B (4:44)

And I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast Ari Shavit, who joins us from Tel Aviv. Ari, good to see you.

A (4:51)

Pleasure to be with you Ari.

B (4:52)

I want to jump into this. For the better part of a decade we have been living in a world where personality, cult of personality in some cases plays a larger role than ideology necessarily does in shaping politics than the role that the worldview or political philosophy plays. And it's true, by the way, this is not unique to Israel. It's true in many countries and it is very true as it relates to Israel and and the role Prime Minister Netanyahu plays. Every question in Israeli politics is where you stand vis a vis Netanyahu. That's the question less about what he stands for, but where you stand relative to him. But Israel doesn't have a two party system. So before we define the camps of only BB and Never bb, how do these two tribes map over the ideological spectrum? Where do they sit? Is it just like a right wing block versus a Left wing block, as.

A (5:45)

Things stand now, Netanyahu faces or the Raklo Bibi. Never Bibi or anyone. But Bibi camp has five, six leaders. From the left, Yael Golan and the Social Democratic doves. To the right, Lieberman, who is a hawk and a very right wing person. So it's not the traditional right left divide. And yet Israel is torn over three major issues. One is Netanyahu, but the other two issues is whether Israel is more Jewish or more democratic, and then whether democracy is more direct rule of the majority or more checks and balances. So there is a kind of overlap between these three issues. It's not total, but the people who oppose Netanyahu, generally the democratic dimension of the identity of the country and the more liberal democratic dimension of democracy is very important for them. And all of them see Netanyahu as a dangerous phenomena. And if you wish, in a sentence, I think the feeling is that while in the past Netanyahu was a republican American, he became a French monarch, that with all these years in power, he himself became royal. And the attitude of his supporters is not like a regular political leader, but it's the admiration for a kind of king. So that is I think where the divide is right now.

B (7:15)

Okay, So I just want to just put a finer point on it. So you have for instance, leaders on the right in Israel who are viewed as core to the Never Bibi camp, the Ruklo Bibi camp, and they include people like Avigdor Lieberman, who was once Bibi's chief of staff, would arguably be considered to the right of Bibi. Now he's been for some kind of either annexation or forced population removal over the years of Palestinians. You have Naftali Bennett, who was the leader really of the political movement, representing the settlement movement. I mean, these are people ideologically and historically have been far to the right of Netanyahu. And yet in some respects the left today is betting on them to be part of the force that takes out Bibi.

A (7:59)

Absolutely. Look, the most striking phenomenon right now, Bennett, who's the leading opposition leader or the candidate right now, the main rival presidential candidate if you wish, gets. He's clearly a right wing person who gets most of his votes from the center, from the Israeli center, because care about the issue of the west bank or other issues. The main thing is get the best person who can get Bibi out of office.

B (8:24)

Is this a new phenomenon where you have these right wing players who are part of the Never Bibi camp?

A (8:30)

It's relatively new. Many people in the Right. Historically were suspicious of Bibi, that he will betray them. And I want to remind you, Bibi gave the Bar Laund speech. Bibi froze settlement building in 2010.

B (8:43)

This is a speech he gave in 2009 where he said he reckoned for the first time he would pursue a Palestinian state.

A (8:48)

Yeah, Bibi endorsed his own version of the two state solution. 2009 Froze settlements, negotiated two state solution under President Obama. So there were people on the right who were suspicious of him. But I think that what you see today with Lieberman and Bennett and others is a relatively new phenomenon of people who are totally right wing, but they think the main threat to the country is Bibi in power. And therefore they're willing to cooperate with people on the left, on the center, in order to get rid of Bibi.

B (9:18)

Okay, so then how would you define these two groups, these two camps, from a demographic and an identity perspective? Who are they in Israeli society? And just take us through them.

