A (3:25)

But before today's conversation, a word from our sponsor. Over the years I've written about a lot of Israeli innovations, but among those I missed early on United Hatzala of Israel, the country's largest nonprofit, independent, all volunteer, completely free emergency medical service. The idea began about 30 years ago with a single devastating moment. A child was choking. It took 21 minutes for an ambulance to arrive. By then it was too late. The child did not survive. That tragedy became the founding impulse for United Hatzala, revolutionizing emergency medical care in Israel by placing life saving skills and equipment directly in the hands of volunteer medics. So help arrives fast and often before an ambulance arrives. Learn about United Hatzala's life saving work at IsraelRescue.org CallMeBack and stay tuned to hear from a hero medic who responded to the terrible attacks of October 7th.

B (4:35)

Now onto today's episode. For years, something like over a decade, the operating assumption in Jerusalem and in many foreign policy focused circles in Washington has been that Saudi normalization with Israel would be the key to unlocking the region, bring real growth, economic growth and security to the region. But beneath the surface, we're seeing a sharp and unexpected rivalry heating up inside the Gulf between Mohammed bin Salman, MBS in Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed, MBZ in the Emirates. This was the topic of the most recent episode of Arc Media's what's yous Number? Podcast, hosted by Yonatan Adiri and Yael Wisner Levy. The episode followed a piece Yonatan wrote for Yidioth Ahrenot in Israel, arguing that the reason for Saudi Arabia's confrontational approach toward the UAE is triggered by the power that the UAE has been quietly amassing through economic means, infrastructure and new global partnerships. Now, there's a lot to unpack here, some of which I agreed with in Yonatan's piece and his discussion with Yael last week, some of which I disagreed with. So to try to understand this feud between Riyadh and the Emirates, I thought we'd bring Anyael and Yonatan to call me back to discuss. Yonatan and Yael, thanks for being here.

D (5:52)

Thanks, Dan.

C (5:52)

Thanks for having us.

B (5:53)

Before we jump into the conversation, I do want to just recommend to all of our listeners to subscribe to Yonatan and Yael's podcast. What's your number? Please follow the link in the show notes. It's excellent. I am a religious listener and they have developed a real loyal following and I think you'll understand why when you sign up. Okay, so let's jump into things. Yonatan. Anyone listening to this podcast would know that only a few months ago hope was in the air as it relates to some kind of normalization with Saudi Arabia, which, as the vision would have it, could usher in a new age in the Middle East. And then the theory goes, or the perception goes, I'm not sure it's reality, but the perception goes that MBS begins to take a harder stand as it relates to Israel and separately, a hostile stance towards the uae. Now, obviously there are different accounts of what came first, whether one is just collateral damage from the other. But be that as it may, those are the two trends that people are seeing out there. But that is, as I see it, a very Israel centric perspective. So before we dive into these stories, let's just turn the table around to better understand MBS's point of view. What has been shaping MBS's political and geopolitical moves these past months. And also maybe take us back to before these past few months where we thought Saudi Arabia was on one path and now you and others would argue he's on a different path.

D (7:19)

Thanks, Dan. It's good to be back. I think a few weeks ago when we had the episode with Mark Dubowitz and we started unfolding these dynamics in the Iran context, I mentioned that I think the core here is actually the internal dynamics in Saudi Arabia. So let's just kind of recap that. My understanding of what's going on is the following. I admire Mohammed bin Salman for the political reform he's trying to execute in Saudi Arabia. But if you take a closer look, the magnitude of the reform and the probability of its success is very, very delicate. About a decade ago, Mohammed bin Salman embarked on a path that is a 180 degree divergence from three pillars of 100-year-old policy or political reality in Saudi Arabia. 1, 100 years of oil, easy capital in zero agency, kind of numbing any idea of creativity in the Saudi private sector. The second piece was 100 years of misogyny. We are entering in the last five, six years that women are allowed to sort of walk around in public in Saudi Arabia. That is a very, very profound change in the structure and the culture of the society. And the third is, if you will, the removal or the rebalancing of a very, I want to say, radical or assertive sect in Islam, the Wahhabi sect that has been dominating Saudi Arabia for so long. In many ways, Mohammed bin Salman is trying to do three things at the same time. To be Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, to drive Saudi Arabia from third world to first when it comes to knowledge, economy, creativity, AI and so on. He's trying to be Martin Luther, create a reform in Islam, kind of shaping a different dynamic with the Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia and remove them from diplomatic and state corridors when it comes to policy and to bring women into the workforce, a person who brings in property, equality, all that then in less than 15 years, with clear KPIs for 2030. And what we're seeing right now is that it's not working. The internal dynamics in Saudi Arabia, the failure to meet the goals of 2030, are, in my mind, what's driving this turn of events, just for our listeners.

