B (6:03)

Dan, the probability of a strike is growing. I mean, President Trump has certainly, over the course of a number of weeks as these protests erupted and Iran began massacring thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of Iranians. President Trump has been warning the regime. He said that help is on its way. He encouraged Iranians to come to the streets and take over their institutions. He told the regime to stop the killing. And in the meantime, USS Liberty, a carrier strike group, has been moving from the South China Sea and into the Middle East. And Central Command has been in close touch with the IDF in preparing military options. So the firepower is almost there. It should be there in the next couple of days. And President Trump has promised decisive action. In the meantime, Iranians have been feeding him lines that they have stopped the the executions of 800 Iranians are ready for diplomacy. Steve Witkoff, the envoy for President Trump has ratcheting up the price of what diplomacy would entail. And just a bombshell yesterday, according to Israel Hayom, Israeli intelligence has provided smoking gun evidence to the President and to the US intel community that Iran in fact didn't stop the executions. They instead used guns to mow down those hundreds of Iranians that were supposed to be formally executed. So that's where we are as we sit.

A (7:22)

Okay, so Mark, there's a lot there I want to drill down on before I do. What targets would the US Likely strike in Iran should an attack take place? I'm just trying to visualize cuz I'm asked this question all the time, including 20 minutes ago when I was out at Starbucks on my dog walk when some Israeli friends of mine who live nearby US in New York City and they asked me that what would the US Strike if it struck Iran? And I was not equipped to answer that question standing on one foot in the middle of a snowstorm. And I'm also not equipped now, so I'm turning to you.

B (7:53)

So I mean it's a target rich environment, clearly inside Iran. I don't know what the President's going to strike. If you look back, Dan, you remember you reported on this in December, the discussions between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump in Mar a Lago where President Trump gave the green light to Netanyahu for Israel to strike Iran's missile program. And it's clear that the Israelis at some point are going to go after that missile program. They did serious damage to it in June of 2025 during the 12 Day War. But Iran has rapidly reconstituting its ballistic missile program and it represents significant danger to Israel, to US Forces, to our Gulf allies. So if I were President Trump, I would order the US Air Force to destroy what's left of Iran's missile program. Now the Iranians have been moving those further east into Iran, attempted out of Israeli range. They've been burying a deep and missile bunkers and silos. U.S. air Force could do significant damage with our B2s and massive ordnance penetrator. So that's number one. Number two would be to go after the regime, regime's apparatus of repression. That's the apparatus that has been slaughtering tens of thousands of Iranians. The IRGC, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, who are the goons that are beating up and killing Iranians on the streets, the Ministry of Intelligence go after their command and control and really take out that apparatus of repression. By the way, it's also an apparatus of aggression because it's also would be used for Iranian retaliation. And third is to go after the IRGC Navy. Go after the navy, go after the missile launchers, anything that could be used for retaliatory Iranian strikes against the United States in the region or our allies.

A (9:31)

Okay, and then just two other quick things before I move to Yonatan. One, you said that the diplomatic price has been raised. Can you be a little more specific about that? What is the price been raised to if Iran hopes to get some kind of off ramp from possible military action?

B (9:46)

So Steve Witkoff just recently came out publicly and said that a deal could be done with the Iranians, but the price for that, that deal is zero uranium enrichment, full dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program. Iranians must give all of the existing stockpiles of enriched material to the iaea, the International Atomic Energy Agency, restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile program, and the end of Iranian support for its terror proxy. So that's a pretty steep price for the Iranians to pay. I mean, they even last year before the 12 Day War, refused even to pay the price of zero enrichment, never mind all of these other restrictions. And that actually led to President Trump's decision to greenlight Israel and to join Israeli strikes. So now the price has gone way up. There's no way the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei could ever agree to those terms. But Witkoff is holding out the prospect of diplomacy, perhaps at setting the stage for a potential U.S. strike.

A (10:40)

Okay, Yonatan, you've been in discussions with security officials within Israel in recent weeks. Some of these podcast recordings we've tried to schedule have had to be rescheduled because, Yonatan, I'm told you are in a meeting at the Kirya, which is Israeli military high command. So you, you have been talking to a lot of Israeli officials. How are security officials in Israel assessing an Iranian retaliation to a US Strike?

C (11:06)

There are three camps within the Israeli Defense Administration. One I would call day 13 camp. Right. So we just continue from the end of day 12. We have our set of targets that we wanted to achieve. The.

A (11:18)

Just to be clear, you mean day 12, meaning the 12 day war in June of last year. And there's this sense among Israelis that there were more targets, but the war ended after 12 days. And if Israelis could have had their wish to continue going forward, you're saying the Day 13 campus, this is what they would have targeted.

