my wife. So I tell my son, you talk to Mama.”
  — Amit Segal, joking about the Israeli government’s indirect complaints to the U.S. [16:19]

• On Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe:
  “Now 80% of Gaza are basically a huge refugee camp, not only by name. Today it’s really a refugee camp.”
  — Amit Segal [29:11]

• On Israel’s security calculus:
  “The only force in the world that can actually disarm Hamas and is willing to sacrifice the lives of its soldiers to do so is the IDF. And even the IDF doesn’t think it would be the right move right now to renew the war in Gaza.”
  — Nadav Eyal [23:23]

• On the cyclical drama of Israeli politics:
  “I always tell delegations… you’re coming in such an amazing time. How did you pick these dates to visit here when so many important things are happening? And it’s always true, right?”
  — Nadav Eyal [39:49]

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Timestamps of Key Segments

• International Oversight Structure Explained: [04:30] – [06:05]
• Palestinian Technocrats & Accountability: [06:06] – [09:52]
• Hamas Disarmament & Future: [11:26] – [14:08]
• The “Yellow Line” and IDF Policy: [14:08] – [15:38]
• Israel-U.S. Frictions Over the Plan: [15:38] – [19:50]
• Role of International Stability Force (ISF): [19:51] – [22:03]
• Gaza’s Humanitarian Reality: [27:30] – [31:35]
• Israeli Political Responses (Right/Center/Left): [31:35] – [37:34]
• Election Stakes & Netanyhau’s Strategy: [37:34] – [40:19]

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Tone & Final Thoughts

The tone throughout is urgent, irreverent, and rooted in the on-the-ground realities of policy, politics, and human suffering. The contributors blend hard-headed realism, humor, and skepticism, warning that much of the international “structure” might be political theater, while real power struggles—and real humanitarian needs—play out beneath the headlines. Both the outcome for Gaza’s future and Israel’s own leadership remain deeply uncertain, overshadowed by election pressures and the enduring challenge posed by Hamas.

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For listeners seeking a nuanced, inside view of how strategic, political, and human factors collide in Israel’s Gaza dilemmas, this episode offers unvarnished analysis—tempered with moments of dark humor and an ever-present awareness of history’s weight.

Transcript

[A]

Foreign. You are listening to an art media podcast. The far right in Netanyahu's government is extremely unhappy, Dan, with this plan, any armed Palestinian force attached to the Palestinian Authority. Might I remind us all the expressions about no Hamas and no Abbas, meaning Abu Mazen? Well, of course, right now in Gaza, what we have just practically speaking, we have Hamas and we're going to have a bus.

[B]

But you know, this conversation was almost impossible to imagine on October 8, 2023 or October 9. Just thinking that Netanyahu would run on the basis of I'll do way better in terms of security than my opponents. Following 1200 victims in six hours is something unheard of. I'm not sure Gaza is the raison d' etre of Netanyahu's campaign. I think he would like to actually zoom out to the bigger picture, to say, listen, it's not Gaza, it's the entire Middle East.

[C]

It's 2:30pm on Wednesday, January 21st here in New York City. It's 9:30pm on Wednesday, January 21st in Israel as Israelis wind down their day. Today, Wednesday, Prime Minister Netanyahu accepted President Trump's invitation to join the Board of Peace, a supervisory body for Gaza's post war development. Also announcing their decision to join the board on Wednesday are eight Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan. European leaders are still considering their position regarding the Board of Peace, which is already named former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as senior executives. France has indicated it plans to decline the invitation. A signing ceremony is scheduled to be held on Thursday at 10:30am on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos as it seeks to establish a nascent international oversight body to address conflict resolution around the globe in an apparent effort to use the Board of Peace to in some way supplant functions of the United Nations. On Tuesday, during a White House press conference, President Trump said that U.S. intelligence might know where slain Israeli hostage Sgt. Ron Gvili's body is located within Gaza. Gvili was killed battling terrorists at Kibbutz al Umim on October 7, 2023, and his body was immediately abducted to Gaza, where it is still being held in Israel. Focus is beginning to shift towards the elections. According to Channel 12's report, former MK Ghadi Eisenkot, who previously served as a member of the war cabinet after October 7, said he would join forces with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and opposition leader Yair Lapid to run together in a unified list for the upcoming elections to win against Netanyahu. The only caveat, of course, is to answer the question about who would actually serve atop of that joint list. And B, this bloc's candidate for prime minister would be determined in some scheme based on who was ahead in the polls leading up to the election. Bennett didn't address Eisenhower's proposal, but in an activist conference he said, I invite Netanyahu to a debate anytime, anywhere. I'm not looking to humiliate Netanyahu. I intend to replace him. Now, on to today's episode. As part of the implementation of phase two of President Trump's Gaza plan, the White House announced last Friday the formation of an international panel to oversee postwar management of Gaza, naming senior officials from Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and as I mentioned, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to its Executive Committee. The Prime Minister's office in Israel had released a statement saying that it, quote, was not coordinated with Israel and contradicts its policy. Close quote with me to try to explain how all of this might work or not. Our ARC media contributors Nadavael and Amit Sehgal. This is very complicated stuff. So we needed to assemble the dream team. Thank you both for being here.