B (9:36)

To understand the history. So what you just described was the path that MBS was on, and I think that was a very good summary. And people ask, well, how was he empowered to be on that path? So he becomes Crown Prince in 2015, and he's technically not the king of Saudi Arabia. And yet everything you just described, he's been driving. So he's been driving this now for a little over a decade. And he's a young crown prince. He's expected to obviously be the next king. This is a man who could be running Saudi Arabia for like, the next, the half century almost. So the fact that he has been empowered and empowered himself and the people around him to be on this path over the last decade, and the fact that it's understood that he's such a strong power within the kingdom that he will be around for so long. Every move he makes here that you just described, it's not just, like, important in the moment. The stakes are extraordinary. For, like, decades to come, our listeners.

D (10:33)

Some of them, will remember that the first thing he did is put the elite of all those three segments in the Ritz Carlton in Saudi Arabia in a form of a very prestigious house arrest, in preparing the ground for royal recalibration of wealth so that Saudi Aramco can go public. It is now a public company. We know now that it turns order of magnitude 130, $140 billion net profit per year for the kingdom. And he tried to rebalance and recreate, you know, the Saudi Arabia that he believes in. Dan, in the last few weeks, we've seen a failure of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 to meet its foreign direct investment goals significantly below target. We've seen Saudi Arabia recalibrate its two big national projects, NEOM and the Line, cutting them down by 30, 40, 50%. And we've seen Saudi Arabia just a week ago fire its minister of Investments and reinstate another person into that role. The turmoil in the economic dynamics of the third of his vision, the Lee Kuan Yew part, right, is clearly failing. And the question I think he's asking himself is how do I balance that? Everybody's seeing that I'm failing in this path. I cannot be seen as weak, and which of the other parts can I push against to be seen as a strong monarch and so on? He cannot push internally against the Wahhabi sect, and he can push in the diplomatic dynamic, and he chose to push against mbz.

B (11:59)

Okay, I want to come back to that. And just before I bring Alan, I just want to again, SCENE table setting here. Two other big events that happened in his rise and the power moves, you know, the policy decisions he's made, I just want to add to them because they're important to the discussion as we get into it. One is, soon after he comes to power, he makes a decision as it relates to Yemen and serious Saudi military action in Yemen. I just think that's important for people to understand. What did Saudi Arabia do in Yemen almost a decade ago? And I just want to establish that because it sets up this conversation.

D (12:30)

The Saudi air force even 10 years ago has the second largest F15 squadron in the world outside of the US it is not Israel, it is not any NATO army, not even Turkey. And it deployed its military, its air force in a very aggressive set of strikes against Yemen. There's a very long border, Saudi Arabia, and the Crown Prince is interested above everything else in stability in the region so that he can try and achieve his goals for 2030. Yemen threatened that to the tune Dan of firing ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. The aggressive nature of the Saudi assault into Yemen is something that, you know, human rights organizations were monitoring closely in very unfavorable terms to Mohammed bin Salman. He's also won some criticism in Western capitals because of that. At the end of the day, though, the big tension of his first round into the 2030 division came actually from the Democratic side, where he was not willing to accept the notion of freedom of press, which is what you need to build a knowledge economy. And the person who paid the price was Khashoggi. And then he was called by none other, by President Biden, a pariah. And so I think we need to look at the first calibration, which ended up with outspoken thoughts about Israeli Saudi normalization. You had Brett McGurk on the show, who was the architect of that from the White House, was a plea to win back legitimacy in Washington, and that went through normalization with Jerusalem. That is no longer the case. And I think that's why the failure of the 2030 plan. One casualty, direct casualty is MBZ. The secondary casualty is Israel, as he feels that he got everything he needed from Trump. He's now a legitimate leader in the region and in Western capitals. And I think that' way to kind of think about the last decade.