C (11:35)

That's right. And that camp, and it goes back to what Mark said is sort of seeing this as an independent Israeli action that needs to happen one way or another because there are those targets that threaten Israel pretty heavily. The second camp is sit out in American action. And if we're not fired at, kind of sit it out, if you will. That's kind of the first Gulf War, the 1991 camp, you know, kind of aligned with the U.S. if Iran doesn't choose to fire at Israel, some of those call it an irrational step by Iran. With that, I totally disagree. I think this regime has proven that this dynamic of rational tit for tat does not apply to it. And the third is go all in with the Americans once the escalation begins, divide the target bank and for Israel to do, you know, whatever it can on its own side. I will say one thing that has changed. And you mentioned Turkey, Dan. There is concern a couple of weeks ago, Turkey finished the Asil San, which is the Turkish defense tech giant, finished establishing its radar in the Damascus airport. And as you guys remember, in June Israel had this sort of radar free corridor that it created in Syria. That might not be the case given where Turkey is right now. So that's a concern I'm hearing also on the Israeli side.

A (12:51)

And question for you, Yonatan, but obviously, Mark, feel free to jump in. Mark mentioned that there was smoking gun evidence that the Israelis provided the US Administration regarding the lie that Iran had stopped the executions when Trump demanded that they do and pose that threat. Can you tell us a little bit more about that? What was the smoking gun I think.

C (13:14)

This is what Yisrael Ayom reported that Israeli officials had provided that evidence. I can tell you I'm half Iranian, I have a lot of family worldwide that's kind of sending those one time videos that you can't kind of send. Again, these are very tough videos to watch. People being gunned down in the middle of the street and then folks trying to call, you know, the nine one ones without getting any answer and then sort of these type of things supposedly happening right now, but you know, within the regime's jails and areas of detention. That's sort of the dynamic that Yisrael reported today. I can't say that I have anything to add in terms of the specifics of what was provided to the administration.

A (13:53)

Mark, any more on that?

B (13:55)

Yeah, Dan, I just want to just put some context on what Jonathan said about the scale of the slaughter. So there's reports that on January 8th and 9th over 33,000 people were slaughtered by the regime's security forces, which is on par with how many Jews were slaughtered in 1941 at Bab in Kyiv, Ukraine. So I mean, it's up there with one of the greatest slaughters in modern history. And obviously all of this happened in the dark because the regime had shut down the Internet and now people are only starting to get the videos that Jonathan talked about. And human rights groups are painstakingly trying to figure out exactly the scale of the slaughter. But it's beyond belief.

A (14:34)

Mark, I want to come back to something you said when you were talking about the military targets. I understand obviously and support the damage that this would impose on the regime and the regime's capabilities. But is the objective with those strikes as you laid them out, if they were to be advanced the fall of the regime? Because right now you've reached a point where the US would be striking after there were these hundreds of thousands or millions of people, depending on which estimate you buy. There are hundreds of thousands or millions of people out on the streets and protesting the government. And there seemed to be that perfect storm where everyone was out on the streets and if the US struck, the regime would be weakened and it would embolden the anti regime protests. And now those protests appear to have abated based on the repression from the regime. Now for the US to strike the Iranian security capabilities is the expectations that people would rise back up, they would be newly emboldened or like what's the. I'm just trying to understand operationally is the goal for the regime to actually collapse?

B (15:37)

Dan, I think the three major objectives for US Strikes if you're going to build a case for military action. The first is that President Trump has laid down a clear red line that Iran must stop killing its citizens. It clearly defied that and it actually, if you believe this Israel Ayom report about Israeli intelligence. Iranian President Possesskian actually lied to Steve Witkoff about that. President Trump has made it clear over and over again that help was on its way. Lay down the red line to enforce that red line would do what Obama did in 2012 with the Syria chemical weapons red line. When he laid it out that Assad must stop using chemical weapons. He prepared military strikes and then called them off because there was some Russian deal. And after that Russian deal, Assad went back to using chemical weapons in a gruesome way against Syrian citizens. So enforcing American red lines matters when you don't do it. Then what happened with the Obama red line is shortly after that, Vladimir Putin realized that Obama was not serious. A year after that invaded Crimea and the Iranians and the Russians got to work in Syria in keeping Assad in power and slaughtering hundreds of thousands of Syrians. So that's objective number one, enforce American red lines because American credibility matters, matters. The second is that as Jonathan and I are talking about, the ballistic missile program is a strategic threat to Israel, to U.S. forces, U.S. allies, and that has a specific military objective. And the United States should do that, not Israel, because ultimately we will be implicated when the Israelis attack that missile program. We'll have to deal with the fallout. Better we do it. We can do it better. And Iranian retaliation will probably be lower because the regime will be worried about regime ending US Military strikes. Which gets to the third point, Dan, is will those strikes, whatever they are, lead to the end of the regime? I don't think it will in a day or in a week or in a month. What I think it will do is send a clear message to one of the most pro American populations in the Middle east, if not the world, the Iranian people, that US Assistance came, that our word means something and that we are with them in the short to medium term to bring down this regime using a whole array of American power, Israeli power, but most importantly, giving the Iranian people the belief that they have allies that have their backs.