[A]

Thank you, Dan.

[B]

Thank you so much.

[C]

So there's a lot of explaining to do on how the different bodies I mentioned in the intro are supposed to work together to shape the future of Gaza. So just to set the table before we get into the conversation, let me just rattle them off one by one and provide a very quick definition so we understand. Just for reference purposes. There's the Board of Peace, which is a Trump chaired body of invited heads of state tasked with resolving global conflicts, whose decisions and membership terms ultimately depend on President Trump's approval. So that's the first. The second is there's the General Executive Committee which is a senior advisory group that sets the Board of Peace's agenda, composed of key Trump associates and prominent international figures. Then there's the Gaza Executive Committee which is a regional and international coordination body which includes senior officials from Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the uae, led by Nikolai Maledinov, that manages civil and security coordination between Gaza and the Board of Peace. Then there's a Technocrat Committee which is a professional administrative team, a Palestinian professional administrative team responsible for the day to day governing and basic governing functions in the Gaza Strip. And then finally the isf, which is the International Stability Force, a multinational security force intended to support stability security in Gaza by maintaining order and enabling the civilian administration to operate with some safety and and predictability. So a lot there to digest. Nadav I want to start with you. How will these bodies operate with each other on the ground?

[A]

Okay, I'm going to try and make it easy and simple and keep our eyes on the bull. And here's the bull. The bull is the key body, the Gaza Executive Committee on the ground, which, I mean the bureaucratic government, the Palestinian government on the ground in Gaza, okay? That's the most important thing. The ministers that are going to run Gaza, they are all Palestinians. We have their names. These are people that have been affiliated with the Palestinian Authority, with Fatah, some of them considered arch enemies of Hamas, others not so much. And these people are supposed to enter Gaza from the Rafah crossing with Israel's blessing, with the blessing of Egypt, all the other countries. Another person to watch is Nikolai Mldanov. Nikolai Medanov was the envoy of the International Quartet for the Middle East, a very well known diplomat in international circles. His name has been raised in the past as a UN Secretary General candidate. He was the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, if I remember correctly. Nikolai Leidanov has been around for a really long time. And here's the key fact about Medanov, you. His job, his day job is actually an academy at the uae. So he's very much affiliated with the uae. So you're asking me, Dan, what's important as to the future of Gaza and this conflict in Gaza in that regard? What's important is what the Palestinian governance is actually going to do inside Gaza. And also the Executive committee that is supposed to be responsible, that's Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff and, and the person who's leading that effort, Nadanov.

[C]

So Nadav, just staying on that. So you have these Palestinian technocrats who will be running things day to day. Who are they ultimately accountable to?

[A]

To the Gaza Executive Committee.

[C]

And that is who?

