← Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
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- [00:02]
A
As events accelerate in the Middle east, the team here at ARC Media is increasing our coverage. More conversations, more context, more time spent trying to help make sense of what's happening. And all with an expanding cast of podcast hosts, analysts and journalists. Our Inside CallMeBack subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. If you're not yet an inside Call Me Back subscriber, this is an important time to join us. To subscribe, you can follow the link in our show notes or visit ark media.org and to our insiders, thank you.
- [00:47]
B
You are listening to an Art Media podcast. At the end of the day, the big picture is this. Israel doesn't know how to solve the Hezbollah problem right now in Lebanon. It doesn't know how to do that. And what's really happen that Iran has managed to use Lebanon as part of this negotiations with the United States. So it's absolutely on the record that the negotiations with Iran as to the agreement on nuclear issues on Hormuz are connected to what Israel is doing in Lebanon. And that is not something that Israel wanted to begin with.
- [01:25]
C
When Hezbollah started firing at Israel in order to protect Iran, it caused a heavy damage for the image of Netanyahu. Because now, without the Lebanon marked as done deal, all of a sudden question arises, is this war ever going to end? Voters might say, if you have failed to actually bring security after two and a half years, or almost three years. And bearing in mind, of course, October 7th, why would we elect you?
- [02:06]
A
It's 7am on Wednesday, June 3rd here in New York City. It's 2pm on Wednesday, June the 3rd in Israel. There are two versions of what happened on Monday as it relates to the war in Lebanon. There's a version that looks like progress. Donald Trump announced a ceasefire. Hezbollah committed to stop firing rockets into Israel. Israel committed to stop striking Beirut. New talks between Israeli and Lebanese delegations opened in Washington yesterday. If you squint, you can see the outline of a diplomatic solution taking shape, one that might eventually produce something dur and then there is another version. In that version, Israel has been fighting in southern Lebanon for months, absorbing daily casualties from drones which the IDF hasn't found. A military answer to. Hezbollah is degraded but intact, targeting Israel's northern communities on a daily basis. The IDF has seized the strategic Beaufort Castle, but there's no clear endpoint to the campaign and no credible mechanism to disarm the organization that started the war on Israel's northern front. The ceasefire announced last night doesn't touch any of that. The ground Fighting continues and the strategic problem remains unsolved. Both versions are true. That's what makes this moment so difficult to read. What we know is this. President Trump is pushing hard for a Lebanon deal. Hard enough that he reportedly called Netanyahu this week, screaming, calling the prime minister, quote, effing crazy, which President Trump has since confirmed. The layered on top of all this is Iran. Tehran has successfully linked the Lebanon war to the nuclear negotiations, conditioning any agreement on a sustainable ceasefire there. Which means that whatever Israel decides to do in southern Lebanon is no longer just a Lebanon decision. It feeds directly into the most consequential strategic question Israel faces. What kind of Iran deal, if any, emerges from the current round of talks. And what Israel's position looks like the morning after it signed, with all these pressure points bearing down simultaneously, Trump, Iran, the Gulf states, the IDF's daily casualty count in southern Lebanon, and of course, the upcoming elections. What will Prime Minister Netanyahu actually do? What are the real constraints on his decision making? And what are the geopolitical and security consequences for Israel, depending on which path he takes? With me to unpack all of this is Archimedia contributor and senior analyst for Yiddier Ahronot Nedavayel and Archimeded contributor and senior analyst for Channel 12 in Israel, Amit Segal. Amit Nadav, thanks for coming back on so soon.
- [04:47]
B
Thank you for having us.
- [04:48]
A
Okay, Amit, I wanna start with what was reported last night on Channel 12. A series of conversations between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu that began with a coordinated tactical threat against Hezbollah and devolved to, from what we understand, to Trump reportedly screaming at Netanyahu. So tell us this story.