C (17:51)

Just to add one more thing. Over the weekend, the Pentagon published its 2026 National Defense Strategy. And I think it gives a bit of a hint or a clue on how America sees Israel in the region in that episode that relates to the 12 Day War. And I'm going To quote Secretary Hegseth is obviously signed on the document, Israel is defined as a model ally. And we, that is the US have the opportunity now to further empower it to defend itself and promote our shared interests. Building on President Trump's historic efforts to secure peace in the Middle east, it is clear that America is willing and open and wants this to be sort of out there clearly for everybody to see. The sense is that this is an act of collaboration and both parties see the Iranian threat eye to eye. That is super relevant for what's going on right now in the Middle East.

A (18:42)

And Yonatan, in terms of how Israel is preparing defensively, we talked offensively, how the US Is preparing, how Israel may be preparing, or how Israel's at least viewing the opportunity with a possible US Operation. What is Israel doing to prepare defensively? Because in recent volleys back and forth, Israel has absorbed pretty severe damage domestically.

C (19:03)

On the home front, there was an Iranian missile, a very heavy one, that landed, you know, 200 meters, 100 yards, if you will, from my home in Tel Aviv. We spent the weekend just cleaning our shelter a bit. So you want to be ready to.

A (19:16)

Be clear for our listeners who aren't watching this, Yonatan is in his mamad now. He's recording this from his mamad because he's been getting it ready for possible use again. They got a lot of use of it over the last couple years and then, thank God, not a lot of use of it recently, but may need it again.

C (19:30)

Yeah, but on the national level, the ex secretary of the National Security Council, Yaakov Nagel, Professor Nagel spoke this morning and basically mentioned the fact that the defense administration and all the air defense systems are on full alert, on high alert, and that the rumors, according to which Israel has limited resources and has to have an interceptor economy, as it's called here in Israel, are baseless. I will say that the analysis that I saw a couple of months ago on the reconstitution of the ballistic missile program have a lot to do with building new missiles, but they haven't been able to recreate the capacity of the launchers. And at the end of the day, launchers are what matters, right? Because you can have 10,000 missiles, but if you have 200 launchers and we hit, you know, 150 of them, if you manufacture, know, two or 3,000 rockets, more, but you have missiles, sorry, more, but you have a limited amount of launchers and to the best of my knowledge, that hasn't been able to be reconstituted on Time, that's part of sort of the posture, the architecture. Israel's preparing to. I will say one last thing, which is, to me, a variable that's unanswered is the Houthi threat. We kind of forgot about these guys. But they've been able to hit Israel time and time again. And if Iran is hit, you know, they don't have Hezbollah, but they definitely seem to still have the Houthis partners down south.

A (20:45)

Mark, there was a lot of speculation as to what or who stopped a US Plan to attack Iran two weeks ago. What can you tell us about that, Dan?

B (20:55)

I think, well, President Trump stopped it. I think there was every indication they were going, and then he decided not to. And I think there are a number of factors at play. We've talked about the importance of having all the military assets in the region so the president has full firepower so that he can actually decide on some really meaningful, decisive options. I think he was presented by his military advisors with a set of options to hit the Iranians. I think he deemed them insufficient given the scale of the slaughter and the importance of ensuring that he has also defensive options on retaliation to protect U.S. troops. Gulf allies in Israel. So that's one moving military assets. Two was the Saudis in particular, but also the Qataris and others were lobbying the president not to use military force. They're concerned that any retaliation would be directed against them. And so they've been really active on the phones trying to convince the president to take the diplomatic path and not the military path. I also think for the Saudis and Qataris, they're happy to have a weakened Iran and defanged Iran, but they certainly don't want regime change. And they worry about two scenarios. One, regime collapse and chaos. On the other hand, I don't think they want regime collapse and success. I don't think they want to see a prosperous, democratic and free Iran where Iran would have both influence, influence in the region, but also freedom and democracy would be a message of success that maybe Saudi citizens and Qatari citizens would look to as potential alternatives. So for them, they don't want any military action and they're happy to have a weakened and defange Iran, but not one that goes down. And third, I think for the Israelis now, my understanding is the Israelis were not lobbying the president to strike Iran, and they were not lobbying the president not to. They wanted the US to make that decision on its own. That be President Trump's decision, the consequences be his successful or not. And they certainly don't want to undermine the support that he has provided them if they have to go back in and strike the ballistic missile program. So all those factors came together and the President decided to hit the pause button while the Iranians took advantage of that opportunity, as I mentioned, to feed in this misinformation that they were not moving ahead with the executions, even though it had appears that's exactly what happened in terms of significant uptick in Iranian deaths.