B (14:24)

Okay, so Yael Yonatan outlined these pressures that MBS has been under specifically as it relates to Israel. There were a number of very public signals that MBS had made. The two that are most stark for me in terms of how committed Saudi Arabia appeared to be under MBS towards some kind of normalization with Israel. One was on September 23, 2023, so 16 days before October 7, in which the Prime Minister of Israel is speaking at the UN General assembly, and he talks about Saudi normalization with Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu and all these diplomats, all these Arab diplomats walk out of the General assembly hall while the prime minister is speaking, except for the Saudi diplomat. And soon after that speech, Prime Minister Netanyahu, MBS is asked about it in an interview, and he says something that's certainly not brushing it aside or shooing it away. So all the signals are there, I will say, at a very personal level. I met with MBS and 2018. At this point, I'm not disclosing anything confidential because it was reported all over the press. I was in a meeting with a few others in April of 2018 in which he talked openly about all the advantages Saudi Arabia could imagine in terms of some kind of integration with Israel. So this was out there. He was in the middle of what seemed to be some kind of process that was only heading in one direction. We could debate how fast it was moving, how slow it was moving, but it was only heading in one direction. So I just want to set that up. So how has everything Yonatan just described affected his position, MbS's position towards Israel in recent Months.

C (15:53)

So there's definitely an effect if we do look at the big picture. And I don't want to belittle the effect it has on Israel. It does have an effect, but it's not just a spat between MBS and mbz. This is kind of. The Washington Post called it an epic feud. Right. It's going to really polarize the region and Israel is going to be collateral damage. Perhaps, but it's not the eye of the storm. That is important to remember when we talk about the effects of this on Israel. But who knows how strong normalization was in the first place.

B (16:20)

Meaning we may have overstated how viable it was.

C (16:23)

Exactly. Mbs, at the end of the day, as Jonathan said, he has a lot on his plate. He's attempting maybe the most ambitious political pivot in modern Saudi history and his numbers aren't cooperating. At the end of the day, he's a political figure. His vision is underperforming. His debt is rising, oil is still dominating, so his economic KPIs are slipping and so he has to compensate it politically. So I don't want to undermine the effect it has in Israel. In practical terms, there have been Saudi linked narratives that have been framing the uae, for instance, as Israel's Trojan horse and even as Israel's proxy executing Zionist plans. So that's rhetoric that is risky. It's turning normalization into ammunition and really becoming a political tool more than anything else.

B (17:05)

Okay, and what is the nature of the relationship between MBS and mbz? I have heard Yonatan MBZ described as a mentor.

C (17:13)

Yeah.

B (17:14)

To mbs.

D (17:15)

So when we want to understand the magnitude of the change, these two men have had a long standing relationship that was framed many times by Mohammed bin Salman himself as him being the mentee of Mohammed bin Zayed of uae, basically being the mentor, not just for him, but for the entire region. So much so that the two men collaborated in an effective blockade against Qatar that lasted a good number of months as they both tried to uproot the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood on the region. And so these two men not have only had a relationship of trust. They've collaborated around mutual interests in line with Mohammed bin Salman's 2030 goals. So this is not some random issue, this is 180 degree pullback. Which by the way begs the question, if Mohammed bin Salman can do that to his mentor, what would he have done with an Israeli normalization had that been in effect right now?