A (9:27)

So I think what is so important to understand is that originally the Likud under Begin, and then more so under Netanyahu, created a coalition of minorities, if you wish, of social groups somewhat resembling FDR's Democratic Party. Originally four groups, the lower middle class, working class and middle class, Mizrahi, the ultra orthodox, the ultra nationalists and the Russians. As Lieberman broke away, we are left with three groups. So today the Netanyahu coalition is very much these three groups. I would say that there are two driving sentiments there. One is, I would say, fear of our enemies, of our Arab neighbors and mainly the Palestinians. And the other is resentment to white secular Tel Aviv. So in a sense it's a people. The battle is between the insiders and the people of the periphery. Now what's so striking about the people on the other side, the Nevaebe people that in many ways they are like the core of it is kind of Mayflower Israel. Okay. In the past I used to describe this population as WASPs, Israel's WASPs, white Ashkenazi supporters of peace. Now these people don't believe in peace anymore. But many of them, the core of it is white secular Ashkenazi's anti Bibi.

B (10:50)

It's not they don't believe in peace. Just I would say they have a real about the prospects for peace.

A (10:55)

We know what happened. We know what happened. So the peace was replaced by democracy, if you wish. These people now feel that democracy is in danger. So if you wish, what you have is an interesting struggle and I think it's important in order to make peace within Israel to understand both sentiments, I think there is a profound fear among my friends and colleagues in the Tel Aviv area, liberal Israel, that really democracy is in danger. And the Israel that our grandparents has built is the very identity of it is in danger. And the people on the other side feel that the trauma of the past is very deep. And I want to concentrate for a moment on the Mizrahi population because I think that many American Jews are not aware enough of this phenomenon. Originally, Israel was built for Ashkenazi, for European Jews. After the Diaspora, Jews come from the Arab speaking countries. They feel, many of them feel that in the 1950s and 60s and 70s they were dealt very badly. And they feel that by now they've arrived, okay, they have political power, they succeeded in business, they are in the army, but they feel that there are two, three closed clubs that they don't enter. The judiciary, the media, the civil service, up to an extent. So while the people who support Netanyahu feel that they are oppressed by an old aristocracy and they want to get in, the people inside who held power, who still hold power in Israel in ways fear that the Jewish democratic country, the enlightened Zionist nation, is under danger because of these powers. The issue here is not specifically territory, it's not specific, this issue. Even the judiciary debate, which is so important, is an expression of those two profound feelings. What we will see in the elections next year is the clash between fear, acute existential fear of liberal Israel. On the one hand, enrage among the Netanyahu supporters who feel that they've been left out, that after all they made it, but they didn't quite made it. And they feel that they are still discriminated against to this day.

B (13:08)

What has been the impact of this division on the country as a whole?

A (13:12)

Oh, this has been disastrous. This has been disastrous. You know, one of the articles that I'm rather proud of, that I wrote six years ago is called Bbzis. And I say Israel is an amazing country. I think we are the most wonderful people. We have an amazing. As you wrote in your books, we've achieved so much in the last decades and especially in the last decade. We've been taken by a dangerous bacteria called bibesis because we are just obsessed with one person. In a paraphrase on an Israeli popular song, I say at the end of every sentence, we say in Hebrew, there is a bibi with a cigar, okay? When you open your mouth in Israel, people are not interested if you are nice or not nice, if you are tall or short, if you are Blonde or brown. They are just interested if you are for Bibi or against Bibi. So this obsession, we stop dealing with our health, with our education, with our security. I think this is one of the reasons, major reasons, that led to October 7th. We are so obsessed now. Where is the irony? The irony is when you see people that actually ideologically are not that much apart, okay? Because many of these, especially Mizrahi, lack moderate, pragmatic, right? And many people on the center today, the differences regarding the Palestinian issue, for instance, is minimal, if at all. You have. Sometimes people are more moderate in the Likudz Natania than in Yeshatidz Ra', Anana, okay? And yet people cannot speak to each other, they cannot listen. And we are torn in the most dramatic way over one person. Over one person. I'll tell you, between us, that I personally think not. Although I try to be fair to Netanyahu, I think that if it was a decent politician leader would have said, just because the nation is so obsessed with me, I should resign again, even if I'm the greatest leader ever. But this is where we are. The implication of this 30 years and now these 10 years of ongoing conceptual, emotional civil war regarding one person is really tearing the country apart. And there are like three issues that they create real divides regarding the ultra Orthodox, regarding the Palestinians and regarding the settlers, Greater Israel or not, these are real issues. The Netanyahu issue became much stronger than all of them. And in my mind, there are elements of it that are really such a fierce battle over one person with no deep ideologies behind it.