A (23:16)

So Mark, there was a lot of reporting a couple weeks ago that it was Netanyahu and the people around him who were also for not moving on Iran, for the US not moving on Iran. At least back then there was some reporting that they, because Israel, quote unquote wasn't ready either, didn't believe that the situation on the ground in Iran was not, not ripe for regime collapse. And also Israel, more importantly from Israel's perspective, Israel defensively was not ready for a retaliation. So it was Israel that had advocated for slowing things down. And then there was some pushback to the reporting. And people, a lot of reporters who cover the US Israel relationship minute to minute in sometimes a very histrionic way said that that was nonsense. I heard from a senior Israeli adviser who's in the middle of things with the US's relationship that in fact there was real apprehens around Netanyahu and his team about whether or not it was the right time for the US to go a couple weeks ago. And the concerns I heard in comparing now to this period to June of last year was in June of last year if the US struck Fordeau and other nuclear facilities in Iran, it would be hard to fail. Meaning you could either get a lot of it, you could get all of it, you could set it back by some time, you could set it back by a lot of time. But there was no bad outcome. If the US did a surgical strike, it would do serious damage to Iran's nuclear capabilities. Whereas this official explained to me with this set of policy choices and trade offs there's a lot that the US could get right and there's a lot it could get wrong. There's no such thing under this scenario. Oh yeah, we did some damage, but we didn't finish the job or we didn't bring the regime down or because doing some damage but the regime surviving could send a message that, that the regime is impervious. Look at the US took their best shot at us and we're still standing and that the risk of that was high. And also Israel was very confident in June of last year that it could do most of the work on the front end, and it could deliver the good, so to speak, to Trump. They were very confident, the Israelis were very confident that we will make this not easy, but we'll make this very doable for the US to come in late. And so therefore, they weren't worried about embarrassing themselves in the eyes of Trump. They knew that they would perform in a kind of excellent military intelligence fashion, whereas this time they were concerned about egging the president on to do something, and then it goes sideways and then Israel kind of owns it for having egged the president on. What's your reaction to all of that, Dan?

B (25:54)

I think that's right. I think that's exactly why the Israelis were reticent in actively lobbying the president. And I think they are right not to. I don't think they're actively lobbying the president not to do something. And I think this is the reason why Jonathan and I keep focusing on the ballistic missile issue. It's a serious threat. It's something that the United States could do. They could do successfully. To your point, they could eliminate or do severe damage or in Trump's word, obliterate the Iranian ballistic missile program. They could do so relatively easily because Iran has not reconstituted its air defenses. So the skies are effectively open for those US fighter jets and B2 bombers. The United States has massive ordnance penetrators that could do severe damage to those underground missile silos. And President Trump could call that a great success. And it would be. It would also forestall or make unnecessary an Israeli strike. And I think there is going to be an Israeli strike, if not this year, next year, because Iran is reconstituting its missile program. It will have thousands and thousands of missiles. To Yonatan's point, he's right. Many of those launchers were destroyed in the 12 Day War, but they're actively trying to rebuild those launchers. So at some point, Israel will have to say it's time to go back in. And when Israel does, we're going to get involved. We're going to be implicated, if not on the offensive side, certainly on the defensive side. So better we do it. Trump gets the victory. And then when he does it, he says to the supreme Leader, Khamenei, that's it. You've seen what I've done to your nuclear program. I obliterated it. You've seen what I've done to your ballistic missile program. I've obliterated. Now, here are my demands. You stop the killing. You return to negotiations full Dismantlement of your nuclear missile and terror proxies. That's the deal Witkoff has offered you. Send your foreign minister Iraqi to Oman. We'll do that deal. If you don't do the deal, you've seen that I don't bluff. I enforce my red lines. And now I'm coming after you and the top commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And then again, I'm going to honor the commitment I made, which is that there should be new, quote, new leadership in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile, economic pressure, cyber attacks, covert action influence operations and we wear down the Islamic Republic and bring it down eventually through the support for the Iranian people.