- [05:09]
C
So there is no dis that this conversation was very tense and President Trump has just confirmed the details in the Axios Report, according to which he yelled at Prime Minister Netanyahu, you are effing crazy. I saved you from jail. By the way, no one knows if he meant the Israeli jail through pushing President Herzog to powder Netanyahu or the jail in Hague in the International Criminal Court. This was by far the most tense conversation that the two gentlemen have held since 2016, when President Trump got elected. Here is the thing. For President Trump, Lebanon is a collateral damage. The main thing is Iran and the conversations with Iran and the achievements he wants to have there. So for him, there is no point in having an attack. By the way, it's quite clear that Trump hasn't been diving into the details, to say the least, because he wrote on Social Truth that he stopped the Israeli troops en route to Beirut. I'm not familiar with a single Israeli soldier that was on his way there. This is one thing. The second is that when he wrote on Truth Social, when he announced the ceasefire, he said that Israel would stop firing at Hezbollah, which was not accurate. The only deal was about the Dahya versus Israeli citizens. The fighting in southern Lebanon is to continue. So it's quite clear that President Trump is not the master of the details when it comes to Lebanon. All he wants is Israel to stop bothering him with this situation while he is negot with the Ayatollah regime.
- [06:42]
A
Okay, Nadav, first of all, a reaction to what Amit said. But also, the ceasefire last night has a very specific shape, which is Hezbollah stops firing rockets, Israel stops striking Beirut, and the ground fighting in southern Lebanon more or less continues. That does not sound like a ceasefire in any traditional sense. So walk us through what Netanyahu actually agreed to, what was he careful not to agree to, and what is he communicating to the Israeli public?
- [07:10]
B
To describe this as something that is meticulous or there is planning there or anything like that, I think would not be accurate. And I am saying this, I think really this is an understatement. The last 10 days has seen dozens of Israeli soldiers as casualties in Lebanon, out of which, if I'm not mistaken, true for the time that we're recording this, six Israeli soldiers or officers that were killed in action as a result, mostly from drones. And these are the cyberoptic drones that Hezbollah introduced. Israel intended to attack in Beirut and escalate this in order to pressure Hezbollah. It cannot do that. It's not the desire of the US Administration right now for this war to escalate. The Iranians threatened before that that if Israel does that they will attack the northern part of Israel. So the Iranians basically issued evacuation notices to the northern parts of Israel. This was their way to say that they're going to attack the northern parts of Israel. The US intervened to prevent an escalation. The President intervened, and they settled on a limited arrangement of warfare. It's not a ceasefire. And the arrangement is Hezbollah isn't shooting at Israel. It doesn't have drones in penetrating the sovereign state of Israel, and Israel doesn't hit Beirut. But fighting, actually, this wasn't said, but it was implied. Fighting continues at southern Lebanon. This is the arrangement right now. Right now, as far as I know. Indeed, Hezbollah isn't shooting towards Israel and Israel has not attacked Beirut. This is where we are at right now. And of course, this is shrouded with two phone conversations, one phone conversation in which this arrangement between the President and the Prime Minister was made, and a second phone conversation that came, if I'm not mistaken, after the Prime Minister tweeted something about that, then got according to what the President reported to have said, according to Barack Ravid's report in Axios in Channel 12, but also according to the President himself. Talking to the New York Post podcast this morning has said some very angry, resolute words as to the Prime Minister. And again, I'm using an understatement there. At the end of the day, the big picture is this. Israel doesn't know how to solve the Hezbollah problem right now in Lebanon. It doesn't know how to do that. And what's really happening is that Iran has managed to use Lebanon as part of this negotiations with the United States. So it's absolutely on the record that the negotiations with Iran as to the agreement on nuclear issues on Hormuz are connected to what Israel is doing in Lebanon. And that is not something that Israel wanted to begin with.
- [10:07]
A
So, Amit, tell us about the political response to this development inside Israel.
- [10:11]
C
So Netanyahu's weakest point in his standing within the Israeli society is what's going on and has been going on in Lebanon.
- [10:18]
A
Why?
- [10:19]
C
Because till March 3, when Hezbollah started attacking re attacking Israel, Lebanon was the thing that was all but total victory. Hezbollah was the most formidable threat on Israel prior to October 7th. He took the pager attack, Nasrallah was killed, the entire leadership was killed, and Israel took 80% of its rocket barrage. And Israel kept attacking Hezbollah without Hezbollah responding. That was almost a total victory. But when Hezbollah started firing at Israel in order to protect Iran, it caused a heavy damage for the image of Netanyahu. Because now, without the Lebanon front marked as done deal, all of a sudden question arises, is this war ever going to end? Is there a single front in which we can declare victory which lasts for a generation or five years or even one year? And that's why I think Netanyahu's main problem now is those optic drones that Nadav has just talked about. If Netanyahu solves this problem, he is in a way better shape because he can actually say, we occupy, we took more land from southern Lebanon, we are deep inside Lebanon and no more casualties. If he doesn't and this daily or half weekly bleeding continues, he's going to have hard times talking the Israeli public into his core value as the candidate being Mr. Security and Diplomacy. Voters might say, if you have failed to actually bring Security after two and a half years, almost three years. And bearing in mind, of course, October 7th, why would we elect you? Add to this the most important ingredient, which is that the northern part of Israel is mainly a Likud stronghold.
