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Hi, it's Dan. This is a sneak peek from the members only edition of our show, Inside Call Me Back. I hope you enjoyed this segment and if you want to get the full episode and support our mission at ARC Media, please become an Inside Call Me Back member by following the link in the description or by going to arkmedia.org that's arkmedia.org and to all our insiders, thank you. It's your support that keeps the lights on at ARK Media.
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You are listening to an art media podcast.
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Welcome to the inside edition of the CallMeBack podcast where we pull back the curtain and have the conversations we typically have after the cameras stop rolling. Thank you for subscribing to the show and supporting the Call Me Back podcast and everything else we do here at ARC Media. It actually means a lot to us. Us. And now that our month long special series about Mossad's shadow war with Iran is over and we're back to our regular programming, we decided to do a lot of catch up with a double feature. Both of our regular insiders, Nadavael and Amit Segal, are in the hot seat together. Not in the exact same seat, they're sitting in separate seats, but they're both on to address your questions and personal dilemmas. Amit Nadav, welcome back to the Inside.
B
Thank you for having us.
C
Thanks. It's been a long time.
A
I know, because there's not much been going on. It's been sleepy.
C
So Israel is very boring and you were busy with Serbia and, you know.
A
Yeah, exactly. Netherlands, Sweden, you know, that's where we're going to focus going forward. Okay, let's jump into it. Before we get into questions, I do want to give a shout out to one of our insiders, Josh from Miami, who wrote to us on March 16th. This is important. Think about this. March 16th, he wrote to us. We why haven't the US and Israel closed the strait to Iranian oil? If we prevented them from doing that, their economy would collapse. In other words, why aren't we saying to Iran that if our oil can't pass, neither can theirs? Hmm. And Jim from Detroit around that time sent a similar note, as did Jonathan from Ramat Gan. Well, maybe you all should start your own political party and run either in the US or somewhere, because you guys have policy foresight. But as for the first question, Michelle from Westchester, New York writes, there have been many reports that a key issue that convinced President Trump to attack Iran was the Mossad's conviction that the regime would be toppled. I know, Nadav. This is something you and I have discussed offline, since we're in a quasi offline format. I want to get into this with both of you now pivoting off of Michelle's question. So do either of you or both of you have any details about what the Mossad said it would deliver relative to what it delivered? Nadav, I'll start with you.
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I have some details as to that. And I want to say it's already a matter of historic and very loaded political debate right now. So I want to be as careful, as factual as I can in answering that question. Dan, first of all, there's a report at the New York Times that is based on the book by Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan that details how Netanyahu allegedly sold the idea to President Trump that a war is going to be a good idea. This is the way that it would was pitched. I'm not going to go into the specific details of that report. I would say that what Israeli sources are telling me as to the report, that in general, many of the details there are accurate and they agree with the description in which there was a meeting, there was a discussion, Israel thought it's going to be a good idea. They definitely do not agree that Israel sold the idea to the president. They see this as a decision by the president, as the decision led by American interests. But as to the details of what's going to happen in Iran and the regime change, here's what I'm hearing. The Mossad is basically pushing back against the idea that they promised an immediate regime change or that the regime would just crumble. And there are differences of opinions within Israeli sources. So if you go to security sources, they're saying, yes, we thought that this regime can fall. No, we didn't think it's going to happen momentarily. And even the president, when he began the war spoke about the possibility of something changing by the decision of the Iranian people after the bombs stopped falling. And at any rate, and here's the point, Dan, they're saying what we recommended that will be done was never approved to the fullness of the plan. One element was published by the New York Times and I can speak about that, and that's the Kurds. And the idea that the Kurds are going to have a full blown invasion that was published by American media. And as far as I know from Israeli sources that's true. And it's not even getting the right gravitas in the discussion. Israelis were really banking on it. Now when you speak with international sources, they go, God, were you Banking on the Kurds. They always think it's a joke, okay? Because everybody is always talking about the Kurds. No, I think that the Mossad and the Israeli government thought that there's a real potential there. So that's one element. Let me add another element. The Israelis thought that you need to have, quote, a shock and awe element right at the beginning of the war that will influence Tehran, for instance, the possibility of complete and utter darkness in Tehran. Taking out all the electricity grid in Tehran and leaving it in that situation, beside, of course, emergency generators for hospitals and the rest of the. But basically taking off electricity. They thought that you need to do that in order to destabilize the regime. And they were saying, look, if everything would have been done as we planned it and it wouldn't have worked, six months later, you can come and say it didn't work, but you didn't allow us to do everything we planned. To that other sources from the Netanyahu government are blaming the Mossad. And they were saying very similarly to stuff that we were hearing by American media. Are you joking? They said that things are going to go down in Iran that didn't happen. It's clear that we didn't authorize everything or not everything happened. The Kurds thing was probably derailed by Erdogan, okay, at the time, it was derailed by the Turks. But the things that we were told, not by the Israeli military intelligence, by the Mossad, that are going to happen in Iran, they didn't really happen. I'm leaving it to you, Dan. Whatever you and Amit are hearing, I love to hear.