A (28:15)

Okay, Yonatan, in recent months it appears that animosity towards Israel in Saudi Arabia has been on the rise. I think animosity on the kind of Saudi suddenly street, as people call it, has been on the rise over the course of the two year war post October 7th. But obviously now there's something going on with the leadership in Iran. There's a debate about how much of a problem there is. We had Nadav Eyel and Amit on the podcast two episodes ago, I think where they jumped into it and said that it is a real problem. Then we had Tal Becker on Inside Call Me Back. In the latest episode of Inside Call Me Back, we've released a section of it on the main Call me Back feedback where he is not as alarmed. He thinks there's some technical setbacks, but the strategic path between Riyadh and Jerusalem is still on track. So he was not as concerned. What do you think is going on? What has led MBS to change course if in fact he has Regarding normalization with Israel.

C (29:10)

The way I look at it, as we have before on analyzing Turkey is looking at it through their perspective, right? So I look at it from MBS's perspective. He is a very ambitious leader. He is attempting the type of radical political reform that I think the 21st century hasn't seen. He's trying to tackle three forces, each of which is a formidable force, right? The clerical Wahhabism, the hundred years of misogyny and sort of, you know, women not being part of society and like an equal society and 100 years of oil which created a lazy sort of zero agency type population if you will. He's trying to be Lee Kuan Yew and Martin Luther and Napoleon at the same time. And each of them is a huge task. So for me, each time I would say every three to five years as Vision 20, 30 evolves and sort of Hits the ground. MBS needs to recalculate. And I think we are now in the midst of an evolving profound recalculation because Vision 2030 isn't working out. Part of that vision was to see $100 billion of foreign direct investment by 2030. We are are at 12 billion at this point. The price of oil is not acting in ways that would be able to finance NEOM and the line and those projects are being reduced and quite a lot of pressure from the street as he's pushing forward these liberal reforms. And I think the best indication is not Israel. What's going on between MBS and mbz? MBZ Mohammed bin Zayed has been mbz.

A (30:41)

The leader of the uae, of the UAE Abu Dhabi and there's tension between the UAE and Saudi. This is a key development development and.

C (30:48)

I think it's indicative of what's going on with Israel. We like to think of the world and the region as Israel at the center. I think we need to understand the, the sheer complexity of what Muhammad bin Salman is trying to do and what he's now undergoing with MBZ in Abu Dhabi is very indicative of the, the shift and how profound it is. Muhammad bin Salman referred to Muhammad bin Zayed as his mentor 10 years ago. So this is not some kind of, you know, a superficial relationship. In the last seven weeks, Saudi Arabia has bombed the UAE convoy in South Yemen. It made sure that through military campaigns the South Yemen or South Saudi Arabia as they call it, their kind of provincial government, dismantles its head, had to flee to Somaliland and then by private jet to Abu Dhabi. And we've witnessed in the last three to four weeks a rabid, aggressive anti Abu Dhabi propaganda from Saudi Arabia, from Riyadh and you know, and its affiliates and social media such that MBZ last Thursday decided to, you know, realize the pact with India. And while not kind of pushing back at mbs, just going to New Delhi, being warmly accepted, signing up on a defense deal, a strategic mineral deal and otherwise. We are in the midst of a realignment in Israel is a piece of that. When it comes to Saudi, we are not at the core.

A (32:10)

Mark, as Yonatan mentioned, relations between Saudi Arabia and uae, as he said allies for decades, have been volatile in recent weeks. I know you have close relationships in both countries. So anything to add from your perspective here, Dan?

B (32:25)

Yeah, Jonathan did a great job of explaining what's going on. I've been in very close touch with Emirati and Saudi officials over the past weeks, including yesterday, trying to really understand Their perspective, because I think from an American perspective, this is really bad for the United States that two of our closest Gulf allies are in a major fight. And it's bad for Israel because clearly the Saudis and Emiratis fighting means opportunities for the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Qatar, and for the Iranians to take advantage of these divisions. What both sides are saying is, look, we're brothers. This is not going to be a protracted fight. But we have very different perspectives on the region, region and where the flashpoints are. Yonatan mentioned Yemen, but also in Sudan and in Somalia and through the Red Sea and Africa. And there's really a doctrinal conflict taking place. The Saudis want to support central governments that can control borders, protect trade routes, wind down wars, and create the conditions for MBS's 2030 vision to be realized. That's what they're doing in Yemen, in supporting the Yemeni government in exile in Sudan, where they've lined up in favor of one general that they think can bring authority in Somalia, which is obviously a disaster of a country. They've supported the Somalian government rather than the Somaliland which has sought its independence. Israel became the first country to recognize the independence of Somaliland. So that's the Saudi perspective. And they're quite upset because what they think the Emiratis are doing. Doing are trying to undermine that by supporting militia groups that are seizing territory and establishing sort of carving out sovereign territory from Yemen, South Yemen, from Sudan, from Somalia, which again, is Somali land. And what the Emiratis say is, look, we're not trying to create problems here. We just don't believe that these central authorities have any power or any influence. And by the way, many of them are infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, who we despise, which is very much an existential threat for the Emiratis. And they're endemic with corruption and they're committing violence, and they have no ability in these failed states to bring any kind of authority. So what we are backing, yes, we're backing militia groups that actually have the ability to take land, protect trade routes and protect our ports. Because Emirati port strategy is one of the most important elements of influence that the Emiratis have throughout the region, region. And so this is where these two doctrines are colliding, and it's creating enormous tension. And of course, Israel's feeling the blows. And I've said to the Saudis, I'm very concerned because certainly American Jews, those in the pro Israel community, supported Saudi Arabia through some Very difficult times in the U. S. Saudi relationship. And now the Saudi ecosystem is rife with not only anti Israel incitement, but anti Semitic incitement. I'm hoping that will cool down because certainly that it's blowing back against Israel and blowing back against the global Jewish community.