B (15:50)

What is it about Netanyahu? His personality, his politics, his style of politics? What is it that so viscerally divides Israelis that creates what you could just call this babesis? Like, what is it?

A (16:04)

Yeah. So first of all, you know, Netanyahu, generally speaking, has very few friends, real friends. One of the real friends he had told me once, you know, Ari, I never met a person that's such an impressive person and such a flawed person in one suit. There is a combination in him of talent and flaws, which I won't go into right now, that is driving this nation nuts for 20 years. I mean, there is something rather unique about his personality. That's number one. Number two, it is this Les Tin syndrome at a certain point, I think it's around 2014 or 2015. Look, the Netanyahu I knew in the 2000s, when he first became prime minister late 90s, was a moderate, reasonable conservative who actually looked for the center. He was looking for the Central ground. And what happened that because he felt so rejected by the Israeli elites, because he felt haunted, and because he is, to put it mildly, a suspicious person, he sunk into a bunker. So since 2014, 15, 16, you see a new Netanyahu who is very different than the previous one. And I think the judicial process made this worse. And ever since, also there is some import from America, without getting into it. So the old Netanyahu was not a populist at all. The genuine Netanyahu is a 19th century Tory. Okay? Now you have an angry populist who became much more aggressive, but is also attacked much more aggressively. But I want to explain how this looks to the two camps, to the two tribes in my mind, for the many in liberal Israel, in Tel Aviv, Israel, Netanyahu makes people angry because his English is better than ours. Okay? There is, among these circles, there is a feeling, no, we go to Princeton, we go to the fine places on Fifth Avenue, we are worldly. Suddenly there is a leader of the people on the other side who is better than us in all of that, okay? And there is an element that I think makes people very. It's a profound feeling beyond the justified fe regarding the way he behaves on the other side, you have a mirror image of that. Because people who feel that there is still an old aristocracy that is oppressing them feel suddenly we have a hero, we have a king to fight the old aristocracy. So they identify. Look, one of my hobbies is to go to Likud rallies. I don't care about Netanyahu. I don't listen to him. I'm interested in his voters and the sentiment I hear everywhere there is the sentiment I'm just describing. We are oppressed. We are not represented in the media properly in the old media. Now there's new media. The judiciary keeps us out. We feel oppressed. And Netanyahu is the only one fighting for us. He's our hero. So you have these two conflicting narratives which intensify the drama regarding the real person.

B (19:09)

But, Ari, I take your point that that Netanyahu. You would argue that Netanyahu has changed, but I would argue that the environment in which Netanyahu was elected for the first time back in 1996 is in some respects not different than what we're dealing with today. The intensity of the tribalism may have increased, but Netanyahu won that election against Paris with a little over 1.5 million votes, and Paris got a little less than 1.5 million votes, which is to say that he won by less than 1%. And it wasn't like voter turnout was low. Voter turnout was close to 80%. So you had a clearly split, dare I say polarized electorate when he first got elected in 1996. And I should add that was against the backdrop about a big messy debate in Israel over the Oslo process. A two state solution, the Rabin Peres pursuit of accommodation with Arafat and the PLO that would involve a path to a Palestinian state. That was the cauldron from which Bibi was elected. So that was not. That was an issues driven election of which he was a beneficiary, but it was a deeply polarized electorate. And the resentment, I remember it, I remember it, the resentment towards Bibi among the same elites you're talking about now was as sneering and as sanctimonious, I should add, as it sometimes is today.