B (18:11)

I do want to just explain this dynamic though, this geopolitical dynamic. So can You, Yonatan, just briefly explain what is the tension in Yemen, because that seems to be the flashpoint that has challenged this relationship between these two men. Presumably they both want quiet in Yemen, so why has the way they're each pursuing quiet resulted in a rupture in the relationship between UAE and Saudi Arabia, given that they both, one would think, want the same thing in Yemen?

D (18:39)

Colleagues of mine in the Gulf call the diplomacy of the Gulf something along the lines of quantum diplomacy, meaning you can be aligned with your partner on certain issues and your partner can be your enemy on others. So while there are areas of disagreement between Saudi Arabia and the UAE overall vis a vis Sudan, vis a vis the Horn of Africa, Yemen traditionally and supposedly the moderate Sunni axis, as they were called until recently, also vis a vis Israel and the U.S. it seems like, at least to me, that the Yemen thing is. I don't say an excuse, but it was that gasket that exploded that allowed for the steam to be blown from Riyadh in Abu Dhabi's direction. To keep it simple, the UAE supported a separatist movement in Yemen that had gained a couple of months ago access to the shores and declared itself an independent movement of democratic nature, if you will, or at least pro west, pro uae, anti Houthi, anti Iran type of territory.

B (19:44)

They call themselves the Southern Transitional Council.

D (19:46)

The stc. Exactly.

B (19:48)

The STC and the Emirates are supporting this stc. This resulted in what was perceived as the UAE supporting some kind of military action right by Saudi Arabia's border. And this forced Saudi Arabia to basically give some ultimatum to the Emirates to pull back their support for the SDC or this one particular military operation.

D (20:06)

That's the story Saudi Arabia tells. It could have been resolved diplomatically. And it just from the UAE's perspective, the kinetic surprise, the fact that airplanes flew out of Saudi Arabia and bombed a UAE sponsored convoy was one step too much. And as Yael said, this was orchestrated. This was not a single event after that. We saw enormous pressure coming out of Saudi, both formal and proxy digital forces. And then they actually use the word regime change in the uae, calling for the Emir of Sharjah to compete with Mohammed bin Zayed, Emir of Sharjah, being.

B (20:43)

Another emirate within uae.

D (20:45)

Another emirate, exactly.

B (20:46)

Okay, Yael, undergirding all of this is the economic strategy of the UAE. Can you talk a little bit about what the UAE's strategy is, what it's specifically its economic strategy has been? And then I know you've spent a lot of time in India and with various Players within India. By your lights, there's an India factor here playing in all of this. So can you walk us through both of those?

C (21:08)

The UAE has its own kind of soft power and it's called quiet diplomacy or, you know, infrastructure diplomacy. And what I mean by that is that instead of shouting, instead of the rhetoric it's building, it has ports and corridors, sovereign capital. And you know, when it normalized relations with Israel, it built leverage. Right. It didn't treat it as some kind of headline maybe also. I mean, it's a great headline to have, but we had new aviation routes and tech funds, energy cooperation. So it's treating normalization as the plumbing behind the scenes and not the politics which we just talked about vis a vis Saudi. And so when we look at the UAE's strategy, long term, it's kind of economic counter moves where Saudi makes shouts and rhetoric. And you see that also not only with Israel, you see that as you said with India, India is kind of like the hinge. And whoever anchors India anchors the next economic corridor between Asia and Europe. And the UAE has been on this early. It's been on the Israel case also early. Now that the Saudi knows that its Vision 2030 depends on plugging into that for its growth engine, it's going to be interesting. As I said, this is not just a spat. It's a real pivotal, polarizing feud.