A (35:32)

And to be clear, Mark, I just want to put a fine point on what you're talking about. You're saying that many people like you arguing to US Policymakers don't blow up the US Saudi bilateral relationship after the killing of Khashoggi. Not that you were giving cover for the killing of Khashoggi, but it was obviously a major setback. It was tragic. But we, the US Cannot blow up our relationship with Saudi Arabia and with him, MBS over this. Your point is there were many voices making that point to U.S. officials. And your reaction now is, where's the.

B (36:05)

Love back, Daniel Right. I mean, so the killing of Khashoggi was horrific, and certainly that was the lowest point in U.S. saudi relations probably since 9 11. But there were a number of us in Washington and elsewhere who said that the U.S. saudi relationship was strategic and that even though the Saudis needed to pay a price for that killing, blowing up the entire bilateral relationship was geopolitical malpractice. And so despite the fact that it was difficult at the time to stand up for the Saudis or make that case, we did, and we did through other low points in the US Saudi relationship and then certainly the high points of the relationship under President Trump. And then even after or before October 7th, when there looked like Israel, Israel and Saudi Arabia were moving to a normalization deal, there was a lot of potential and there were a lot of good feelings. And then all of a sudden after October 7th, the Saudis did a 180. They became very vociferous in their condemnation of Israel after the slaughter of Israelis on October 7th. And I reminded the Saudis time and time again, as they would bash the Israelis for not taking care in their Gaza campaign, that the tactics that were being used against Israel by Hamas, the use of human shoes shields, are exactly the tactics that the Houthis used against Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia was being condemned at the time by folks in the Obama administration for unnecessarily killing civilians in Yemen. And the Saudi retort to that was they're using human shields, they're being trained by Hezbollah how to do that. They're taking their weapons and they're burying them in mosques and in schools and in hospitals, and then they're firing on Saudi cities. What do you expect us to do? We. Well, doesn't that sound familiar? So there was a lot of hypocrisy from the Saudis after October 7th and their condemnation of the Israelis. And I think that there is still an opportunity. I think that MBS is still very much committed to normalization with Israel. Clearly, President Trump wants to see that. And of course, the Palestinian question looms large. The Saudis are looking for some Palestinian pathway that gives MBS the political cover to do a deal with Israel.

A (38:18)

Yonatan, you mentioned Turkey and earlier, and you've been on the podcast twice to draw attention to Turkey, which now has representatives sitting on the executive board overseeing Gaza. What is Erdogan's strategy right now, as far as you're concerned?

C (38:32)

It's not just a representative. This Hakan Fidan, the foreign minister, the ex head of the Turkish CIA equivalent, a very sophisticated person. I've recently referred to him as a hybrid between Kassam Soleimani and Henry Kissinger. Right. Like he knows how to operate people on the ground, the sort of counterinsurgencies, but he also knows how to stand tall next to President Trump in Davos and be sort of that diplomat that knows how to carry that weight. I think Turkey, through Hakan Fidan, has really pursued what you can call as to build a trident in our region, one anchor of which is Liberty Libya, same playbook. The other in Somalia, not Somaliland, where they recently also sent their oil excavation company into the discovery of $600 billion worth of oil on the shores of Somalia. And they're trying to do the same thing in Syria with Jelani. So that's the trident, if you. Or the, or the triangle. Gaza is, you know, just an opportunity that they can realize given the dynamics that that have happened, happened and in many ways the driving force of neo Ottomanism. Right. The idea of make Turkey great again in a way that Erdogan espouses, has been enabled by Israel's victory over Hezbollah and the push in Syria and the damages that the Iranian nuclear program had gone through. That has been really lifting some of the constraints on Turkey's ability to realize its strategy. And it's now going on full force. I will touch turn every our listener's attention to the fact that Turkey is still under what's called Caatsa CATSA sanctions in the US and that is a very important piece that they're lobbying the administration to allow the rejoining of turkey into the F35 program and some other elements. This is a thorny issue for Israel. And I would place it higher than the person who is or is not in the sort of high executive board of the Gaza peace plan as of now, I don't know where it goes from there, but these are the things I'd keep my eye on when it comes to Torah Turkey.