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So I think it was more about the level of the sound rather than the texts. Yes, but all the options were mentioned. No one is ridiculous enough in order to promise President Trump or even Prime Minister Netanyahu that this regime is to be removed instantly with, you know, two, three brilliant steps. However, as far as I understand, the music was that this option has more than 50%. That's the main thing. That's why both sides are right. The Israeli side is absolutely right by saying we have never promised something like regime change because no one can promise regime changes, especially not the US And Israel. We have quite a mutual and separate bad experience with trying to change regimes worldwide and in the Middle East. However, Americans can say or can respond. Yes, but you are way more optimistic about this. The head of Mossad, Dadi Barnea, exploited a rare opportunity in which he spoke about unfinished business. If I want to translate it, that is to say we're still in the Middle of the effort and the lion's share is yet to come.
A
Okay, Andrew from Oxford in the uk, how concerned should we be about the hundreds of kilograms of 60% enriched uranium trapped underground in Iran? Amit, let's start with you.
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I mean, it's not something to be happy and relaxed with. However, here is the debate within. Inside Israel you have for instance, experts, mainly from the Israeli security apparatus, who say at the end of the day, after consecutive very successful military operations, they still got uranium and now the rest of the process can be done in smoke filled rooms under the ground or even, you know, just think about a school basketball arena, something like this. This is the size of the facility which is needed in order to actually put the uranium in a bomb. So it's not a huge facility like the nuclear ones, it's way smaller. And that's why it's quite hard, because Iran is a huge country. So technically you can do it. Let's say it's no longer two weeks to enrich the rest of uranium and it's not going to take six months to actually build the weaponizing the uranium, but it's still feasible and they got more motivation. And on the other side you can former politicians like Yuval Steinitz, who I appreciate a lot, and he says that their idea of enriching and building a bomb is dead. Why? Because first, they no longer have the knowledge and the experts. Second, because they didn't lack motivation in the past, they lacked the facilities, maybe some of the knowledge and they got quite far from this following Israel and the US Two consecutive military operations. And in addition, he claims that the entire technology that was purchased, that had been purchased by the Iranians is completely ruined, it's completely destroyed following those military operations. That's why he says that the Iranian nuclear project is dead now. Can Iran relaunch the process? Yes. But then Mr. Steinitz says even if Italy or the Netherlands wants to actually have a nuclear bomb, it's going to take them five years. So they're, according to Steinitz, far closer to Italy and the Netherlands as we speak, than to Pakistan and North Korea.
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And do I have anything to add.
B
Yeah, I think to the question itself, it's very important to take out the highly enriched uranium out of the country. This is a key principle of the Trump administration. And I think that the Trump administration, from all I'm hearing from my regional sources, they're just not going to turn their back to that principle. Now there's also another possibility that those few hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium by the way. I'm just stating the obvious, Dan. There is no reason for you to enrich uranium to that level unless you want to have a bone. So I just want to say this for the record. You can dilute it back to 3.67% enriched uranium and have it stay in Iran. But from what I know right now, the position of the United States is we're taking that enriched uranium out of Iran and you're not going to have any enrichment on Iranian soil, period. The question is for how many years? According to the reports, it was 20. Then the Iranians said, we're willing to do five. But even if they agree, for instance, for 1212 years with no enrichment and with all of the enriched material out of Iran, that's a better deal, the president would say, than the JCPOA led by President Obama. Now, I don't know if the Iranians are going to agree to that.
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That's it for our sneak peek today. If you want to catch the full episode, please subscribe to Inside. Call Me Back by following the link in the description or by going to arkmedia.org that's ark media.org your support is what allows us to do what we do here at Ark Media. I hope to see you there. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Weiner. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.
Main Theme
This sneak peek of Inside Call Me Back with Dan Senor features a roundtable with Israeli journalists and regular insiders Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal. The episode dives into the complex policy debates among Israelis, Israelis’ perspectives on Iran, Mossad’s reported promise to President Trump regarding regime change, and the persistent dilemma of Iran’s nuclear program. The hosts emphasize nuanced disagreements within Israeli and American establishments on how to interpret Mossad’s role, what was promised, and how serious enrichment threats remain.
Background:
Core Question:
Nadav Eyal’s Response ([02:52]):
Amit Segal’s Perspective ([06:44]):
This episode provides a rare, candid look at Israel’s internal policy debates about Iran, the careful positioning of Mossad in the political arena, and the intractable questions of Iranian nuclear capabilities. The hosts highlight the tensions between stated intentions, political selling, intelligence expectations, and real-world constraints—with a special focus on what was told to the Trump administration and what Mossad truly believed or “promised.” For listeners interested in the intersections of intelligence, diplomacy, and Middle East security, this episode offers measured, sometimes skeptical, insight laced with on-the-ground expertise and a touch of characteristic Israeli candor.