A (20:31)

Let me be transparent. I never voted for Netanyahu and I never will. And I think this government is catastrophic. But the sentiment you described, I wrote about, I'm ashamed to say, in 1997. So Netanyahu was elected, as you say, 1996. I think at that time there was a sentiment in liberal Israel that never forgave him for the Rabin murder.

B (20:53)

Just for our listeners, understand. As many of our listeners know, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in 1995. But what Ari is referring to is that there are many in the Israeli political class, the political activist class, many in the media, who believe that Netanyahu stoked the hostility to the creation of the Palestinian state and the Oslo peace process so much in the 1990s that it terrified people and kind of radicalized them to the point that the environment got so hot that someone took Rabin's life in order to stop this process that Netanyahu had been warning against.

A (21:22)

So let me explain what happened. So he's elected. And Again, this is 20 years before America, the Likud supporters begin to feel there is a deep state in Israel that doesn't let the elected prime minister, they just chose rule. And I think that Netanyahu was treated unfairly in his first term. Unfairly because he was not given a chance and he was not such a horrible prime minister. I mean, they had some records, some flaws and so on. But let me defend my theory. When Netanyahu comes back, what's the first thing that he does in 2009? A unity government with Ehud Barak of all people. And who's next? Yair Lapid and C.P. livnik.

B (22:00)

So for our listeners, Netanyahu were populating his government when he returned with leaders of the opposition.

A (22:05)

Basically there is a tragedy here because there was a moderate conservative reaching to the center to collaborate with his old flaws, feeling rejected and then becoming very angry and very aggressive. But I'll add to you something else that I think people don't know. Even after the last elections, which for me was catastrophic results, 2022, Netanyahu reached out to the leaders of the opposition and he asked them, let's form a government without Benville. And they couldn't. Why couldn't they? Because of Never Bibi, because their constituency will not forgive them. So there was a possibility to stop all the horror that we've experienced in the last two years. We could have had a Netanyahu Lapid, Gantz government established in 2022. But the sentiment of Never Bibi didn't let Benny Gantz, who wanted it, and Yair Lapid, who doesn't want it, join. So this is a theme. There is a theme of over dozens of years. But I do insist that in the last decade we have a new Netanyahu. Whether he can change again, that's a question. But the new Netanyahu of the last eight, nine years is much more aggressive, much more populist. The end justifies the rule and the legitimacy he gives to Bengrier and small children like that is in my mind, is unforgivable.

B (23:30)

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A (25:28)

I don't know how it is in America, but in Israel sometimes the personal dimension matters as well. So the relationship between Lieberman, Netanyahu has a personal element that we won't go into it right now, but I want to prove your point in a different way. Look, the main battle today in Israel is about the judiciary, okay? The right, Netanyahu and the right critical of the judiciary and the center left and the anti Bibi supporting it. Do you know who began the criticism of the judiciary in Israel? Yitzhak Rabin. Yitzhak Rabin was the first one to say the judiciary has too much power. And who came after that? Ewud Olmert and his centrist Kadima Party. And at that time, who was the best friend of the judiciary? Benjamin Netanyahu, who would have dinners and lunches with Aaron Barak and Dorit Benish in his mention in his residence. It's no mentions in Israel, okay? Not in the public sector. So you see how absurd this thing is. Because we should have all discussed the issue of the judiciary in a reasonable way. Because everybody understands there is a problem. And everybody understands you don't want to destroy an independent judiciary. All reasonable people. But the debate over Netanyahu, the battle has. Now, you talked about Netanyahu's ideological stand in 2014, when it will be revealed what Netanyahu was willing to give for the two state solution in his negotiations with Dennis Ross. People would be shocked. And that's Netanao 2014. Neteneo 2024 wants to annex everything. So you see that the whole ideological thing became a charade. It's a charade because this identity, emotional obsession took over everything. And again, because I'm a centrist and I have some friends of my moderate left, I say to them, look what happened. The obsession with Netanyahu emptied us of our values, of our convictions, of our. You don't know what the center and what the left stand for. They don't talk. No, it's not clear what's the positive agenda, because it's all just obsession with Netanyahu. Again, understandable to a degree, justified, but tragic.