B (22:17)

Yael, one person close to MBS's thinking described things to me, just thinking about what you just said and what Yonatan was saying earlier about the relationship between MBS and mbz. And this person said to me, this Saudi said to me, look, you need to understand, without the rise of Dubai and the model it created, the glittery, shiny, very modern rise of Dubai economically was that we now think more and more of the Gulf like that are heading in that direction. But when Dubai was on the move in that direction, it was really unheard of. And this Saudi person close to MBS said to me, without that, we may not have had Vision 2030, that that created the example. And the person also said, without the Abraham Accords, we probably wouldn't have had talk about Saudi normalization with Israel, whether it's on track or off track or maybe heading back on track, we'll see. In other words, the degree to which MBS was looking at the moves that UAE were making, it really influenced a lot of how Saudi views its role and its future in the region. And I think it had an effect on other Gulf countries too, for sure.

C (23:23)

You know, when UAE did all of this Dubai positioned itself as India's Gulf gateway. India's obviously one of the fastest growing, if not the fastest growing, major economy and energy consumers. So really setting it up for success. And now the Saudis either can decide if they want to compete for the corridor dominance or build their own without making it too personal. And I think when we look at the relationship between MBS and mbz, it's become so personal. I'm not sure there is room for two when you look at where Modi is hedging, I'm not sure India has chosen itself. So time will tell, but Saudi can still compete for this card or dominance.

B (24:00)

Yonatan, one of the strongest arguments in the piece you wrote is that the real contest in the 21st century is about control over energy routes, ports, economic corridors. Can you just verbally draw us a map? Because it picks up of what Yale was just describing. How are those interests playing out in the region? Just draw us the map.

D (24:19)

So I think an important element here is also the China US dynamic. The corridor between India and Europe referenced as the IMEC India Middle East Europe corridor should be that, you know, China stopper, right? A corridor that starts in India, through Saudi Arabia, through Jordan, Israel and then by the port of Haifa through Cyprus and Greece. And we should say Narendra Modi is supposed to land in Israel within 10 days. So India is active, it's active in Israel. Narendra Modi visited Ethiopia a few weeks back. And I think what Saudi Arabia did, one of the mistakes that MBS did was very early in this feud he called Turkey and Pakistan for security alliance. That raised an eyebrow in New Delhi. And when it comes to the corridors, New Delhi suddenly looks at this and says, hey, if Mohammed bin Salman is also picking up tension between us through this Pakistan deal, then we should think about it the other way around. Now let's talk about the corridors per se. So we have obviously oil and gas in the Arab peninsula. It flows mainly through ships, not through pipes. So lng liquefied natural gas comes out of Qatar into Europe. We have oil that goes out of Saudi Arabia with tankers. So not a lot of pipelines going out of this part of the world. Then we have Central Asia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, all that part which is corridored via pipelines through Turkey, all through Europe. And here's the interesting bit. Adnoc, which is the UAE National Energy company was already planning on this potential dynamic with Saudi Arabia and not being able to execute on the IMEC and on the benefits of a pipeline that would come from Saudi Arabia all the way to Haifa port and has been quietly amassing its position in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. And one of the things that Mohammed bin Zayed did when MBS was acting aggressively and so on, he flew to meet Narendra Modi and they signed agreements that were delayed for about a decade in energy, in foreign investment and in security. A week later he flew to meet Putin. That's Mohammed bin Zayed and basically seeking northern exposure because the routes of Central Asia are opening up. Seems like Putin gave him a green light. And now Turkmenistan is about to be connected via the Caspian Sea to the Azeri pipeline that goes all the way to Europe. Now, dan, just in 60 seconds, this is a critical junction and the UAE has just mastered it and dominated it through three things. Very clever diplomacy, understanding that with Iran weakened, finally the Central Asia going West pipeline could be realized. This was vetoed by Iran and by Russia so far. And UAE seizes that opportunity, cedes the capital, takes first dollar risk and suddenly Turkmenistan, if everything works well, can export its natural gas. It's number four in the world in reserves to Europe instead of to China. So that wraps up the entire cycle. Also vis a vis the American blessing because this oil so far has been and gas has been captive to China due to these geopolitics, the UAE has been really masterfully responding to the Saudi aggression in this context.