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A
So in those towns in northern. In Kiryatchmona, et cetera, all these places.
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B
Yeah.
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A
Okay. And can I just ask a question? This is important. Obviously, northern Israel has been a big story, very big story, since October 7, 2023. Obviously, some hundred thousand Israelis living in those towns in northern Israel had to evacuate for over a year, well over a year. And then they moved back and they're rebuilding. And now this. Over the course going back to October 7, has Netanyahu and the Likud seen the weakening of their support in those areas?
- [12:33]
C
No. No, it was there. But then came the Pedro attack and the killing of Nasrallah. And the real total victory was against Hezbollah. And again, Israelis went back to the hotels in the north and the wineries reopened their gates. The situation now is better than it was in 2024, but the emotions are more negative because the sentiment was, that's it. We paid our tax as citizens who actually took the toll for the Hezbollah rockets in order to pave the way for the total victory. And now Hezbollah is here again. That's why, in my opinion, the entire election is hanging by a thread. And the thread is the northern border, specifically the very specific Hezbollah drones targeting Israeli soldiers.
- [13:19]
A
Okay, Nadav, you have called this moment we're in, this period we're in, and I'm quoting you here, the Lebanon Trap. That was in your newsletter, a title we're stealing, by the way, for the title of this episode. So as part of being part of the ARK Media team is we get to appropriate your material.
- [13:35]
B
It's impossible for you to steal anything, any IP that I have.
- [13:40]
A
Okay, so the Lebanon trap. And on last Monday's episode, you said, and I'm quoting, you can't really disarm Hezbollah without occupying the entire state of Lebanon. The entire state of Lebanon. Israel is not going to do that. Close quote. And then you added a ceasefire might be saving Israel from itself. So if there's no credible military exit and a ceasefire saves Israel from a war, according to your framing, it cannot win. Is the trap actually a trap, or is it actually some kind of off ramp that is helpful to Netanyahu?
- [14:16]
B
When I wrote a trap, I don't mean a ceasefire. I mean going into what we call the Lebanese mud, habotzalvanoni in Hebrew, which refers to the long period of time back in the 1980s and 90s in which Israel held a buffer zone in Lebanon. That buffer zone was aimed at defending the northern part of Israel because there are terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Amal. Amal is another Shia group that since then disarmed, by the way. And they were set on attacking, sending, launching rockets towards our northern communities. And the idea was to have this buffer zone, Israel had its own militia of civilians in southern Lebanon, the army of Southern Lebanon, which was composed of Lebanese people. Now, to the question that you just asked, it seems, according to the conversations I'm having, that many people are saying within the defense apparatus, yes, if the US can impose a ceasefire there and Israel is still in Lebanon, even if it has some outposts in Lebanon, then that is much better than the current condition in which. What are we actually trying to do? Look, back in 2024, there was a plan. There were pagers. There was a brilliant intelligence and air force operation that destroyed more than half of the inventories of rockets and ballistic missiles by Hezbollah. Right. Now, if you ask both military analysts or people from within the apparatus, what's the plan? What are you going to do? They don't think they're going to disarm Hezbollah. Now, there's another option for Hezbollah to be disarmed by the Lebanese society. So you mentioned one occupying all Lebanon. That's not going to happen. What can happen is that the Lebanese are going to do that. They're not going to do that either. Everybody lost hope about the Lebanese government, Lebanese army disarming Hezbollah. So the idea there is, if President Trump can come to this and say, hey, it's over, you struck Hezbollah hard, you eroded the power of Hezbollah, and as far as I'm concerned, and there's an agreement with Iran maybe, and the IDF can stay in some important outpost in Le, or even if the IDF can't stay. But there's an understanding that Hezbollah can go back to its outposts on the border with Israel. That's an essential thing after October 7th. So they won't sit physically on the border building watchtowers, planning their invasion to the Galilee. If the president can sort this out, the administration can sort this out, and they have sorted out more complex issues, then maybe that's a blessing in disguise. If they're limiting the IDF ideas as to Lebanon, because truthfully, and the Israelis don't want to be completely candid about that, they don't know how to disarm Hezbollah or how to get this done right now because it seems that Hezbollah has sort of morphed into more of a guerrilla group than an army. Right now it's launching these drones. There are solutions, as Amit said, that are being considered, but I don't think it's only the drones. It's also about you can't take out this entire armed organization that is heavily funded by the Iranians at this point unless you go into a wider campaign in Lebanon. And nobody wants to do that, including the Prime Minister.