[A]

That's Jared Kushner and Steve Witkov and Nikolai Medanov and of course, the Turkish representatives, the Qatari representatives under protest from the Prime Minister of Israel. And they report to them. However, I don't know what reporting means. I'll give you just one question that I'm trying to find out myself. As a journalist, one of the questions that I'm asking my sources across the region is who's going to fund the bureaucracy of the Palestinians in Gaza? Who's actually paying the checks starting basically tomorrow morning? Now, there are the usual suspects, and these are Arab countries around Israel. Israel is definitely not going to fund it. I don't think that the United States is going to write a check. Maybe, Dan, you have some other information. I don't believe that the Trump administration is going to write a check for the Palestinians going to run Gaza. So that leaves us basically with countries across the region. And the truth is that if you're looking for influence, you should follow that. Right? These bureaucrats are going to be in Gaza. They're going to be there alone. With all due respect to the phone calls they're going to get from people, and they are Palestinians, by the way. Many of them come from very respected Palestinian families inside Gaza. And the key questions, there are power and funds, and this is how you're going to know how things are really going down in Gaza and on this.

[C]

In terms of who they're reporting to. You mentioned it is this council that includes Kushner and Witkoff. Other advisors to it include Josh Gruenbaum and Aryeh Lightstone. People may be familiar with those names. They both have become very important in this entire process. I think you'll be hearing more and more about them, US Officials. Just before I bring in Amit in Nadav, just one other question. Of these 15 people, I understand that many of them from prominent families, to what extent do any of them have ties to Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad or to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank?

[A]

So as to Hamas, they've been vetted by Israel. And as far as the Israeli defense apparatus is concerned, they're not affiliated with Hamas. Can Hamas use leverage on them? Can Hamas pressure the family members? It's the same society, Dan. And the monopoly over violence in the Gaza Strip, even after these people enter the Gaza Strip, is right now held by Hamas. This is the reason why President Trump has said today, when we are recording this, that Hamas would need to disarm or will blow them up or something of the sorts. Right? And because of that, they won't be able to work with no threats as long as Hamas is armed. As to the question, are they affiliated with the Palestinian Authority in Fatah? Absolutely. Every single one of them has some sort of an affiliation with either Fatah, the Palestinian Authority, either through family members or other means. The person who's supposed to be the interior minister responsible for, for instance, Homeland Security in Gaza, a man called Sami Nasman, General Samin Usman, is an intelligence official of the Palestinian Authority or former intelligence official of the Palestinian Authority. By the way, this man, Samin Assman, has an arrest warrant against him that was issued by Hamas, and he's supposed to sit in hamas jail for 15 years for allegedly collaborating with Israel. And this is the man who's waiting to Enter the Gaza Strip. So he's an arch enemy of Hamas, and that's a huge story. If they let him in because they might try to kill him.

[C]

Amit. According to sources cited in influential Arabic press, Hamas is weighing a coordinated departure from Gaza following the rollout of phase two. Is that consistent with your reporting? How realistic is it? And where on earth would Hamas go if they were to actually leave?

[B]

So basically, what we have to bear in mind regarding Hamas is that it has a huge mobility in terms of its purpose and its functioning. It's an animal that can actually change shapes and change function according to the situation. I'll give an example. It began its monstrous career in the 80s as a welfare organization. Then it turned in the 90s to a terrorist organization. Then in 2007, it all of a sudden became a government, a state. Now in April 2024, all of a sudden, Hamas understood that it no longer has an army and it no longer has a government. As a result, they mourned for a month and then they got used to the new situation in which it's a guerrilla organization. And I would like to add another very important thing. Hamas is like the story from the book of Genesis about the seven good years and the seven bad years. So Hamas has had 17, or had had 17 very, very good years. It ruled Gaza, it became a power in the Muslim world, but now it gets used to the. So Israel's number one mission is not to come to terms and not to put up with the situation. According, Gaza is relatively. Everything is relative, relatively peaceful. And that again, Israel buys time at the expense of let Hamas get away with terrorist activity. That's the thing. Now, according to this main principle, they will do almost everything that doesn't demand them to actually demilitarize, because their raison d' etre is the weapons, both tunnels and Kalachnikov rifles. I think those are the two very important ingredients. And that's why you are going to see many ceremonies. I guess they're going to hand over weapons, maybe RPG missiles, etc. But, and that's why it was so important that Netanyahu mentioned the number 60,000 Kalachnikov rifles in Gaza. Because as long as we don't see 60,000 Kalatnikov rifles handed over to the new government, we know that Hamas is still there. And that's why Israel should not agree to anything less than the full demilitarization of disarmament of Hamas.