B (27:35)

How also then, in that spirit, has Netanyahu confronted the Never Bibi camp? And actually how has he benefited from it politically?

A (27:43)

I think that again, in Hebrew we say anyone but Bibi. But the Never Bibi camp, in my mind is the most. I think there were benign goals. People meant the best. It was the worst political investment ever. Hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of articles and tweets and whatever, which achieved exactly the opposite of what they wanted. It didn't weaken Netanyahu. It strengthened Netanyahu. It didn't moderate Israeli governments, it drove them to the extreme right. It didn't strengthen democracy either. Only the Can Never Be movement lost seven of the last election campaigns. And in the one election campaign it won. When Bennett and Lapid became government, the backlash was so extreme that we see the consequences. So I asked my friends in the center left in Israel, isn't it time to learn the lesson? Every morning when Bibi wakes up in the morning and sees this obsession, he says, thank you so much, guys, you are helping me so much. Because what does this do? It does three things. One, it alienates the Likud, the moderately Likud voters, because they feel that when we are obsessed with Bibi, we are condescending regarding them, we don't respect their vote. And Bibi is a master in manipulate. Number two, he drives, as I just gave you an example, he drives Bibi to the extreme right where he didn't want to be. And three, as I just said, it makes the entire discussion, you know, the most intelligent people in Israel, so well educated, bring a very shallow argument to the table because they are just obsessed with one person. Now, don't get me wrong, I think Netanyahu should go. I think the goal for Israel is to end the Netanyahu era with peace, not in courts, but in the polls. Look, I have a PhD on Netanyahu. I knew his father, I knew most of his family, his close friends. At a certain point, I'm not interested in Netanyahu anymore. I'm interested in his voters. And the tragedy is that you have there hundreds of thousands, which in Israel is a lot of potential people who can be part of building a kind of more unified, reasonable, Jewish, democratic, national liberal Israel who feel a alienated and are now in political alliance with Benvir and Smotridge and the ultra orthodox. So in my mind, the need is to try to reorganize, redefine the map. Because the way right now it works is that the just not Bibi, the never Bibi movement, actually achieved exactly the opposite of what it wanted to achieve.

B (30:29)

So basically you're saying that the left in Israel, but it's not really just the left anymore, but let's just call it the left, or what has become the anti Bibi camp, which is not just the left, actually never developed a worldview and a platform to present to the electorate other than we will bring down this one person. So the hope, the expectation was that a plurality of voters would rally to the mission of taking down one politician, rather than rally to a set of ideas and a governing vision for the country.

A (31:01)

Bibi's radical opponents in Israel are his best friends. The left is unpopular. The left has 10% support. It's there. But there is a strong centrist and there is a strong moderate right sentiment that both reject Netanyahu. But because they did not develop a vision, ideas, plans, you don't know what's the positive. Everything is just bb, bb, bb. That people don't listen to us. The people on the other side don't listen to us. There are two issues here. One, one, the country always, definitely after October 7th, needs a new deal, a new vision. We need it. And two, if you want to win in politics, you have to bring love to the table, not hate. You have to bring a vision of something positive. When you have a negative ethos, you will lose. And Bibi is a master in one of the reasons. Our conversation, I think, is based on several articles I published in Yediot Hachonot in Israel in the last two months. And I was happy to see that now, unlike in the past, some people understand that because the elections of 2026, in my mind, are kind of make or break elections. It's a fight for Israel's soul and identity. And I do think this government is catastrophic. We cannot reelect it. I think the need to develop new messaging and new ideas that are constructive and positive. If you bring that, Netanyahu will melt in the sun. In a sense, okay? He lives on this ongoing resentment, which builds his ability to play with identity politics. What I say to my friends, the right has said, what has happened to you guys? You became Berkeley, okay? Because they're all into victimhood and identity politics. So ironically, I think you have some phenomenon in America, but in Israel, it's striking. The Israeli right has lost the commitment to traditional conservative Values. It's all or not all. It's mostly victimhood. We are persecuted, we are oppressed, and it's identity politics. I think I said it to you one of our previous conversations. I think that, that if liberals go back to being liberal and the conservatives go back to being conservative, we can actually build a nation, which is something we must do. This kind of sentiment, of negative sentiment on both sides is tearing the country apart and endangering it.