- [17:37]
A
Before I bring me back in, Nadav, there was all this hope and I was hearing it. The Lebanese government for the first time is serious about confronting Hezbollah. And the Lebanese government is serious about really ensuring there's a real break in between the Iranian regime and its access into Lebanon. What changed you say? Like, everyone's given up hope that the Lebanese army will confront Hezbollah. Just why is that hope dashed? Like why is everybody suddenly giving up on that?
- [18:01]
B
Let me be non diplomatic about that. Because the Lebanese politicians and leaders who despise Hezbollah more than the Israelis, who want Hezbollah disarmed are basically a bunch of cowards. That's the truth. They know what they need to do. They have the decision set within the Lebanese society. They have a UN Security Council decision after Israel withdrew from the entire state of Lebanon back in 2000. There is an international understanding and backing to that. Hezbollah needs to disarm, but they're not willing to go through the process itself and risk anything that they actually own. And by own, I mean corruption. It's also about their safety. It's their personal safety. Hezbollah MURDERED LEBANESE Prime Minister. It had no problem doing that. And they are worried that when push comes to shove or if there's an agreement with Iran, they'll come after them. And because they're not willing to go through that brave process, it's actually an example by the way, of what's happening across the Arab world. There are many, many reforms that need to happen across the Arab world and across countries around Israel that are essential for these countries. And the politicians are not doing that because they are so, so afraid. Because if you rule a country in a non democratic way or by arrangements and you start moving stuff, you can get hurt. And by getting hurt, I mean physically hurt. And because of that, they're not doing what they needed to do. And that hope that you spoke about, Dan, has been absolutely dashed by intelligence, basically Western intelligence, Israeli intelligence, they're all saying no, there is no resolve within the Lebanese society to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah is an Iranian funded and founded militia intended on destroying Israel with a clear assignment in its videos and propaganda of occupying parts of the Galilee and having another October 7th. This is what Hezbollah is all about. And because of that, you need to drive them away from the border as far as you can. And if you can push and make them disarm, of course you can do that. You should do that. But right now, without occupying Lebanon or without the Lebanese politicians finding their spine, it's impossible.
- [20:15]
A
Stay with us. We'll be right back.
- [20:22]
D
I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of ARC News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. That's why we started ARC News Daily. Every weekday morning, I walk you through the most important news, give you the context you need, and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything, and I don't waste your time. On most days, I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully a little bit smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show notes. I hope to see you tomorrow.
- [21:08]
A
Okay, Amit, in terms of Netanyahu's decision making, what would you say is the biggest driver of how he's navigating this crisis? Is it pressure from President Trump? Is it pressure from his own coalition, his own government? Or is it pressure from his security chiefs?
- [21:25]
C
I would say that the consideration is Iran. If Netanyahu knows that, for instance, the enriched uranium is too extreme, extracted from Iran, this is a real total victory for him. So it's worth paying a price in the Lebanese front. If not, and if Israel goes and the United States goes to a ceasefire with Iran without those achievements, and the Iran regime is still there, so he'll need something physical in Lebanon. I have to say that I came quite pessimistic, similar to what Nadav just described. I came pessimistic to a meeting this week somewhere in Israel, in central Israel. And I'm more optimistic now because I had thought before I entered a meeting that there are two bad options. One is to occupy almost the entire Lebanon in order to dismantle Hezbollah, or to wait for the Iranian regime to collapse, which is not at sight. The idea behind the war in Iran was that once you toppled the regime, Hezbollah is actually dead, is effectively dead because 90% of its budget comes from Tehran. But there is a third way, and as far as I understand, Hezbollah really desperately wants to stop the fighting in Lebanon. The damage it Took is heavy. One quarter of its forces was killed by Israel over the last two and a half years, including 3,000 out of 30,000 in the last three months alone. So there is an option, according to which the IDF stays in what we call the yellow line, these expensive parts of southern Lebanon, and the firing stops from both sides, which is, in my opinion, a huge achievement for Israel, as long as the IDF is allowed to keep fighting and keep targeting threats in the making. For instance, if a terrorist is caught in Camrans trying to deliver rockets to someplace in southern Lebanon, et cetera, et cetera. So there is an option that within weeks it's going to happen. That's what keeps me optimistic.