[C]

Okay, I want to come back to that. I also want to understand this yellow line, the future of the yellow line. You know, we've talked about this East Berlin, West Berlin model on the podcast. Meaning that part of Gaza will be the Gaza of the future, and part of Gaza will be Hamas stand and let Palestinians in Gaza ultimately choose which one they want. What does it mean for phase two? I understand that was the vision for phase one. In phase two, Nadav, will the IDF retreat from behind the yellow line?

[A]

So, of course the IDF doesn't want to retreat at all. The next retreat. We mentioned this in.

[C]

And why not?

[A]

Because Israel doesn't want to give any grounds right now in Gaza unless it knows that it has completely. Not only Hamas has been disarmed, but Ghaza had been demilitarized. Meaning also the tunnels and everything else. Now, there is an agreement out there, and there are the demands of the Trump administration, and it's going to be the decision of the president made in the Oval Office. If the president is going to order the Prime Minister to have another retreat as part of this new Palestinian government there and as part of the process of Hamas disarming, Netanyahu is going to do that. For the first time this week, Dan, we have seen the attempts by Netanyahu to show his dissatisfaction with some issues related to Gaza. This is the first time that we had anything that is public dissatisfaction.

[C]

With the Trump plan for Gaza?

[A]

No, with the implementation of the plan.

[C]

Okay, got it.

[A]

There was an announcement by the Prime Minister's office that some elements were not coordinated with Israel and that the Prime Minister has asked the Foreign Minister Sar to speak about this and raise these issues with Marco Rubio. Now, that's a very funny statement coming from the Prime Minister's office. And I see that you're smiling, but let me explain that to our listeners as well. I think you know that Prime Minister Netanyahu doesn't need Guidon Sar. With all due respect to Guidon Sar, who's the foreign minister to speak with Marco Rubio. If the Prime Minister wants to voice his dissatisfaction, he can text Steve Witkoff.

[C]

Or he can text Marco Rubio.

[B]

Or President Trump.

[C]

Yeah, or President Trump.

[B]

Right, Nadav? It reminds me of the story when I'm afraid of speaking to my wife. So I tell my son, you talk to Mama. Okay.

[A]

And then we learned that before issuing that message from the Prime Minister's office, Netanyahu actually did speak with Marco Rubio personally over the phone. So what was he doing there? By voicing his concern dissatisfaction, saying it's not coordinated with Israel. This is huge in terms of the ideal harmony between the White House and Jerusalem. Was it coordinated to some extent. It sounds like this was coordinated between the sides. I'm gonna say I don't like it and I'm gonna ask SA to speak with you. And they're trying to contain this. But there is friction there. And here's the friction relates to what you asked. Then, for instance, is there gonna be another withdrawal? For now, for instance, we are hearing that Israel is still not allowing the bureaucrats, the Palestinian bureaucrats, to enter the Gaza Strip from Rafah. It's not signing off on their entry. So these are examples. Now, this is the beginning. It's going to happen. We're speaking today, tomorrow morning, Israel time, there's going to be a ceremony in Davos. In that ceremony, the executive board for Gaza of the Council of Peace is going to be announced. The President is going to be there. We still don't know who's going to be the Israeli representative there because the Prime Minister is not in Davos and the Israeli president is not a representative of the government. Herzog is in Davos. But this is going to be the beginning of the process.

[B]

I think that the dispute between Israel and the US is smaller than appears and that it's a compromise for Netanyahu, something like, let bygones be bygones and I'll explain for Israel, this membership in this body is something which is quite remote from Gaza itself. For Israel, and I would like to add for the UAE and Saudi Arabia too, it doesn't make sense to give the patrons of Hamas to actually be in charge of trying to demilitarize it, because Turkey hosts in Istanbul senior members of Hamas. By the way, there is a secret agreement between their intelligence service and our intelligence service that the Kidon unit, those are in charge of assassinations, would not operate in Istanbul. So this is a shelter, a safe haven for Hamas senior members. And Qatar has funded Hamas since the beginning of the millennium, almost. So it doesn't make any sense. However, it makes a perfect sense for President Trump to have Qatar and Turkey, which are rising powers both in the Middle east and worldwide, to take part in its Board of Peace, the substitute for the un. So for Israel, it was quite a compromise, which made sense to actually put up with this and write a comment when Shabbat ends and the National Orthodox Knesset members start being furious about it, to publish an announcement, only in Hebrew, in which SAR is to talk to Rubio. And I'm quite sure Rubio is still shocking awe from the phone call from Mr. Saar. I'm not sure the US is going to survive this phone call, I mean, 249 years are one thing, but from now on, history would remember the United States as something utterly different.