A (27:36)

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B (28:34)

So I want to ask you both how now Israel plays in what could be seen as a mess. I hear it from a lot of Israelis, people in the business world, people in the policy making, political world seem to be really stuck about what they should do here. One Israeli official put it to me, and I'm quoting here, Saudis are not undergoing a major strategic reversal. This person wrote to me on WhatsApp. They are responding to realities. Israel is toxic now in the Kingdom, UAE is pursuing policies they the Saudis object to. They calculate that in the current environment being seen as siding with Israel will make it harder for them to wield influence and soft power in places like Syria, key arena. And Israel is not giving them what they want on the Palestinian issue. So what this person is basically saying is, and by the way, I've heard this from a Saudi official that basically said, look, you need to understand, majority of our population, overwhelming majority of our population is under 35 years old. Okay? So that population had known nothing of the Palestinian issue for their lives. The Palestinian issue was just not on the radar. It wasn't part of their experience. It's not like Saudi Arabia participated in wars against Israel, Israel a factor in their lives. The Palestinians weren't a factor in their lives. And suddenly October 7th happened. And whether we get into a whole debate here about how what Israel did in Gaza was accurately portrayed in the pan Arab media, let's just posit that it wasn't. But be that as it may, the way the war was covered in the pan Arab press was such that suddenly all these Saudis under 35 years old now out of nowhere have very strong views about Israel. And so that is what MBS is dealing with here. So again I'm not defending this analysis, but this is an analysis that the environment has changed. Give MBS some breathing room. He's not walking away from Israel. This is a rift between brothers MBZ and mbs. There's not a big strategic change. There may be some tactical changes that we're witnessing. They're probably short term. Let this play out. Israelis need to calm down. Yael, I'll start with you and then have Yonatan respond to that.

C (30:37)

I largely agree with that sentiment. Saudi Arabia has really deep internal issues that Israel just is not at the top. And it's kind of convenient Almost that under 35 year old Saudis have now this portrayal of Israel similar by the way to under 35 year olds around the world. It wasn't only a problem with the pan Arab media. And so if you kind of isolate that power meter and look at all the rest, the rest is not pretty. And I think the core difference between how MBS and MBZ have been dealing vis a vis Israel is that you know, MBS is looking at their Vision 2030 and it's very inward. It's how do we lead from the inward out and diverse, diversify away from oil, attract foreign investment, modernize society basically. And he has a lot of economic KPIs attached to it. None of them have to do with Israel. To kind of answer your question, I agree with this official because MBS has a lot on his plate that has nothing to do with Israel and has everything to do with domestic politics. MBZ is totally different model. They already did their internal reform decades ago. So their strategy doesn't have to go inward and can go outward. He has kind of the luxury of looking outward and seeing how he builds his diplomacy. As I said, the infrastructure, economy there, the quiet diplomacy, controlling the flows, the ins and outs of the region, trade corridors and so forth. So they're already operating like a global hub, as you said, Dan, before building Dubai from the ground up. So it's really a structural difference of visions. In my mind, Israel is collateral damage. But I would agree with this official of sitting tight and not saying much.

B (32:07)

Okay, so Yonatan, I want you to respond to what Yale just said. But before you do, I want to now quote another Israeli official who said to me, look, look, at the end of the day, no UAE means no Abraham Accords. UAE has been central, indispensable. Mbz, there's no better ally of Israel's, both in terms of integration to the Middle east, in terms of confronting Iran, in terms of confronting the Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood forces throughout the Middle east and beyond. And UAE has had Israel's back. And even while some other countries that have warm or warm ish relations with Israel since October 7th made some pretty strident statements against Israel after October 7th, UAE was. It's not to say they didn't have any criticisms, but they were much more measured. They were a much more responsible partner. They've stuck their necks out. It's a tiny country, a population of like one and a half million people. They're small, they're economically mighty, but they are small and we need to have their back. Jonathan, your response?