B (33:23)

But you said earlier that even though Bibi wins, his supporters feel unrepresented in Israeli society. Unrepresented, I guess, in popular culture, in the media, in academia, in the judiciary, in government, in all these institutions. How is that possible if he's been in power for most of the past 30 years?

A (33:44)

So if we would have had this conversation back in 2010, it would have been very difficult for me to explain. But now the strongest feeling of the Netanyahu voters is there is a deep state in Israel. In their mind, there is a coalition of the judiciary, the attorney general, sometimes the police, the military establishment and the civil service to prevent them from ruling the country. I don't share that opinion, make it clear. But it's important to understand the sentiment. There was a book published in Israel, we vote time after time, we win the elections, but we never really acquire power. Now, the importance of the 2022 elections was that within the right. Because when begin won in 1977, he respected the judges, he respected the civil service, he respected the media. He was an old fashioned, decent conservative who respected all this. Now, the feeling in the Likud was we had enough. We were civilized for 20 years. We don't have real power now. It's our time now. I think it's a very dangerous populist sentiment, but this is where it is right now. And the answer they will give you, the answer Netanyahu would give you is that they want a much stronger parliament and government and elected bodies and to reduce the power of the unelected branches of government. And this is where I daresay we liberals have a very good reason to be terrified. Because there is a sense almost of a popular revolution, a popular uprise, and the danger is that it will really destroy the Israeli democracy. I mean, the attack, in my mind, the Israeli judiciary made many mistakes, including when Netanyahu trial. But it's so dangerous to endanger the judiciary. So these sentiments. If we don't stop now and think of October 7th, it was such a wake up call. If we don't stop, then the populist rage can really burn down the institutions of liberal democracy. So in my mind, the coming months is really like almost the last opportunity to pull back and try to bring a different option to the table. That on the one hand, will respect the sentiments of the Netanyahu voters and understand that they are, first of all, patriots and good people. People should not be condescending towards them, but on the other hand, convince them to stop, stop this madness. Don't go to the extreme, Benvir, and to the extreme all kinds of members of the Likud who are now really, really risking the Israeli democracy.

B (36:17)

The politics in Israel, as you're laying out, are organized right now along the lines of where you stand on Netanyahu as a political figure, as a leader, his personality. Do you think that structure can actually change while he's still in power? Meaning, is that what this next election is going to be about too?

A (36:35)