[A]

I feel that you're slightly sarcastic towards the actions of the Prime Minister of Israel.

[B]

Yeah. You are not the first one to.

[A]

Tell me this, Amit.

[C]

What about the International Stability Force or International Security Force, what they call the isf? What is this thing going to do?

[B]

What people thought it would do is to actually demilitarize Gaza and dismantle Hamas. What it is actually going to do is to be like the police in the eastern part of Gaza, controlled militarily by Israel, the new Rafah, the new city, funded by the Emirates, secured by Israel and policed by the international force. They are not going under any circumstances to fight against Hamas members inside West Gaza, which is still controlled by Hamas. So this is one very important ingredient which leads us to the question. So when President Trump says that Hamas is going to be demilitarized, actually the last option that remain the default is that the IDF, sooner or later, in 60 days, 90 days, you name it, is going to reinvade Gaza and try to conquer significant part of it in order to dismantle Hamas. So we are going to actually waste, quote, unquote, waste Trump's number one achievement in international policy in his first year of his second term, which is ending the war in Gaza. So it doesn't work. And I would like to offer two explanations. One is the explanation of President Trump himself, which would, I guess, would tell you, had he been asked here, how.

[A]

Do you explain it?

[B]

He would say, you didn't believe in the past that I'm going to release each and every single hostage. So trust me now as well, I'm going to dismantle Hamas and demilitarize Gaza. This is one explanation. But the second explanation, in my opinion, is that when push comes to shove, the IDF is not going to relaunch a full scale war in Gaza. The purpose is to have a pinpoint operation, weeks, not months or years, in order to actually force Hamas to being demilitarized. This is supposed to be the outcome. And that's how both President Trump can say, I ended the war with HAMAS and the IDF can operate inside the 42% controlled by Hamas.

[C]

Nadav, what's your reaction to that?

[A]

At the end of the day, we should at least assume that there could be a bluff here. Amit spoke about so many Kalachnikovs, I'm going to give a spoiler here. I don't think we're going to see 60,000 Kalachnikovs being assembled, being collected in the Gaza Strip, and here's why. Because Israel controls the West Bank, Judea and Samaria. Since 1967, it's having some sort of a security control at all, if not most, if not all, of Judea and Samaria. There are are so many weapons over there that aren't controlled by Israel or by the Palestinian Authority. It's a heavily armed area. And that's one of the problems that Israel has in the West Bank. So I don't see these weapons really collected in the Gaza Strip. What I do see is the possibility that there would be some sort of disarmament, that Hamas would be able to say, here are tunnels and here is some weapons and machinery to produce maybe rockets or something like that, and everybody will play along. Unless, of course, Prime Minister Netanyahu is extremely serious about renewing the war. As Amit said, and I agree, the only force in the world that can actually disarm Hamas and is willing to sacrifice the lives of its soldiers to do so is the idf. And even the IDF doesn't think it would be the right move right now to renew the war in Gaza. And here's why. Because Hamas is surrounded. It's weakened again, as Amit has said, it's also surrounded and encircled. If you look at this, diplomatically speaking, its ability to rebuild its force in these enclaves in Gaza are limited. And now, unlike before, we also have a different governance in Gaza that also means more intelligence, more incentive on the ground to maybe fight Hamas. I would add to that that there is a big question of who's going to manage security in Gaza, Sort of answering to that government of bureaucrats, who's going to be their police force? And to that, what I'm hearing is that they are going to have a Gaza police force that is allegedly not affiliated with Hamas. What does it mean? It means that they will need to bring in people from Judea and Samaria and to arm them, or they will need to arm Gazans. And all of this is going to be done under the hospice of the Council of Peace, with the backing of the government of Israel. This entire question, Dan, should rotate around the Israeli elections.

[C]

It should or will.