D (33:06)

Dan? I side completely with Israeli number two. I think this is a test and a trial for Israeli diplomacy. I know for a fact that some members of the defense administration diplomats have obviously engaged on that basis. I think even if, and there is a rumor of what's called in Arabic a sulha, some kind of forgiving ceremony that will happen during the Hajj. Ramadan is starting in a few days. I think it will be like a humiliating walk into Canossa if MBZ does it. But if he does decide to do it and if they sort of repair the rupture, MBZ will not forget who stood by his side quietly and informally. I do hope that the Israeli senior officials who Interact with him and his close circle. Make it clear to them that Israel is an ally. Israel prefers Abraham accords with UAE and current countries to future of normalization with Saudi Arabia. It sees what Saudi Arabia did and it understands the full negative dynamics that unfold through this Saudi move. It is not by chance and that Israel recognizes that. I think this message needs to be heard loud and clear in Abu Dhabi. I totally agree with that. I disagree with the notion that Israel is central to this. I think we have this notion of Israel being the core here, normalization, this, that or the other. These are bigger issues. I think they stem first and foremost from Mohammed bin Salman's challenges in running this, this three part ambitious plan of political reform. And Dad, I think you remember from a year ago when we sat at the podcast and discussed the death of Israel's notion of a villa in the jungle and introducing a new national security concept of regional integration. And we called it from India to Ethiopia, not from Saudi out of respect to mbs, knowing that the risks associated with the breadth of his vision and ambition are so big that Israel cannot allow itself to lean against Saudi Arabia strategically in realizing its own vision for its hundredth year of Jewish sovereignty and prosperity in the land of Israel. That's why I think India is the right partner. Saudi should come into the team, if you will, when it's ripe, when it's ready. Israel can't wait. And I think MBZ and Narendra Modi are critical, if you will. Think about it like a diamond architecture. The north front is Azerbaijan with Aliyev, who is Shiite moderate. The east is Narendra Modi. The core is Abu Dhabi, Israel, uae, Israel. The south is Ethiopia and the west is Greece and Cyprus. That's Israel's future from a regional architecture. And Saudi Arabia should complete its path. And whenever they decide they can join, they'll be welcome.

B (35:47)

The only thing I would say, though, Yonatan, is while I agree with you, MBZ is indispensable, the UAE is indispensable and Israel needs to stand shoulder to shoulder with the uae. If one believes, as I do, that this is probably a temporary spat and this is a strong heated disagreement between brothers that will ultimately make up and get back together. Israel does need to be careful in the period before they make up, needs to be careful about not seeming to burn bridges. You know, you don't want to be like Kramer and Seinfeld who tells Jerry how much he hated his girlfriend after they broke up and then they got back together and it was really awkward. For Kramer, in this situation, Israel does not want to be Kramer.

D (36:26)

No, Dan, I think that's why we need to look at Mohammed bin Salman out of a point of admiration, out of an understanding genuinely what he's going through and trying to make his vision a reality and not out of some kind of criticism, but understanding that India is the candidate for strategic partnership long term until Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Salman, he needs that space to figure it out. I think I have nothing but understanding to the dynamics that drive Mohammed bin Salman. And that's why originally, even before the spat, I thought normalization is great. It cannot be the cornerstone of Israel's regional strategy. India should be that part.

C (37:03)

And maybe not framing normalization as peace, selling it as a corridor, as an economic incentive and making it something that MBS can get optics that he has regional leadership cover and not like a one off.

B (37:15)

Yeah, it's interesting that you say that, Yael, because one Saudi official explained to me that they don't even like the word normalization. They like the word integration, which is interesting. They think normalization almost sells the opportunity too short. That normalization. What's normalization? That things are just going to be normal.

D (37:30)

The origin is a bad translation from Arabic, by the way.

C (37:33)

Exactly.

D (37:35)

From Hebrew, Teva, from nature.

B (37:37)

Yael, you are on the front lines of the Israeli innovation ecosystem. I'm just curious because I know there's been a lot of excitement over the last few years since the Abraham accords in the 2020. If you're a tech entrepreneur or you're a VC investor in Israel or you're an engineer coming up with the next big idea, all this energy between the UAE and Israel has been very exciting of what could be and what will be. Are people in the ecosystem following this, what we're talking about today?