A (40:34)

Mark, just raising the lens here, spanning the aperture. Over the course of one month, January, we've seen the capture of Maduro, early in the month in Venezuela, we've seen the US Announce some kind of ambition intentions for Greenland, and then obviously pulling back to some degree, we've seen Trump shake things up in Davos and also his announcement of this new board of peace. Some analysts are referring to the sequence of events as, as the remaking of the world order. I'm skeptical of that narrative, by the way, because I'm not sure how well that old world order was working. But be that as it may, there's something going on regardless if it's the end or the beginning of a world order. But what role do you imagine the Middle east playing in these major geopolitical shifts that are happening and are being largely driven, it seems, by the US And China?

B (41:26)

Well, Jonathan mentioned the national security strategy and the national defense strategy. And if you read that the Middle east does not play a very important role in the conception that the Trump administration has of their grand strategy, I think that the point that Jonasen mentioned earlier, really important to emphasize, is that when they think about the Middle east, they think about Israel as a, quote, model partner. And so from a US national security perspective, as they look across the world and all these areas of responsibility, from the Americas to Europe to the Indo Pacific, and they look at a rising China, and they look at countering Russia and its aggression in Eastern Europe. The Middle east for them is a place where they want to move resources out of, not move resources into, despite recent weeks of moving a US Carrier strike group. So the Middle east certainly is no longer an area of top priority, it's of secondary priority. But it's worth noting that for the Chinese, we may be trying to pivot out of the Middle east east while Beijing is pivoting into the Middle East. And Beijing is moving in there, forming strong partnerships not only with our adversaries, but with our allies, strong economic ties, technology ties, setting up naval bases. And as well, it's very much a free rider on US Power. They like to sit back. We take care of the problems, we keep the oil flowing on which the Chinese economy depends. They make very little in the way of military commitments. Most of it is political and economic. They get all the benefits without accruing the cost. So for China, this is a great situation. The United States bears the costs and the burdens, and they get many of the benefits. But I think the United States has to be very wary of taking the eye off the ball in the Middle East. The Middle east still remains an incredibly important area for energy reasons, for economic reasons. And it's also a region that can create enormous national security challenges for everybody, including the Chinese. I mean, the Chinese economy would be in serious trouble if China was not able to get oil from Saudi Arabia, the uae, natural gas from Qatar. And they are now looking at the possibility of not getting oil from Venezuela and even maybe from Iran. So the Chinese are going to make the Middle East a huge priority. I think US Policymakers are going to have to continue to wrestle with this dilemma of where we focus our resources. The Americas, the Indo Pacific to counter China and protect Taiwan and the Middle east to ensure free flow of oil, and that our partners still believe that America is there.

A (43:57)

Yonatan, India is another player on the Middle east chessboard that I didn't mention or just outside of it. What role is India playing here? And how are countries in the Middle east, including Israel, positioning themselves accordingly?

C (44:08)

I think what we're looking at, and I totally agree with Mark, in terms of the evolving situation and redrawing, drawing, if not the world order, but just sort of the player's hierarchy, if you will, Dan, in this region. And as this hierarchy plays itself out, we're going back to what was a principle that Ben Gurion, David Ben Gurion kind of put in place. And that's the sort of second tier, the expanded Middle East. Right. To me, when Israel sort of goes and opens the aperture. The Middle east is defined by four corners. It's defined by India at its east, it's defined by Azerbaijan, Central Asia, but predominantly Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and the area of Horn of Africa. And then the Hellenic partners, that's Turkey and Greece. The strongest partner for Israel within this context of those four corners is New Delhi. New Delhi. India, after Operation Sindor earlier in 2025, has learned a lesson. Mark, by the way, to your point about the navy has learned an important lesson. They are now investing $45 billion in building a strong navy. When they their ships went to sea, the Pakistani ships stayed at port, which is a very strong indication of who has a stronger navy and who deters, and they decided to double down on that. We just saw last week a declaration of India buying German submarines very advanced ones. Israel is also a recipient of that type of relationship. And so I think India itself is projecting power all the way to Hormuz. I think two weeks before Israel recognized Somaliland, Narendra Modi was in Addis Abdic Ababa for historic visit to the capital of Ethiopia. And so I think we are seeing a realignment in the region within which India is expanding its moat. And to that point, Curious to hear your thoughts on that. The whole Saudi, Pakistani, Turkish axis also raises an eyebrow or a concern rather, in New Delhi and draws them further into a more of an activist position when it comes to our region.