[A]

It should and it will. Okay, we can't analyze the question of what's going to happen in Gaza without remembering the context. And the context is that this is a crucial election for both sides. Like every elections in Israel are the most dramatic elections elections in history.

[C]

They always are, though.

[A]

But I think this one is.

[C]

This one really is.

[A]

Yeah, the first one after October 7th, I think.

[C]

Right, exactly.

[A]

I think we're going to look back and we're not going to say, oh, no, it turned out not to be not that important. No, it's a really important elections. And for Netanyahu, I think the way that he looks at this is first and foremost political risk analysis. If he does that, what does it mean in terms of the election? We're already seeing the far right in Israel attacking him for what's happening in Gaza. And we're seeing the center in Israel, the IR Lapi, the chairman of the opposition, attacking him for what's happening in Gaza. And this could get much worse.

[C]

Let's take a short break to hear a word from our sponsor. Lately, many people have been asking me, where can I go to think more seriously about this moment in Jewish life? Among my strong recommendations, the Shalom Hartman Institute's Community Leadership program in Jerusalem. This summer. From July 1 through July 7, you can study with scholars I respect and admire, including Danielle Hartman and Yossi Klein Halevi, hosts of ARC Media's For Heaven's Sake podcast, and Tal Becker, a frequent guest here on Call Me Back. Join dedicated learners from around the world, including lay leaders and philanthropists, for an immersive week of study, conversation and community. Explore big Jewish ideas and wrestle with the challenges facing Israel and Jewish communities today in conversation with top Hartman scholars. In this moment, being in Israel matters. So does learning together, asking hard questions and imagining what comes next. If you're looking for a summer learning experience grounded in meaning, debate, community and possibility, this is an invitation worth accepting. Space is limited and last summer this program was sold out. So learn more and reserve your spot [e-mail] CLP. Okay, I want to ask you both what is going on for day to day life of Gazan Palestinians? Like, we're talking all about these boards and the Board of Peace and the technocrats and who the technocrats accountable to and the police force and the yellow line and the disarmament and the demilitarization and. And if you're an average Palestinian living in Gaza, what is life for you? Like now start with you, Nadav, and then have you Amit, jump in.

[A]

So life is miserable in Gaza. Many Gazans live in tents. It's a difficult winter in the Middle East. Not as difficult as the Eastern coast in the United States, but still for people who know what winter is like in Israel, it's windy, it's very rainy, there is no sanitary systems in much of the areas of Gaza. Children are living Their life soaking wet in some parts of Gaza. And many children, if not most children, are still not in any educational framework of system or schools. Most of the schools, as they were, don't exist anymore. There is a beginning of a school system done through tents and makeshift housing. Across Gaza, unemployment is skyrocketing. The economy isn't really working. What really fuels the economy today in Gaza, I'm speaking with both Palestinian sources, but also Israeli sort of defense officials, is the aid. There is an enormous amount of aid that is coming and food and everything that's coming into Gaza. It's being controlled by the Hamas officials, it's being resold to the public, but that there is nothing coming out in terms of product from Gaza. And looking into the future, nobody knows how this would actually change in a positive way or quickly enough. By building of institutions, by people going back to work. Unemployment in Gaza was always high, even before October 7th. By high I mean dozens of percentiles. People need to understand that. I don't mean like 7%. Okay? I mean like 30% among men, but this is even worse.

[C]

Amit, anything to add there?

[B]

I would say that the main difference, Gaza was a miserable place. I agree that it's in its lowest point since 1949, the end of the officials independence war with all the refugee camps. Now 80% of Gaza are basically a huge refugee camp, not only by name. Today it's really a refugee camp. The weather is bad like in New York City. The leadership is pro Hamas, like in New York City. If I want to be more serious. The main difference is that there is no horizon in the past. What was the plan by Sinoar and his predecessors? The plan was that we are going to have a military operation and then we are going to suffer to take heavy damages. But once the operation ends, the Arab world would actually aid Gaza with billions of dollars for the recovery. You know, the cement or, I don't know, concrete would be used for tunnels, what we call double usage materials. However, since Israel's conclusion from October 7 was that Qatari money and Arab aid is used first and foremost to reoperate and recover Hamas's war machine. So Israel refuses to enter into Gaza anything but food, iPhones and some other marginal products, which means that there are no buildings to be built in the coming future. Now I heard something, a brilliant idea by a senior Israeli officer. He said, since, as Nadav said, we're not going to see 60,000 Kalachikov rifles handed over to Israel or the international community, why won't we agree on a Price tag. For instance, you want a new high school. Okay, give us 500 Kalachikov rifles. You want a new hospital. Okay, no worries. Just reveal the locations of three different attack tunnels. And that's how it works twice. Once you get more demilitarization of Gaza, and second, for the first time, you know that the recovery doesn't go for first and foremost for Hamas and only then for the population, but you actually switch the chessboard. This is a very interesting idea. I hope someone really considers it.