C (38:05)

Absolutely. And I think not every industry within high tech is looking at the uae, but there are certainly some, like defense tech, cyber, that are definitely looking at the UAE not only as funding source, but as a regional partner to kind of test the products out over time. So this is extremely important for both sides and the UAE stuck through, especially on the tech front, despite others shying away from Israel at that time.

B (38:29)

This is something that's top of mind for me right now because as many of our listeners know, I'm involved, co founder and on the board of an organization called Startup Nation Central, which is a organization in Israel based in Tel Aviv that we founded 13 years ago that was inspired by the book that Saul Singer and I wrote that was focused on, among other Things being this connector, this GPS for governments and companies and NGOs and academic institutions and investors around the world that wanted to plug into the Israeli innovation ecosystem to help solve their own problems around the world. When we started the organization, global investment in Israel was $2.6 billion. Last year it was 17 billion. So there's a lot going on and a lot of this has been happening while Israel was in the middle of fighting a seven front war. But we're also cognizant of the fact that the Israeli ecosystem is so established right now in many of the areas that Yael just talked about, that organizations like Startup Nation Central are not as central in terms of getting Israel plugged into the global scene. But we do want to focus on this topic, which is the future of the Abraham Accords. So what we're doing is we're refocusing the organization. We are putting a team together that's really. This is going to be the primary focus, what we call innovation diplomacy at the organization. And I just. This is something we've been hearing, that this track Israel and the Gulf, and specifically Israel and the UAE here needs attention. Yes, it has survived the war, but unless it is constantly being nurtured, we could have problems. And it needs real attention. And obviously our focus is on the economic track. But can you just speak a little bit to. On the one hand, Yonatan, the success the Israeli ecosystem has experienced and yet this, both the promise and the peril of this Abraham Accord situation.

D (40:18)

Well, look, I think first and foremost, as an entrepreneur, ex entrepreneur, I should say, you know, Startup Nation, the book and then the institute, it started as a mega meme, you know, the most successful meme related to Israel in the last 15 years. It actually grew into an ethos when I recruited people, when we went on trade shows, when we dared to dream global dreams, it had a lot to do with this notion that this is startup nation. We can do everything right, everything is doable. So on a personal note, I benefited from the meme. I then benefited from the ethos and then benefited from the institute itself. But I think you're right. We are experiencing the expiration of dead political ideas and political frameworks. It takes a lot of guts to look in the mirror, you know, and say, hey, this idea served us well. It actually exhausted its, you know, power because now there are other challenges that require the brain trust, the capacity, the network that this group of people can put in service of Israel, its ecosystem in the region. It sounds to me like the right move and I'm the first one to applaud. When a group who founded an idea and founded an ethos say, hey, here's reality, here's the ethos. It needs to be recalibrated, what should we be busy with? Where's the greatest contribution that can be made? And it sounds to me like the regional integration. I look at it as a diamond axis right now. Beyond the Abraham Accord is really where we should go, and I think that's the right path.

B (41:43)

Yael Yonatan thank you for doing this. Again, I encourage our listeners to subscribe to what's yous Number for insight into conversations happening inside Israel that we don't always capture on Call Me Back. And you both are important narrators and analysts and participants, your practitioners in the Israeli tech ecosystem. And having that perspective for our broader Call Me Back audience is extremely important. So I look forward to having you guys back on. And again, be sure to listen to.

D (42:15)

What'S your next thanks for having us. Thanks Dan.

B (42:27)

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our.

A (42:31)

Mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavyal Amit Segal and I respond to challenging.

B (42:42)

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A (42:45)

That typically occur after the cameras stop rolling.

B (42:50)

To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go.

A (42:53)

To ark media.org that's ark media.org call.

B (42:58)

Me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. ARC Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our Production Manager is Brittany Cohn. Our Community Manager is Ava Wiener. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.

A (43:30)

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