A (46:02)

Mark, any reaction to the to that?

B (46:04)

Yeah, I mean, I think some really important points that Janetson's making. I mean, the first is on the question of naval power. I mean, Israel has got formidable air power, intelligence dominance, strong on the ground, army power, but it's got a small navy. And its biggest challenge right now is from Turkey, which has a formidable navy, is setting up naval bases throughout the region. So this partnership with India, which again has a strong navy, is, Jonathan Said, is central. I think the Israelis also need to partner again with the Greeks and the Cypriots, the Italians, who have a quite large navy. Israeli naval strategy is not something we spend a whole lot of time talking about. But I know that not only is the Israeli navy, but the IDF in general really starting to think about that as they confront the possibility of challenges from Turkey, not only in the air, on the ground, but but also in the water. So that's important. The second is, you know, clearly what's happening in the Middle east today is that as Iran is weaker, second, you've got all these other players that are asserting themselves, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Qataris, the Turks and the Israelis. And this is going to make for a really complicated and uncertain Middle East. The US can play a very important role, needs to, not only as a offshore balancer in supporting our allies, but also making sure that we do intervene decisively with military force when we need to against enemies like Iran on the nuclear side, the missile side. There's no doubt that getting rid of the Islamic Republic will be an absolute game changer for Israeli security and American security. But it's certainly not going to turn the Middle east into Eden because we've got these other players that are asserting themselves politically. And finally, I just think it's worth I know many of your listeners care deeply about this, but the role of Israel as this model partner, I mean, I think Israelis today should be proud of the fact that they are, are the only ally in the world, maybe with the exception of the Ukrainians, who are willing and capable of fighting and dying on their own against an American enemy, have demonstrated incredible capabilities. Since October 7, Israel should not be arrogant, but should be confident about Israel's ability to be a great American partner. And I'll just tell you this, Dan. I mean, I've heard from the Vice President's office all the way to the State Department, the White House, everywhere they're going around the world and they're saying to our allies around the world in the Indo Pacific and Europe and Latin America, we want you to be like Israel. We need more Israels in the world. And I think that speaks to Israeli accomplishments and to what a model ally Israel really is.

A (48:35)

Yeah, there's this sense out there, I've heard this from officials in the administration too, where there's both the Pentagon, the Vice President's office. I mean, this is a line they use. It's all about capable allies that everyone says the US Is dissing its allies, which we can get into whether or not they are or not. But what they clearly have tremendous respect for and really rely on are what they call capable allies, which allies that meet the criteria that you just laid out, its ability to defend itself, fight itself, and in so doing advance US Interests. And it's not just a recipient of US US Largess, but actually strengthens and augments US Capabilities around the world.

C (49:13)

Dan, there's a point. I just came back before the recording from the presentation of the chairman of the Central bank of Israel and he showed a graph in relating to the fact that the dollar shekel rate today is 313. The shekel is in its all time.

A (49:26)

High, meaning about three shekels per dollar.

C (49:28)

Which is historically high. It's absolutely insane. And this series of economic indicators that were presented in this, in this presentation, we're going to deep dive in. What's your number? Just to say that the notion that a capable ally is not just its ability to fight militarily but also to keep a resilient economy that seeks innovation and so on, which has been also a bit of an unexpected, I would say, feat considering everything we went through in the last two years and that to an extent is also a deterrent when it comes to Jerusalem strategic thinking on when to act again vis a vis Iran, when to act again in force in Lebanon, on because the economy's rebound is really significant and is a serious issue to consider.

A (50:10)

By the way, on that particular note, he mentioned what's yous Number. I would encourage our listeners to listen and subscribe to what's yous Number? This is the podcast focused on economics and Israel's business and tech sectors and economic policy in Israel and the Middle east. And that is an ARC Media podcast. You can find it wherever you find your podcast. Yonatan is the co host of the podcast and obviously I mentioned Mark's podcast in the intro, which I strongly encourage you to subscribe to as well. Especially always, but especially during this moment we're in right now. You won't find better analysis as it relates to Iran than you'll find from Mark and his colleagues, and we will link to both of Yonatan and Mark's podcasts in the description of this episode. Gentlemen, we'll leave it there. I'm sure you'll both be back on soon, but until then, thanks for us joining doing this.

C (50:58)

Thanks Dan.

B (50:59)

Thanks Mark. Thanks Dan. Thanks Jonathan.

A (51:10)

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadav Ayala meets Segel and I were respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to ark media.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin. Already our Production manager is Brittany Cohn. Sound and video editing by by Liquid Audio Community Management by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.