[C]

Looking at domestic Israeli politics, back to Nadav's point, this is the most important.

[B]

Election, another disaster area with no leadership.

[C]

How is the Israeli political right responding to this rollout of phase two?

[B]

Not very happy, very confused. And I think that they still give Netanyahu credit for the next few months before the elections. Why? Because there is a difference between what we hear from Witkoff about phase two and what we hear from President Trump, which says, and I'm going to unleash hell upon Hamas if they do not demilitarize, etc. I think it's still too early to call. I still don't know whether Netanyahu is going to have a military operation before the election or to run to the election with, among other things, pledges to actually finish the job in Gaza.

[C]

Nadav, how is the opposition responding? The parties that I mentioned in the introduction, the Bennetts, the Eisencots, the Yair Golans.

[A]

Well, first of all, why talk about the opposition? The most toxic opposition to Netanyahu's leadership comes from his own government, from the things that Smotrich, for instance, has said this week, saying stuff like, we need to tell President Trump that the plan is dead, or I'm paraphrasing on the argument. So the far right in Netanyahu's government is extremely unhappy, Dan, with this plan or moving ahead, any withdrawal there, any armed Palestinian force, the Palestinian government attached to the Palestinian Authority. Might I remind us all the expressions about no Hamas and no Abbas, meaning Abu Mazen? Well, of course, right now in Gaza, what we have, just practically speaking, factually speaking, we have Hamas and we're going to have Abbas.

[C]

Abbas meaning technocrats from Ramallah, from the Palestinian Authority that are led by Mahmoud Abbas.

[A]

Yeah. Now, I don't want to be simplistic about that. I don't want to say. And that means that everything's lost. No, we got the hostages back and Hamas is isolated. And I actually think it's a good idea to have this bureaucratic government. But if you think about these kind of slogan going to stop until every single Hamas person is disarmed and all Kalachnikovs are collected and what real life looks like, it's very different. And I think we need to recognize that. And that gives ammunition to yay, Lapid. It gives ammunition to Smotrich and Ben to say, if you want Netanyahu not to head to the center and to agree for everything, you need us strong. Don't vote for the Likud, vote for the far right, because Netanyahu will need the far right in the next elections. And of course, Lapid and Bennett and Lieberman are using this to make the point, and that's a really important point that the opposition, the centrist opposition is trying to make. They're not attacking him from the left. Definitely not. They're not really attacking him from the right. What they're really saying is Netanyahu is full of hot air. And that's it. That's the real point that Bennett is trying to make, that Netanyahu can't achieve anything. You know, he surrenders to Qatar, he surrenders to the US he's not achieving the strategic goals of Israel. This is what they're trying to build upon. And Gaza, for them is a test for that. Whether or not it's going to work and convince the Israeli public, I'm not sure. Netanyahu, on the other hand, I think Amit will agree with me, will go with the line that I always worked with for him, and that is say to the public, if you elect these guys, just imagine what's going to happen in terms of security. I might not be the optimal person, but they're gonna be with the Arab parties, they're gonna be with the Muslim Brotherhood. They're gonna surrender for everything. And that always worked for Netanyahu. And I'm sure that he's gonna definitely not gonna say, I'm gonna bring a new Middle East, I'm gonna bring peace. That's not gonna be Netanyahu's line in the next elections.

[B]

But, you know, this conversation was almost impossible to imagine on October 8, 2023, or October 9 would run on the basis of, I'll do way better in terms of security than my opponents. Following 1200 victims in six hours is something unheard of. I'm not sure Gaza is the raison d' etre of Netanyahu's campaign. I think he would like to actually zoom out to the bigger picture, to.