- [23:29]
A
All right. Against the backdrop of that optimism, Nadav, I want to ask you about the story in Axios, but regarding a U.S. official this week saying that any agreement with Iran will include a ceasefire in Lebanon, last week you noted that if Iran is acknowledged as a player in Lebanon, again, quote, the news of the death of the Axis of Resistance was slightly premature. That's what you said. If Lebanon is formally part of the negotiations with Iran, what does that mean for Israel on both fronts with regard to Hezbollah on Israel's northern border and also with Iran more generally?
- [24:01]
B
Well, that ship has sailed. Obviously, Iran is recognized as a player in Lebanon. Obviously, during the negotiations, Iran has been making demands as to Lebanon, and they've not been shunned. Nobody said to the Iranians, hey, you're not allowed to include Lebanon in your calculus. I'm not saying that it can't change in the future, but right now, Lebanon is part of equation related to Iran. And again, you can play this differently. And here's what I'm hearing, Dan. I'm hearing, if this is the case, why not allow the Israelis to push Hezbollah harder in order to use this as leverage vis a vis the Iranians? So let's turn the equation, and if the Israelis do want to pressure substantially Hezbollah and go to Beirut, I'm opening a bracket there. This entire idea that if you strike in Beirut, Hezbollah is going to be hurt hard. It's not a military thing. The idea is that you'll hit Hezbollah targets in Beirut, but it will pressure the Lebanese society to pressure Hezbollah.
- [25:09]
C
Okay?
- [25:09]
B
It's not about the tactical achievements of hitting some precious targets. Hezbollah also already evacuated, what it can evacuate from the Dahya and from Beirut. I'm closing that bracket. But. But the bottom line there is saying, why shouldn't we use the Israelis and their pressure on Hezbollah to push the Iranians towards an agreement. If our interests, the interests of the Israelis and the Americans are on the same page, which is right now, push the Iranian militia and give the regime in Tehran the impression that if they don't reach an agreement with the US Administration, they will be held to pay not only in Iran and in the Gulf, but also through their proxies. So I'm hearing this idea not only from Israeli sources. I think it's an interesting idea. So I definitely can see a scenario in which President Trump tells the Prime Minister, you know what, go for Beirut, do whatever you want to do. Because if the Iranians blow this up, the Israelis, here's the thing, thought that they were in that condition when the Israelis ordered the Israeli air force to start striking in Beirut and then it would stop. They thought, oh, you know, the Iranian thing, nothing's happening there. The message, it was lost on translation for the Israelis was we can do what we need to do. And then the US Stepped in saying, no, we want this to be controlled. We don't want this escalation right now. But I absolutely see a scenario in which if everything falls apart with Iran, Israel will be able to do that.
- [26:38]
A
Right. Amit, I just want to come back to. You talked about Iran a moment ago back in April. You argued that the best way to destroy Hezbollah is not the Litany River. It's, and I quote here, an Israeli presence over skies of Tehran. Fordo and hum. So looking at the situation now, what does that say about how things have changed?
- [26:56]
C
I guess it takes more time than expected. But the perception in the Israeli high places is that if the sanctions are not to be eased and if the Strait of Hormuz is still closed, the Iranian regime will collapse by the end of 2026. And even before even Dadi Barnea, the now former head of Mossad, said that it's a matter of months that we see it at s But the assumption in Israel at the very same time is that the slate of Hormuz will be open soon and the sanctions are going to be eased one way or the other. So I would say it's something like months, months to a year, according to the main Israeli. I would call it even a guess or a gamble that in a year from now this regime will collapse if there is no total surrender by the United States. So it's a lot of time, especially if you take into account that Netanyahu cares the most about one specific date, October 27, 2026, in which he has to go to the polls. So for him, if he goes to the polls, like any other Israeli, on October 27, and the regime in Iran collapses the day after. It won't help him as the head of opposition because he cannot actually make it a political asset. That's why I think that Netanyahu tries to push the election forward as latest as he can.