Look, I had hope regarding there could have been some sort of inner peace even with Netanyahu back in the early 2000s and 2010. And again, to an extent, it worked. When Netanyahu came back to power in 2009, it wasn't so extreme. But things have gotten so bad now that I find it difficult. And Netanyahu is surrounded by people who are so much into this divisive poison and they have such a sense of paranoia. And I'm not saying he, but some of people close to him are like, fighting the state. So I find it difficult to hope now that there can be reconciliation with Netanyahu. I'm not saying it's totally impossible, but that's not my agenda. That's not my message. My main message is that we have to prepare Israel for the day after Netanyahu, whether it's next year or whether it's 2028 or 23. I'm not getting into it right now. And. And in order to do that, you have to redefine the map. I think there's a huge. There's an enormous moderate, pragmatic Zionist Israeli majority which proved itself in the war. People who work hard, fight for the country, the most creative people in the world. And right now this group is divided because of the Netanyahu issue. And as a result of that, the center left depend on extreme leftists and the right depends on ultra orthodox who are not Zionists and very extreme. I think that if we rebuild Israel, I mean, the concept I believe in is Zionist unity. Let all reasonable Zionists unite and make compromises between us regarding the right, center left issues in order to rebuild the republic as a Republic, not as a monarchy. And I think that Zionist unity is crucial for Israel immediately after the next election. Zionist unity is crucial for the relationship, the lines between us and unity between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. We cannot let the ultra Orthodox and the extremists drive away young American Jews and European Jews from Israel. I think there is actually the optimist in me. Under all this noise and poison and hate and vicious populism, I see a yearning for something new. And I think that the concept of Zionist unity should be there whether we achieve it next year or a few years later.

B (39:03)

Ari, we're having this conversation. As I said at the introduction, against the backdrop of Netanyahu's pardon request, heightened attention around his trial, the decision before Bouji Herzog, the President of Israel, on whether or not to grant some kind of pardon to Netanyahu. How much of this trial, Herzog's decision, the debate about how to resolve or not resolve Netanyahu's legal problems, how much of that is the. The crucible through which what you're talking about here, what you're laying out, in many respects, what you're hoping for, is going to get resolved, the crucible of how Israel gets through this highly polarized, around one person framework that its politics lives in. And not just its politics, its whole society lives in.

A (39:50)

Look, I think the Netanyahu trial brought the climax. First of all, it's like the incarnation of everything I was talking about. And he brought it to a climax. Okay, because what you saw is, on the one hand, I don't want to get into too many details, but I think there are serious problems with the way the trial was carried out. On the other hand, Netanyahu did things. There was wrongdoing. His main sin was not the cigars and champagne. His main sin was he tried to attack the judiciary. Once he was in trouble. He totally took his personal agenda. And for that, I'm very angry at him. I think it's very. So it brought everything to a climax. I think that if there is any compromise possible to end this tragedy again, as I said, I want us to end the Netanyahu era in peace. And if it goes through the courts, it won't be in peace and won't be forgotten by his people. They'll come angry. So I think the grand deal should be pardon Netanyahu, but stop totally the Yariv Levine calls the judicial reform what I call the judicial revolution. I mean, stop this. Say we will deal with the judicial issues and constitutional issues that have to be dealt with. The next government will deal it in a sense of unity, looking for wide agreement. We won't agree about anything. We won't do it in this hostile, aggressive way. So I think that if Netanyahu can be pardoned, and on the other hand, this terrible reform and revolution that is threatening Israeli democracy is totally stopped, then I think there is some hope. Do I think. I'm an optimist. I'm not optimist enough to think this is likely. Look, look, we need to detox Israel. We need to detox Israel and we have to understand that this issue has poisoned our political life for such a long time. I put most of the blame on Netanyahu, but many mistakes, many mistakes were done by his opponents. And it's time for everyone to stop blaming everyone else, take responsibility and move forward toward Zionist Union.

B (42:02)

All right, Ari, thank you for this. We'll leave it there. That was a hopeful note on which to end. I hope lots and lots and lots of people, especially Israelis, are hearing your and internalizing your hope. We'll see. Lot to happen over the next few weeks as Herzog contemplates his move here and then obviously a lot to follow over the next few months in the lead up to the elections where all this will be kind of playing out. And I'm sure we'll be calling on you many times during all of that. So. So I look forward to being in touch soon.

A (42:31)

Thank you very much. See you too.

B (42:43)

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavayal Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arkmedia.org that's ark media.org Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti Sound and video editing by Martin Juergo and Marian Khalis Burgos. Our director of operations, Maya Raka research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.