[A]

Say, listen, maybe his achievements with the conscription law. Maybe.

[B]

Maybe, by the way, maybe. I guess you were kidding, but I'M not sure Netanyahu is kidding about it, but I think Netanyahu would try to zoom out. It's not Gaza, it's the entire Middle East.

[C]

Yeah. Transformation of Israel's status in the Middle East.

[B]

Absolutely.

[A]

I don't know. I just read a very interesting article by a young and coming commentator in Israel, A Segal, who wrote in Israel, Ayom, about the way that Saudi Arabia has been rabidly attacking Israel in its media in general in the last few months and is absolutely not in the direction of having.

[B]

And that's why I don't think normalization is going to be on the table. I think he's going to speak about a new Middle east, but not in the terms of the old Paris terms of, you know, peace and security, but about Iran cooperation with the moderate parts. And listen, we defeated Iran. I'll put it this way. If the Iranian regime falls before the election against 90% of the polls, I will tell you that Netanyahu is going to win it. I mean, Iran and Netanyahu fighting Iran and Netanyahu. I mean, it's something that everyone knows it's in Netanyahu's pocket. So if he comes to the election with this achievement, and let's hope, hope all of us, that he comes not for Netanyahu, Netanyahu's campaign, but for the peace of the world and the Middle East. So it would dramatically improve his situation. However, if he goes to the polls when there is still fighting in Gaza and with very bad pictures of Hamas rearming, et cetera. So I think it might cause him to lose ground politically.

[A]

Netanyahu's best argument indeed is with the condition of Hezbollah and Iran and the proxies across the region. And this is the credit that he, he should have go for saying for years we're going to tackle Iran. And at the end, he managed to get a green light from the United States and for the United States, of course, to participate in that.

[C]

And he managed the relationship with Washington, especially as it relates to June of 2025, that he may have been uniquely skilled for.

[A]

By the way, at the time, he didn't see a bump in the polls following Iran. He was very frustrated personally, from it. He thought he was going to see a huge bump in the poll because this is really something that you can say this was Netanyahu's agenda. No other prime minister spoke about Iran the same way. And it sort of happened. And I agree with Amit that if the regime will fall, this could change everything. But right now, I hear very few people in Israel that think that the regime itself would fall. Some people think, and we spoke about this, Dan, that the regime will change from within. But if that happens, that could actually be worse for Israel, the regime sort of putting lipstick on a pig than the regime staying the course that it has right now because the course right now is disastrous. And an internal reform in Iran that will make this regime stronger. That's not going to play well in the region. It's not going to play well for Netanyahu. But this is in the future. And the present is so complex. So we better not stare into the abyss of the future. Right.

[C]

One week at a time here on Call Me Back. That's what we're focused on. So. All right, Amit Nadav, I know it's late in Israel. Thank you for doing this. You brought some, a little bit of clarity to a lot of confusion. And on the topic of this being the most important election about to be the most important election, we will be digging into those scenarios with you guys. I was teaching a group of high school students this morning in New York City and I work with this one group every year. And every year I say this is the most important and interesting time in Israeli politics. In 2022, during the Bennett Lapid seven party government, I told the students it's the most interesting. But in 2023, during judicial reform, I said this is the most interesting time. I told them today this is the most interesting time. I really believe it is.

[A]

I always tell that to delegations coming to Israel when they invite me to speak. You're coming in such an amazing time. How did you pick these dates to visit here when so many important things are happening? And it's always true, right?

[B]

Yeah, absolutely. I think that it's the second most interesting elections. Second only to the next election in.

[C]

2028 or second only to the series of Israeli elections that'll happen one after the other in 2026.

[B]

Exactly. The second 2026 campaign in December.

[C]

Yeah, that's what I think is most likely to happen. But whatever. Conversation for another day. Gentlemen, thank you.

[B]

Thank you so much.

[A]

Thank you. Foreign.

[C]

That'S our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavael Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to ark media.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. ARC Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio Community Management by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval SEM. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. This moment calls for learning, reflection and imagining what comes next. Don't miss the chance to be part of the Shalom Hartman Institute's Community Leadership Program in Jerusalem this summer. Reserve your spot [e-mail] CLP.