- [28:19]
A
Push it back. You mean push it back.
- [28:21]
C
Push it back. I always have hard times about push it back.
- [28:24]
A
I know, I know. It's confusing. Even in English, it's confusing.
- [28:26]
C
That was a moment of English delivered to you by Danson. So he wants to make the election as late as possible. Exactly. For this reason.
- [28:34]
A
Okay, Nadav, to wrap things up here a year from now. I know it's impossible. I mean, to do these things a year from now. If you think of where we were a year ago, if you would have imagined the situation, it would have been difficult to imagine. But a year from now, is Hezbollah more dangerous and more of a threat to Israel or less dangerous, Less of a threat to Israel or status quo?
- [28:53]
B
I've lived too many days in the Middle east then making predictions. A year from now, I can't make a prediction for a month from now. And I'm really not trying to be modest. I really cannot. What I can say is that part of the trap that we spoke about, Dan, is you fight these guerrilla organizations, they become better. If they survive, they become better. The thing is, you build an outpost and you build high walls, and then they have different rockets to shoot at you or mortars, and you dig deeper in order to prevent tunnels, and they dig even deeper, and you change your tactic and they change their tactic. And at the end of the day, Hezbollah grows into a massive army because it's the idf, one of the best armies in the world that they've been TR against and trying to survive. And that's part of the trap. And do you get more security by doing that? Do you get more security for the northern parts of Israel? That's an essential question. But there is a deeper question here, and I'll end with that. And that is, what do you do? And that is the material question. Since October 7th, if you have people on your border that are part of fundamentalist organization devoted to the idea that they're going to destroy you, and how do you manage that? If you can't utterly destroy them because they have. Have grassroots support and a lot of funding, what do you do? And that's one of the reasons why you need to materialize military gains into actual long lasting political arrangements. And this was always something that defense Officials used to say in Israel, and it got some parts of the Israeli society very angry when they would have said that at the end of the day, there is no military solution to some of these problems. And what we're seeing after almost three years of war is that it is absolutely true to achieve security and stability. These arrangements are really very much needed and they need to be ironclad in that sense. My hope is with the Trump administration because the Trump administration has shown its resolve to get these arrangements and not to be in an eternal state of never ending war. They really want to get to these arrangements in Gaza and I think in Lebanon. It's the nature and the specifics of these arrangements that will determine much of our future.
- [31:22]
A
Amit, any final thoughts?
- [31:25]
C
The situation in Lebanon was exactly this. A decisive military victory over Hezbollah followed by an agreement with the Lebanese government that was supposed to dismantle Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. It didn't happen because exactly as military power alone is not enough, the same applies for bad agreements with weak partners or those who just use it in order to use it as a deception against Israel. So I'm more optimistic when it comes to Hezbollah because I think there are many, many positive powers in Lebanon who are tired of Hezbollah functioning as the protector of Tehran. And I think the number one achievement of this last round of fighting is exactly this. That now everybody knows that the only reason Hezbollah attacked 72 hours after Israel and the the dictator Khamenei was because of Iran and not in order to protect Lebanon, because there was nothing to protect. And that's why I'm very, very optimistic that this time an agreement will be achieved and will be actually executed in a way that helps both Lebanon and Israel.
- [32:30]
B
I just want to add one update as we record this. The IDF has just said that Hezbollah has shot two rockets that has crossed into Israel's sovereign territory. It was also shot a drone to Kyatmuna and other sovereign territory. So if the equation is if you shoot towards Israel's sovereign territory, we hit Beirut. They have just shot into Israel's sovereign territory and let's see if Israel can actually operate in Beirut.
- [32:58]
A
It's quite a note to end this very rich conversation on. I appreciate you both doing this, especially on short notice and tragically, this story is not ending soon. So we will be back with you guys soon. Thank you.
- [33:11]
C
Thank you so much.
- [33:11]
B
Thank you so much.
- [33:21]
A
Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Eva Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan. Senor.